Re: [Fis] FIS Discussion (No Vol #)

[Alex Hankey]

Dear Bruno,

You have brought up a vitally important question.
Thank you so very much.
Best wishes

Alex

RE Bruno: How could the quantum correlations existence be definite if
nothing is objective?

ME: It does not really matter what the nature of the reality is, either
strongly objective (denied by quantum theory), or D'Espagnat's 'Veiled
Reality', the title of his book in which he discusses a
not-strongly-objective reality. Quantum correlations will have the same
level of existence as the wave function and everything built out of
mixtures of wave-functions, wave-packets, and / or quantum fields.

Quantum correlations exist as 'definitely' (or indefinitely) as everything
else.
(See the discussion(s) under Steve Bindeman's response(s) earlier today.)

ALSO: The problem with 'Interpreting Quantum Theory' is that if your basic
assumption about the nature of reality is not consistent with the
implications of quantum theory, then quantum theory will inevitably be
impossible to interpret, because its implications will deny your underlying
assumptions. (I REGARD THIS AS OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE)

Quantum theory popularizer, Heinz Pagels (late husband of Elaine Pagels),
posed the question: "What is quantum theory trying to tell us about
existence / our universe?"
I fell that D'Espagnat's theorem says it all - or at least a great deal of
it.

My Proposed Resolution of the problem is to make sure that the macroscopic
reality you choose as the context for your interpretation of quantum theory
is not inconsistent with the theory. Then quantum theory turns out to be
relatively (sic!) easy to interpret.

But such realities are not popular as an underlying metaphysics in western
thought, though they do occur in South Asian schools of thought, and in
Whitehead's Process Philosophy.

That is why I promote a 'Vedic' interpretation of quantum theory which
starts with the idea of information and information generation as being
primary, and matter and energy as being secondary. The *processes* of
information generation (wave packet reduction), information transmission
(free states of wave functions), and information storage (bound states)
then become fundamental, along with the non-quantum states at critical
instabilities, where phenomenal experience becomes possible via <*O*
.

The primary source of information in the universe is then the symmetry
breaking process at the origin of the inflationary process in quantum
cosmology, a singularity in which I can locate information states of the
kind that I am proposing in this webinar as the foundation for
phenomenology / experience, since their <*O* structure can support
both the sense of self', in *O*, and integrated information supporting
gestalt cognition in <.

Interestingly and as I have already emphasized, this makes both the 'self'
a process, <*O*, and objects of perception, weakly objective entities
supported / manifested by sequences of information production processes.

I confess that I am a slightly unwilling Whiteheadian! (There is much to
learn!)

On 2 May 2016 at 09:55, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> Hi Alex,
>
> On 02 May 2016, at 08:30, Alex Hankey wrote:
>
> RE Bruno Marchal: It is easier to explain the illusion of matter to
> something conscious than to explain the illusion of consciousness to
> something material.
>
> ME: At the Consciousness Conference I found it extraordinary that at least
> one plenary presentation was centered round treating the wave function as a
> real entity in the (strongly) objective sense.
>
> I was under the impression that Bernard D'Espagnat's work for which he
> received the Templeton Prize had definitively shown that nothing is
> 'objectively real' in the strongly objective sense. The definite existence
> of quantum correlations destroys all that.
>
>
> Is that not self-defeating? How could the quantum correlations existence
> be definite if nothing is objective?
> With Digital Mechanism we need to accept that the existence of the
> universal machine and the computations is as real/true as the facts of
> elementary arithmetic, on which everyone agree(*). Then we can explain why
> machines develop a belief in a physical reality, and why that beliefs can
> last and can be sharable among many individuals, like with the quanta, and
> why some part of those beliefs are not sharable, yet undoubtable, like the
> qualia.
>
> (*) I like to define Arithmetical Realism by the action of not withdrawing
> your kids from school when they learn the table of addition and
> multiplication. It is mainly the belief that 2+2=5 is not correct.
>
>
> Once this is accepted, the enquirer is faced with the question of what to
> accept as fundamental. I have always considered 'information' in the sense
> of the process or flow that connects the observed to the observer as a
> satisfactory alternative. The process of information flow creates the
> observer-observed relationship and (the illusion of??) their separation.

Re: [Fis] FIS Discussion (No Vol #)

[Alex Hankey]

RE Bruno Marchal: Gödel's theorem implies that machines which are looking
at themselves (in a precise technical sense) develop a series of distinct
phenomenologies (arguably corresponding to justifiable, knowable,
observable, sensible).

ME: I find this a fascinating observation in that you are making a
phenomenological association with a self-referential kind of machine.

However, from the perspective of my proposal, surely your classes of
machine are not operating from a critical instability where the information
states themselves have the self-referential property embedded within them.
Or are they? Or some of them?

The question then arises whether such a machine could exhibit a capacity to
"reason about" a problem, which it had been posed, and so tackle the
problem as one of a member of.a class of similar problems?

It is certainly true in mathematics that the human mind possesses such
abilities to an outstanding extent: not only the ability to comprehend a
problem, and secondly the ability to see the problem as a member of (in the
context of) a class of similar problems, but also the ability to *generalize
*a problem, and so *create* a class of similar problems as a context within
which more general reasoning processes can be applied to solve the problem
in question.

An example of such an approach is given by the Taniyama-Shimura
conjecture, "Each
Elliptical Function is equivalent to a particular Modular Form", one step
of the path followed by Andrew Wiles to prove Fermat's last theorem between
1986 and 1994.

Does this not also illustrate aspects of the discussion of Godel's theorem,
where Maxine has extensively quoted semantic objections to Godel's
statement on the grounds (as I understand her) that it could not be
construed as a direct product of phenomenological experience.

May I say that I would not regard my paraphrase of Maxine's reason as a
valid objection because I do not expect statements in mathematics to
conform to requirements for statements to be considered phenomenological.
The sentential calculus is constructed within the category of sets, and
Frege and Russell and Whitehead were operating within that framework, as
was Godel.

I personally do not regard the category of sets as a valid framework for
phenomenology.
My construction of a new information theory appropriate to describe
phenomenological experience specifically denies it. The sentential calculus
of Frege & co has no bite - it is superficial and not the enamel required
to start up the mind's intellectual digestion and absorption processes.


-- 
Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India
Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195
Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789


2015 JPBMB Special Issue on Integral Biomathics: Life Sciences, Mathematics
and Phenomenological Philosophy

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Re: [Fis] FIS Discussion (No Vol #)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 02 May 2016, at 03:38, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone wrote:


To all concerned colleagues,

I appreciate the fact that discussions should be conversations about  
issues,
but this particular issue and in particular the critique cited in my  
posting
warrant extended exposition in order to show the reasoning upholding  
the critique.
I am thus quoting from specific articles, the first  
phenomenological, the second
analytic-logical--though they are obviously complementary as befits  
discussions

in phenomenology and the life sciences.

EXCERPT FROM:
SELF-REFERENCE AND GÖDEL'S THEOREM: A HUSSERLIAN ANALYSIS
Husserl Studies 19 (2003), pages 131-151.
Albert A. Johnstone

The aim of this article is to show that a Husserlian approach to the  
Liar paradoxes and to their closely related kin discloses the  
illusory nature of these difficulties. Phenomenological meaning  
analysis finds the ultimate source of mischief to be circular  
definition, implicit or explicit. Definitional circularity lies at  
the root both of the self-reference integral to the statements that  
generate Liar paradoxes, and of the particular instances of  
predicate criteria featured in the Grelling paradox as well as in  
the self-evaluating Gödel sentence crucial to Gödel's theorem.  
Since the statements thereby generated turn out on closer scrutiny  
to be vacuous and semantically nonsensical, their rejection from  
reasonable discourse is both warranted and imperative. Naturally  
enough, their exclusion dissolves the various problems created by  
their presence. . . .


VII: THE GOEDEL SENTENCE
Following a procedure invented by Gödel, one may assign numbers in  
some orderly way as names or class-numbers to each of the various  
classes of numbers (the prime numbers, the odd numbers, and so on).  
Some of these class-numbers will qualify for membership in the class  
they name; others will not. For instance, if the number 41 should  
happen to be the class-number that names the class of numbers that  
are divisible by 7, then since 41 does not have the property of  
being divisible by 7, the class-number 41 would not be a member of  
the class it names.
	Now, consider the class-number of the class of class-numbers that  
are members of the class they name. Does it have the defining  
property of the class it names? The question is unanswerable. Since  
the defining property of the class is that of being a class-number  
that is a member of the class it names, the necessary and sufficient  
condition for the class-number in question to be a member of the  
class it names turns out to be that it be a member of the class it  
names. In short, the number is a member if and only if it is a  
member. The criterion is circular--defined in terms of what was to  
be defined--and consequently not a criterion at all since it  
provides no way of determining whether or not the number is a member.
	The situation is obviously similar for the class-number of the  
complementary class of class-numbers--those that do not have the  
defining property of the class they name--since the criteria in the  
two cases are logically interdependent. The criterion of membership  
is likewise defined in circular fashion, and hence is vacuous. In  
addition, the criterion postulates an absurd analytic equivalence,  
that of the defining property with its negative. The question of  
whether the class-number is a member of the class it names is  
unanswerable, with the result that any proposed answer is neither  
true nor false. In addition, of course, any answer would generate  
paradox: the number has the requisite defining property if and only  
if it does not have it.
	As might be expected, the situation is not significantly different  
for the class-number of classes of which the definition involves  
semantic predicates. Consider, for instance, the class of class- 
numbers of which it is provable that they are members of the class  
they name. The question of whether the class-number of the class is  
a member of the class it numbers is undecidable. The possession by  
the class-number of the property requisite for membership is  
conditional upon the question of whether it provably possesses the  
property, with the result that the question can have no answer.  
Otherwise stated, the number has the defining property of the class  
it names if and only if it provably has that property. In these  
circumstances, the explanation of what it means for the class-number  
to have the property has to be circular in that it must define  
having the property in terms of having the property. The vacuity  
that results is hidden somewhat by the presence of the requirement  
of provability, but while provability might count as a necessary  
condition, in the present case it cannot be a sufficient one. In  
fact, its presence creates a semantically absurd situation: the  
analytic equivalence of having the property and provably having it.  
The statement of the 

Re: [Fis] FIS Discussion (No Vol #)

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Alex,

On 02 May 2016, at 08:30, Alex Hankey wrote:

RE Bruno Marchal: It is easier to explain the illusion of matter to  
something conscious than to explain the illusion of consciousness to  
something material.


ME: At the Consciousness Conference I found it extraordinary that at  
least one plenary presentation was centered round treating the wave  
function as a real entity in the (strongly) objective sense.


I was under the impression that Bernard D'Espagnat's work for which  
he received the Templeton Prize had definitively shown that nothing  
is 'objectively real' in the strongly objective sense. The definite  
existence of quantum correlations destroys all that.


Is that not self-defeating? How could the quantum correlations  
existence be definite if nothing is objective?
With Digital Mechanism we need to accept that the existence of the  
universal machine and the computations is as real/true as the facts of  
elementary arithmetic, on which everyone agree(*). Then we can explain  
why machines develop a belief in a physical reality, and why that  
beliefs can last and can be sharable among many individuals, like with  
the quanta, and why some part of those beliefs are not sharable, yet  
undoubtable, like the qualia.


(*) I like to define Arithmetical Realism by the action of not  
withdrawing your kids from school when they learn the table of  
addition and multiplication. It is mainly the belief that 2+2=5 is not  
correct.




Once this is accepted, the enquirer is faced with the question of  
what to accept as fundamental. I have always considered  
'information' in the sense of the process or flow that connects the  
observed to the observer as a satisfactory alternative. The process  
of information flow creates the observer-observed relationship and  
(the illusion of??) their separation.


I can be OK with this. In arithmetic, it is more like a consciousness  
flow, and actually a differentiating consciousness flow, from which  
the laws of physics evolve.






Sequences of information production made possible by lack of  
equilibrium, both mechanical and thermodynamic, create pictures of  
particle tracks at the microscopic level, and pictures of objects at  
the macroscopic level.


This already seem to presuppose a physical reality. As I am interested  
in understanding what that could be and where it comes from, I prefer  
to not assume it. I gave an argument why such an assumption is not  
quite compatible with the digital mechanist assumption (not in  
physics, but in cognitive science).





Everything is made consistent by the existence of quantum  
correlations in mathematical ways use by Everett in the book on the  
Many Worlds interpretation by Bryce De Witt (note that I use the  
mathematics, but do not concur with the interpretation).


Everett did not talk about a new interpretation. He just gave a new  
Quantum Mechanics formulation, which is basically the old one  
(Copenhagen) but without the assumption of a wave collapse. I tend to  
agree with David Deutsch on this: the "many-world" is just literal  
quantum mechanics, where we apply the wave or matrix equation to the  
observed and the observer as well.






In my approach, the universe continuously makes choices, and selects  
among its own futures. I had a lengthy conversation with Henry Stapp  
two days ago at the conference after his talk, and checked that he  
still approves of this approach.



The only problem with Everett theory, is that he used digital  
mechanism, and what I did show, is that this should force him to  
extend the embedding of the physicist in the wave to the embedding of  
the mathematician in arithmetic (a dormant notion, alas). The ultimate  
equation of physics might be only arithmetic (or anything Turing  
equivalent). All the rest becomes internal phenomenologies, at least  
assuming digital mechanism.
This makes also digital mechanism testable, by comparing the physical  
phenomenology with the actual observation. Up to now, it fits:  the  
quantum weirdness of the universal wave (the multiverse) seem to match  
well  the digital mechanist arithmetical weirdness of arithmetic  
(intuitively and formally).
The only trouble is that such a top down approach leads to complex  
unsolved problem in mathematics, which is normal, given the depth and  
complexity of the subject. I am not a defender of digital mechanism, I  
use it only because the philosophical and theological questions  
becomes mathematical problem. I search the key only under the lamp of  
mathematics.


Best,

Bruno




P.S. Thanks to all for making this such a rich and interesting  
discussion.


--
Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India
Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195
Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789


2015 JPBMB 

[Fis] FIS Discussion (No Vol #)

[Alex Hankey]

RE Bruno Marchal: It is easier to explain the illusion of matter to
something conscious than to explain the illusion of consciousness to
something material.

ME: At the Consciousness Conference I found it extraordinary that at least
one plenary presentation was centered round treating the wave function as a
real entity in the (strongly) objective sense.

I was under the impression that Bernard D'Espagnat's work for which he
received the Templeton Prize had definitively shown that nothing is
'objectively real' in the strongly objective sense. The definite existence
of quantum correlations destroys all that.

Once this is accepted, the enquirer is faced with the question of what to
accept as fundamental. I have always considered 'information' in the sense
of the process or flow that connects the observed to the observer as a
satisfactory alternative. The process of information flow creates the
observer-observed relationship and (the illusion of??) their separation.

Sequences of information production made possible by lack of equilibrium,
both mechanical and thermodynamic, create pictures of particle tracks at
the microscopic level, and pictures of objects at the macroscopic level.
Everything is made consistent by the existence of quantum correlations in
mathematical ways use by Everett in the book on the Many Worlds
interpretation by Bryce De Witt (note that I use the mathematics, but do
not concur with the interpretation).

In my approach, the universe continuously makes choices, and selects among
its own futures. I had a lengthy conversation with Henry Stapp two days ago
at the conference after his talk, and checked that he still approves of
this approach.

My best to all,

Alex

P.S. Thanks to all for making this such a rich and interesting discussion.

-- 
Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India
Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195
Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789


2015 JPBMB Special Issue on Integral Biomathics: Life Sciences, Mathematics
and Phenomenological Philosophy

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[Fis] _ Discussion

[Maxine Sheets-Johnstone]

To all colleagues,

I hope I may voice a number of concerns that have arisen in the course
of the ongoing discussions that are ostensibly about phenomenology and
the life sciences.

The concerns begin with a non-recognition of what is surely the ground
floor of real-life, real-time realities, namely, animation, not in the
sense of being alive or in opposition to the inanimate, but in the sense
of motion, movement, kinetics. As Aristotle cogently remarked,
“Nature is a principle of motion and change. . . . We must therefore see
that we understand what motion is; for if it were unknown, nature too
would be unknown” (Physics 200b12-14).

Through and through--from animate organisms to an ever-changing world--
movement is foundational to understandings of subject and world, and of
subject/world relationships, and this whether subject and world are
examined phenomenologically or scientifically. In short, movement is at
the core of information and meaning, at the core of mind and 
consciousness,

at the core of both gestural and verbal language, at the core of nervous
system and organic functionings, at the core of molecular 
transformations,
at the core of ellipses, electrons, gravity, waves, particles, and so 
on,
and further, at the core of time, the concept, measurement, and meaning 
of

time.

I enumerate below specifics with respect to what is essentially the
foundational dynamic reality. The summary concerns are followed by
references that document each concern. If further specifics are wanted 
or

if specific articles are wanted, kindly contact m...@uoregon.edu

(1). Instincts and/or feelings motivate animate organisms to move.
Without such instincts or feelings there would be no disposition
to move. An ‘animate organism’ would in truth be akin to a statue,
a statue Condillac described two and a half centuries ago as having
first this sense given to it, then that sense given to it, but that,
lacking movement, is powerless to gain knowledge of the world. Such
a movement deficient creature would furthermore lack the biological
capacity of responsivity, a near universal characteristic of life.
The startle reflex is a premier example. Can what is evolutionarily
given be “illogical”? Clearly, feelings are not “illogical,” but move
through animate bodies, moving them to move. Without feelings of
curiosity, for example, or awe, or wonder, there would be no exploration
of the natural world, no investigations, hence no “information.”
Furthermore, without feelings of movement—initially, from an 
evolutionary
perspective, no proprioception, and later, no kinesthesia--there would 
be

no near and far, no weak and strong, no straight and curved, and so on,
hence, no determinations of Nature. In short, there would be no 
information

and no meaning. (See Note #1: The Primacy of Movement)

(2). An excellent lead-in to scientific understandings of movement and
its inherent dynamics lies in the extensive research and writings of
J. A. Scott Kelso, Pierre de Fermat Laureate in 2007. Kelso was founder
of the Center for Brain and Behavioral Studies and its Director for 
twenty
years. His rigorous multi-dimensional experimental studies are anchored 
in

coordination dynamics, an anchorage that is unconstrained by dogma. The
breadth of his knowledge and his sense of open inquiry is apparent in 
the
literature he cites in conjunction with his articles and books. His 
recent

article in Biological Cybernetics that focuses on “Agency” is strikingly
relevant to the present FIS discussion. It takes experience into 
account,
specifically in the form of “positive feedback,” which obviously 
involves
kinesthesia in a central way. Moreover his upcoming Opinion piece in 
Trends
in Cognitive Science should be essential reading. (See Note #2: “The 
Coordination
Dynamics of Mobile Conjugate Reinforcement” and The Complementary 
Nature)


(3). As pointed out elsewhere, “Certainly words carry no patented 
meanings,
but the term ‘phenomenology’ does seem stretched beyond its limits when 
it
is used to denote either mere reportorial renderings of perceptible 
behaviors
or actions, or any descriptive rendering at all of perceptible behaviors 
or
actions. At the least, ‘phenomenology’ should be recognized as a very 
specific
mode of epistemological inquiry invariably associated with the name 
Edmund Husserl. . . . ”
Phenomenological inquiries are tethered to a very specific methodology, 
one as
rigorous as that of science. Phenomenological findings are furthermore 
open to

verification by others, precisely as in science. Moreover two forms of
phenomenological analysis warrant recognition: static and genetic, the 
former
being a determination of the essential character of the object of 
inquiry, the
second being a determination of how the meaning of that object of 
inquiry came

to be constituted, hence an inquiry into sedimentations of meaning, into
protentions and retentions, into horizons of meaning, and so on. Thus 
too,
what warrants

Re: [Fis] DISCUSSION SESSION: INFOBIOSEMIOTICS

[Mark Johnson]

I'd be interested to know whether "mattering" is considered within
"meaning". I suspect "mattering" is distinct.

thinking aloud

Science isn't just meaningful. It matters to scientists. Perhaps it's
only because it matters to some people, it exists.

Re. meaning, I think the connection between meaning and expectation is
correct. I agree Shannon is helpful for constructing approaches to
explore this. But we expect many things, yet only a few of them really
matter.

There are many varieties of transcendental argument about information
which start from assumed mechanistic properties of nature. Yet we have
no certainty about whether nature's apparent regularities are real or
not - it is conjecture. There does appear to be a kind of "cybernetic
functionalism" (which I think is what Soren is complaining about)
which maintains scepticism about reality at one level, and positivism
at another. Not all cybernetics is culpable of this however. I would
be interested in an approach to information which avoids untestable
assumptions about "natural necessity".

Is there a "personalist" interpretation of information which starts
from concrete personal being (note that 'personal' does not have to
mean "individual": persons well be relations), and does not seek to
reduce personal being to more abstract "foundations"?

From a personalist perspective, information may simply be constraint.
Is the difference between things that matter and things that mean
something differences in relations between constraints? Bateson's
double-bind, which definitely matters to those caught in it, is a
particular dynamics of constraint. Bateson also specified constraint
dynamics in what he called "symmetrical schizmogenesis" (seen in
tit-for-tat engagements, fighting) and "complementary schizmogenesis"
(seen in master slave relations). This is a good start

A question which I don't think Bateson addresses, but maybe Ashby had
an idea about, is what science would look like if we sought agreement
about the constraints which we share rather than our theories about
causation. I don't think that would be a functionalist pursuit.

Best wishes,

Mark







On 9 April 2016 at 11:21, Loet Leydesdorff  wrote:
> Dear Pedro,
>
>
>
> I disagree about putting "meaning" outside the scope of natural sciences.
>
>
>
> I doubt that anybody on this list would disagree about using the metaphor of
> meaning in the natural sciences.
>
>
>
> Maturana (1978, p. 49): “In still other words, if an organism is observed in
> its operation within a second-order consensual domain, it appears to the
> observer as if its nervous system interacted with internal representations
> of the circumstances of its interactions, and as if the changes of state of
> the organism were determined by the semantic value of these representations.
> Yet all that takes place in the operation of the nervous system is the
> structure-determined dynamics of changing relations of relative neuronal
> activity proper to a closed neuronal network.”
>
> http://www.enolagaia.com/M78BoL.html#Descriptions
>
>
>
> In other context, Maturana used the concept of “languaging”.
>
>
>
> My point is about the differentia specifica of inter-human communication
> which assumes a next-order contingency of expectations structured by
> “horizons of meaning” (Husserl). One needs a specific (social-science) set
> of theories and methods to access this domain, in my opinion. In concrete
> projects, one can try to operationalize in terms of the information sciences
> / information theory. One can also collaborate “interdisciplinarily” at the
> relevant interface, notably with the computer sciences. The use of metaphors
> in other disciplines, however,  cannot be denied.
>
>
>
> This is just a reaction; I had one penny left this week. J
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Loet
>
>
>
>
> ___
> Fis mailing list
> Fis@listas.unizar.es
> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>



-- 
Dr. Mark William Johnson
Institute of Learning and Teaching
Faculty of Health and Life Sciences
University of Liverpool

Visiting Professor
Far Eastern Federal University, Russia

Phone: 07786 064505
Email: johnsonm...@gmail.com
Blog: http://dailyimprovisation.blogspot.com

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Re: [Fis] DISCUSSION SESSION: INFOBIOSEMIOTICS

[Francesco Rizzo]

Caro Karl,
la chiamiamo natura, ma è tutta arte. A. Einstein e S. Hawking pensavano
che Dio non giocasse a dadi. Il primo non ha avuto il tempo di ricredersi,
il secondo si. Ha perso una scommessa, circa la non emissione di
informazione da parte dei buchi neri sostenuta nel 1975, dopo (2004-5) ha
dovuto ricredersi. Io da economista, non da fisico, secondo il mio processo
di tras-in-forma-azione che ha come "input" (immissione) la materia,
l'energia e l'informazione e come "output"  (emissione) la materia,
l'energia e l'informazione in stato diverso, la pensa(vo) diversamente: ed
ho avuto ragione. La natura non ha bisogno di retorica ed è
ininterrottamente sottoposta ad un processo di trasinformazione a partire
dal "big bang". Nei primi tre vv. della "Genesi", che può condividersi
senza avere alcuna fede religiosa, è scritto: "In principio Dio creò il
cielo e la terra. La terra era informe e deserta e le tenebre ricoprivano
l'abisso e lo spirito di Dio aleggiava sulle acque. Dio disse: 'Sia luce!'.
E la luce fu". In questo processo informazione significa dare o prendere
forma. Quindi l'informazione "non" è il modo che ciò che è il caso si
differenzia da ciò che non il caso, tranne che non si voglia sostituire
caso con caos. Io uso "sfondo e primo piano in concomitanza e gioc(o) con
interferenza tra i due", perché la conoscenza ha fondamenti biologici e
dipende dall'immaginazione umana che si realizza a diversi livelli di
inferenza - da molto astratti a molto concreti -  e in una dinamica
spazio-temporale.
Comunque, non ho la pretesa di possedere alcuna verità. E ascolto e leggo
sempre con attenzione le parole dette e scritte dagli altri. Specialmente
se autorevoli.
Grazie.
Francesco

2016-04-09 18:24 GMT+02:00 Karl Javorszky :

> not in Italian but in full concordance with what Rico ha dito:
> information as a concept lies behind all and each of the ways of looking
> at the world. Whatever the picture, it has a background to it.
> Could it be that a description of the background is common to each and all
> of the pictures one makes of the world?
>
> Rational thinking has always been cautious and only permitted speaking
> about what is clearly delineated. All other is art.
> Now we see that Nature is not that well educated in rhetoric, and makes
> allusions also to that what is the background in our imagination. She
> simply does not use our perspectives and our bifurcations. She uses
> background and foreground concurrently and plays with interferences between
> the two.
>
> The general answer to "and relative to what?" is non-existence as such,
> the background sui generis. That, to which everything else is different,
> just like the thing as such has something common with everything else. The
> general idea of how different a background is to the foreground shown/known
> could well be the root for the concept of information. That what we know,
> what is the case, is no information. Information is how that what is the
> case differs from what is not the case.
> Karl
> On 9 Apr 2016 16:56, "Francesco Rizzo" <13francesco.ri...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Cari Tutti,
>> il concetto o significato di informazione è unico, quel che varia è il
>> modo di qualificarlo o quantificarlo in ragione dei diversi tipi o
>> categorie di informazione: naturale o termodinamica, genetica, semantica e
>> matematica. E questo lo dico da studioso di economia della scienza o
>> dell'esistenza, non da studioso di esistenza o  della scienza economica.
>> Un abbraccio, non solo fisico, ma anche emo-ra-zionale.
>> Francesco
>>
>> 2016-04-09 12:21 GMT+02:00 Loet Leydesdorff :
>>
>>> Dear Pedro,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I disagree about putting "meaning" outside the scope of natural
>>> sciences.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I doubt that anybody on this list would disagree about using the
>>> metaphor of meaning in the natural sciences.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Maturana (1978, p. 49): “In still other words, if an organism is
>>> observed in its operation within a second-order consensual domain, it
>>> appears to the observer as if its nervous system interacted with internal
>>> representations of the circumstances of its interactions, and as if the
>>> changes of state of the organism were determined by the semantic value of
>>> these representations. Yet all that takes place in the operation of the
>>> nervous system is the structure-determined dynamics of changing relations
>>> of relative neuronal activity proper to a closed neuronal network.”
>>>
>>> http://www.enolagaia.com/M78BoL.html#Descriptions
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> In other context, Maturana used the concept of “languaging”.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> My point is about the *differentia specifica* of inter-human
>>> communication which assumes a next-order contingency of expectations
>>> structured by “horizons of meaning” (Husserl). One needs a specific
>>> (social-science) set of theories and methods to access this domain, in my
>>> opinion. In concrete projects, one can try 

Re: [Fis] DISCUSSION SESSION: INFOBIOSEMIOTICS

[Pedro C. Marijuan]

Dear FIS Colleagues,

A brief note on the variety of exchanges. It is quite intriguing that 
fundamental questions on mathematics (geometry/algebra), computation, 
quantum mechanics, and biology converge on a pretty similar "information 
stuff". Considering the social sciences domain too, where information 
becomes obvious (helas, too obvious to inquire on it!), the timeliness 
of our discussions is exciting.


I disagree about putting "meaning" outside the scope of natural 
sciences. The current bio-info revolution concerning omic disciplines, 
evo-devo, ecology, etc. has stumbled upon meaning although most often in 
empirical, applied domains. What does mean this or that signal? Gene 
knockouts, microarrays, computational inference, etc. provide a massive 
response that has to be interpreted functionally via the new ontologies. 
Perhaps most theoretical interpretations have gone towards the "in 
silico" worlds and bio-computational perspectives, but there is plenty 
of stirring in most fields.


In neuroscience, a similar revolution has been occurring, although 
perhaps at a slower pace, via all the advancements in imaging, 
connectomics, massive modeling procedures, etc. Meaning is explicitly 
considered by authors such as Edelman, Fuster, Berthoz, Dehaene, Tononi, 
Sporns, Frinston, etc. Well, one would like to see how the different 
notions of info, meaning, memory, knowledge, etc. are elegantly cohered, 
articulated, and well connected --in my view, always around the 
advancement of a life cycle. And that should also include the origins 
and evolutionary path of nervous systems (curiously, they did not appear 
for info concerns but for osmotic/trophic functions).


In both biological and neuronal sciences, this enterprise of linking the 
advancement of a life cycle with the communication with the environment 
needs philosophical commitment too, as the itinerary is full of 
"provincial" ways of thinking that have created artificial borders to 
the intercommunication of ideas. Some parties have argued that a new 
info philosophy should be framed, and that should include contribution 
of the closest schools of thinking (perspectivism/phenomenology for my 
personal taste).


The convergence with physics does not look so far away (as has been 
properly claimed by some discussants). Self-production via communication 
with the environment by assemblages of excitable elements, counting with 
algorithmic devices that mirror how the inner and outer worlds coalesce, 
in one case genomes and in the other mystical or Platonic "laws of 
nature" (what strange existentiality do they have!), may finally 
represent a common panorama.


About the ways and means to overcome the complexity crisis that 
surrounds even the more modest steps in the information adventure... I 
have no idea (but to establish a shield with basic consensus in 
"principled" matters).


Best regards--Pedro

El 07/04/2016 a las 13:05, Christophe escribió:


Dear Soren,
To avoid a possible misunderstanding let me say that the MGS has no 
ambition to reach a ’full Peircean semiotic framework’.
The Meaning Generator System has been designed to introduce what 
looked to me as missing in the young ‘science of cognition’ in the mid 
90’s. ‘Meaning’ was a key concept without any model for meaning 
generation in an evolutionary perspective. The MGS was designed to 
fill the gap. At that time I did not know about Peirce (was at IBM on 
very different subjects). Information on Peirce work came in later.
The MGS has some compatibility with the Peircean approach as both rely 
on interpretation. But two key points of the MGS are not really 
present in the Peircean framework: the evolutionary story from animals 
to humans and the development of a meaning generation process (Peirce 
tells about the generated meaning (the Interpretant) but does not tell 
much about a meaning generation process (the Interpreter)).
So my question about the MGS as a possible introduction to the 
concepts of meaning and experience is not to be understood as strictly 
part of the Perceian semiotic framework. And the question is still 
being asked.

Best
Christophe



*De :* Søren Brier <sb@cbs.dk>
*Envoyé :* mercredi 6 avril 2016 02:04
*À :* 'Christophe'
*Cc :* fis@listas.unizar.es
*Objet :* SV: [Fis] _ DISCUSSION SESSION: INFOBIOSEMIOTICS

Dear Christophe

Never the less we consider that cats and dogs or dolphins –I have 
played with them all – to have an inner experimental life in order 
also to support their perceptual skills for instance and they have 
memory and recognition capabilities.


I do appreciate that you work with these things and try to move your 
modelling more towards a Peircean biosemiotic paradigm. But in what I 
have seen from you so far I do not think you have moved to a full 
Peircean semiotic framework.


But even if

Re: [Fis] _ DISCUSSION SESSION: INFOBIOSEMIOTICS

[Loet Leydesdorff]

Dear Soren,

 

It is very strange for me to read yours –as usual very learned – text,
because your understanding of what it is I am trying to do is so different
from my own understanding. Though I have had great pleasure of reading you
works over the years I am not sure that you have read much of mine.

 

I read quite a bit of your texts, but I may have misunderstood. In that
case, I apologize.

 

Non-biologist usually underestimate the complexity of biological processes. 

 

I agree.

 

I do not know what you mean when you write about semiotics that it’s:”
status is not different from a methodology or a mathematical theory of
communication”? You seem to assume some postulate from me that is not
explicit in the text.

 

I formulated (quote):

 

“A mathematical theory of information (e.g., Shannon) enables us to
entertain models that one can use from one level to another, for testing
hypothesis. These models may come from biology (e.g. Lotka-Volterra),
engineering (anticipatory systems; Dubois), complex systems theory (Simon,
Ashby), etc. For example: can interactions among codes be modeled using
Lotka-Volterra? (Ivanova , 2014; in Scientometrics). The math is
not meta, but epi because the other domains can also be considered as
specific domains of communication. Maturana, for example, argues that a
biology is generated whenever molecules can be communicated (as more complex
than atoms exchanged in a chemistry).”

 

3. But of cause if you deny the central idea in systems theory and
especially Luhmann’s triple autopoietic theory of closed communication
systems, which I have accepted but want to put into a semiotic, pragmaticist
methodology and metaphysical framework, then of cause we do not speak the
same language at all and may be in a situation of incommensurability. 

 

I am not so sure that inter-human communications are closed in terms of
codes being unambiguous. It seems to me that differently coded
communications can always be translated more or less. Luhmann is often too
apodictic. For example, his notion of “truth” as the code for scholarly
communication seems not to hold empirically.

 

Let’s enjoy the communication. I am sorry if I offended you.

 

Best,

Loet

 

It is my feeling that you do not see what I see and attempts to communicate
and that you project postulates from scientistic researcher onto my theory
blocking you from seeing what it is I want to communicate. So I do not know
if we disagree – because that demands some mutual level of  understanding.

 

  Best

 Søren

 

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Re: [Fis] _ DISCUSSION SESSION: INFOBIOSEMIOTICS

[Loet Leydesdorff]

Dear Soren, 

 

In my opinion, there are two issues here (again J ):

 

1. the issue of non-verbal (e.g., bodily) communication; 

2. the meta-biological or transdisciplinary integration vs. the
differentiation among the disciplines.

 

Ad 1. Although I don't agree with Luhmann on many things, his insistence
that everything communicated among humans is culturally coded, is fully
acceptable to me. "Love" is not a counter-example. Unlike animals, our
behavior is regulated by codes of communication. Preparing "Love" as a
passion, Luhmann spent months in the Bibliotheque Nationale in Paris reading
the emergence of romantic love in the literature of the early 18th century.
A similar intuition can be found in Giddens' book "The Transformation of
Intimacy". Of course, one sometimes needs bodily presence; Luhmann uses here
the concept of "symbiotic mechanisms"; but this is only relevant for the
variation. The selection mechanisms - which impulses are to be followed -
are cultural. Among human beings, this means: in terms of mutual and/or
shared expectations. The realm of expecting the other to entertain
expectations, shapes a "second contingency" which is otherwise absent in the
animal kingdom. (If you wish, you can consider it as a function of the
cortex as a symbiotic mechanism.)

 

This special status of human society should make us resilient against using
biological metaphors. Socio-biology has a terrible history since it links
social processes with evolutionary ones. The rule of law, however, protects
us against "survival of the fittest" as a structure of expectations. One
cannot define "the fittest" without using one (coded!) vocabulary or
another, and these vocabularies (discourses; Foucault) can be different; but
always disciplining. The codes function as selection mechanisms different
from an assumed "nature". (Inga Ivanova used the term "fractional
manifold".) The selection mechanisms are also coordination mechanisms; their
differentiation enables us to process more complexity.

 

2. As Krippendorff once emphasized, one should be suspicious about using the
word "system" in this context because it entails a biological metaphor of
integration and wholeness. Because the codes tend to differentiate and thus
to generate misunderstandings (variation), the social system can process
complexity by an order of magnitude more than any biological system. The
notion of "system" tends to reify, whereas in sociological theorizing it is
important to keep a firm eye on the second contingency of interacting
expectations. The clarification of misunderstandings, for example, enables
us to solve problems; sometimes one may need to invent new metaphors and
words. From this perspective, the sciences can be considered as rationalized
systems of expectations which operate in terms of codes retained above the
individual level. (Note that this is different from belief structures - cf.
the sociology of scientific knowledge of Bloor and Barnes -- because beliefs
remain attributes to agents of communities of agents.)

 

"Transdisciplinary integration" may be needed for one's internal well-being
(or soul), but it can be expected to remain a local instantiation. Since we
decapitated the ointed body of the King of France, there is no center left
(Lyotard). One may feel a need for integration and community. Community is
another coded form of communication (religion?). I provocatively advised my
students to keep that celebration for the Sunday mornings. Aren't we
celebrating our community today?

 

Central to our community is the notion of "information". A mathematical
theory of information (e.g., Shannon) enables us to entertain models that
one can use from one level to another, for testing hypothesis. These models
may come from biology (e.g. Lotka-Volterra), engineering (anticipatory
systems; Dubois), complex systems theory (Simon, Ashby), etc. For example:
can interactions among codes be modeled using Lotka-Volterra? (Ivanova
, 2014; in Scientometrics). The math is not meta, but epi
because the other domains can also be considered as specific domains of
communication. Maturana, for example, argues that a biology is generated
whenever molecules can be communicated (as more complex than atoms exchanged
in a chemistry).

 

3. Let me return to the theme of "love": note the transition from "Love" as
Christ, and thus the only intimate relations (17th century) to love as
passion in interpersonal relations. Here, Husserl is relevant: the
intersubjective is secularized. Luhmann proposed to operationalize this as
communication. In later work (after 1990), Luhmann than moved from the
communication of expectations to "observations". Observations, however,
serve us to update the expectations. The dynamics of expectations are the
proper subject of a sociology. Observations presume observing "systems"; but
it is problematic to consider evolving discourse as a "system" (see above).
The codes in the communication of expectations enable us also 

Re: [Fis] _ DISCUSSION SESSION: INFOBIOSEMIOTICS

[Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic]

Dear colleagues,
In my understanding, both Loet and Søren are right. Loet about how sciences 
look like today and Sören about the need of integrative processes in the future.


Sören:
Thus the question is how can we establish an alternative transdisciplinary 
model of the sciences and the humanities to the logical positivist reductionism 
on one hand and to postmodernist relativist constructivism on the other in the 
form of a transdisciplinary concept of Wissenschaft (i.e. “knowledge creation”, 
implying both subjectivism and objectivism)? The body and its meaning-making 
processes is a complex multidimensional object of research that necessitates 
trans-disciplinary theoretical approaches including biological sciences, 
primarily biosemiotics and bio-cybernetics, cognition and communication 
sciences, phenomenology, hermeneutics, philosophy of science and philosophical 
theology (Harney 2015, Davies & Gregersen 2009).


Loet:
The organization of bodies of knowledge in the sciences takes place at another 
level than the integration of cognition in the body of an individual. One 
cannot reduce the one level to the other, in my opinion. Which research program 
of these two has priority? How do they relate – potentially differently – to 
information?




On all levels, knowledge is a result of two opposed processes – integration and 
differentiation of information. Here data can be seen as atoms of information. 
I take it to be self-evident that knowledge is produced by all living 
organisms, individually and in groups, from bacteria or single cells in a 
multicellular organism up. So yes, knowledge is not only what individuals have 
in their bodies as saved data/ information/ knowledge (Here I think of the 
process of formation ever more complex structures from data to information to 
knowledge to wisdom (Tom Stonier). Knowledge is shared by communities of 
practice.

Interestingly, there is already today a body of knowledge about integrative 
research projects, especially developed in applied research such as one aiming 
at solving wicked, ill-defined, real-world problems such as problems of 
environment and sustainable development. Also, medicine is a field where more 
and more transdisciplinary approaches can be found such as in cancer research 
where models are made ranging from molecular up to macroscopic social 
structures, where all disparate research fields such as molecular biology and 
epidemiology contribute to build a complex, multi-faceted knowledge of the 
phenomenon. As an illustration, have a look at: 
http://www.transdisciplinarity.ch/td-net/Aktuell.html

Two handbooks are also of interest:

Hadorn, G.H. et al., 2008. Handbook of transdisciplinary research, Springer 
Netherlands.

Frodeman, R., Klein, J.T. & Mitcham, C. eds., 2010. The Oxford Handbook of 
Interdisciplinarity, OUP Oxford.

How does information enter this process of integration of knowledge from 
diverse research domains?

Dodig-Crnkovic G., Physical Computation as Dynamics of Form that Glues 
Everything Together<http://www.mdpi.com/2078-2489/3/2/204/pdf>,
Information<http://www.mdpi.com/2078-2489/3/2/204> 
(doi:10.3390/info3020204<http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/info3020204>) Special Issue 
on Information: Its Different Modes and Its Relation to 
Meaning<http://www.mdpi.com/journal/information/special_issues/information_meaning/>,
 R. Logan Ed., 2012 3(2), 204-218

Best,
Gordana




Gordana Dodig Crnkovic, Professor of Computer Science
Vice Dean of Graduate Education
Department of Applied IT
Chalmers University of Technology & University of Gothenburg, Sweden
http://www.ait.gu.se/kontaktaoss/personal/gordana-dodig-crnkovic/
School of Innovation, Design and Engineering, Mälardalen University
http://www.mrtc.mdh.se/~gdc/


From: Fis <fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es<mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es>> 
on behalf of Loet Leydesdorff 
<l...@leydesdorff.net<mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net>>
Organization: University of Amsterdam
Reply-To: "l...@leydesdorff.net<mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net>" 
<l...@leydesdorff.net<mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net>>
Date: Saturday 2 April 2016 at 13:04
To: "'Pedro C. Marijuan'" 
<pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es<mailto:pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es>>, 
"fis@listas.unizar.es<mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es>" 
<fis@listas.unizar.es<mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es>>
Subject: Re: [Fis] _ DISCUSSION SESSION: INFOBIOSEMIOTICS


Thus the question is how can we establish an alternative transdisciplinary 
model of the sciences and the humanities to the logical positivist reductionism 
on one hand and to postmodernist relativist constructivism on the other in the 
form of a transdisciplinary concept of Wissenschaft (i.e. “knowledge creation”, 
implying both subjectivism and objectivism)? The body and its meaning-making 
processes is a complex multidimensio

[Fis] _ DISCUSSION SESSION: INFOBIOSEMIOTICS

[Pedro C. Marijuan]

Dear FIS Colleagues,

I am attaching herein Soeren's presentation. If you have any trouble 
with the attachment, the file is in fis web pages too:


http://fis.sciforum.net/fis-discussion-sessions/

By clicking on Soeren Brier's session (highlighted in red) you can 
immediately obtain it.


Nevertheless, below there is a selection of more general ideas from the 
paper. For those interested in FIS "archeology", Soeren presented in 
January 2004 a discussion session on Information, Autopoiesis, Life and 
Semiosis. It  can be found by scrolling in the same above link.


Best greetings--Pedro

-


 Infobiosemiotics


Søren Brier, CBS

This discussion aims at contributing to the definition of a universal 
concept of information covering objective as well as subjective 
experiential and intersubjective meaningful cognition and communication 
argued in more length in Brier (2015a). My take on the problem is that 
information is not primarily a technological term but a phenomenon that 
emerges from intersubjective meaningful sign based cognition and 
communication in living systems. The purpose of this discussion is to 
discuss a possible philosophical framework for an integral and more 
adequate concept of information uniting all isolated disciplines (Brier, 
2010, 2011, 2013a+b+c).


The attempts to create /objective concepts/ of information were good for 
technology (Brilliouin 1962) and the development of AI, but not able to 
develop theories that could include the /experiential (*subjective*) 
aspect/ of informing that leads to meaning in the social setting (Brier 
2015b). The statistical concept of Shannon (Shannon and Weaver 
1963/1948) is the most famous objective concept but it was only a 
technical invention based on a mathematical concept of entropy, but 
never intended to encompass meaning.Norbert Wiener (/1963) /combined the 
mathematics statistical with Boltzmann’s thermodynamically entropy 
concept and defined information as neg-entropy. Wiener then saw the 
statistical information’s entropy as a representation for mind and the 
thermodynamically entropy as representing matter. So he thought he had 
solved the mind matter problem through his and Schrödinger’s (1944/2012) 
definition of information as neg-entropy. The idea was developed further 
into an evolutionary and ecological framework by Gregory Bateson (1972, 
1979, 19827) resulting in an ecological cybernetic concept of mind as 
self-organized differences that made a difference for a cybernetically 
conceptualized mind (Brier 2008b). But this concepts that could not 
encompass meaning and experience of embodied living and social systems 
(Brier 2008a, 2010, 2011).


My main point is that from the present material, energetic or 
informational ontologies worldview we do not have any idea of how life, 
feeling, awareness and qualia could emerge from that foundation.


Ever since Russell and Whitehead’s attempt in Principia Mathematica to 
make a unified mathematical language for all sciences and logical 
positivism failed (Carnap, 1967 & Cartwright et.al. 1996),the strongest 
paradigm attempting in a new unification is now the info-computational 
formalism based on the mathematic calculus developed by Gregory Chaitin 
(2006 and 2007) ). The paradigm is only in its early beginning and is 
looking for a concept of natural computing (Dodig-Crnkovic, 2012) going 
beyond the Turing concept of computing. But even that still does not 
encompass the experiential feeling mind and the meaning orienting aspect 
of intersubjective communication wither be only sign or also language based.


So far there is no conclusive evidence to make us believe that the core 
of reality across nature, culture, life and mind is purely absolute 
mathematical law as Penrose (2004) seems to suggest or purely 
computational.Meaning is a way of making ‘sense’ of things for the 
individual in the world perceived. It is a non-mathematical existential 
feeling aspect of life related to reflection past, present and future of 
existence in the surrounding environment, in humans enhanced by 
language, writings, pictures, music through culture. In animals 
cognition and communication are connected to survival, procreation and 
pleasure. In humans beings cognition develops into consciousness through 
subjective experiential and meaning based (self-) reflection of the 
individual’s role in the external world and becomes an existential aspect.


My conclusion is therefore that a broader foundation is needed in order 
to understand the basis for information and communication in living 
systems. Therefore we need to include a phenomenological and 
hermeneutical ground in order to integrate a theory of 
interpretative//subjective/ and intersubjective meaning and 
signification with a theory of /objective/ information, which has a 
physical grounding (see for instance Plamen, Rosen & Gare 2015). Thus 
the ques

[Fis] Discussion Recap.

[Raquel del Moral]

Hi to everyone,

Sorry for my tardiness (life within a PhD is not very easy!)

First, I am happy that every body has agreed on the conceptual chain 
genotype-phenotype-sociotype. For me that's important, as it is one of 
the foundations of my own work and the research project associated.

I return to John Collier’s comments on sets of behaviors (praxotype) and 
cognitive capabilities (cognotype). It calls my attention that the 
cognotype is defined as a software: something configurable and 
extendable. This point makes me consider: has our cognition limits? From 
my point of view, the brain needs to be stimulated in order to be 
minimally functional, to feel good. Brain stimulation is needed to 
fix, maintain and strengthen the whole knowledge architecture, 
particularly in the social domain. Is there also an upper limit in this 
cognitive stimulation, or do we have unlimited processing capabilities? 
Seemingly, over-stimulation is only possible for a while, after which 
you lose the mental resistance and exhaustion ensues. In general, 
over-stimulation becomes negative and produces stress (e.g. learning in 
babies). Therefore, I believe that effective processing capacity does 
move within certain limits or thresholds.

Following the need to distinguish levels, I see our cognitive skills set 
as the essential element (micro). The behavior of the individual, the 
adopted roles, and the multiple relational situations are social 
phenomena studied by social psychology. Ok, but in order to understand 
the emerging macro-variables of the social structure, one must always 
take into account the whole cognitive capabilities of the individual. 
Hence I consider they are closely related levels. Although they may not 
follow the same laws, I think that they converge in the fact of moving 
within approximate thresholds, outside of which the system effectiveness 
is lost.

To make it clearer, in the extent to which they are effective, we could 
explore quantitatively some of these individual/social thresholds. And 
that's the goal of my PhD Thesis on the sociotype, to try to capture a 
few of them. How many relationships? How much talk?


Thanks to all for the useful comments!
Raquel

-- 
-
Raquel del Moral
Grupo de Bioinformacion / Bioinformation Group

Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud
Avda. San Juan Bosco 13, 50009 Zaragoza
Tfno. +34 976 71 44 76
E-mail. rdelmoral.i...@aragon.es
-

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Re: [Fis] Discussion Recap.

[Loet Leydesdorff]

 Ok, but in order to understand the emerging macro-variables of the social
structure, one must always take into account the whole cognitive
capabilities of the individual. 

Dear Raquel and colleagues,

It seems to me that this misses the point that the non-linear dynamics of
the macro-system do not require that specific individuals participate at all
levels, in all dimensions, and at all times concurrently. One can only
access this system of expectations (horizons of meaning) insofar as has
developed cognitive competencies in relevant dimensions. 

For example, one cannot be an expert in all sciences at the same time
because of the different literatures. Thus, the social has a dimension of
its own (as cogitatum) which is reflexively accessible to cogitantes (us).
There is no need for reductionism. Luhmann, for example, used the concept of
interpenetration for this interfacing between meanings available at the
supra-individual and individual levels. I would take from him that the
interface can be considered as an operational coupling (in language and
symbols) that adds to the structural coupling between the social and
psychological. 

No need for reductionism or hierarchy! The dynamics operate in parallel with
windows on each other. One can try to specify the mechanisms of these
windows.

Best,
Loet


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[Fis] ongoing FIS discussion

[PEDRO CLEMENTE MARIJUAN FERNANDEZ]

- Mensaje original -
Message from Bruno Marchal--Hi Jerry, hi 
List,
 On 06 Jun 2012, at 17:43, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
 but offhand it seems to me to depedn on a sort of idealism that I do not 
 accept.
 It does not. It does rely on Church thesis, which relies on arithmetical 
 realism, that is the idea that elementary arithmetical truth are NOT a 
 creation of the mind, which is a form of 
 anti-idealism.---
 I am utterly confused by this post.
 It seems to intermingle mathematics, logic, philosophy and personal beliefs 
 without any apparent connection to the history of the subjects or science.
 My post was a pointer to a (technical) paper which proves that digital 
 mechanism, or computationalism, is incompatible with physicalism. The paper 
 is 
 here:http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
 In my url, you can find longer and more detailed versions (the longer one are 
 in french, alas).
 
 
 I have not any idea what elementary arithmetics truths means.  It is a 
 standard expression for logicians. It means all first order arithmetical 
 statements true in the usual structure (N, +, *).
 A first order logical sentence is a sentence build with the logic symbols (, 
 V, -, for all, it exists ...) and the arithmetical symbols s, 0, +, and 
 *. For example 6 is even abbreviates the true arithmetical sentences:
  It exists x such that s(s(s(s(s(s(0)= s(s(0)) * x.   (or 
 Ex(s(s(s(s(s(s(0)= s(s(0))*x)
 Elementary arithmetical truth can be seen as the collection of such 
 sentences. That set is well defined, even if it is not axiomatizable, nor 
 constructively definable. Technically, only a tiny subset has to be supposed 
 true independently of me.
 
 Do you wish to include or exclude logs?Log is not among the primitive 
 notions. But you can already defined the ceiling of log just with addition 
 and multiplication. Thanks to the work of Matiyasevich, it is not to 
 difficult to prove that addition and multiplication of natural numbers are 
 Turing universal. We can define all computable functions with s 
 (successor), (, ),  and + and *, and 0.
 
 
 Either way, are you including or excluding arithmetic and/or geometric 
 progressions from arithmetic realism?Could you be specific and point out 
 the exact relations between truths as used in this context and your 
 philosophy of physics?  Or the nature of physics?Truth means satisfied by 
 the model (N,+, *). (in the logician's sense, quite akin to our intuitive 
 idea of truth in arithmetic).
 The reasoning detailed in the paper mentioned above is hard to sum up. I hope 
 you agree that science has not yet decide between the Aristotelian 
 conception of reality and the Platonist conception of reality. 
 Basically, for the Aristotelian, the physical reality (what we observe and 
 measure) is real.For the Platonist, the physical reality is only the 
 shadow, or the border of something vaster. 
 What I explain in the paper is that IF we assume that there is a level of 
 description of my brain (even in a very large sense of the word) such that I 
 would survive with a digital substitution respecting functionality at that 
 level, then the Aristotelian picture of reality is no more consistent, and 
 the Platonic one is correct. The proof is constructive and explain how to 
 derive physics from arithmetic. It makes comp testable.
 
 
 
 a creation of the mind  ??  What does this possibly mean in this context? 
 In particular, do you wish to imply or infer or illate that the human mind 
 before the social creation of arithmetic symbol systems was somehow 
 non-creative??  VERY CONFUSING from a historical perspective.
 We must distinguish the arithmetical propositions and their content, with the 
 shape of the sentences used by humans to communicate and think about those 
 propositions. Comp needs Church's thesis, and Church's thesis need 
 arithmetical realism to make sense. But we need only to be realist on a tiny 
 fragment of arithmetic, usually accepted by both classical and intuitionist 
 mathematicians. Such tiny part of arithmetic is also needed to define what is 
 a formal system, and is accepted by formalist. It is equivalent with the 
 admission that all programs/machine stop or don't stop. This can be 
 translated into an arithmetical sentence.
 
 
 
 a form of anti-idealism??? Perhaps you mean something to do with 
 representation or symbolization of your beliefs?  Why introduce form as a 
 concept related to a personal view of anti-idealism   Makes no sense to 
 me.Your point is not clear. Idealists believe that reality is a creation of 
 the mind, and I explained that computationalism (my working hypothesis), just 
 to make sense, needs to assume that the arithmetical truth (actually a tiny 
 part of it) is independent of me (and you, and the physical universe if that 
 exists). 
 For example I accept that the table of addition and 

Re: [Fis] Discussion of Information Science Education

[Krassimir Markov]

Dear Gordana, Marcin and FIS Colleagues,

I think we all talk about a new interdisciplinary area, already called:

“Intelligence Science”

Please see:
http://www.intsci.ac.cn/en/index.html

Maybe it is good to name our summer school:

“Foundations of Intelligence Science”

Please comment this.

Friendly regards
Krassimir







From: Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic
Sent: Sunday, December 04, 2011 8:38 PM
To: Joseph Brenner
Cc: m...@aiu.ac.jp ; Krassimir Markov
Subject: RE: [Fis] Discussion of Information Science Education


Dear Joseph,

Now I have no right to post to the list, but I anyway want to say that I of 
course agree with you, and also that Loet made a good practical point.

We talk about two different things and I believe it could be useful to make 
this distinction as clear as possible.

If we (FIS = Foundations of Information Science) are something different 
from what is called “Information Science” and funded, supported by 40 
journals etc.

we must be able to show definitely the distinction and why this is 
important.



It also seems to me that what Marcin and Krassimir say is important, as we 
(FIS) see this synthetic potential to connect different seemingly disparate 
fields like

1. Nature

2. Living organisms

3. Society



That which “Information Science” is not interested in.

This is what it is about according to Bertram C. Brookes:

The foundations of information science Part I. Philosophical aspects

It is first argued that a niche for information science, unclaimed by any 
other discipline, can be found by admitting the near-autonomy of Popper's 
World III - the world of objective knowledge. The task of information 
science can then be defined as the exploration of this world of objective 
knowledge which is an extension of, but is distinct from, the world of 
documentation and librarianship. The Popperian ontology then has to be 
extended to admit the concept of information and its relation to subjective 
and objective know ledge. The spaces of Popper's three worlds are then con 
sidered. It is argued that cognitive and physical spaces are not identical 
and that this lack of identity creates problems for the proper 
quantification of information phenomena.

http://jis.sagepub.com/content/2/3-4/125.short



So this information is about human knowledge, as Marcin says.

But that is not the only or even the main interest of FIS.





Maybe “Information Science” is an already established name and maybe we have 
no chance to change it given existing structures of research communities.



But if we would insist that we work on the foundations of information which 
underlie all information (be it in inanimate nature, living beings or 
societies) that may make good practical sense.

“Foundations of Information” (and not “Foundations of Information Science”!) 
seems to be still free.

Pragmatically, I would insist that what we do is not Information science but 
Foundations of Information.

Of course, one may expect confusions again, but I would start from placing 
all those different fields in some boxes and say that we have a box of our 
own that no one else
dealing with information (in scientific way) have covered so far.

And I would insist on this synthetic capacity of information as FIS 
discusses it, which Marcin already pointed out.



Best, Gordana



PS

Krassimir, I think summer school is right idea and it would be good if 
discussion can help to understand what to present.







@bluewin.ch]
Sent: den 4 december 2011 16:19
To: Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic; Loet Leydesdorff
Cc: fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: Re: [Fis] Discussion of Information Science Education







Dear Gordana and Loet,







Ref.: Cat, Jordi. 2007. The Unity of Science. Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy.







I think you are being too defensive vis à vis the conventional idea of 
science. The authority of people who have decided to what information 
science must be limited may be open to criticism as reductionist, and there 
are views (see attached) that emphasize epistemological and ontological 
pluralism. As Cat says, contra epistemological monism, there is no single 
methodology that supports a single criterion of scientificity, nor a 
universal domain of its applicability.







To keep the concept of information science as broad as possible, however, 
implies a great deal of individual responsibility to insure high 
intellectual standards, in or out of the mainstream. The definition of any 
science should be determined by these and not by what is funded.







Cheers,







Joseph



- Original Message - 



From: Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic



To: Loet Leydesdorff



Cc: fis@listas.unizar.es



Sent: Saturday, December 03, 2011 10:08 PM



Subject: Re: [Fis] Discussion of Information Science Education







Dear Loet,



I think you made an important point.

It is really a problem if we use the same term “Information Science” for 
different things.

What “Information Science” in the Web-of-Science's

Re: [Fis] Discussion of Information Science Education

[Stanley N Salthe]

And it could feature in 'Science for Non-Majors' courses as well.

STAN

On Mon, Dec 5, 2011 at 12:44 PM, Guy A Hoelzer hoel...@unr.edu wrote:

 Hi All,

 I agree with those who are suggesting that Information Science makes sense
 as a widely useful way to think about different scientific disciplines
 even if we don't have a strong consensus on how to define 'information'.
 I think there is enough coherence among views of 'information' to underpin
 the unity and universality of the approach.  Perhaps Information Science
 is less a discipline of its own and more of a common approach to
 understanding that can be applied across disciplines.  While I can imagine
 good courses focusing on Information Science, it might be most productive
 to include a common framework for information-based models/viewpoints
 across the curriculum.

 Guy Hoelzer


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Re: [Fis] Discussion of Information Science Education

[Robin Faichney]

Saturday, December 3, 2011, 8:43:47 PM, Gavin wrote:

 I was reading Richard Dawkins book “the greatest show on earth” and
 almost fell over backwards when I read his comments about life and
 information. He says the only difference between living matter and
 non living matter is information. That would be the most conjectural
 statement I have ever read. There is not one scrap of evidence or
 test or mathematical model to prove this statement.

Don't you find it strange to think that such a successful and
prominent scientist, recipient of many honourary doctorates and other
awards* and former Professor of the Public Understanding of Science,
would take such a position?

Is it not much more probable, a much more conservative hypothesis,
that Dawkins means something different by information than you do?

I'd suggest that, if people want to promote information science,
Dawkins is someone they should be following. He's probably done more
for public recognition of the place of information in science than
anyone else has or is likely to do in the near future. Though Stephen
Hawking, with his work on the black hole information paradox, should
not be neglected.

(I wrote to Dawkins in the early nineties suggesting that life could
be defined as the survival of information. I'd love to say that he got
the idea from me, but in fact he replied saying that it was true, but
obvious! I have the handwritten letter (actually my own letter
returned with his notes in the margin) carefully stored because I
think some day it might be valuable!)

* See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Dawkins#Awards_and_recognition

-- 
Robin Faichney
http://www.robinfaichney.org/


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Re: [Fis] Discussion of Information Science Education

[Krassimir Markov]

Dear Marcin,

You are quite right: Your Theory is absolutely correct !

As well as the Theory of Mark, of course as main, and as all others, at the 
first place - the Theory of Shannon !

Every theory represents any specific point of view and from its point of 
view it is correct.

What we have to do is to agree that:

1. The variety is not bad but very stimulating for reasoning, and
2. Independence is absolutely needed for growing our knowledge and 
developing the science.

During my work on information theory I found at least three areas of 
information phenomena (if you remember my presentation at GIT in Varna):
1. Nature
2. Living organisms
3. Society

All they have one common occurrence - reflection.
This way it is clear that information has to investigated in correspondence 
of it.

The education has to be turned toward this common phenomena, which had been 
recognized by the ancient philosophers.

Friendly regards

Krassimir




-Original Message- 
From: m...@aiu.ac.jp
Sent: Sunday, December 04, 2011 12:57 PM
To: fis
Subject: Re: [Fis] Discussion of Information Science Education

Dear Colleagues:
Thank you for many interesting contributions in the first day
of the discussion.
I will try to answer in one entry to three postings from Stan,
Loet, and Steven.

1. Specialization in Education (Answer to Stan)

There was a period of overwhelming tendency to increase
specialization of education. However, the ideals of Liberal
Arts Education are coming back. I can give you example of
Japan, but I know that it's a global phenomenon. When we
opened our university seven years ago it was just a beginning
of the return. Our university has its Japanese name
International Liberal Arts University (kokusai kyoyou daigaku
- but kyoyou is based on Japanese tradition of personality
cultivation, not European university tradition) and was
designed to develop intellectual autonomy and the ability to
learn rather than to specialize in any particular subject.
This was the selling point which in short time gave us one
of top ten (or top five) ratings among more than 300
universities in Japan. Now, all leading universities in Japan
declare this style of educational philosophy.
Many American universities have been faithful to the ideal of
what is called there Liberal Education which was interpreted
in various ways, but was always opposed to excessive
specialization.
In all variety of educational philosophies of Liberal Arts,
there is a recognition of the need for the integration of
curricula and for the crossing disciplinary borders.
This creates a niche for Information Science to develop as a
domain integrating different parts of the curriculum.

2. Reinventing of a Wheel (Answer to Loet)

I agree with Gordana, that there are ways to find place for
what FIS is about in curriculum.
Here is a related, but little bit different issue. There are
already some routines in using terms related to information.
Information Theory is typically understood as mathematical
theory initiated by Shannon, which as already observed by
Carnap and Bar-Hillel in 1952 does not say much about
information, but about its transmission.
Information Science as Loet pointed out in the States is
associated quite commonly with Library Science, but actually
is more about knowledge management (it's my opinion). For
quite long time American journals related to library
associations were the only places where you could publish non-
mathematical articles about general concept of information. No
wonder that Library Science in 1990's inherited title for
representing all studies of information.
In Japan, Information Science is considered a different name
for Computer Science. There is no category in Japanese
Ministry of Education system where you can apply for grant to
do research in Information Science. You have to use category
basically meaning computer science.

Now, we can think about using different name for the
discipline (Information Studies), or we can try to promote the
view that Information Science is broader than it is usually
recognized. A generic course in Information Science for all
students (within General Education, or in Liberal Arts
curriculum) could serve this role to propagate the view that
study of information includes many different perspectives on
the information phenomena, and that it requires a broad,
uniting philosophical reflection on information.

3. Do we know what we are talking about? (Answer to Steven)

Sometimes I doubt it, when I read FIS discussions. Of course,
I am joking. The unity to all disciplines are given by their
philosophy and their methods, not by the definitions of the
concepts involved. I am a mathematician and theoretical
physicist. I do not know two physicists who would share
exactly the same definitions of all concepts. Even more, I do
not know two physicists who would agree what exactly physics
is.
I do not see any problem in discussing ten different concepts
of information, as long as there is a common

Re: [Fis] Discussion of Information Science Education

[Joseph Brenner]

Dear Gordana and Loet,

Ref.: Cat, Jordi. 2007. The Unity of Science. Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. 

I think you are being too defensive vis à vis the conventional idea of 
science. The authority of people who have decided to what information science 
must be limited may be open to criticism as reductionist, and there are views 
(see attached) that emphasize epistemological and ontological pluralism. As Cat 
says, contra epistemological monism, there is no single methodology that 
supports a single criterion of scientificity, nor a universal domain of its 
applicability.

To keep the concept of information science as broad as possible, however, 
implies a great deal of individual responsibility to insure high intellectual 
standards, in or out of the mainstream. The definition of any science should 
be determined by these and not by what is funded.  
 
Cheers,

Joseph
  - Original Message - 
  From: Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic 
  To: Loet Leydesdorff 
  Cc: fis@listas.unizar.es 
  Sent: Saturday, December 03, 2011 10:08 PM
  Subject: Re: [Fis] Discussion of Information Science Education


  Dear Loet,

   

  I think you made an important point.

  It is really a problem if we use the same term Information Science for 
different things.

  What Information Science in the Web-of-Science's Science Citation Index 
journals is about is something different from what we thought of.

  Science in their case consists in systematization, description etc. - a 
conventional idea of science about already existing artifacts and related 
phenomena
  addressed by already established methods.

   

  That is why the Handbook on the Philosophy of Information 
http://www.illc.uva.nl/HPI/ (which is close to what we discuss within FIS)
  is not titled Handbook on the Philosophy of Science of Information. 

   

  Maybe the field we have in mind is just Information or Foundations of 
Information (that is how Brian Cantwell Smith calls it)?

   

  Maybe that is why the journal Information is not in the Web-of-Science's 
Science Citation Index.

  Because we discuss things that are not mainstream and already existing.

  However, this does not prevent us from trying to introduce into curricula 
some basic knowledge that already is established in Foundations of Information.

  In the similar way as it is introduced in the HPI, even though many things 
are still under development.

   

  Best,

  Gordana

   

   

  From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On 
Behalf Of Loet Leydesdorff
  Sent: den 3 december 2011 18:08
  To: m...@aiu.ac.jp; 'PEDRO CLEMENTE MARIJUAN FERNANDEZ'; fis@listas.unizar.es
  Subject: Re: [Fis] Discussion of Information Science Education

   

  Dear colleagues, 

   

  The category of Information and Library Science contains 40+ scholarly 
journals in the Web-of-Science's Science Citation Index. Of these at least 10 
can be identified as Information Science. The lead journal is the Journal of 
the American Society for Information Science  Technology. May universities 
have special schools for library and information science (LIS).

   

  This is different from our discussions at this list about information 
theory. Nevertheless, there is a problem with reinventing a wheel. J 

   

  Best wishes,

  Loet

   

   

  Loet Leydesdorff 

  Professor, University of Amsterdam

  Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR), 

  Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam. 

  Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-842239111

  l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/ ; 
http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJhl=en  

   

   

  -Original Message-
  From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On 
Behalf Of m...@aiu.ac.jp
  Sent: Saturday, December 03, 2011 1:24 PM
  To: PEDRO CLEMENTE MARIJUAN FERNANDEZ; fis@listas.unizar.es
  Subject: [Fis] Discussion of Information Science Education

   

  Dear Colleagues: 

  There are some questions which periodically return to FIS discussions without 
conclusive answers. For instance: What is information? However, the lack of 
consensus regarding central concept is not an obstacle in the development of 
Information Science. There is no commonly accepted answer to the question What 
is life? But, this does not threaten the identity of Biology. 

   

  Information Science has not yet achieved a status of a commonly recognized 
discipline. It is frequently confused with Computer Science, because of the 
term Informatics which in Europe denotes what in the US is called Computing, or 
with Library Science and sometimes even with Philosophy of Information, as 
visible from the Handbook on the Philosophy of Information 
http://www.illc.uva.nl/HPI/ where philosophy and science interleave on many 
levels. 

   

  Information Science will never receive recognition without an organized 
effort of research community to introduce its philosophy, goals, methods

[Fis] Discussion of Information Science Education

[mjs]

Dear Colleagues: 
There are some questions which periodically return to FIS 
discussions without conclusive answers. For instance: What is 
information? However, the lack of consensus regarding central 
concept is not an obstacle in the development of Information 
Science. There is no commonly accepted answer to the question 
What is life? But, this does not threaten the identity of 
Biology. 

Information Science has not yet achieved a status of a 
commonly recognized discipline. It is frequently confused with 
Computer Science, because of the term Informatics which in 
Europe denotes what in the US is called Computing, or with 
Library 
Science and sometimes even with Philosophy of Information, 
as visible from the Handbook on the Philosophy of Information 
http://www.illc.uva.nl/HPI/ where philosophy and science 
interleave 
on many levels. 

Information Science will never receive recognition without an 
organized effort of research community to introduce its 
philosophy, 
goals, methods, and achievements to the general audience. 

Books and articles popularizing the theme of information as 
a subject of independent study do not have big enough 
circulation to be sufficient in establishing an identity of 
the discipline. The only effective way is to introduce 
Information Science as a subject of education at the college 
level for students who do not necessarily want to specialize 
in this direction. 

Certainly, introduction of a new subject to curriculum is not 
easy, but it is possible. After all, Information Science is a 
perfect tool for integration of curriculum, especially in the 
context of Liberal Arts education. Which other concept, if not 
information, can be applied in all possible contexts of 
education? 

Now, the question is whether we are ready to come out with a 
syllabus for such a course acceptable for all of us, those who 
are involved in the subject, and those who aren't, but 
participate in the development of curricula. Can we overcome 
differences between our views on the definition of 
information, on the relationship of information understood in 
a general way to its particular manifestations in other 
disciplines? 

Since the course (or courses) should present an identity of 
the discipline of Information Science, it is very important 
that we are convinced about the authentic existence of a large 
enough common ground. Can we develop a map of this territory? 
Can we pool resources to establish foundations for a standard, 
Information Science curriculum? 

Marcin and Gordana 

Marcin J. Schroeder, Ph.D. 
Professor and Dean of Academic Affairs 
Akita International University 
Akita, Japan 
m...@aiu.ac.jp 


Gordana Dodig Crnkovic, 
Associate Professor 
Head of the Computer Science and Networks Department 
School of Innovation, Design and Engineering 
Mälardalen University 
Sweden 
http://www.mrtc.mdh.se/~gdc/ 

Organizer of the Symposium on Natural/Unconventional 
Computing, 
the Turing Centenary  World Congress of AISB/IACAP 
https://sites.google.com/site/naturalcomputingaisbiacap2012


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Re: [Fis] Discussion of Information Science Education

[Stanley N Salthe]

Regarding:

Information Science is a perfect tool for integration of curriculum,
especially in the context of Liberal Arts education. Which other concept,
if not information, can be applied in all possible contexts of education?

I would point out that there have been two previous disciplines that have
attempted this reasonable goal -- systems science and semiotics.  Neither
one ever became a major program except in one or two universities where
major players worked.  Our culture rewards specializations much more than
general applications.

STAN



On Sat, Dec 3, 2011 at 7:23 AM, m...@aiu.ac.jp wrote:

 Dear Colleagues:
 There are some questions which periodically return to FIS
 discussions without conclusive answers. For instance: What is
 information? However, the lack of consensus regarding central
 concept is not an obstacle in the development of Information
 Science. There is no commonly accepted answer to the question
 What is life? But, this does not threaten the identity of
 Biology.

 Information Science has not yet achieved a status of a
 commonly recognized discipline. It is frequently confused with
 Computer Science, because of the term Informatics which in
 Europe denotes what in the US is called Computing, or with
 Library
 Science and sometimes even with Philosophy of Information,
 as visible from the Handbook on the Philosophy of Information
 http://www.illc.uva.nl/HPI/ where philosophy and science
 interleave
 on many levels.

 Information Science will never receive recognition without an
 organized effort of research community to introduce its
 philosophy,
 goals, methods, and achievements to the general audience.

 Books and articles popularizing the theme of information as
 a subject of independent study do not have big enough
 circulation to be sufficient in establishing an identity of
 the discipline. The only effective way is to introduce
 Information Science as a subject of education at the college
 level for students who do not necessarily want to specialize
 in this direction.

 Certainly, introduction of a new subject to curriculum is not
 easy, but it is possible. After all, Information Science is a
 perfect tool for integration of curriculum, especially in the
 context of Liberal Arts education. Which other concept, if not
 information, can be applied in all possible contexts of
 education?

 Now, the question is whether we are ready to come out with a
 syllabus for such a course acceptable for all of us, those who
 are involved in the subject, and those who aren't, but
 participate in the development of curricula. Can we overcome
 differences between our views on the definition of
 information, on the relationship of information understood in
 a general way to its particular manifestations in other
 disciplines?

 Since the course (or courses) should present an identity of
 the discipline of Information Science, it is very important
 that we are convinced about the authentic existence of a large
 enough common ground. Can we develop a map of this territory?
 Can we pool resources to establish foundations for a standard,
 Information Science curriculum?

 Marcin and Gordana

 Marcin J. Schroeder, Ph.D.
 Professor and Dean of Academic Affairs
 Akita International University
 Akita, Japan
 m...@aiu.ac.jp


 Gordana Dodig Crnkovic,
 Associate Professor
 Head of the Computer Science and Networks Department
 School of Innovation, Design and Engineering
 Mälardalen University
 Sweden
 http://www.mrtc.mdh.se/~gdc/

 Organizer of the Symposium on Natural/Unconventional
 Computing,
 the Turing Centenary  World Congress of AISB/IACAP
 https://sites.google.com/site/naturalcomputingaisbiacap2012


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Re: [Fis] Discussion of Information Science Education

[Krassimir Markov]

Dear  Marcin, Gordana, and FIS colleagues,

It is impossible for me not to answer of such very important and, I think, 
on time proposal.

What we have to do?
Of course, to establish common paradigm !?!
The great problem here is that every author stay on his own position and do 
not accept the others.
Well, I hope this is temporally (till corresponded persons pas away) but it 
is not so short period.

The decision is coming himself:

We have to start not with building common paradigm accepted all over the 
world,
but with writing and teaching History of information Science and Theories,
where most popular authors may be presented starting from the ancient 
centuries.

Such surveys are available in many monographs, for instance Mark made very 
nice one.
Greetings to Gordana, Mark and other colleagues for the new book 
INFORMATION AND COMPUTATION !
Handbook on the Philosophy of Information is another example.

***

At this point I want to stop this explanation and to congratulate Pedro for 
his new very important position!

Dear Pedro, please receive my greetings for your best work, which is now 
recognized by electing you as Scientific Director of your Institute !

***

The idea of Pedro to organize Summer School of FIS is very appropriate.
Let start this way.

Varna is nice place for such event.
In Spain, during the NIT 2011,  we had discussed it but we had no 
possibilities to start advertising this idea.
Now is the right time.

Following proposition of Pedro we have to establish a lecturers' group,
which will present main areas and theories of Information Science.

Please see the preliminary variant of ITA 2012 First Call given at:

http://www.ithea.org/fis/ITA2012-cfp1.pdf

In the time table we reserve five days for GIT and Summer School on FIS.
( The Summer School on FIS may occupy more days than GIT conference,
i.e from June 25 until June 29, 2012.
It depends of quantity of presentations.  )

Who has possibility to participate and what will he/she present ?

Dear members of PC of GIT Int.Conf.,
Please help us to prepare a good program for the Summer School on FIS and to 
have as more participants as possible !

Dear Colleagues from FIS,
Please be invited to take part as lecturers and/or participants is this very 
important and, I hope, pleasant for everybody, event !

Friendly regards
Krassimir






-Original Message- 
From: m...@aiu.ac.jp
Sent: Saturday, December 03, 2011 2:23 PM
To: PEDRO CLEMENTE MARIJUAN FERNANDEZ ; fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: [Fis] Discussion of Information Science Education

Dear Colleagues:
There are some questions which periodically return to FIS
discussions without conclusive answers. For instance: What is
information? However, the lack of consensus regarding central
concept is not an obstacle in the development of Information
Science. There is no commonly accepted answer to the question
What is life? But, this does not threaten the identity of
Biology.

Information Science has not yet achieved a status of a
commonly recognized discipline. It is frequently confused with
Computer Science, because of the term Informatics which in
Europe denotes what in the US is called Computing, or with
Library
Science and sometimes even with Philosophy of Information,
as visible from the Handbook on the Philosophy of Information
http://www.illc.uva.nl/HPI/ where philosophy and science
interleave
on many levels.

Information Science will never receive recognition without an
organized effort of research community to introduce its
philosophy,
goals, methods, and achievements to the general audience.

Books and articles popularizing the theme of information as
a subject of independent study do not have big enough
circulation to be sufficient in establishing an identity of
the discipline. The only effective way is to introduce
Information Science as a subject of education at the college
level for students who do not necessarily want to specialize
in this direction.

Certainly, introduction of a new subject to curriculum is not
easy, but it is possible. After all, Information Science is a
perfect tool for integration of curriculum, especially in the
context of Liberal Arts education. Which other concept, if not
information, can be applied in all possible contexts of
education?

Now, the question is whether we are ready to come out with a
syllabus for such a course acceptable for all of us, those who
are involved in the subject, and those who aren't, but
participate in the development of curricula. Can we overcome
differences between our views on the definition of
information, on the relationship of information understood in
a general way to its particular manifestations in other
disciplines?

Since the course (or courses) should present an identity of
the discipline of Information Science, it is very important
that we are convinced about the authentic existence of a large
enough common ground. Can we develop a map of this territory?
Can we pool resources to establish foundations

Re: [Fis] Discussion of Information Science Education

[Loet Leydesdorff]

Dear colleagues, 

 

The category of Information and Library Science contains 40+ scholarly
journals in the Web-of-Science's Science Citation Index. Of these at least
10 can be identified as Information Science. The lead journal is the Journal
of the American Society for Information Science  Technology. May
universities have special schools for library and information science (LIS).

 

This is different from our discussions at this list about information
theory. Nevertheless, there is a problem with reinventing a wheel. J 

 

Best wishes,

Loet

 

 

Loet Leydesdorff 

Professor, University of Amsterdam

Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR), 

Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam. 

Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-842239111

l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/ ;
http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJ
http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJhl=en hl=en  

 

 

-Original Message-
From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On
Behalf Of m...@aiu.ac.jp
Sent: Saturday, December 03, 2011 1:24 PM
To: PEDRO CLEMENTE MARIJUAN FERNANDEZ; fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: [Fis] Discussion of Information Science Education

 

Dear Colleagues: 

There are some questions which periodically return to FIS discussions
without conclusive answers. For instance: What is information? However,
the lack of consensus regarding central concept is not an obstacle in the
development of Information Science. There is no commonly accepted answer to
the question What is life? But, this does not threaten the identity of
Biology. 

 

Information Science has not yet achieved a status of a commonly recognized
discipline. It is frequently confused with Computer Science, because of the
term Informatics which in Europe denotes what in the US is called Computing,
or with Library Science and sometimes even with Philosophy of Information,
as visible from the Handbook on the Philosophy of Information
http://www.illc.uva.nl/HPI/ http://www.illc.uva.nl/HPI/ where philosophy
and science interleave on many levels. 

 

Information Science will never receive recognition without an organized
effort of research community to introduce its philosophy, goals, methods,
and achievements to the general audience. 

 

Books and articles popularizing the theme of information as a subject of
independent study do not have big enough circulation to be sufficient in
establishing an identity of the discipline. The only effective way is to
introduce Information Science as a subject of education at the college level
for students who do not necessarily want to specialize in this direction. 

 

Certainly, introduction of a new subject to curriculum is not easy, but it
is possible. After all, Information Science is a perfect tool for
integration of curriculum, especially in the context of Liberal Arts
education. Which other concept, if not information, can be applied in all
possible contexts of education? 

 

Now, the question is whether we are ready to come out with a syllabus for
such a course acceptable for all of us, those who are involved in the
subject, and those who aren't, but participate in the development of
curricula. Can we overcome differences between our views on the definition
of information, on the relationship of information understood in a general
way to its particular manifestations in other disciplines? 

 

Since the course (or courses) should present an identity of the discipline
of Information Science, it is very important that we are convinced about the
authentic existence of a large enough common ground. Can we develop a map of
this territory? 

Can we pool resources to establish foundations for a standard, Information
Science curriculum? 

 

Marcin and Gordana 

 

Marcin J. Schroeder, Ph.D. 

Professor and Dean of Academic Affairs

Akita International University

Akita, Japan

 mailto:m...@aiu.ac.jp m...@aiu.ac.jp 

 

 

Gordana Dodig Crnkovic,

Associate Professor

Head of the Computer Science and Networks Department School of Innovation,
Design and Engineering Mälardalen University Sweden
http://www.mrtc.mdh.se/~gdc/ http://www.mrtc.mdh.se/~gdc/ 

 

Organizer of the Symposium on Natural/Unconventional Computing, the Turing
Centenary  World Congress of AISB/IACAP 

 https://sites.google.com/site/naturalcomputingaisbiacap2012
https://sites.google.com/site/naturalcomputingaisbiacap2012

 

 

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 mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es fis@listas.unizar.es

 https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis

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Re: [Fis] Discussion of Information Science Education

[Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic]

Dear Loet,

I think you made an important point.
It is really a problem if we use the same term Information Science for 
different things.
What Information Science in the Web-of-Science's Science Citation Index 
journals is about is something different from what we thought of.
Science in their case consists in systematization, description etc. - a 
conventional idea of science about already existing artifacts and related 
phenomena
addressed by already established methods.


That is why the Handbook on the Philosophy of Information 
http://www.illc.uva.nl/HPI/ (which is close to what we discuss within FIS)
is not titled Handbook on the Philosophy of Science of Information.

Maybe the field we have in mind is just Information or Foundations of 
Information (that is how Brian Cantwell Smith calls it)?

Maybe that is why the journal Information is not in the Web-of-Science's 
Science Citation Index.
Because we discuss things that are not mainstream and already existing.
However, this does not prevent us from trying to introduce into curricula some 
basic knowledge that already is established in Foundations of Information.
In the similar way as it is introduced in the HPI, even though many things are 
still under development.

Best,
Gordana


From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On 
Behalf Of Loet Leydesdorff
Sent: den 3 december 2011 18:08
To: m...@aiu.ac.jp; 'PEDRO CLEMENTE MARIJUAN FERNANDEZ'; fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: Re: [Fis] Discussion of Information Science Education


Dear colleagues,



The category of Information and Library Science contains 40+ scholarly 
journals in the Web-of-Science's Science Citation Index. Of these at least 10 
can be identified as Information Science. The lead journal is the Journal of 
the American Society for Information Science  Technology. May universities 
have special schools for library and information science (LIS).



This is different from our discussions at this list about information theory. 
Nevertheless, there is a problem with reinventing a wheel. :)



Best wishes,

Loet





Loet Leydesdorff

Professor, University of Amsterdam

Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR),

Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam.

Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-842239111

l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/ ; 
http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJhl=en





-Original Message-
From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On 
Behalf Of m...@aiu.ac.jp
Sent: Saturday, December 03, 2011 1:24 PM
To: PEDRO CLEMENTE MARIJUAN FERNANDEZ; fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: [Fis] Discussion of Information Science Education



Dear Colleagues:

There are some questions which periodically return to FIS discussions without 
conclusive answers. For instance: What is information? However, the lack of 
consensus regarding central concept is not an obstacle in the development of 
Information Science. There is no commonly accepted answer to the question What 
is life? But, this does not threaten the identity of Biology.



Information Science has not yet achieved a status of a commonly recognized 
discipline. It is frequently confused with Computer Science, because of the 
term Informatics which in Europe denotes what in the US is called Computing, or 
with Library Science and sometimes even with Philosophy of Information, as 
visible from the Handbook on the Philosophy of Information 
http://www.illc.uva.nl/HPI/ where philosophy and science interleave on many 
levels.



Information Science will never receive recognition without an organized effort 
of research community to introduce its philosophy, goals, methods, and 
achievements to the general audience.



Books and articles popularizing the theme of information as a subject of 
independent study do not have big enough circulation to be sufficient in 
establishing an identity of the discipline. The only effective way is to 
introduce Information Science as a subject of education at the college level 
for students who do not necessarily want to specialize in this direction.



Certainly, introduction of a new subject to curriculum is not easy, but it is 
possible. After all, Information Science is a perfect tool for integration of 
curriculum, especially in the context of Liberal Arts education. Which other 
concept, if not information, can be applied in all possible contexts of 
education?



Now, the question is whether we are ready to come out with a syllabus for such 
a course acceptable for all of us, those who are involved in the subject, and 
those who aren't, but participate in the development of curricula. Can we 
overcome differences between our views on the definition of information, on the 
relationship of information understood in a general way to its particular 
manifestations in other disciplines?



Since the course (or courses) should present an identity of the discipline of 
Information Science, it is very

Re: [Fis] Discussion of Information Science Education

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

I find this view a little disturbing. 

If you do not have a definition, of some kind, of the term information. Your 
claim is simply equivalent to saying that you have no idea what you are talking 
about. How can you proceed without a clarification of terms? 

I can at least point toward living things, organisms, and ask: What is this 
and what distinguishes it?  And thereby justify the question What is life? 

What justification do you have for asking the question: What is information?

If it appears that we do not know what we are talking about, that would appear 
to be an adequate explanation of why Information Science has little traction.

Recall my own definition of information as that which identifies cause and 
adds to knowledge, i.e., speaking of that which is in-formation, it rests 
between cause and that which determines subsequent action, it modifies that 
which determines subsequent action. 

Is information then a necessary distinction, forced upon us by the world, or 
is it a way of speaking, a notion that we force upon the world? And what does 
it mean to have a science of it?

I think it is clear, Information is a way of speaking about the ongoing 
transformation of the unfolding world, it is a way of speaking about change. 
Just as cause and effect are ways of speaking about change. Information has 
no existential status beyond our conception of it as such.

A science of information then would be the study and language of change, of 
differences, of the process of causes and effects and ways of speaking about 
them. Information exists in this sense then only if the cause it identifies 
makes a difference to the effect under consideration.

With respect to Library Science, that I will take to be simply the organizing 
of text to facilitate effective access to reading materials, information 
science relates only to the measure of the difference such organization makes 
to the behavior (effective or otherwise) of those accessing these materials.

This suggests that Information Science is a useful study for those that wish 
to reason about behaviors of any kind, and if I were to teach or study the 
subject then this would be the motivation for placing it into my curriculum. 

With respect,
Steven


--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science  Engineering
http://iase.info
http://senses.info







On Dec 3, 2011, at 4:23 AM, m...@aiu.ac.jp wrote:

 Dear Colleagues: 
 There are some questions which periodically return to FIS 
 discussions without conclusive answers. For instance: What is 
 information? However, the lack of consensus regarding central 
 concept is not an obstacle in the development of Information 
 Science. There is no commonly accepted answer to the question 
 What is life? But, this does not threaten the identity of 
 Biology. 
 
 Information Science has not yet achieved a status of a 
 commonly recognized discipline. It is frequently confused with 
 Computer Science, because of the term Informatics which in 
 Europe denotes what in the US is called Computing, or with 
 Library 
 Science and sometimes even with Philosophy of Information, 
 as visible from the Handbook on the Philosophy of Information 
 http://www.illc.uva.nl/HPI/ where philosophy and science 
 interleave 
 on many levels. 
 
 Information Science will never receive recognition without an 
 organized effort of research community to introduce its 
 philosophy, 
 goals, methods, and achievements to the general audience. 
 
 Books and articles popularizing the theme of information as 
 a subject of independent study do not have big enough 
 circulation to be sufficient in establishing an identity of 
 the discipline. The only effective way is to introduce 
 Information Science as a subject of education at the college 
 level for students who do not necessarily want to specialize 
 in this direction. 
 
 Certainly, introduction of a new subject to curriculum is not 
 easy, but it is possible. After all, Information Science is a 
 perfect tool for integration of curriculum, especially in the 
 context of Liberal Arts education. Which other concept, if not 
 information, can be applied in all possible contexts of 
 education? 
 
 Now, the question is whether we are ready to come out with a 
 syllabus for such a course acceptable for all of us, those who 
 are involved in the subject, and those who aren't, but 
 participate in the development of curricula. Can we overcome 
 differences between our views on the definition of 
 information, on the relationship of information understood in 
 a general way to its particular manifestations in other 
 disciplines? 
 
 Since the course (or courses) should present an identity of 
 the discipline of Information Science, it is very important 
 that we are convinced about the authentic existence of a large 
 enough common ground. Can we develop a map of this territory? 
 Can we pool resources to establish foundations for a 

[Fis] FIS Discussion Calendar

[Pedro C. Marijuan]

Dear FISers,

After the Summer pause it is time to start with the discussion sessions 
again. This is the tentative calendar for next months:

-- CHEMOINFORMATION (and molecular recognition), by Michel Petitjean

-- INFORMATION SCIENCE TEACHING, by Marcin Schroeder  Gordana 
Dodig-Crnkovic

(themes in preparation for next year:)

-- SOCIAL INFORMATION SCIENCE, by Xueshan Yan and FIS Beijing Group

-- PHILOSOPHY OF INFORMATION IN CHINA, by Joseph Brenner and Liu Gang

-- THE BIOLOGICAL PARADIGM OF INFORMATION (an invitation to members of 
the Inbiosa project)

The formal announcement of Michel's session will appear quite soon. Any 
suggestion about further themes or about the calendar will be welcome, 
either on-line or off-line... Let us hope that the FIS discussions of 
next course will bring us the customary excitement and enlightenment!

best wishes

---Pedro

-
Pedro C. Marijuán
Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group
Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud
Avda. Gómez Laguna, 25, Pl. 11ª
50009 Zaragoza, Spain
Telf: 34 976 71 3526 ( 6818) Fax: 34 976 71 5554
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
http://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/
-

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Re: [Fis] Discussion on INFORMATION THEORY--Karl

[Rafael Capurro]

Dear Pedro

you write:

There is a large risk of becoming
subjective, therefore unitelligible, if one leaves the
foreground-background convention of the unified, standard, invariable
against chaotic, unpredictable, varied.

Is it really like this? or is it like this as seen from the perspective 
you give a
priority by  qualifying the other perspective as subjective? Is not 
not much

more the case that what seems subjective is the primarily experience of
the singularity of being in the world, this eery experience? The 
predominance

of the common experience as described by you is what metaphysics (and
later on science!) has been saying for centuries.


Some days ago I sent this text to Joe that I forward it to the other FIS 
members


Let me quote Octavio Paz El mono gramático (The grammatical monkey) 
(Mexico 1974, pp. 97-98; 100) first in Spanish then in a free (with a 
lot of mistakes!) English translation


Por la escritura abolimos las cosas, las convertimos en sentido; por la 
lectura, abolimos los signos, apuramos el sentido y, casi 
inmediatamente, lo disipamos: el sentido vuelve al amasijo primordial. 
La arboleda no tiene nombre y estos árboles no son signos: son árboles. 
Son reales y son ilegibles. Aunque aludo a ellos cuando digo: /estos 
árboles son ilegibles/, ellos no se dan por aludidos. No dicen, no 
significan: están allí, nada más están. Yo lo puedo derribar, quemar, 
cortar, convertir en mástiles, sillas, barcos, casas, ceniza; puedo 
pintarlos, esculpirlos, describirlos, convertirlos en símbolos de esto o 
de aquellos (inclusive de ellos mismos) y hacer otra arboleda, real o 
imaginaria, con ellos; puedo clasificarlos, analizarlos,  reducirlos a 
una formula química o a una proporción matemática y así traducirlos, 
convertirlos en lenguaje - pero /estos/ árboles, estos que senalo y que 
están más allá, siempre más allá, de mis signos y de mis palabras, 
intocables, inalcanzables, impenetrables, son lo que son y ningún 
nombre, ninguna combinación de signos los dice. Y son irrepetibles: 
nunca volverán a ser lo que ahora mismo son. [...]
La noche me salva No podemos ver sin peligro de eloquecer: las cosas nos 
revelan, sin revelar nada y por su simple estar ahí frente a nosotros, 
el vacío de los nombres, la falta de mesura del mundo, su mudez 
esencial. Y a medida que la noche se acumula en mi ventana, yo siento 
que no soy de a quí, sino de allá, de ese mundo que acaba de borrarse y 
aguarda la resurrección del alba. De allá vengo, de allá venimos todos y 
allá hemos de volver. Fascinacion por el otro lado, seducción por la 
vertiente no humana del universo: perder el nombre, perder la medida. 
Cada individuo, cada cosa, cada instante: una realidad única, 
incomparable, inconmesurable. Volver al mundo de los nombres propios.


With writing we abolish things, we transform them into meaning; through 
reading we abolish signs, we accelerate meaning and delete it almost 
immediately: meaning goes back to the primordial chaos. The small forest 
has no name, these trees are not signs, they are trees. They are real 
and one cannot read them. Even when I refer to them and say: 'these 
trees are not readable' they do not care about what I am saying. They 
say nothing, they do not mean anything: they are there, just there, 
nothing more. I can throw them down, burn them, cut them, turn them into 
masts, chairs, ships, houses, ash; I can paint them, carve them, 
describe them, turn them into symbols of this or that (including of 
themselves) and I can make another small forest, a real or an imaginary 
one. I can classify and analyze them, reduce them to a chemical formula 
or to a mathematical proportion and in this way translate them into 
lenguage - but /these /trees, that I now mean and that are beyond, 
always beyond my signs and words, untouchable, unreachable, 
impenetrable, are what they are and there is no name, no combination of 
signs that can say what they are. They are unrepeatable: they will never 
be again what they are right now. [...]


Night brings deliverance to me. We cannot /see /without the danger of 
getting mad: things reveal themselves to us without revealing anything, 
just with their pure being there in front of us, the void of names, the 
lack of measure of the world, its essential dumbness. And as night comes 
closer and closer to my window I feel that I do not belong to here but 
to there, to that world that just disappeared and waits for the 
resurrection of the morning. I come from there, all of us come from 
there and must go back there. Fascination on the one hand, being seduced 
by the non-human slop of the universe: loosing name, loosing measure. 
Every individual, every thing, every moment: a unique reality, 
uncomparable, unmeasurable. Go back to the world of the proper names.


The world of the proper names is the paradise in which there is a name 
for each thing. The small forest is not such a proper name, then there 
can be a lot of small forests that 

Re: [Fis] Discussion on INFORMATION THEORY--Karl

[Mark Burgin]

 On 5/4/2011 3:56 AM, Rafael Capurro wrote:

Dear Pedro

you write:
There is a large risk of becoming
subjective, therefore unitelligible, if one leaves the
foreground-background convention of the unified, standard, invariable
against chaotic, unpredictable, varied.
Is it really like this? or is it like this as seen from the 
perspective you give a
priority by  qualifying the other perspective as subjective? Is not 
not much

more the case that what seems subjective is the primarily experience of
the singularity of being in the world, this eery experience? The 
predominance

of the common experience as described by you is what metaphysics (and
later on science!) has been saying for centuries.


Some days ago I sent this text to Joe that I forward it to the other 
FIS members


Let me quote Octavio Paz El mono gramático (The grammatical monkey) 
(Mexico 1974, pp. 97-98; 100) first in Spanish then in a free (with a 
lot of mistakes!) English translation


Por la escritura abolimos las cosas, las convertimos en sentido; por 
la lectura, abolimos los signos, apuramos el sentido y, casi 
inmediatamente, lo disipamos: el sentido vuelve al amasijo primordial. 
La arboleda no tiene nombre y estos árboles no son signos: son 
árboles. Son reales y son ilegibles. Aunque aludo a ellos cuando digo: 
/estos árboles son ilegibles/, ellos no se dan por aludidos. No dicen, 
no significan: están allí, nada más están. Yo lo puedo derribar, 
quemar, cortar, convertir en mástiles, sillas, barcos, casas, ceniza; 
puedo pintarlos, esculpirlos, describirlos, convertirlos en símbolos 
de esto o de aquellos (inclusive de ellos mismos) y hacer otra 
arboleda, real o imaginaria, con ellos; puedo clasificarlos, 
analizarlos,  reducirlos a una formula química o a una proporción 
matemática y así traducirlos, convertirlos en lenguaje - pero /estos/ 
árboles, estos que senalo y que están más allá, siempre más allá, de 
mis signos y de mis palabras, intocables, inalcanzables, 
impenetrables, son lo que son y ningún nombre, ninguna combinación de 
signos los dice. Y son irrepetibles: nunca volverán a ser lo que ahora 
mismo son. [...]
La noche me salva No podemos ver sin peligro de eloquecer: las cosas 
nos revelan, sin revelar nada y por su simple estar ahí frente a 
nosotros, el vacío de los nombres, la falta de mesura del mundo, su 
mudez esencial. Y a medida que la noche se acumula en mi ventana, yo 
siento que no soy de a quí, sino de allá, de ese mundo que acaba de 
borrarse y aguarda la resurrección del alba. De allá vengo, de allá 
venimos todos y allá hemos de volver. Fascinacion por el otro lado, 
seducción por la vertiente no humana del universo: perder el nombre, 
perder la medida. Cada individuo, cada cosa, cada instante: una 
realidad única, incomparable, inconmesurable. Volver al mundo de los 
nombres propios.


With writing we abolish things, we transform them into meaning; 
through reading we abolish signs, we accelerate meaning and delete it 
almost immediately: meaning goes back to the primordial chaos. The 
small forest has no name, these trees are not signs, they are trees. 
They are real and one cannot read them. Even when I refer to them and 
say: 'these trees are not readable' they do not care about what I am 
saying. They say nothing, they do not mean anything: they are there, 
just there, nothing more. I can throw them down, burn them, cut them, 
turn them into masts, chairs, ships, houses, ash; I can paint them, 
carve them, describe them, turn them into symbols of this or that 
(including of themselves) and I can make another small forest, a real 
or an imaginary one. I can classify and analyze them, reduce them to a 
chemical formula or to a mathematical proportion and in this way 
translate them into lenguage - but /these /trees, that I now mean and 
that are beyond, always beyond my signs and words, untouchable, 
unreachable, impenetrable, are what they are and there is no name, no 
combination of signs that can say what they are. They are 
unrepeatable: they will never be again what they are right now. [...]


Night brings deliverance to me. We cannot /see /without the danger of 
getting mad: things reveal themselves to us without revealing 
anything, just with their pure being there in front of us, the void of 
names, the lack of measure of the world, its essential dumbness. And 
as night comes closer and closer to my window I feel that I do not 
belong to here but to there, to that world that just disappeared and 
waits for the resurrection of the morning. I come from there, all of 
us come from there and must go back there. Fascination on the one 
hand, being seduced by the non-human slop of the universe: loosing 
name, loosing measure. Every individual, every thing, every moment: a 
unique reality, uncomparable, unmeasurable. Go back to the world of 
the proper names.


The world of the proper names is the paradise in which there is a name 
for each thing. The small forest is not such a proper name, 

[Fis] Discussion on INFORMATION THEORY--J.Brenner

[Pedro C. Marijuan]

Message from Joseph Brenner
-

Dear Karl,

In closing your note, you wrote: and we shall have overcome a long 
division between

those who employ the difference property between a and b, and those
who apply the similarity property of a and b.

One way of helping to achieve this is to recognize, in specific complex 
cases, that similarity and difference are not absolute properties. Some 
things (the most interesting ones) are partly similar to and partly 
different from others at the same time, and the predominance of one can 
increase at the expense of the other. Further, in the system of Stephane 
Lupasco (Principle of Dynamic Opposition, up-dated in Logic in Reality), 
diversity, negativity, inexactitude, vagueness, instability, etc. are 
given appropriate ontological value vs. identity, stability, etc., their 
positive partners. 

This is my proposal of a principled ordering perspective to be 
included in the group available for use. Your comments would be welcome.


Thank you and best wishes,

Joseph



   Ursprüngliche Nachricht
   Von: pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
   Datum: 29.04.2011 12:34
   An: fis@listas.unizar.es
   Betreff: [Fis]  Discussion on INFORMATION THEORY--Karl Javorszky

   Message from Karl Javorszky
   
-

   Information – A Culture Shock

   Dear Fis,

   We keep coming back to the Middle Ages. The real achievement of the
   Fis group is, that here professionals both from biology and the hard
   sciences try to understand each other. If this endeavor will be
   successful – and there are reasons to believe that we are on the right
   path -, then we will have bridged a gap that has been created by the
   distinction between the trivial (artistic) and the quadrivial
   (scientific) arts, differentiating e.g. music from geometry.

   Biology belongs definitely not among the exact 4 of pastimes. Yet, it
   does have its own trade secrets, which may appear surprising to those,
   who have learnt to think according to the rules of exact sciences. It
   is not a big deal of intelligence to think in reverse mode, concluding
   from the effect to the cause, from the conclusion unto the praemisses.
   This is rather a state of the art technique one learns while having to
   do with systems that do not obey the rules, where one deducts the
   rules and hopes that one has deducted usefully.

   The main difference between the art of a psychologist, a composer or a
   painter and the knowledge of a geographer, astronomer or arithmetician
   is the technique of “framing”. One moves the set of references into a
   position which makes the picture feel good (conclusive, aesthetic,
   explanative, didactic, etc.). There is no pre-existence of a single
   ordering principle but rather the rivalry of ordering perspectives is
   assumed as a fact of life. We may wish for an ideal human, but such a
   thing does not exist, not even in the fashion as ideal gases exist, so
   we do not assume that any theory about whatsoever living will ever be
   all-explaining and paramount tautological.

   The tautological sub-system in which the quadrivial scientist operates
   is embedded in a complex web of interdependences, where the hope is
   not maintained that a single ordering principle can declare itself to
   be The Ultimate Ordering Principle. Wittgenstein says that one should
   not even try to explain (from within) that in which the exact
   tautologies are placed. There, Fis is more optimistic than the great
   thinker. We do try to understand by means of the exact rules of
   reasoning that what is presently outside of the realm of what can be
   said exactly. (Adorno’s critique of Wittgenstein is, that a defeatist
   attitude towards the inexplicable offers a deep misunderstanding about
   what the job description of a philosopher contains. The task is to try
   and try again to formulate in a reasonable fashion that what escapes
   an exact formulation.)

   If Fis succeeds, we will have made a Cultural Revolution. We now have
   a sufficiently diverse set of competent people who will translate -
   each into his own words – the deep structure of the message. The
   message the trivials and the exact can agree on might be that
   “generally, things are on their places, in an order. There are rules
   that govern the interplay between when, where and what. Order lies in
   the eyes of the spectator. Information is for a spectator that what
   deviates from his – the spectator’s – expectations about how the
   interplay between when, where and what will unfold.” This approach
   allows the dancers and the painters to be taken seriously, because
   they work with the complex harmony and transmit information by
   manipulating the expectations of the spectator.

   The only difference is that the followers of the exact faith have a
   common agreement

[Fis] Discussion on INFORMATION THEORY--Karl Javorszky

[Pedro C. Marijuan]

Message from Karl Javorszky
-

Information – A Culture Shock

Dear Fis,

We keep coming back to the Middle Ages. The real achievement of the
Fis group is, that here professionals both from biology and the hard
sciences try to understand each other. If this endeavor will be
successful – and there are reasons to believe that we are on the right
path -, then we will have bridged a gap that has been created by the
distinction between the trivial (artistic) and the quadrivial
(scientific) arts, differentiating e.g. music from geometry.

Biology belongs definitely not among the exact 4 of pastimes. Yet, it
does have its own trade secrets, which may appear surprising to those,
who have learnt to think according to the rules of exact sciences. It
is not a big deal of intelligence to think in reverse mode, concluding
from the effect to the cause, from the conclusion unto the praemisses.
This is rather a state of the art technique one learns while having to
do with systems that do not obey the rules, where one deducts the
rules and hopes that one has deducted usefully.

The main difference between the art of a psychologist, a composer or a
painter and the knowledge of a geographer, astronomer or arithmetician
is the technique of “framing”. One moves the set of references into a
position which makes the picture feel good (conclusive, aesthetic,
explanative, didactic, etc.). There is no pre-existence of a single
ordering principle but rather the rivalry of ordering perspectives is
assumed as a fact of life. We may wish for an ideal human, but such a
thing does not exist, not even in the fashion as ideal gases exist, so
we do not assume that any theory about whatsoever living will ever be
all-explaining and paramount tautological.

The tautological sub-system in which the quadrivial scientist operates
is embedded in a complex web of interdependences, where the hope is
not maintained that a single ordering principle can declare itself to
be The Ultimate Ordering Principle. Wittgenstein says that one should
not even try to explain (from within) that in which the exact
tautologies are placed. There, Fis is more optimistic than the great
thinker. We do try to understand by means of the exact rules of
reasoning that what is presently outside of the realm of what can be
said exactly. (Adorno’s critique of Wittgenstein is, that a defeatist
attitude towards the inexplicable offers a deep misunderstanding about
what the job description of a philosopher contains. The task is to try
and try again to formulate in a reasonable fashion that what escapes
an exact formulation.)

If Fis succeeds, we will have made a Cultural Revolution. We now have
a sufficiently diverse set of competent people who will translate -
each into his own words – the deep structure of the message. The
message the trivials and the exact can agree on might be that
“generally, things are on their places, in an order. There are rules
that govern the interplay between when, where and what. Order lies in
the eyes of the spectator. Information is for a spectator that what
deviates from his – the spectator’s – expectations about how the
interplay between when, where and what will unfold.” This approach
allows the dancers and the painters to be taken seriously, because
they work with the complex harmony and transmit information by
manipulating the expectations of the spectator.

The only difference is that the followers of the exact faith have a
common agreement that there is a paramount first ordering principle
which overrides and consolidates all subsequent ordering principles.
This goes back to the cultural achievement of going upright and
observing Gravitation as common – all-pervasive, transcendent,
ubiquitous, static, absolute, eternal – to all activities of the
brain. They understand abstraction as a neurological process that
aligns mental structures to one main ordering structure. The trivial
thinkers do not underestimate the importance of a directed,
continuous, thought-up (because we do not feel in the brain) main
ordering principle. They try to make understand that there are many
other forces affecting our organs and that using one main ordering
principle is nice and all, but one should not eroticise his ability to
neglect all other possible viewpoints.

Ordering and reordering takes place in a human’s life like the natural
process it actually is. One can learn to balance and manipulate the
changes, but the changes are there. It is useless to make up a world
in which the things are by definition stable and remain so unless
otherwise instructed. The trivial people have as much resentment
against the formally exact sciences as those against the trivially
nonsensical. There is much to be understood and explained away before
we make up and kiss.

The culture shock that comes your way, my dear brethren from the 4
noble pastimes, is that Nature does not obey one’s wishes. Better, 

Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering Principles

[Loet Leydesdorff]

Dear Joe, 

 

However, I rather tend to agree with you that Loet's, Rosen's and Dubois' 
models of communication, anticipation, etc. are somewhat too abstract. The 
models, as I think Loet may agree, are created for analysis, and do not define 
the physical, dynamic relation between the models, the creation of models and 
what is being modeled as processes.

 

They are not so abstract that one would not be able to measure these mechanisms 
using information theory. The models can be expected to generate redundancy 
because they are entertained in the present when restructuring the system, 
while they indicate possible future states. Bob Ulanowicz pointed me to the 
mutual information in three dimensions that can indicate redundancy (= negative 
entropy). Last year, we had a discussion with Klaus Krippendorff about the 
relation between this redundancy and the probabilistic entropy which is 
necessarily generated when the redundancy is historically retained (because of 
the second law). [Redundancy in Systems which Entertain a Model of Themselves: 
Interaction Information and the Self-Organization of Anticipation,  
http://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/12/1/63 Entropy 12(1) (2010) 63-79; pdf 
http://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/12/1/63/pdf ]

 

The retention mechanisms of anticipation operating in systems is historical and 
therefore measurable; the anticipatory mechanisms are not directly measurable 
because they are not part of the res extensa, but remain res cogitans. However, 
they can be simulated. The theory and computation of anticipatory systems have 
provided us with new instruments for doing so (Rosen, 1984; Dubois, 1998).

 

At his time, Husserl (1929) had no instruments beyond the transcendental 
apperception of this domain of cogitata and therefore he has to refrain from 
empirical investigation; as he formulated:

 

We must forgo a more precise investigation of the layer of meaning which 
provides the human world and culture, as such, with a specific meaning and 
therewith provides this world with specifically “mental” predicates. (Husserl, 
1929, at p. 138; my translation).

The progression has been made in terms of the analytical modeling (Rosen, 
Dubois) and the development of means to measure redundancy generation within 
cultural domains (McGill, Ashby, Ulanowicz, Krippendorff). See for further 
elaborations: 

 

 http://www.leydesdorff.net/meaning.2011/index.htm Meaning as a 
sociological concept: A review of the modeling, mapping, and simulation of the 
communication of knowledge and meaning, Social Science Information (in press); 
pdf-version http://www.leydesdorff.net/meaning.2011/meaning.pdf 

 

The Communication of Meaning and the Structuration of Expectations: Giddens'  
http://www.leydesdorff.net/GiddensLuhmann/index.htm structuration theory 
and Luhmann's self-organization, Journal of the American Society for 
Information Science and Technology 61(10) (2010) 2138-2150; pdf-version 
http://www.leydesdorff.net/GiddensLuhmann/structuration.pdf 

 

With best wishes,

Loet

 

  _  

Loet Leydesdorff 

Professor, University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR)
Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam.
Tel. +31-20-525 6598; fax: +31-842239111

 mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net l...@leydesdorff.net ;  
http://www.leydesdorff.net/ http://www.leydesdorff.net/ 
Visiting Professor,  http://www.istic.ac.cn/Eng/brief_en.html ISTIC, Beijing; 
Honorary Fellow,  http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/ SPRU, University of Sussex 



 

 

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Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering Principles

[Pedro C. Marijuan]

Dear FIS colleagues,

I have some differences about the epistemic stance recently discussed by 
Karl, Loet (and in part, Joseph, but he looks more as trying to step on 
the reality, whatever it is). Basically, their informational subject 
looks like the abstract, disembodied, non-situated, classical observer, 
equipped in a Cartesian austerity --and outside, just the Order or maybe 
the Disorder.

My contention is that the epistemology of information science has to 
give room for non-human observers, I mean, there is cognition and 
informational processes (forms of knowledge and intelligence included) 
in bacteria, living cells in general, non human nervous systems, and in 
a number of social constructions and institutions (accounting 
processes, specifically the sciences), even at the level of global human 
society we are living now in an epoch of planetary observation and 
actuation (eg, climate change) --not to speak only on politics and 
economics. The micro-macro info flows and knowledge circulation are 
fascinating epistemic problems of our time, when collectively considered.

I have argued in previous messages that a new info rhetorics looks 
necessary, so to prepare the room for a new info epistemology. The 
problem of the agent(s) and the world(s), the abstract observer(s) 
and the real one(s), the necessary disciplinary involvement 
(particularly of the neurosciences, the action strike...) all of this 
looks very difficult to be handled directly. New way of thinking needed.

best wishes

---Pedro

PS. NEXT WEEK THE NEW DISCUSSION SESSION BY MARK BURGING ON INFO THEORY 
WILL BE ANNOUNCED.



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Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering Principles

[Loet Leydesdorff]

Dear Pedro, 

I understand that you have some problems with my epistemic stance. Let me
try to clarify.

Let me go back to Maturana (1978) The Biology of Language ...
On p. 49, he formulated:  ... so that the relations of neuronal activity
generated under consensual behavior become perturbations and components to
further consensual behavior, an observer is operationally generated. And
furthermore (at this same page):  ... the second-order consensual domain
that it establishes with other organisms becomes indistinguishable from a
semantic domain.

This observer (at the biological level) is able to provide meaning to the
information. However, as Maturana argues later in this paper this semantics
is different from that of human super-observers introduced from p. 56
onwards.

My interest is in human super-observers. I consider the latter as
psychological systems which are able not only to provide meaning to the
observations, but also to communicate meaning. The communication of meaning
generates a supra-individual super-semantic domain, in which meaning
cannot only be provided, but also changed; not in the sense of updated but
because of the reflexivity involved. Robert Rosen's notion of anticipatory
systems is here important.

Dubois (1998) distinguished between incursive and hyper-incursive systems
and between weak and strong anticipation. Both psychological observers and
interhuman discourses can be considered as strongly anticipatory, that is,
they use future states -- discursively and reflexively envisaged -- for the
update. Non-human systems do not have this capacity: they learn by
adaptation, but not in terms of entertaining and potentially discussing
models.

Models provide predictions of future states that can be used for updating
the persent state of the systems which can entertain these models. Thus, new
options are generated. This increases the redundancy; that is, against the
arrow of time. Meaning providing already does so, but communication and
codification of meaning enhances this process further. Non-human observers
(e.g., monkeys) are able to provide meaning and perhaps sometimes to
entertain a model, but they are not able to communicate these models. That
makes the difference. If models cannot be communicated, they cannot be
improved consciously and reflexively.

Thus, a non-human may be an observer, but it cannot be a cogito. This makes
the psychological system different from the biological. Cogitantes can
entertain and discuss models (as cogitata). One of the models, for example,
is the one of autopoiesis.

Best wishes, 
Loet

Loet Leydesdorff 
Professor, University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR), 
Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam. 
Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-842239111
l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/ 


-Original Message-
From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On
Behalf Of Pedro C. Marijuan
Sent: Friday, April 01, 2011 11:29 AM
To: fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering
Principles

Dear FIS colleagues,

I have some differences about the epistemic stance recently discussed by
Karl, Loet (and in part, Joseph, but he looks more as trying to step on the
reality, whatever it is). Basically, their informational subject looks like
the abstract, disembodied, non-situated, classical observer, equipped in a
Cartesian austerity --and outside, just the Order or maybe the Disorder.

My contention is that the epistemology of information science has to give
room for non-human observers, I mean, there is cognition and informational
processes (forms of knowledge and intelligence included) in bacteria, living
cells in general, non human nervous systems, and in a number of social
constructions and institutions (accounting 
processes, specifically the sciences), even at the level of global human
society we are living now in an epoch of planetary observation and actuation
(eg, climate change) --not to speak only on politics and economics. The
micro-macro info flows and knowledge circulation are fascinating epistemic
problems of our time, when collectively considered.

I have argued in previous messages that a new info rhetorics looks
necessary, so to prepare the room for a new info epistemology. The problem
of the agent(s) and the world(s), the abstract observer(s) and the real
one(s), the necessary disciplinary involvement (particularly of the
neurosciences, the action strike...) all of this looks very difficult to
be handled directly. New way of thinking needed.

best wishes

---Pedro

PS. NEXT WEEK THE NEW DISCUSSION SESSION BY MARK BURGING ON INFO THEORY WILL
BE ANNOUNCED.



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Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and OrderingPrinciples

[Krassimir Markov]

Dear Loet, Pedro and FIS Colleagues,
It is very important to take in account the ontological structure of the 
information subjects in the reality.
The hierarchy of the intellectual properties is not investigated in deep 
till now.
Who may say that the human brain is one whole but not a very complicated 
system of small cells and possibly special kinds of bacteria and other micro 
organisms ?
The phenomena of intelligence could not be investigated separately taking in 
account only one of its realizations.
Let remember the very actual scientific area called Natural Information 
Technologies.
I expect in the future the scientific collegium to recognize special kind of 
intelligent systems which is seen today - social human-technic systems where 
the new kind of information subject was established - a society built by 
connected nodes of human-computer systems. Let remember Nord Africa.
I think we made step to the next discussion. It is nice to meet Mark!
Friendly regards
Krassimir



-Original Message- 
From: Loet Leydesdorff
Sent: Friday, April 01, 2011 1:14 PM
To: 'Pedro C. Marijuan' ; fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and 
OrderingPrinciples

Dear Pedro,

I understand that you have some problems with my epistemic stance. Let me
try to clarify.

Let me go back to Maturana (1978) The Biology of Language ...
On p. 49, he formulated:  ... so that the relations of neuronal activity
generated under consensual behavior become perturbations and components to
further consensual behavior, an observer is operationally generated. And
furthermore (at this same page):  ... the second-order consensual domain
that it establishes with other organisms becomes indistinguishable from a
semantic domain.

This observer (at the biological level) is able to provide meaning to the
information. However, as Maturana argues later in this paper this semantics
is different from that of human super-observers introduced from p. 56
onwards.

My interest is in human super-observers. I consider the latter as
psychological systems which are able not only to provide meaning to the
observations, but also to communicate meaning. The communication of meaning
generates a supra-individual super-semantic domain, in which meaning
cannot only be provided, but also changed; not in the sense of updated but
because of the reflexivity involved. Robert Rosen's notion of anticipatory
systems is here important.

Dubois (1998) distinguished between incursive and hyper-incursive systems
and between weak and strong anticipation. Both psychological observers and
interhuman discourses can be considered as strongly anticipatory, that is,
they use future states -- discursively and reflexively envisaged -- for the
update. Non-human systems do not have this capacity: they learn by
adaptation, but not in terms of entertaining and potentially discussing
models.

Models provide predictions of future states that can be used for updating
the persent state of the systems which can entertain these models. Thus, new
options are generated. This increases the redundancy; that is, against the
arrow of time. Meaning providing already does so, but communication and
codification of meaning enhances this process further. Non-human observers
(e.g., monkeys) are able to provide meaning and perhaps sometimes to
entertain a model, but they are not able to communicate these models. That
makes the difference. If models cannot be communicated, they cannot be
improved consciously and reflexively.

Thus, a non-human may be an observer, but it cannot be a cogito. This makes
the psychological system different from the biological. Cogitantes can
entertain and discuss models (as cogitata). One of the models, for example,
is the one of autopoiesis.

Best wishes,
Loet

Loet Leydesdorff
Professor, University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR),
Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam.
Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-842239111
l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/


-Original Message-
From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On
Behalf Of Pedro C. Marijuan
Sent: Friday, April 01, 2011 11:29 AM
To: fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering
Principles

Dear FIS colleagues,

I have some differences about the epistemic stance recently discussed by
Karl, Loet (and in part, Joseph, but he looks more as trying to step on the
reality, whatever it is). Basically, their informational subject looks like
the abstract, disembodied, non-situated, classical observer, equipped in a
Cartesian austerity --and outside, just the Order or maybe the Disorder.

My contention is that the epistemology of information science has to give
room for non-human observers, I mean, there is cognition and informational
processes (forms of knowledge and intelligence included) in bacteria, living
cells in general, non human nervous systems

Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering Principles

[joe.bren...@bluewin.ch]

Dear Pedro,
I do not quite recognize myself in the statement:
Basically, their informational subject looks like the abstract, disembodied, 
non-situated, classical observer, equipped in a
Cartesian austerity --and outside, just the Order or maybe the Disorder.
I thought my implicit observer was very much real, embodied and non-classical, 
fully participating (and in part constituting) the order and disorder. 
However, I rather tend to agree with you that Loet's, Rosen's and Dubois' 
models of communication, anticipation, etc. are somewhat too abstract. The 
models, as I think Loet may agree, are created for analysis, and do not define 
the physical, dynamic relation between the models, the creation of models and 
what is being modeled as processes.
I have never understood why Maturana had to say that observers are 
operationally generated when it seems obvious that they exist, albeit at 
different levels of complexity and (and here we agree) capability of 
recursiveness. As I have said previously, autopoiesis, like spontaneity and 
self-organization are concepts that are very useful, but cannot be taken to 
describe, as fully as I anyway would like, the dynamics of the cognitive 
processes necessary for an understanding of information and meaning. 
The above notwithstanding, I then have a problem with your, Pedro, formulation 
of the capabilities of non-human observers. Here, I agree with the principle 
expressed by Loet that the examples of the entities you mentioned lack the 
necessary cognitive abilities, although I focus on aspects of them other than 
model-related.  
A theory in which NOTHING previous is taken as entirely satisfactory seems more 
and more necessary . . .
Best wishes,
Joseph Ursprüngliche Nachricht
Von: l...@leydesdorff.net
Datum: 01.04.2011 12:14
An: 'Pedro C. Marijuan'pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es, fis@listas.unizar.es
Betreff: Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering   
Principles

Dear Pedro, 

I understand that you have some problems with my epistemic stance. Let me
try to clarify.

Let me go back to Maturana (1978) The Biology of Language ...
On p. 49, he formulated:  ... so that the relations of neuronal activity
generated under consensual behavior become perturbations and components to
further consensual behavior, an observer is operationally generated. And
furthermore (at this same page):  ... the second-order consensual domain
that it establishes with other organisms becomes indistinguishable from a
semantic domain.

This observer (at the biological level) is able to provide meaning to the
information. However, as Maturana argues later in this paper this semantics
is different from that of human super-observers introduced from p. 56
onwards.

My interest is in human super-observers. I consider the latter as
psychological systems which are able not only to provide meaning to the
observations, but also to communicate meaning. The communication of meaning
generates a supra-individual super-semantic domain, in which meaning
cannot only be provided, but also changed; not in the sense of updated but
because of the reflexivity involved. Robert Rosen's notion of anticipatory
systems is here important.

Dubois (1998) distinguished between incursive and hyper-incursive systems
and between weak and strong anticipation. Both psychological observers and
interhuman discourses can be considered as strongly anticipatory, that is,
they use future states -- discursively and reflexively envisaged -- for the
update. Non-human systems do not have this capacity: they learn by
adaptation, but not in terms of entertaining and potentially discussing
models.

Models provide predictions of future states that can be used for updating
the persent state of the systems which can entertain these models. Thus, new
options are generated. This increases the redundancy; that is, against the
arrow of time. Meaning providing already does so, but communication and
codification of meaning enhances this process further. Non-human observers
(e.g., monkeys) are able to provide meaning and perhaps sometimes to
entertain a model, but they are not able to communicate these models. That
makes the difference. If models cannot be communicated, they cannot be
improved consciously and reflexively.

Thus, a non-human may be an observer, but it cannot be a cogito. This makes
the psychological system different from the biological. Cogitantes can
entertain and discuss models (as cogitata). One of the models, for example,
is the one of autopoiesis.

Best wishes, 
Loet

Loet Leydesdorff 
Professor, University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR), 
Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam. 
Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-842239111
l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/ 


-Original Message-
From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On
Behalf Of Pedro C. Marijuan
Sent: Friday, April 01, 2011 11:29 AM
To: fis

Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering Principles

[Stanley N Salthe]

It seems obvious to me that any property held by a very complex entity
(e.g., human being), IF it can be modeled, then that model can be used to
generalize that property ANYWHERE we wish to.  On these grounds I have been
busy working on 'physiosemiosis' using the triadic formulation of semiosis
of Charles Peirce.  I have proposed that the 'sign' emerges from the context
of an interaction between object and system.  If context has no effect on
the interaction, there is no semiosis.  If, on the contrary, context affects
the interaction, then we have semiosis, even in a pond.

The key is whether the trait involved can be modeled; on these grounds it
has not yet been shown that 'qualia' can be generalized beyond the human
experience, yet even a child can see, for example, that a mother hen is very
unhappy when her chicks are threatened.

STAN

On Fri, Apr 1, 2011 at 3:04 PM, Pridi Siregar 
pridi.sire...@ibiocomputing.com wrote:

 Hi all !



 Maybe the term « observer » in Pedro’s « non-human observer » term is what
 bugs some of you because it seems to imply some “non-human cogitum” that by
 habit we may want to equate to human thinking. Of course trying to
 understand the “psychology” of a bacteria may be a bit hard for humans so
 perhaps the term “observer” should be given a broader meaning and the
 challenge would be to define the nature/ boundaries/mechanics of this
 semantic extension/redefinition. The same may hold for defining “language”
  and “meaning”… But for lack of time I really haven’t followed all the
 debates and I’m no philosopher.  As a business person I am much more
 practical and I do have one practical concern/question: are we trying to lay
 down a new theory of living systems or are we going (in some not too distant
 future) towards devising a computational framework that (even modestly) may
 go beyond projects such as the VHP?Sorry to be so down to earth but I
 suppose that in this forum everyone is allowed to express himself/herself…
 J



 Pridi









 *De :* fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es]
 *De la part de* joe.bren...@bluewin.ch
 *Envoyé :* vendredi 1 avril 2011 19:38
 *À :* l...@leydesdorff.net; 'Pedro C. Marijuan'; fis@listas.unizar.es
 *Objet :* Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering
 Principles



 Dear Pedro,



 I do not quite recognize myself in the statement:



 Basically, their informational subject looks like the abstract,
 disembodied, non-situated, classical observer, equipped in a
 Cartesian austerity --and outside, just the Order or maybe the Disorder.



 I thought my implicit observer was very much real, embodied and
 non-classical, fully participating (and in part constituting) the order and
 disorder.



 However, I rather tend to agree with you that Loet's, Rosen's and Dubois'
 models of communication, anticipation, etc. are somewhat too abstract. The
 models, as I think Loet may agree, are created for analysis, and do not
 define the physical, dynamic relation between the models, the creation of
 models and what is being modeled as processes.



 I have never understood why Maturana had to say that observers are
 operationally generated when it seems obvious that they exist, albeit at
 different levels of complexity and (and here we agree) capability of
 recursiveness. As I have said previously, autopoiesis, like spontaneity
 and self-organization are concepts that are very useful, but cannot be taken
 to describe, as fully as I anyway would like, the dynamics of the cognitive
 processes necessary for an understanding of information and meaning.



 The above notwithstanding, I then have a problem with your, Pedro,
 formulation of the capabilities of non-human observers. Here, I agree with
 the principle expressed by Loet that the examples of the entities you
 mentioned lack the necessary cognitive abilities, although I focus on
 aspects of them other than model-related.



 A theory in which NOTHING previous is taken as entirely satisfactory seems
 more and more necessary . . .



 Best wishes,



 Joseph



 Ursprüngliche Nachricht
 Von: l...@leydesdorff.net
 Datum: 01.04.2011 12:14
 An: 'Pedro C. Marijuan'pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es, 
 fis@listas.unizar.es
 Betreff: Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering
 Principles

 Dear Pedro,

 I understand that you have some problems with my epistemic stance. Let me
 try to clarify.

 Let me go back to Maturana (1978) The Biology of Language ...
 On p. 49, he formulated:  ... so that the relations of neuronal activity
 generated under consensual behavior become perturbations and components to
 further consensual behavior, an observer is operationally generated. And
 furthermore (at this same page):  ... the second-order consensual domain
 that it establishes with other organisms becomes indistinguishable from a
 semantic domain.

 This observer (at the biological level) is able to provide meaning to the
 information

Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering Principles

[Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic]

Dear Stan,



Ø  The key is whether the trait involved can be modeled; on these grounds it 
has not yet been shown that 'qualia' can be generalized beyond the human 
experience, yet even  a child can see, for example, that a mother hen is very 
unhappy when her chicks are threatened.

Being a computer scientist I don't really know enough about qualia, so I 
checked Wiki and read:

Examples of qualia are the pain of a headache, the taste of wine, the 
experience of taking a recreational drug, or the redness of an evening sky.

I believe that hen and other animals have some sort of qualia, of course not 
human qualia, but their own, animal qualia.

Am I wrong in my believe that animals can feel pain, have headache, feel taste 
of drink and food, can see colors and can even get drunk (Animals Are Beautiful 
People,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dDknJ6KPLxc ) and that pain, headache etc. that 
they experience represent their qualia?

With best regards,
Gordana



http://www.mrtc.mdh.se/~gdc/

From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On 
Behalf Of Stanley N Salthe
Sent: den 1 april 2011 21:39
To: fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering 
Principles

It seems obvious to me that any property held by a very complex entity (e.g., 
human being), IF it can be modeled, then that model can be used to generalize 
that property ANYWHERE we wish to.  On these grounds I have been busy working 
on 'physiosemiosis' using the triadic formulation of semiosis of Charles 
Peirce.  I have proposed that the 'sign' emerges from the context of an 
interaction between object and system.  If context has no effect on the 
interaction, there is no semiosis.  If, on the contrary, context affects the 
interaction, then we have semiosis, even in a pond.

The key is whether the trait involved can be modeled; on these grounds it has 
not yet been shown that 'qualia' can be generalized beyond the human 
experience, yet even a child can see, for example, that a mother hen is very 
unhappy when her chicks are threatened.

STAN
On Fri, Apr 1, 2011 at 3:04 PM, Pridi Siregar 
pridi.sire...@ibiocomputing.commailto:pridi.sire...@ibiocomputing.com wrote:
Hi all !

Maybe the term « observer » in Pedro's « non-human observer » term is what bugs 
some of you because it seems to imply some non-human cogitum that by habit we 
may want to equate to human thinking. Of course trying to understand the 
psychology of a bacteria may be a bit hard for humans so perhaps the term 
observer should be given a broader meaning and the challenge would be to 
define the nature/ boundaries/mechanics of this semantic 
extension/redefinition. The same may hold for defining language  and 
meaning... But for lack of time I really haven't followed all the debates and 
I'm no philosopher.  As a business person I am much more practical and I do 
have one practical concern/question: are we trying to lay down a new theory of 
living systems or are we going (in some not too distant future) towards 
devising a computational framework that (even modestly) may go beyond projects 
such as the VHP?Sorry to be so down to earth but I suppose that in this 
forum everyone is allowed to express himself/herself...:)

Pridi




De : fis-boun...@listas.unizar.esmailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es 
[mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.esmailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] De 
la part de joe.bren...@bluewin.chmailto:joe.bren...@bluewin.ch
Envoyé : vendredi 1 avril 2011 19:38
À : l...@leydesdorff.netmailto:l...@leydesdorff.net; 'Pedro C. Marijuan'; 
fis@listas.unizar.esmailto:fis@listas.unizar.es
Objet : Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering 
Principles

Dear Pedro,

I do not quite recognize myself in the statement:

Basically, their informational subject looks like the abstract, disembodied, 
non-situated, classical observer, equipped in a
Cartesian austerity --and outside, just the Order or maybe the Disorder.

I thought my implicit observer was very much real, embodied and non-classical, 
fully participating (and in part constituting) the order and disorder.

However, I rather tend to agree with you that Loet's, Rosen's and Dubois' 
models of communication, anticipation, etc. are somewhat too abstract. The 
models, as I think Loet may agree, are created for analysis, and do not define 
the physical, dynamic relation between the models, the creation of models and 
what is being modeled as processes.

I have never understood why Maturana had to say that observers are 
operationally generated when it seems obvious that they exist, albeit at 
different levels of complexity and (and here we agree) capability of 
recursiveness. As I have said previously, autopoiesis, like spontaneity and 
self-organization are concepts that are very useful, but cannot be taken to 
describe, as fully as I anyway would like, the dynamics of the cognitive 
processes necessary for an understanding

Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering Principles

[joe.bren...@bluewin.ch]

Dear Karl, Dear Loet,
Thank you both for your postings and the perspectives they provide. They leave 
me with just two questions, and I am glad Karl does not want to close the 
discussion so that I may ask for your and other views on them.
1. Does Loet's reply to Karl regarding frameworks for observation of actual 
states vs. frameworks for expectations imply that such frameworks are 
completely mutually exclusive?
2. Regarding information (copying from Karl), the two views in summary are: 
By information, this approach means the deviation of the actual cases from the 
ideal-typical case, in which an order exists. (universalia sunt ante rem)

The opposing view explains information by means of the axiomatic idea of order.
The information content is then the deviation of the actual cases from the 
ideal-typical state, as Loet defines, and concurrently an implication of which 
order prevails, as the opposing view suggests.
Are both these views, however, purely epistemological or do they have an 
ontological content? Both depend (today, of course, not historically) on the 
reality of the axiomatic idea of order and/some ideal case. On first reading, 
it would appear that Karl would accept some ontological content, perhaps 
partly, since he writes: 
The difference between the Middle Ages and today is, in my view, that they had 
no possibility to face the idea that there is no ultimate
ordering principle behind the many obviously existing ordering principles.
This statement, however, if I understand it, would exclude the possibility of a 
new general, if not ultimate, ordering principle for reality being discovered, 
that would not be an order per se. Here, I would agree with Loet, that the 
paradigm of epistemology has indeed changed, but what else?! 
I look forward to hearing from you.
Best wishes,
Joseph






Ursprüngliche Nachricht
Von: karl.javors...@gmail.com
Datum: 27.03.2011 11:41
An: Pedro C. Marijuanpcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
Kopie: fis@listas.unizar.es
Betreff: Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam

Dear James,

thank you for the widening of this discussion.

Order and Information

Let us not close this session on the historical perspective of the
modern concept of Science yet. Loet’s thoughtful remarks about the
relation between information and order bring us back to some deep
problems they were addressing in the Middle Ages.

The discussion about the relative importance of the universalia vs.
the re (also known as Occam’s) can be restated in today’s terms as
follows: is the idea behind the thing more useful as a description of
the world as the descriptions of the things themselves?

In Loet’s view, there exists a framework within which we can observe
how the actual states of the things are. Therefore, in this approach
there is no need for a separate concept of order; as each possible
alternative is a priori known, it is the information content that
gives a description of the world. By information, this approach means
the deviation of the actual cases from the ideal-typical case, in
which an order exists. (universalia sunt ante rem)

The opposing view explains information by means of the axiomatic idea
of order. The system is in the same fashion closed, and every possible
alternative is equally known a priori. The difference in viewpoints
lies in the focusing on the properties of the ideal-typical case vs.
the actual types of cases. (universalia sunt post rebus).

The numbers offer a nice satisfying explanation. As we order the
things, we encounter ties. (A sort on 136 additions will bring forth
cases which are indistinguishable with respect to one aspect.) The
members of a tie can represent the universalia. (“All additions where
a+b=12” is e.g. a universalium) The actual cases will – almost – each
deviate from the ideal-typical case.

The information content is then the deviation of the actual cases from
the ideal-typical state, as Loet defines, and concurrently an
implication of which order prevails, as the opposing view suggests. So
it is the same extent and collection which both see, but the names are
different as is different the approach of calculating it. A reorder
creates different ties, therefore a different information content.

The difference between the Middle Ages and today is, in my view, that
they had no possibility to face the idea that there is no ultimate
ordering principle behind the many obviously existing ordering
principles. Our generation has credible news about societies which are
ordered in a completely different fashion and yet are not struck down.
We have experienced too many ideal orders to believe that any such
exists.

Karl

2011/3/24, Pedro C. Marijuan pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es:

 Dear all,



 Thank you very much to Pedro for asking me to suggest a discussion for
 the list and to everyone else for indulging me.  As a historian, I have
 learnt that questions I naively thought were quite simple have turned
 out to be very complicated indeed

Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering Principles

[Loet Leydesdorff]

Dear Joe and colleagues, 

 

1. Does Loet's reply to Karl regarding frameworks for observation of actual 
states vs. frameworks for expectations imply that such frameworks are 
completely mutually exclusive?

 

Of course, not: the expectations are informed by previous observations and 
further observations can change our expectations. More precisely: observational 
reports are needed to make the discourse (entertaining expectations) 
progressive.

 

2. Regarding information (copying from Karl), the two views in summary are: 

 

By information, this approach means the deviation of the actual cases from the 
ideal-typical case, in which an order exists. (universalia sunt ante rem)

The opposing view explains information by means of the axiomatic idea of order.

 

I would prefer to use a plural for “ideas of order”: paradigms, theoretical 
frameworks, etc. As argued before, the “sunt” is problematic because this order 
does not “exist” (in the res extensa), but can be entertained (as cogitate in 
the res cogitans).

 

The information content is then the deviation of the actual cases from the 
ideal-typical state, as Loet defines, and concurrently an implication of which 
order prevails, as the opposing view suggests.

 

The information content is always expected information content of a 
distribution.

 

Are both these views, however, purely epistemological or do they have an 
ontological content?

 

It seems to me that my perspective leads to a chaology instead of a cosmology. 
“Out there” is only noise; order emerges from our reflections and exchanges as 
cogitantes.

 

Both depend (today, of course, not historically) on the reality of the 
axiomatic idea of order and/some ideal case. On first reading, it would appear 
that Karl would accept some ontological content, perhaps partly, since he 
writes: 

 

The difference between the Middle Ages and today is, in my view, that they had 
no possibility to face the idea that there is no ultimate
ordering principle behind the many obviously existing ordering principles.

 

These ordering principles are not “given” by God in his Creation (albeit in the 
substance of Natura naturans or natura naturata), but are constructed by us in 
scholarly discourses.

 

This statement, however, if I understand it, would exclude the possibility of a 
new general, if not ultimate, ordering principle for reality being discovered, 
that would not be an order per se. Here, I would agree with Loet, that the 
paradigm of epistemology has indeed changed, but what else?! 

 

“Reality” can be considered as broken in res extensa and res cogitans. 
Alternative expectations are also possible, but have to assume a “veracitas 
Dei” or harmonia prestabilita. When one gives this perspective up, chaology can 
be expected to prevail.

 

Best wishes, Loet

 

I look forward to hearing from you.

 

Best wishes,

 

Joseph

 

 

Ursprüngliche Nachricht
Von: karl.javors...@gmail.com
Datum: 27.03.2011 11:41
An: Pedro C. Marijuanpcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
Kopie: fis@listas.unizar.es
Betreff: Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam

Dear James,

thank you for the widening of this discussion.

Order and Information

Let us not close this session on the historical perspective of the
modern concept of Science yet. Loet’s thoughtful remarks about the
relation between information and order bring us back to some deep
problems they were addressing in the Middle Ages.

The discussion about the relative importance of the universalia vs.
the re (also known as Occam’s) can be restated in today’s terms as
follows: is the idea behind the thing more useful as a description of
the world as the descriptions of the things themselves?

In Loet’s view, there exists a framework within which we can observe
how the actual states of the things are. Therefore, in this approach
there is no need for a separate concept of order; as each possible
alternative is a priori known, it is the information content that
gives a description of the world. By information, this approach means
the deviation of the actual cases from the ideal-typical case, in
which an order exists. (universalia sunt ante rem)

The opposing view explains information by means of the axiomatic idea
of order. The system is in the same fashion closed, and every possible
alternative is equally known a priori. The difference in viewpoints
lies in the focusing on the properties of the ideal-typical case vs.
the actual types of cases. (universalia sunt post rebus).

The numbers offer a nice satisfying explanation. As we order the
things, we encounter ties. (A sort on 136 additions will bring forth
cases which are indistinguishable with respect to one aspect.) The
members of a tie can represent the universalia. (“All additions where
a+b=12” is e.g. a universalium) The actual cases will – almost – each
deviate from the ideal-typical case.

The information content is then the deviation of the actual cases from
the ideal-typical state, as Loet

Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering Principles

[karl javorszky]

 is always *expected* information content of a
 distribution.



 Are both these views, however, purely epistemological or do they have an
 ontological content?



 It seems to me that my perspective leads to a chaology instead of a
 cosmology. “Out there” is only noise; order emerges from our reflections and
 exchanges as cogitantes.



 Both depend (today, of course, not historically) on the reality of the
 axiomatic idea of order and/some ideal case. On first reading, it would
 appear that Karl would accept some ontological content, perhaps partly,
 since he writes:



 The difference between the Middle Ages and today is, in my view, that they
 had no possibility to face the idea that there is no ultimate
 ordering principle behind the many obviously existing ordering principles.



 These ordering principles are not “given” by God in his Creation (albeit in
 the substance of Natura naturans or natura naturata), but are constructed by
 us in scholarly discourses.



 This statement, however, if I understand it, would exclude the possibility
 of a new general, if not ultimate, ordering principle for reality being
 discovered, that would not be an order per se. Here, I would agree with
 Loet, that the paradigm of epistemology has indeed changed, but what else?!



 “Reality” can be considered as broken in res extensa and res cogitans.
 Alternative expectations are also possible, but have to assume a “veracitas
 Dei” or harmonia prestabilita. When one gives this perspective up, chaology
 can be expected to prevail.



 Best wishes, Loet



 I look forward to hearing from you.



 Best wishes,



 Joseph





 Ursprüngliche Nachricht
 Von: karl.javors...@gmail.com
 Datum: 27.03.2011 11:41
 An: Pedro C. Marijuanpcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
 Kopie: fis@listas.unizar.es
 Betreff: Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam

 Dear James,

 thank you for the widening of this discussion.

 Order and Information

 Let us not close this session on the historical perspective of the
 modern concept of Science yet. Loet’s thoughtful remarks about the
 relation between information and order bring us back to some deep
 problems they were addressing in the Middle Ages.

 The discussion about the relative importance of the universalia vs.
 the re (also known as Occam’s) can be restated in today’s terms as
 follows: is the idea behind the thing more useful as a description of
 the world as the descriptions of the things themselves?

 In Loet’s view, there exists a framework within which we can observe
 how the actual states of the things are. Therefore, in this approach
 there is no need for a separate concept of order; as each possible
 alternative is a priori known, it is the information content that
 gives a description of the world. By information, this approach means
 the deviation of the actual cases from the ideal-typical case, in
 which an order exists. (universalia sunt ante rem)

 The opposing view explains information by means of the axiomatic idea
 of order. The system is in the same fashion closed, and every possible
 alternative is equally known a priori. The difference in viewpoints
 lies in the focusing on the properties of the ideal-typical case vs.
 the actual types of cases. (universalia sunt post rebus).

 The numbers offer a nice satisfying explanation. As we order the
 things, we encounter ties. (A sort on 136 additions will bring forth
 cases which are indistinguishable with respect to one aspect.) The
 members of a tie can represent the universalia. (“All additions where
 a+b=12” is e.g. a universalium) The actual cases will – almost – each
 deviate from the ideal-typical case.

 The information content is then the deviation of the actual cases from
 the ideal-typical state, as Loet defines, and concurrently an
 implication of which order prevails, as the opposing view suggests. So
 it is the same extent and collection which both see, but the names are
 different as is different the approach of calculating it. A reorder
 creates different ties, therefore a different information content.

 The difference between the Middle Ages and today is, in my view, that
 they had no possibility to face the idea that there is no ultimate
 ordering principle behind the many obviously existing ordering
 principles. Our generation has credible news about societies which are
 ordered in a completely different fashion and yet are not struck down.
 We have experienced too many ideal orders to believe that any such
 exists.

 Karl

 2011/3/24, Pedro C. Marijuan pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es:
 
  Dear all,
 
 
 
  Thank you very much to Pedro for asking me to suggest a discussion for
  the list and to everyone else for indulging me.  As a historian, I have
  learnt that questions I naively thought were quite simple have turned
  out to be very complicated indeed.  The purpose of history, I think, is
  to explain the past.  It is not just a collection of facts (one damn
  thing after another) or even attempting to find out

Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam

[karl javorszky]

Dear James,

thank you for the widening of this discussion.

Order and Information

Let us not close this session on the historical perspective of the
modern concept of Science yet. Loet’s thoughtful remarks about the
relation between information and order bring us back to some deep
problems they were addressing in the Middle Ages.

The discussion about the relative importance of the universalia vs.
the re (also known as Occam’s) can be restated in today’s terms as
follows: is the idea behind the thing more useful as a description of
the world as the descriptions of the things themselves?

In Loet’s view, there exists a framework within which we can observe
how the actual states of the things are. Therefore, in this approach
there is no need for a separate concept of order; as each possible
alternative is a priori known, it is the information content that
gives a description of the world. By information, this approach means
the deviation of the actual cases from the ideal-typical case, in
which an order exists. (universalia sunt ante rem)

The opposing view explains information by means of the axiomatic idea
of order. The system is in the same fashion closed, and every possible
alternative is equally known a priori. The difference in viewpoints
lies in the focusing on the properties of the ideal-typical case vs.
the actual types of cases. (universalia sunt post rebus).

The numbers offer a nice satisfying explanation. As we order the
things, we encounter ties. (A sort on 136 additions will bring forth
cases which are indistinguishable with respect to one aspect.) The
members of a tie can represent the universalia. (“All additions where
a+b=12” is e.g. a universalium) The actual cases will – almost – each
deviate from the ideal-typical case.

The information content is then the deviation of the actual cases from
the ideal-typical state, as Loet defines, and concurrently an
implication of which order prevails, as the opposing view suggests. So
it is the same extent and collection which both see, but the names are
different as is different the approach of calculating it. A reorder
creates different ties, therefore a different information content.

The difference between the Middle Ages and today is, in my view, that
they had no possibility to face the idea that there is no ultimate
ordering principle behind the many obviously existing ordering
principles. Our generation has credible news about societies which are
ordered in a completely different fashion and yet are not struck down.
We have experienced too many ideal orders to believe that any such
exists.

Karl

2011/3/24, Pedro C. Marijuan pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es:

 Dear all,



 Thank you very much to Pedro for asking me to suggest a discussion for
 the list and to everyone else for indulging me.  As a historian, I have
 learnt that questions I naively thought were quite simple have turned
 out to be very complicated indeed.  The purpose of history, I think, is
 to explain the past.  It is not just a collection of facts (one damn
 thing after another) or even attempting to find out what really
 happened (although it does help if we can do this).  Historians want to
 ask why? and how? as well as what?



 Among historians of science, there are two camps.  The larger one
 examines science as a cultural artefact within a particular historical
 milieu.  It seeks to answer questions like why did people believe what
 they believed?, why did they practice science in the way they did?
 and what did they hope science could achieve?  Historians in this camp
 tend to be specialists in a particular area.  They want to see the world
 through the eyes of their historical agents.  Questions about whether a
 particular scientific theory is true or corresponds to objective reality
 are not very relevant.  What matters is the way people in the past saw
 things.  We need to understand them.



 A second, smaller camp of historians of science where I have pitched my
 own tent want to know what caused modern science.  They recognise the
 enormous utility of scientific discovery and seek to explain how mankind
 came by this wonderful tool.  In other words, they seek a theory of the
 historical origins of science.  For this camp, questions about truth are
 of paramount importance because we are trying to look back in time to
 find the beginnings of processes that ultimately lead to a particular
 end.  That end is a scientific practice that produces true theories, or
 at least theories that correspond to an objective reality.



 This quest for the origins of modern science is difficult, not to
 mention rather pointless, if you contest the claim that modern science
 can give rise to a true description of the objective world.  So, when I
 presented my claim that we should look in the Middle Ages for these
 origins, it seems I had ignored a number of prior questions.  Indeed,
 the whole concept of science as producing true information was rapidly
 thrown into question.



 I 

[Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam

[Pedro C. Marijuan]

Dear all,



Thank you very much to Pedro for asking me to suggest a discussion for 
the list and to everyone else for indulging me.  As a historian, I have 
learnt that questions I naively thought were quite simple have turned 
out to be very complicated indeed.  The purpose of history, I think, is 
to explain the past.  It is not just a collection of facts (one damn 
thing after another) or even attempting to find out what really 
happened (although it does help if we can do this).  Historians want to 
ask why? and how? as well as what?




Among historians of science, there are two camps.  The larger one 
examines science as a cultural artefact within a particular historical 
milieu.  It seeks to answer questions like why did people believe what 
they believed?, why did they practice science in the way they did? 
and what did they hope science could achieve?  Historians in this camp 
tend to be specialists in a particular area.  They want to see the world 
through the eyes of their historical agents.  Questions about whether a 
particular scientific theory is true or corresponds to objective reality 
are not very relevant.  What matters is the way people in the past saw 
things.  We need to understand them.




A second, smaller camp of historians of science where I have pitched my 
own tent want to know what caused modern science.  They recognise the 
enormous utility of scientific discovery and seek to explain how mankind 
came by this wonderful tool.  In other words, they seek a theory of the 
historical origins of science.  For this camp, questions about truth are 
of paramount importance because we are trying to look back in time to 
find the beginnings of processes that ultimately lead to a particular 
end.  That end is a scientific practice that produces true theories, or 
at least theories that correspond to an objective reality. 




This quest for the origins of modern science is difficult, not to 
mention rather pointless, if you contest the claim that modern science 
can give rise to a true description of the objective world.  So, when I 
presented my claim that we should look in the Middle Ages for these 
origins, it seems I had ignored a number of prior questions.  Indeed, 
the whole concept of science as producing true information was rapidly 
thrown into question. 




I hope other members of the list have found some of the issues thrown 
out of this discussion of interest. 




Thank you all for your patience.



Best wishes



James





/The Genesis of Science: How the Christian Middle Ages Launched the 
Scientific Revolution 
http://www.amazon.com/Genesis-Science-Christian-Scientific-Revolution/dp/1596981555/bedeslibrary 
/by James Hannam is available now.




Shortlisted for the Royal Society Science Book Prize



Well-researched and hugely enjoyable.  */New Scientist/*



A spirited jaunt through centuries of scientific development... 
captures the wonder of the medieval world: its inspirational curiosity 
and its engaging strangeness. */Sunday Times/*




This book contains much valuable material summarised with commendable 
no-nonsense clarity... James Hannam has done a fine job of knocking down 
an old caricature. */Sunday Telegraph/*


---

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https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis

Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam

[Loet Leydesdorff]

Dear James and colleagues,

 

I have a few comments to the discussion colophon. First, it seems difficult
to explain something which has already happened. For example, one cannot
test statistically whether what happened could also have been expected. In
the tradition, one distinguished more carefully between explanatory
(nomothetic) sciences and hermeneutic understanding. Thus, you may wish to
adapt the metaphors. 

 

The quest for an explanation of the emergence of modernity in terms of a
single cause seems not productive to me. Marx, for example, considered new
forms of book-keeping as crucial, Weber attributed this revolution to the
Protestant ethics, and others have pointed to the effects of the printing
press. What most of these writers agree upon is that there is a phase
transition between the early 15th and late 16th century. An additional
degree of freedom was developed in the systems of interhuman coordination.

 

We have an intuition (e.g., based on artificial life) that a hypercycle can
emerge if a number of uncertainties operate at the same time. At the minimum
one would need three, but perhaps even more. Why three? Because only a
system with three sources of variance operating selectively upon one another
can generate redundancy (perhaps, measurable as a negative value of the
mutual information in three dimensions). In discussing the Triple Helix of
university-industry-government relations we have called this hypercycle an
overlay with as an additional communication routine is added to the system
and then changes the systems dynamics of all underlying routines.

 

For example, age-long traditions were inverted into different institutional
spheres such as autonomous sciences, liberal capitalism, civil liberties,
etc. Niklas Luhmann has called this the functional differentiation of
society. In my opinion, what was functionally differentiated were the codes
of communication; for example, between science and religion. Some of this
can perhaps be traced back to the struggle of the Investiture which broke
the hegemony of a single order, and left agents with room to make up their
own mind. Initially as an imitatio Christi  -- that is, no longer prescribed
by Rome, but as an individual task, but then generalized to other domains.
During the Roman empire and early Christianity, this interpretation of the
Gospel was not yet possible because of the worldy constraints, but once the
system (cosmology) began to tear apart, further erosion could not be
prevented.

 

I am not offering this as an explanation, but as a reading of history. I am
doubtful about those messages which claim more objectivity to their
statements than such an informed reading. As Whitehead noted: a science
which does not forget its past, is doomed. Probably, a kind of Scylla and
Charybdis between which one has to travel reflexively.

 

Best wishes,

Loet

 

  _  

Loet Leydesdorff 

Professor, University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR), 
Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam. 
Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-842239111
 mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net l...@leydesdorff.net ;
http://www.leydesdorff.net/ http://www.leydesdorff.net/ 

 

From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On
Behalf Of Pedro C. Marijuan
Sent: Thursday, March 24, 2011 12:02 PM
To: fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam

 

 

Dear all,

 

Thank you very much to Pedro for asking me to suggest a discussion for the
list and to everyone else for indulging me.  As a historian, I have learnt
that questions I naively thought were quite simple have turned out to be
very complicated indeed.  The purpose of history, I think, is to explain the
past.  It is not just a collection of facts (one damn thing after another)
or even attempting to find out what really happened (although it does help
if we can do this).  Historians want to ask why? and how? as well as
what?

 

Among historians of science, there are two camps.  The larger one examines
science as a cultural artefact within a particular historical milieu.  It
seeks to answer questions like why did people believe what they believed?,
why did they practice science in the way they did? and what did they hope
science could achieve?  Historians in this camp tend to be specialists in a
particular area.  They want to see the world through the eyes of their
historical agents.  Questions about whether a particular scientific theory
is true or corresponds to objective reality are not very relevant.  What
matters is the way people in the past saw things.  We need to understand
them.

 

A second, smaller camp of historians of science where I have pitched my own
tent want to know what caused modern science.  They recognise the enormous
utility of scientific discovery and seek to explain how mankind came by this
wonderful tool.  In other words, they seek a theory of the historical
origins of science.  For this camp, questions about