Re: UDA refutation take 2
On 22 Nov 2011, at 10:01, Pierz wrote: OK, at last some time to sit down and reply properly. I want to come back on this point about measuring proportions of an infinite set - the measure theory you speak of. Now it seems clear enough that to measure such proportions (say, the proportion of even numbers in the set of natural numbers) one needs to iterate through that set in a specific order. If one uses the counting algorithm n=n+1 iteratively, then the result will be 50%, but if you use some other algorithm such as the alternative one I provided, you get a completely different result. You agree with this? Not really. There are no uniform sigma-additive measure on N, or on discrete infinite spaces, but you can weaken the notion of sigma- additivity to simple additivity, and in that case there are solutions. See "amenable group" in wikipedia, for a summary on how to get rather nice, even uniform, "measure" on infinite discrete group. Now, in the UD*, the measure does not bear on an infinite discrete space but on a continuum, because the UD, notably, reiterate infinitely self-duplications (like the little Mandelbrot sets do on their neighborhoods). The measure on first person consistent extensions are thus defined on a continuum, due to the first person invariance for the UD delays. And the measure depends, and is even defined, by the geometry of the extensions, structured by the logic corresponding to the first person points of view. That is the part technically handled (even if only embyronically) in the "interview" of the LUM (AUDA). Now this is an issue for UDA (it seems), because in order to calculate the proportion of calculations in the infinite set in which I become a giraffe, then we must iterate through those calculations in a specific order. Otherwise, by arranging things the right way, I can get *any result I want*. I demonstrated this in my post by showing how there are more natural numbers divisible by a million than by 2. Again, agreed? The first person invariance results shows that the order of the states in the UD does not matter at all. What matter is the logical (including the epistemological) relationships that a state can have with the infinitely many universal machines going through that state. OK, so I assume the order of calculations used to determine the measure on the set must be the order they run in the UD. Not at all. All what will count is a mix of redundancy, depth, and the self-reference constraints. But my point is that this order is *arbitrary*. This is because wherever the UD uses a natural number n in its calculation, I can imagine some other UD that uses someFunction(n) instead, where someFunction() transforms n in such a way that all natural numbers are generated, but in a different sequence. There are infinite such alternative UDs. So why should your UD algorithm be the 'real' one, simply because it uses the limiting case where someFunction(n) is the identity function (return n)? Each UD generates all possible UDs.The "theology of machines", including physics, does not depend on the choice of any reasonable UD. Physics does not depend either of the precise ontology, as far as it is sigma_1 complete (emulate the UD). It seems fatal to me - unless some other less arbitrary means of counting the algorithms is (implicitly) employed. I say implicitly since what I have read of the UDA from you seems to pass over this critical question in silence. I think I do the exact contrary. UDA exposes the problem, which is passed over by scientists since the neoplatonist have been banished from Occident in 500 and in Orient in the eleventh century. AUDA illustrates the solution, by taking the machine points of view into consideration (as made obligatory by the mechanist mind body problem). It leads to a mathematical formulation of the mind-body problem, and to a theory of qualia and quanta satisfying the UDA requests. I'd also like to put another question which relates to arithmetical realism. Mechanism seems to be able to escape the UDA by denying arithmetical realism in the first place - a doctrine which seems to me to be far from self-evident, and certainly anathema to many physicists. Arithmetical realism is the weaker hypothesis in all science, with the exception of ultrafinitist physicalism (an infinitesimal minority). Note that to define or assert that we are ultrafinitist physicalists, we need arithmetical realism. In fact: "NOT arithmetical realism" needs more than arithmetical realism. Someone really disbelieving AR should just say "I don't understand Pascal triangle", or "I don't understand all the fuss on the prime numbers", etc. It is just the belief that the use of the excluded middle is sound for the first order logical sentences talking about the internal facts of the structure of (N, +, x). Intuitionists and classical mathematicians agree on AR, up to a
Re: UDA refutation take 2
OK, at last some time to sit down and reply properly. I want to come back on this point about measuring proportions of an infinite set - the measure theory you speak of. Now it seems clear enough that to measure such proportions (say, the proportion of even numbers in the set of natural numbers) one needs to iterate through that set in a specific order. If one uses the counting algorithm n=n+1 iteratively, then the result will be 50%, but if you use some other algorithm such as the alternative one I provided, you get a completely different result. You agree with this? Now this is an issue for UDA (it seems), because in order to calculate the proportion of calculations in the infinite set in which I become a giraffe, then we must iterate through those calculations in a specific order. Otherwise, by arranging things the right way, I can get *any result I want*. I demonstrated this in my post by showing how there are more natural numbers divisible by a million than by 2. Again, agreed? OK, so I assume the order of calculations used to determine the measure on the set must be the order they run in the UD. But my point is that this order is *arbitrary*. This is because wherever the UD uses a natural number n in its calculation, I can imagine some other UD that uses someFunction(n) instead, where someFunction() transforms n in such a way that all natural numbers are generated, but in a different sequence. There are infinite such alternative UDs. So why should your UD algorithm be the 'real' one, simply because it uses the limiting case where someFunction(n) is the identity function (return n)? It seems fatal to me - unless some other less arbitrary means of counting the algorithms is (implicitly) employed. I say implicitly since what I have read of the UDA from you seems to pass over this critical question in silence. I'd also like to put another question which relates to arithmetical realism. Mechanism seems to be able to escape the UDA by denying arithmetical realism in the first place - a doctrine which seems to me to be far from self-evident, and certainly anathema to many physicists. On this matter I could cite Deutsch's claim that computability is a function of the laws of physics, and that different laws would permit different proofs and calculations, so to place the computable functions prior to the physical world the way you have is to put the cart before the horse. We see a computable universe because the laws of physics determines our brains as well as the structure of the universe. This to me has a certain force to it, though no doubt you will beg to differ. BTW I disagree that I fail to understand the relation of 1-p and 3-p in your proof. I am not making the same argument as before about the infinite static field, and I do appreciate that our states are represented in infinite calculations in the UD trace and that these calculations are very deep, necessarily. I also see how from your reasoning, we would see an Everett-like uncertainty in our future states. I don't see that you have pointed out any particular misunderstanding on my part, though I am open to you explaining exactly where in my reasoning this failure is. Thanks for your explanation of my great-grandfather's work. I'm afraid my physics is that of the very well read layperson, so I've never really appreciated the ins and outs of what his contribution was - other than "the statistical interpretation of quantum physics". I read the Einstein-Born letters too, many years ago, and enjoyed what I understood! On Nov 19, 8:49 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: > On 19 Nov 2011, at 03:02, Pierz wrote: > > > In a previous post I launched a kamizake assault on UDA which was > > justly cut to shreds on the basis of a number of misunderstandings on > > my part, perhaps most crucially my conflation of information and > > computation. I claimed that the UD cannot be distinguished from the > > set of all possible information states and therefore from an infinite > > field of static, within which all possible realities can be found, > > none of which, however, have the slightest coherence. I also > > mistakenly used the word 'random' to describe this bit field, which of > > course is wrong. I should instead have used the word 'incoherent'. > > Bruno and others quickly put me straight on these errors. > > > I am still troubled however by the suspicion that UDA, by explaining > > 'everything' (except itself - there is always that lacuna in any > > explanatory framework) also explains nothing. > > The UD is not proposed as an explanation per se. On the contrary UDA > shows that it is a problem we met when we assume that the brain (or > generalized brain) is Turing emulable. > > > Because the UD executes > > every computation, it cannot explain why certain computations (say > > Schroedinger's equation, or those of general relativity) are preferred > > within our presenting reality. > > That is basically my critics of Schmidhuber I have made on this list. >
Re: UDA refutation take 2
On 20 Nov 2011, at 21:54, Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, Nov 20, 2011 at 12:23:57PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: Ricardo, On 19 Nov 2011, at 16:33, R AM wrote: Has Eric Vandenbush written a paper about how complex numbers are derived from UDA? He has some health problem, and rarely finish papers. Sorry. I work hard to encourage him to finish a paper on those complex numbers. I will let you know if he succeeds in that task. Bruno I, too, am intersted in this result. Even if you don't persuade him to publish, maybe you could convince him to do an informal write up of the idea? I will try. It took me years to make him write what I put on my webpage (the solution of the first AUDA-related open problem), despite it is just an hand written manuscript. This gives hope! But we have to be patient. I got another solution by him of some other problem, but find some mistake (which is hard to tell him, because he is oversensible). The guy is brilliant, but I think he might have lost carrier opportunities ... just because he dares to take public lunch with me. Humans, even scientist, still obeys to the law: the boss is right (especially when wrong!). What a pity. Of course being bipolar does not help him. And I am not quite glad with the type of legal medication he is using, but I don't want to interfere with this. About those complex numbers derivation, I am still not sure he does not presuppose some (classical) Hamiltonian. I think his assumption are still a bit fuzzy. We will see. I will let you know about the progress (or refutation). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA refutation take 2
On 20 Nov 2011, at 17:27, Jason Resch wrote: Hi Bruno, I had few questions regarding some of the things said in your post. On Sat, Nov 19, 2011 at 3:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Nov 2011, at 03:02, Pierz wrote: David Deutsch's idea of a good explanation is one that closely matches the structure of the thing it describes, allowing for little variation. The vast variation in the possible worlds where UDA could be invoked makes it a bad explanation, in those terms. You have just not (yet) understood the role of the 1/3 person pov distinction in the reasoning. UDA shows that physics is determined by a relative measure on computations. If this leads to predict that electron weight one ton then mechanism is disproved. UDA shows that physics is entirely reduce to computer science/number theory in a very specific and unique way (modulo a variation on the arithmetical definition of knowledge). Couldn't the UD predict various computational histories and different types laws of physics for different observers? I don't think so, because physics is given by ALL computations going through your state, and that means any state accessible by a universal numbers/machines. The "different observers" and "other universes" have to be too much different. They cannot be Turing universal. If they are, you appear in their computations, and so become part of your physics. I will reexplain this to Stephen and Johnathan, so don't worry if this is not clear. Of course the electron weighing a ton might be ruled out from observation if such electrons are incompatible with life, but I don't see that the UD could ever perfectly derive the laws of physics if there are multiple computational histories compatible with observers. By UDA, physics is neither a computation, nor the result of a computation. It is the result of interference of all (relative) computations. The computation leading to non universal observers have a measure null with respect to the "real (arithmetical) measure". They exist in UD*, but does not influence what we observe. They are "white rabbit computations". For example, might there be such histories that have observers but no electrons at all? I see the UD perhaps being used in the future to derive a rough estimate of the probabilities for different common universes observers might expect to find themselves in, but nothing definite. This is not entirely excluded, but then the mass or the existence of electron is a geographical phenomenon. This is not a problem for an Everett -type multiverse, in which the universes are bound together by consistent physical laws which allow one to speak of a proportion of universes in which event x occurs. However, in a mathematical platonia where all possible calculations occur, and nothing outside of them, there can be no such ordering principle. If the Everett idea works, and is the solution, (which has not yet been completely proved) then the UDA conclusion is that the Everett simultion in the UD wins the "measure battle", and we HAVE to justify this from computer science alone. More general physical principals like the Schrodinger equation might be applicable to all observers if it is truly, as Russell staid, a theory of observation. But something like the weight of the electron, the Gravitational constant are, in my mind, more properly considered local properties rather than global principals. This is possible. It would make the mass of the electron similar to the mass of the planet around the sun, that is: a geographical contingent reality, as unpredictable than being myself in W or in M after a self-duplication. The advantage of comp is that it gives what is really invariant for all universal numbers, in any lawful and persistent (from its point of view) environments. More on this later. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA refutation take 2
On Sun, Nov 20, 2011 at 2:59 PM, Russell Standish wrote: > On Sun, Nov 20, 2011 at 10:27:20AM -0600, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > > > > > More general physical principals like the Schrodinger equation might be > > applicable to all observers if it is truly, as Russell staid, a theory of > > observation. But something like the weight of the electron, the > > Gravitational constant are, in my mind, more properly considered local > > properties rather than global principals. > > > > Jason > > > > The Gravitational constant is a conversion constant between units - no > more significant than the fact there are 2.54... centimetres per inch. > That's one way of looking at it, but what I meant to convey is that the force of gravity has a certain definite strength in this universe. Must it be this way for all possible observers or not? We have a choice of saying either gravity is weak or that masses are really small, but either way you approach it, one of those two must be considered a property of our physical universe. > > The electron mass may be parochial property of where we live, or it > may be derivable from some more fundamental theory. For example, it is > thought that the mass of the proton is given by quantum > chromodynamics, but the calculations are so fierce, that nobody has > achieved this yet. > > Have you heard of Heim theory? It is little known since most of his publications were only published in German, but one of the claimed results is derivation of particle masses based on just the Gravitational constant, Planck's constant, vacuum permittivity and permeability. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA refutation take 2
Yes - the terminology of complex numbers in Mathematics (and real/imaginary numbers) is unfortunate. Forunately, hardly anyone gets confused :). I am interested in Eric Vanderbusch's result, of course, because one of the least satisfactory parts of my derivation of quantum mechanics is the use of the complex measure. Cheers On Sun, Nov 20, 2011 at 03:54:26PM -0500, John Mikes wrote: > Russell, > > 5 minutes after I "sent" my letter on complexity to you, here is your next > piece explaining that I misunderstood the topic. > Of cours "a theory on complex numbers" is quite different from what I had > in mind. > > Sorry > > John M > -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA refutation take 2
On Sun, Nov 20, 2011 at 10:27:20AM -0600, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > > More general physical principals like the Schrodinger equation might be > applicable to all observers if it is truly, as Russell staid, a theory of > observation. But something like the weight of the electron, the > Gravitational constant are, in my mind, more properly considered local > properties rather than global principals. > > Jason > The Gravitational constant is a conversion constant between units - no more significant than the fact there are 2.54... centimetres per inch. The electron mass may be parochial property of where we live, or it may be derivable from some more fundamental theory. For example, it is thought that the mass of the proton is given by quantum chromodynamics, but the calculations are so fierce, that nobody has achieved this yet. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA refutation take 2
Russell, 5 minutes after I "sent" my letter on complexity to you, here is your next piece explaining that I misunderstood the topic. Of cours "a theory on complex numbers" is quite different from what I had in mind. Sorry John M On Sun, Nov 20, 2011 at 3:54 PM, Russell Standish wrote: > On Sun, Nov 20, 2011 at 12:23:57PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Ricardo, > > > > On 19 Nov 2011, at 16:33, R AM wrote: > > > > >Has Eric Vandenbush written a paper about how complex numbers are > > >derived from UDA? > > > > > He has some health problem, and rarely finish papers. Sorry. I work > > hard to encourage him to finish a paper on those complex numbers. I > > will let you know if he succeeds in that task. > > > > Bruno > > > > > > I, too, am intersted in this result. Even if you don't persuade him to > publish, maybe you could convince him to do an informal write up of > the idea? > > Cheers > > -- > > > > Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > Principal, High Performance Coders > Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au > University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA refutation take 2
On Sun, Nov 20, 2011 at 12:23:57PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: > Ricardo, > > On 19 Nov 2011, at 16:33, R AM wrote: > > >Has Eric Vandenbush written a paper about how complex numbers are > >derived from UDA? > > > He has some health problem, and rarely finish papers. Sorry. I work > hard to encourage him to finish a paper on those complex numbers. I > will let you know if he succeeds in that task. > > Bruno > > I, too, am intersted in this result. Even if you don't persuade him to publish, maybe you could convince him to do an informal write up of the idea? Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA refutation take 2
On 19 Nov 2011, at 12:27, Pierz wrote: Thank you for this reply. You mention a lot of theory I'm unfamiliar with as yet, so I will have to do some study before I can make a sensible response. OK. I've never heard you call it a problem rather than a solution before, but that enhances my understanding of where these ideas fit in your field. I might not always be clear. UDA is a proof (or intended or presented as such). UDA proves that IF mechanism is true THEN physics is a branch of machines' psychology (or bio-psycho-theology) which is itself a branch of computer science which is itself a branch of elementary arithmetic. SO UDA reduces physics (and actually the whole mind-body problem) to a body problem in (pure, mathematical, non physical) computer science. So, and that might be confusing, UDA definitely shows that in the mechanist theory, physics is reduced to arithmetic. But that result leads to the problem of explicitly deriving physics (body appearance, physical law appearance) from arithmetic, now that we know that physics *is* and* has to be* reduced to number theory. UDA gives also the shape of the physical laws: physics is in principle a relative measure on the computations, or a many-dream, internal (i.e. made by the universal numbers themselves) interpretation of arithmetic. This fits nice in the "everything exists" idea which starts this list. It is *the* precise form of it imposed by the constrains of the computationalist hypothesis. Then AUDA, or the "interview" (the part two of the sane04 paper) explain how to derive "completely" physics, and how to get both quanta and qualia from arithmetic, but it does only the beginning: the extraction of the logic of quanta and of the logic of qualia (and more than that: a complete arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus). So UDA is both a proof of a statement: comp => reversal between physics and machine's dream theory, and at the same time transform a problem (the mind body problem) into another problem (the derivation of the correct universal numbers' belief in persistent matter appearances). My deeper goal was to convince some scientists that Mechanism does not solve the mind-body problem per se, but that it makes it possible to translate that problem into a mathematical problem. I don't know that it's germane to the points I'm making though. and you say in a post to Brent: I think Evan Harris Walker makes the same point in The Physics of Consciousness (a book that provides a very clear explanation of Bell's theorem, though his speculations on the brain appear egregiously wrong). I don't think though that the point you're making here is quite the same as mine however. I will have to follow up the measure theory mentioned by Bruno below to see how this apparent problem actually isn't one. You mention the Born rule. He was my great grandfather as it happens but I didn't know there was a Born rule... Max Born? That's funny. I like very much the correspondence between Born and Einstein. The Born rule is that if a quantum state is describe by a u + b v + c w, with a, b, c, complex numbers such that a^2 + b^2 + c^2 = 1, and u, v, c being the eigenvectors of some observable (and thus corresponding to the possible results of the experience) then the probability of finding a result corresponding to u (resp. v, w) is given by a^2 (resp b^2 , c^2). So if you look at a particle in the state 1/sqrt(2) (u + v} with a u/v analyser, you will see u or v with probability (1/sqrt(2))^2 = 1/2. a, b, c are usually called amplitudes of the (superposed) wave, and Born rule is that the probability is given by the square of the amplitude. (I guess you know that). If the observable is continuous, like with position, impulsion, ... you have to use an integral instead of a sum, and you have to use probability on a continuous space. I think that your great grandfather got the Nobel price for that idea (30 years after the finding). The Copenhagen school said that the observation collapses the wave, going from 1/sqrt(2) (u + v} to u, for example, and the many-worlders (Everett) said that the observer get just entangled with the state of the particle, going from O * 1/sqrt(2) (u + v} to 1/sqrt(2) (O * u + O* v}. The wave then describes two branching (superposed) observers, each with a definite result in his mind or diary. Everett school just applies QM to the couple observer + particle. Born rule becomes, or should become, a theorem. Everett, argued that it is, and you can indeed recover it by different methods with varying degrees of rigor. This is still a bit controversial, to be sure, like Brent's comment illustrates. Deutsch uses decision theory for doing so, Graham and Preskill use frequentist probabilities and special measurement observable, Everett makes a direct QM derivation, and I use Gleason theorem to get them, but probably none of
Re: UDA refutation take 2
Hi Bruno, I had few questions regarding some of the things said in your post. On Sat, Nov 19, 2011 at 3:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 19 Nov 2011, at 03:02, Pierz wrote: > > David Deutsch's idea >> of a good explanation is one that closely matches the structure of the >> thing it describes, allowing for little variation. The vast variation >> in the possible worlds where UDA could be invoked makes it a bad >> explanation, in those terms. >> > > You have just not (yet) understood the role of the 1/3 person pov > distinction in the reasoning. UDA shows that physics is determined by a > relative measure on computations. If this leads to predict that electron > weight one ton then mechanism is disproved. UDA shows that physics is > entirely reduce to computer science/number theory in a very specific and > unique way (modulo a variation on the arithmetical definition of knowledge). > > > > Couldn't the UD predict various computational histories and different types laws of physics for different observers? Of course the electron weighing a ton might be ruled out from observation if such electrons are incompatible with life, but I don't see that the UD could ever perfectly derive the laws of physics if there are multiple computational histories compatible with observers. For example, might there be such histories that have observers but no electrons at all? I see the UD perhaps being used in the future to derive a rough estimate of the probabilities for different common universes observers might expect to find themselves in, but nothing definite. > > >> This is not a problem for an Everett -type multiverse, in which the >> universes are bound together by consistent physical laws which allow >> one to speak of a proportion of universes in which event x occurs. >> However, in a mathematical platonia where all possible calculations >> occur, and nothing outside of them, there can be no such ordering >> principle. >> > > If the Everett idea works, and is the solution, (which has not yet been > completely proved) then the UDA conclusion is that the Everett simultion in > the UD wins the "measure battle", and we HAVE to justify this from computer > science alone. > > > More general physical principals like the Schrodinger equation might be applicable to all observers if it is truly, as Russell staid, a theory of observation. But something like the weight of the electron, the Gravitational constant are, in my mind, more properly considered local properties rather than global principals. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA refutation take 2
Ricardo, On 19 Nov 2011, at 16:33, R AM wrote: Has Eric Vandenbush written a paper about how complex numbers are derived from UDA? He has some health problem, and rarely finish papers. Sorry. I work hard to encourage him to finish a paper on those complex numbers. I will let you know if he succeeds in that task. Bruno Ricardo El nov 19, 2011 9:49 a.m., "Bruno Marchal" escribió: On 19 Nov 2011, at 03:02, Pierz wrote: In a previous post I launched a kamizake assault on UDA which was justly cut to shreds on the basis of a number of misunderstandings on my part, perhaps most crucially my conflation of information and computation. I claimed that the UD cannot be distinguished from the set of all possible information states and therefore from an infinite field of static, within which all possible realities can be found, none of which, however, have the slightest coherence. I also mistakenly used the word 'random' to describe this bit field, which of course is wrong. I should instead have used the word 'incoherent'. Bruno and others quickly put me straight on these errors. I am still troubled however by the suspicion that UDA, by explaining 'everything' (except itself - there is always that lacuna in any explanatory framework) also explains nothing. The UD is not proposed as an explanation per se. On the contrary UDA shows that it is a problem we met when we assume that the brain (or generalized brain) is Turing emulable. Because the UD executes every computation, it cannot explain why certain computations (say Schroedinger's equation, or those of general relativity) are preferred within our presenting reality. That is basically my critics of Schmidhuber I have made on this list. I'm afraid that you miss the role of the first person indeterminacy. I will add explanation here asap. You have to follow UDA step by step: it is a proof (in the theory "mechanism"), so to refute UDA you have to say where it goes wrong. I insist: UDA is a problem, not a solution. Indeed it is a subproblem of the mind-body problem in the mechanist theory. AUDA will be the solution, or the embryo of the solution. This very universality also insulates it against disproof, since although it allows everything we see, it is hard to conceive of something it would disallow. Not at all. A priori it predicts everything *at once*. That is the "white rabbit problem". We don't see white rabbits, or everything at once, so mechanism seems to be disproved by UDA. The point will be that such a quick disprove does not work, and when we do the math we see mechanism is not yet disproved, but that it predicts or explain the quantum weirdness. David Deutsch's idea of a good explanation is one that closely matches the structure of the thing it describes, allowing for little variation. The vast variation in the possible worlds where UDA could be invoked makes it a bad explanation, in those terms. You have just not (yet) understood the role of the 1/3 person pov distinction in the reasoning. UDA shows that physics is determined by a relative measure on computations. If this leads to predict that electron weight one ton then mechanism is disproved. UDA shows that physics is entirely reduce to computer science/number theory in a very specific and unique way (modulo a variation on the arithmetical definition of knowledge). Of course the objection that nobody has yet found an application for UDA, a concrete example of its usefulness, is more of an objection to it as a scientific theory than a philosophical one. UDA is a proof. Unless wrong, it is done. Asking for the use of the UDA is like asking for the use of the theorem saying that no numbers n and m are such that (n/m)^2 = 2. UDA shows a fact to be true and that we have to live with it. UDA shows that mechanism and materialism are (epistemologically) incompatible. Still, I believe there is an argument against it at the philosophical level. The UDA invokes the notion of probability in relation to 1-p states on the basis of the "infinite union of all finite portions of the UD in which correct emulation occurs". Thus the indeterminacy of 1-p experience is a function of the distribution of states within the observer’s consistent histories. For instance, there’s a 20% chance of x happening, if it happens within 20% of my consistent histories. Please Bruno correct me if this is a misunderstanding. No, here I mainly agree with you. Now we know from QT there is a finite, if absurdly remote, probability of my turning into a giraffe in the next minute. So the UD, if not to contradict science as it stands, must allow this too. And indeed there is no reason for it not to, since there must be computational pathways that lead from human to giraffe - a sort of deep version of the morphing algorithms used in CGI - or a simple arbitrary transform. In fact there must be infinite such pathways leading to slight variations on t
Re: UDA refutation take 2
Hi Ricardo, On 19 Nov 2011, at 16:12, R AM wrote: I've been following the list for a couple of months now and I sort of share Piertz worries about randomness. Here is a summary of what I've understood this far. The UDA might imply lots of white rabbits but only those computations with self-reference to have to be taken into account. Yes. Or computation going through my actual state, in case I predict my immediate future personal feelings, like the personal feeling of seeing a needle of some measuring apparatus. Such a prediction contains ipso factor a self-reference. In principle this restriction might reduce the number of white rabbits to a reasonable probability (compatible with QM). But whether this is the case remains to be proved. Is this understanding correct? Yes. I mean that if from UDA we get that the probability of me being converted to a giraffe is let's say 50%. then UDA is false. Not UDA! In that case the mechanist hypothesis is false. The UD Argument (UDA) just prove that if we assume mechanism the mind body problem is reduced to an obligatory explanation of physics in term of the additive and multiplicative structure of the natural numbers (or equivalent with respect to computability). It shows that physics is "theory and machine independent". Mechanism is used implicitly by virtually all scientists (including some which pretend to be non mechanist, but confuse machine with the older outdated 19th century, pregodelian, conception of them). Self-reference might reduce this probability to 0.0001%, but we don't know whether this is the case yet. Correct? We know already that self-reference imposed a quantum logic for the "observable propositions". The "measure one" obeys a quantum logic with a transparent arithmetical interpretation. In case we don't recover the measurable probability distribution, the UDA provides a tool for measuring our degree of non computability. Do you have an intuition of why this should be the case? Any intuition favoring mechanism will do. So the intuition can be developed from the fact that natural phenomena seems Turing emulable (all physical laws know today are Turing emulable, or Turing recoverable with the mechanist first person indeterminacy). Then the study of self-reference shows that the "giraffe" problem is intrinsically very complex, and that the theoretical computer science constraints are highly non trivial, and it already gives a quantum logic for the measure one. If that quantum logic is of the right type, then we get an arithmetical tensor products, a notion of interaction, an explanation of where time and space comes from, why there is a symmetry at the bottom of our physical description, etc. The alternative does not really exist: there are no known non mechanist theory (in the weak sense I am using) for mind and life. All what I show is that such Mechanism is a refutable theory. Thanks to both Gödelian self-reference and quantum weirdness, we can say that the evidences know today are strongly in favor of mechanism, and against materialism. Bruno Ricardo El nov 19, 2011 9:49 a.m., "Bruno Marchal" escribió: On 19 Nov 2011, at 03:02, Pierz wrote: In a previous post I launched a kamizake assault on UDA which was justly cut to shreds on the basis of a number of misunderstandings on my part, perhaps most crucially my conflation of information and computation. I claimed that the UD cannot be distinguished from the set of all possible information states and therefore from an infinite field of static, within which all possible realities can be found, none of which, however, have the slightest coherence. I also mistakenly used the word 'random' to describe this bit field, which of course is wrong. I should instead have used the word 'incoherent'. Bruno and others quickly put me straight on these errors. I am still troubled however by the suspicion that UDA, by explaining 'everything' (except itself - there is always that lacuna in any explanatory framework) also explains nothing. The UD is not proposed as an explanation per se. On the contrary UDA shows that it is a problem we met when we assume that the brain (or generalized brain) is Turing emulable. Because the UD executes every computation, it cannot explain why certain computations (say Schroedinger's equation, or those of general relativity) are preferred within our presenting reality. That is basically my critics of Schmidhuber I have made on this list. I'm afraid that you miss the role of the first person indeterminacy. I will add explanation here asap. You have to follow UDA step by step: it is a proof (in the theory "mechanism"), so to refute UDA you have to say where it goes wrong. I insist: UDA is a problem, not a solution. Indeed it is a subproblem of the mind-body problem in the mechanist theory. AUDA will be the solution, or the embryo of the solution.
Re: UDA refutation take 2
Has Eric Vandenbush written a paper about how complex numbers are derived from UDA? Ricardo El nov 19, 2011 9:49 a.m., "Bruno Marchal" escribió: > > On 19 Nov 2011, at 03:02, Pierz wrote: > > In a previous post I launched a kamizake assault on UDA which was >> justly cut to shreds on the basis of a number of misunderstandings on >> my part, perhaps most crucially my conflation of information and >> computation. I claimed that the UD cannot be distinguished from the >> set of all possible information states and therefore from an infinite >> field of static, within which all possible realities can be found, >> none of which, however, have the slightest coherence. I also >> mistakenly used the word 'random' to describe this bit field, which of >> course is wrong. I should instead have used the word 'incoherent'. >> Bruno and others quickly put me straight on these errors. >> >> I am still troubled however by the suspicion that UDA, by explaining >> 'everything' (except itself - there is always that lacuna in any >> explanatory framework) also explains nothing. >> > > The UD is not proposed as an explanation per se. On the contrary UDA shows > that it is a problem we met when we assume that the brain (or generalized > brain) is Turing emulable. > > > > > > Because the UD executes >> every computation, it cannot explain why certain computations (say >> Schroedinger's equation, or those of general relativity) are preferred >> within our presenting reality. >> > > That is basically my critics of Schmidhuber I have made on this list. > > I'm afraid that you miss the role of the first person indeterminacy. > I will add explanation here asap. You have to follow UDA step by step: it > is a proof (in the theory "mechanism"), so to refute UDA you have to say > where it goes wrong. I insist: UDA is a problem, not a solution. Indeed it > is a subproblem of the mind-body problem in the mechanist theory. > AUDA will be the solution, or the embryo of the solution. > > > > > > This very universality also insulates >> it against disproof, since although it allows everything we see, it is >> hard to conceive of something it would disallow. >> > > Not at all. A priori it predicts everything *at once*. That is the "white > rabbit problem". We don't see white rabbits, or everything at once, so > mechanism seems to be disproved by UDA. The point will be that such a quick > disprove does not work, and when we do the math we see mechanism is not yet > disproved, but that it predicts or explain the quantum weirdness. > > > > David Deutsch's idea >> of a good explanation is one that closely matches the structure of the >> thing it describes, allowing for little variation. The vast variation >> in the possible worlds where UDA could be invoked makes it a bad >> explanation, in those terms. >> > > You have just not (yet) understood the role of the 1/3 person pov > distinction in the reasoning. UDA shows that physics is determined by a > relative measure on computations. If this leads to predict that electron > weight one ton then mechanism is disproved. UDA shows that physics is > entirely reduce to computer science/number theory in a very specific and > unique way (modulo a variation on the arithmetical definition of knowledge). > > > > >> Of course the objection that nobody has yet found an application for >> UDA, a concrete example of its usefulness, is more of an objection to >> it as a scientific theory than a philosophical one. >> > > > UDA is a proof. Unless wrong, it is done. Asking for the use of the UDA is > like asking for the use of the theorem saying that no numbers n and m are > such that (n/m)^2 = 2. > UDA shows a fact to be true and that we have to live with it. UDA shows > that mechanism and materialism are (epistemologically) incompatible. > > > > Still, I believe >> there is an argument against it at the philosophical level. The UDA >> invokes the notion of probability in relation to 1-p states on the >> basis of the "infinite union of all finite portions of the UD in which >> correct emulation occurs". Thus the indeterminacy of 1-p experience is >> a function of the distribution of states within the observer’s >> consistent histories. For instance, there’s a 20% chance of x >> happening, if it happens within 20% of my consistent histories. Please >> Bruno correct me if this is a misunderstanding. >> > > No, here I mainly agree with you. > > > > >> Now we know from QT there is a finite, if absurdly remote, probability >> of my turning into a giraffe in the next minute. So the UD, if not to >> contradict science as it stands, must allow this too. And indeed there >> is no reason for it not to, since there must be computational pathways >> that lead from human to giraffe - a sort of deep version of the >> morphing algorithms used in CGI - or a simple arbitrary transform. In >> fact there must be infinite such pathways leading to slight variations >> on the giraffe theme, as well as to all other animals, inanima
Re: UDA refutation take 2
Dear Bruno, I've been following the list for a couple of months now and I sort of share Piertz worries about randomness. Here is a summary of what I've understood this far. The UDA might imply lots of white rabbits but only those computations with self-reference to have to be taken into account. In principle this restriction might reduce the number of white rabbits to a reasonable probability (compatible with QM). But whether this is the case remains to be proved. Is this understanding correct? I mean that if from UDA we get that the probability of me being converted to a giraffe is let's say 50%. then UDA is false. Self-reference might reduce this probability to 0.0001%, but we don't know whether this is the case yet. Correct? Do you have an intuition of why this should be the case? Ricardo El nov 19, 2011 9:49 a.m., "Bruno Marchal" escribió: > > On 19 Nov 2011, at 03:02, Pierz wrote: > > In a previous post I launched a kamizake assault on UDA which was >> justly cut to shreds on the basis of a number of misunderstandings on >> my part, perhaps most crucially my conflation of information and >> computation. I claimed that the UD cannot be distinguished from the >> set of all possible information states and therefore from an infinite >> field of static, within which all possible realities can be found, >> none of which, however, have the slightest coherence. I also >> mistakenly used the word 'random' to describe this bit field, which of >> course is wrong. I should instead have used the word 'incoherent'. >> Bruno and others quickly put me straight on these errors. >> >> I am still troubled however by the suspicion that UDA, by explaining >> 'everything' (except itself - there is always that lacuna in any >> explanatory framework) also explains nothing. >> > > The UD is not proposed as an explanation per se. On the contrary UDA shows > that it is a problem we met when we assume that the brain (or generalized > brain) is Turing emulable. > > > > > > Because the UD executes >> every computation, it cannot explain why certain computations (say >> Schroedinger's equation, or those of general relativity) are preferred >> within our presenting reality. >> > > That is basically my critics of Schmidhuber I have made on this list. > > I'm afraid that you miss the role of the first person indeterminacy. > I will add explanation here asap. You have to follow UDA step by step: it > is a proof (in the theory "mechanism"), so to refute UDA you have to say > where it goes wrong. I insist: UDA is a problem, not a solution. Indeed it > is a subproblem of the mind-body problem in the mechanist theory. > AUDA will be the solution, or the embryo of the solution. > > > > > > This very universality also insulates >> it against disproof, since although it allows everything we see, it is >> hard to conceive of something it would disallow. >> > > Not at all. A priori it predicts everything *at once*. That is the "white > rabbit problem". We don't see white rabbits, or everything at once, so > mechanism seems to be disproved by UDA. The point will be that such a quick > disprove does not work, and when we do the math we see mechanism is not yet > disproved, but that it predicts or explain the quantum weirdness. > > > > David Deutsch's idea >> of a good explanation is one that closely matches the structure of the >> thing it describes, allowing for little variation. The vast variation >> in the possible worlds where UDA could be invoked makes it a bad >> explanation, in those terms. >> > > You have just not (yet) understood the role of the 1/3 person pov > distinction in the reasoning. UDA shows that physics is determined by a > relative measure on computations. If this leads to predict that electron > weight one ton then mechanism is disproved. UDA shows that physics is > entirely reduce to computer science/number theory in a very specific and > unique way (modulo a variation on the arithmetical definition of knowledge). > > > > >> Of course the objection that nobody has yet found an application for >> UDA, a concrete example of its usefulness, is more of an objection to >> it as a scientific theory than a philosophical one. >> > > > UDA is a proof. Unless wrong, it is done. Asking for the use of the UDA is > like asking for the use of the theorem saying that no numbers n and m are > such that (n/m)^2 = 2. > UDA shows a fact to be true and that we have to live with it. UDA shows > that mechanism and materialism are (epistemologically) incompatible. > > > > Still, I believe >> there is an argument against it at the philosophical level. The UDA >> invokes the notion of probability in relation to 1-p states on the >> basis of the "infinite union of all finite portions of the UD in which >> correct emulation occurs". Thus the indeterminacy of 1-p experience is >> a function of the distribution of states within the observer’s >> consistent histories. For instance, there’s a 20% chance of x >> happening, if it happen
Re: UDA refutation take 2
I think Evan Harris Walker makes the same point in The Physics of Consciousness (a book that provides a very clear explanation of Bell's theorem, though his speculations on the brain appear egregiously wrong). I don't think though that the point you're making here is quite the same as mine however. I will have to follow up the measure theory mentioned by Bruno below to see how this apparent problem actually isn't one. You mention the Born rule. He was my great grandfather as it happens but I didn't know there was a Born rule... On Nov 19, 1:18 pm, meekerdb wrote: > On 11/18/2011 6:02 PM, Pierz wrote: > > > So if there are infinite pathways where I turn into a giraffe, as > > there must be, there is no way for my 1-p experience to select > > probabilistically among these pathways. I can no longer say, if the > > set of calculation pathways is infinite, that giraffe transformation > > occurs in, say .1% of them, or 5%, or 99% of them. > > > This is not a problem for an Everett -type multiverse, in which the > > universes are bound together by consistent physical laws which allow > > one to speak of a proportion of universes in which event x occurs. > > I think you make good points. But it is also a problem for an Everett > multiverse. If the > Born rule says that two possible results are equally probable we may suppose > the universe > splits two, each with weight 1/2. But if the Born rule says that there are > two possible > results with probability 1/pi and (1-1/pi) are we to imagine an infinite > number of each in > the appropriate ratio? Or do we imagine that there are just two, but somehow > they are > marked with "weights"? > > Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA refutation take 2
Thank you for this reply. You mention a lot of theory I'm unfamiliar with as yet, so I will have to do some study before I can make a sensible response. I've never heard you call it a problem rather than a solution before, but that enhances my understanding of where these ideas fit in your field. I don't know that it's germane to the points I'm making though. On Nov 19, 8:49 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: > On 19 Nov 2011, at 03:02, Pierz wrote: > > > In a previous post I launched a kamizake assault on UDA which was > > justly cut to shreds on the basis of a number of misunderstandings on > > my part, perhaps most crucially my conflation of information and > > computation. I claimed that the UD cannot be distinguished from the > > set of all possible information states and therefore from an infinite > > field of static, within which all possible realities can be found, > > none of which, however, have the slightest coherence. I also > > mistakenly used the word 'random' to describe this bit field, which of > > course is wrong. I should instead have used the word 'incoherent'. > > Bruno and others quickly put me straight on these errors. > > > I am still troubled however by the suspicion that UDA, by explaining > > 'everything' (except itself - there is always that lacuna in any > > explanatory framework) also explains nothing. > > The UD is not proposed as an explanation per se. On the contrary UDA > shows that it is a problem we met when we assume that the brain (or > generalized brain) is Turing emulable. > > > Because the UD executes > > every computation, it cannot explain why certain computations (say > > Schroedinger's equation, or those of general relativity) are preferred > > within our presenting reality. > > That is basically my critics of Schmidhuber I have made on this list. > > I'm afraid that you miss the role of the first person indeterminacy. > I will add explanation here asap. You have to follow UDA step by step: > it is a proof (in the theory "mechanism"), so to refute UDA you have > to say where it goes wrong. I insist: UDA is a problem, not a > solution. Indeed it is a subproblem of the mind-body problem in the > mechanist theory. > AUDA will be the solution, or the embryo of the solution. > > > This very universality also insulates > > it against disproof, since although it allows everything we see, it is > > hard to conceive of something it would disallow. > > Not at all. A priori it predicts everything *at once*. That is the > "white rabbit problem". We don't see white rabbits, or everything at > once, so mechanism seems to be disproved by UDA. The point will be > that such a quick disprove does not work, and when we do the math we > see mechanism is not yet disproved, but that it predicts or explain > the quantum weirdness. > > > David Deutsch's idea > > of a good explanation is one that closely matches the structure of the > > thing it describes, allowing for little variation. The vast variation > > in the possible worlds where UDA could be invoked makes it a bad > > explanation, in those terms. > > You have just not (yet) understood the role of the 1/3 person pov > distinction in the reasoning. UDA shows that physics is determined by > a relative measure on computations. If this leads to predict that > electron weight one ton then mechanism is disproved. UDA shows that > physics is entirely reduce to computer science/number theory in a very > specific and unique way (modulo a variation on the arithmetical > definition of knowledge). > > > > > Of course the objection that nobody has yet found an application for > > UDA, a concrete example of its usefulness, is more of an objection to > > it as a scientific theory than a philosophical one. > > UDA is a proof. Unless wrong, it is done. Asking for the use of the > UDA is like asking for the use of the theorem saying that no numbers n > and m are such that (n/m)^2 = 2. > UDA shows a fact to be true and that we have to live with it. UDA > shows that mechanism and materialism are (epistemologically) > incompatible. > > > Still, I believe > > there is an argument against it at the philosophical level. The UDA > > invokes the notion of probability in relation to 1-p states on the > > basis of the "infinite union of all finite portions of the UD in which > > correct emulation occurs". Thus the indeterminacy of 1-p experience is > > a function of the distribution of states within the observer’s > > consistent histories. For instance, there’s a 20% chance of x > > happening, if it happens within 20% of my consistent histories. Please > > Bruno correct me if this is a misunderstanding. > > No, here I mainly agree with you. > > > > > Now we know from QT there is a finite, if absurdly remote, probability > > of my turning into a giraffe in the next minute. So the UD, if not to > > contradict science as it stands, must allow this too. And indeed there > > is no reason for it not to, since there must be computational pathways > > that lead from hum
Re: UDA refutation take 2
On 19 Nov 2011, at 03:02, Pierz wrote: In a previous post I launched a kamizake assault on UDA which was justly cut to shreds on the basis of a number of misunderstandings on my part, perhaps most crucially my conflation of information and computation. I claimed that the UD cannot be distinguished from the set of all possible information states and therefore from an infinite field of static, within which all possible realities can be found, none of which, however, have the slightest coherence. I also mistakenly used the word 'random' to describe this bit field, which of course is wrong. I should instead have used the word 'incoherent'. Bruno and others quickly put me straight on these errors. I am still troubled however by the suspicion that UDA, by explaining 'everything' (except itself - there is always that lacuna in any explanatory framework) also explains nothing. The UD is not proposed as an explanation per se. On the contrary UDA shows that it is a problem we met when we assume that the brain (or generalized brain) is Turing emulable. Because the UD executes every computation, it cannot explain why certain computations (say Schroedinger's equation, or those of general relativity) are preferred within our presenting reality. That is basically my critics of Schmidhuber I have made on this list. I'm afraid that you miss the role of the first person indeterminacy. I will add explanation here asap. You have to follow UDA step by step: it is a proof (in the theory "mechanism"), so to refute UDA you have to say where it goes wrong. I insist: UDA is a problem, not a solution. Indeed it is a subproblem of the mind-body problem in the mechanist theory. AUDA will be the solution, or the embryo of the solution. This very universality also insulates it against disproof, since although it allows everything we see, it is hard to conceive of something it would disallow. Not at all. A priori it predicts everything *at once*. That is the "white rabbit problem". We don't see white rabbits, or everything at once, so mechanism seems to be disproved by UDA. The point will be that such a quick disprove does not work, and when we do the math we see mechanism is not yet disproved, but that it predicts or explain the quantum weirdness. David Deutsch's idea of a good explanation is one that closely matches the structure of the thing it describes, allowing for little variation. The vast variation in the possible worlds where UDA could be invoked makes it a bad explanation, in those terms. You have just not (yet) understood the role of the 1/3 person pov distinction in the reasoning. UDA shows that physics is determined by a relative measure on computations. If this leads to predict that electron weight one ton then mechanism is disproved. UDA shows that physics is entirely reduce to computer science/number theory in a very specific and unique way (modulo a variation on the arithmetical definition of knowledge). Of course the objection that nobody has yet found an application for UDA, a concrete example of its usefulness, is more of an objection to it as a scientific theory than a philosophical one. UDA is a proof. Unless wrong, it is done. Asking for the use of the UDA is like asking for the use of the theorem saying that no numbers n and m are such that (n/m)^2 = 2. UDA shows a fact to be true and that we have to live with it. UDA shows that mechanism and materialism are (epistemologically) incompatible. Still, I believe there is an argument against it at the philosophical level. The UDA invokes the notion of probability in relation to 1-p states on the basis of the "infinite union of all finite portions of the UD in which correct emulation occurs". Thus the indeterminacy of 1-p experience is a function of the distribution of states within the observer’s consistent histories. For instance, there’s a 20% chance of x happening, if it happens within 20% of my consistent histories. Please Bruno correct me if this is a misunderstanding. No, here I mainly agree with you. Now we know from QT there is a finite, if absurdly remote, probability of my turning into a giraffe in the next minute. So the UD, if not to contradict science as it stands, must allow this too. And indeed there is no reason for it not to, since there must be computational pathways that lead from human to giraffe - a sort of deep version of the morphing algorithms used in CGI - or a simple arbitrary transform. In fact there must be infinite such pathways leading to slight variations on the giraffe theme, as well as to all other animals, inanimate objects and so on - okay let’s leave out the inanimate objects since they possess no consciousness as far as we know, therefore no 1-p experience. Of course, these pathways are an extreme minority compared to the ones in which I retain my present form, behaving as we would expect on the basis of the past. "Of course"? No, wh
Re: UDA refutation take 2
On 11/18/2011 6:02 PM, Pierz wrote: So if there are infinite pathways where I turn into a giraffe, as there must be, there is no way for my 1-p experience to select probabilistically among these pathways. I can no longer say, if the set of calculation pathways is infinite, that giraffe transformation occurs in, say .1% of them, or 5%, or 99% of them. This is not a problem for an Everett -type multiverse, in which the universes are bound together by consistent physical laws which allow one to speak of a proportion of universes in which event x occurs. I think you make good points. But it is also a problem for an Everett multiverse. If the Born rule says that two possible results are equally probable we may suppose the universe splits two, each with weight 1/2. But if the Born rule says that there are two possible results with probability 1/pi and (1-1/pi) are we to imagine an infinite number of each in the appropriate ratio? Or do we imagine that there are just two, but somehow they are marked with "weights"? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
UDA refutation take 2
In a previous post I launched a kamizake assault on UDA which was justly cut to shreds on the basis of a number of misunderstandings on my part, perhaps most crucially my conflation of information and computation. I claimed that the UD cannot be distinguished from the set of all possible information states and therefore from an infinite field of static, within which all possible realities can be found, none of which, however, have the slightest coherence. I also mistakenly used the word 'random' to describe this bit field, which of course is wrong. I should instead have used the word 'incoherent'. Bruno and others quickly put me straight on these errors. I am still troubled however by the suspicion that UDA, by explaining 'everything' (except itself - there is always that lacuna in any explanatory framework) also explains nothing. Because the UD executes every computation, it cannot explain why certain computations (say Schroedinger's equation, or those of general relativity) are preferred within our presenting reality. This very universality also insulates it against disproof, since although it allows everything we see, it is hard to conceive of something it would disallow. David Deutsch's idea of a good explanation is one that closely matches the structure of the thing it describes, allowing for little variation. The vast variation in the possible worlds where UDA could be invoked makes it a bad explanation, in those terms. Of course the objection that nobody has yet found an application for UDA, a concrete example of its usefulness, is more of an objection to it as a scientific theory than a philosophical one. Still, I believe there is an argument against it at the philosophical level. The UDA invokes the notion of probability in relation to 1-p states on the basis of the "infinite union of all finite portions of the UD in which correct emulation occurs". Thus the indeterminacy of 1-p experience is a function of the distribution of states within the observer’s consistent histories. For instance, there’s a 20% chance of x happening, if it happens within 20% of my consistent histories. Please Bruno correct me if this is a misunderstanding. Now we know from QT there is a finite, if absurdly remote, probability of my turning into a giraffe in the next minute. So the UD, if not to contradict science as it stands, must allow this too. And indeed there is no reason for it not to, since there must be computational pathways that lead from human to giraffe - a sort of deep version of the morphing algorithms used in CGI - or a simple arbitrary transform. In fact there must be infinite such pathways leading to slight variations on the giraffe theme, as well as to all other animals, inanimate objects and so on - okay let’s leave out the inanimate objects since they possess no consciousness as far as we know, therefore no 1-p experience. Of course, these pathways are an extreme minority compared to the ones in which I retain my present form, behaving as we would expect on the basis of the past. But here’s where I see the problem. In a mathematical platonia we cannot make such a statement. The notion of probability within an infinite set is untenable. It is analogous to expecting that a number selected at random from the set of natural numbers is more likely to be divisible by 2 than by, say, a million. This is only the case of the set is ordered to appear this way, eg 1,2,3,4... If we write the set thusly: 1, 1 million, 2 million, 3 million, 2, 4 million, 5 million, 6 million, 3, 7 million etc then our expectation breaks down. So if there are infinite pathways where I turn into a giraffe, as there must be, there is no way for my 1-p experience to select probabilistically among these pathways. I can no longer say, if the set of calculation pathways is infinite, that giraffe transformation occurs in, say .1% of them, or 5%, or 99% of them. This is not a problem for an Everett -type multiverse, in which the universes are bound together by consistent physical laws which allow one to speak of a proportion of universes in which event x occurs. However, in a mathematical platonia where all possible calculations occur, and nothing outside of them, there can be no such ordering principle. I believe this same principle can be used to show that the calculations of the UD must be disorderly. Consider some calculation c which employs number n. In the UD there will also be a calculation which instead uses the number n+1, another which uses n+2 etc. There will also be calculations in which the ordering of the natural numbers is rearranged in arbitrary ways such as my example above. Instead of using simple n, the calculation will employ someFunction(n), where someFunction() transforms the number as per my example, i.e. (in pseudocode): if n modulo 4 = 0 return n else return (n-1) * 1,000,000 Thus the UD cannot rely even on the ordering of natural numbers to ‘prefer’ certain calculations, since t
