Re: [Fis] Hannam's Contentious Postulate. The Peircean Mirror

[Pedro C. Marijuan]

Dear Gordana and colleagues,

Your quotation  "But I would rather risk such reproaches than accept the 
present situation, in which philosophers argue only with dead biologists 
and biologists only with dead philosophers... " is quite funny and 
descriptive. In my terms, the recombination of knowledge is a slow, 
generationally driven process, except maybe in "revolutionary"  periods 
like today. Thus, in spite of Peirce scholarly greatness, and his 
crucial involvement in the creation of "pragmatism", it does not follow 
that this general philosophy or his semiotician stance, elaborated 
almost three generations ago, make a good match with the current 
developments in "connectomics" and in the "motor-centered approach" 
attempted by contemporary neuroscientists. My hunch is that a new 
information philosophy is needed in order to coherently link not only 
with the neurosciences but also with biology and Q Info science and 
advanced Artificial Intelligence. The unfortunately missing 
neurosceintific aspect is really crucial for our common enterprise, and 
it is a discussion we must promote in the list...


There is a very interesting attempt in the theoretical-biological arena 
that may be taken as a model for the neuroscience missing link. It is 
the INBIOSA project (www.inbiosa.eu ), that 
promotes a new integration paradigm about theoretical biology, 
biomathematics, and biocomputing. It is a preliminary European project 
funded by the EU, and some FISers know it very well as they (we) are 
already cooperating in this initiative. Somehow, what inbiosa attempts 
is the "what is life" of our times... It has been promoted by Plamen 
Simeonov, Andrée Ehresmann, Leslie Smith, Bruno Marchal, and others. 
They have recently joined our own discussion list (let me welcome them 
publicly!). In the extent to which a general multidisciplinary 
discussion may be convenient for them at some developmental stage, they 
are invited to chair some FIS future discussion session.


By the way, given that we have almost discontinued with James' 
presentation on medieval science, maybe it is time that he writes down a 
discussion "colophon"... We have had a nice time with his historical 
panorama (particularly in the scholarly "disputatione" so enlivened by 
Jerry's musings). Thanks, James!


best wishes

---Pedro



Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic escribió:


Dear Joseph,

 

Thank you for this precise clarification. I agree completely and I 
also follow tensions and changes in our discussions in the list.


Especially interesting to me is how theories or frameworks 
communicate, use each other and internalize each other.


(I believe that is essentially the same process as the one you mention 
for the change of Logic in Reality itself).


Currently there are ongoing paradigm shifts in computing, logic, 
biology, cognitive science, information science and several others.


Not all research fields get "updated" instantly, it takes time.

Interdisciplinary discussions sometimes contain criticisms built on 
presupposition about other research fields as they looked like some 
time before.


(I meet often the idea that computing is the same as the Turing 
Machine model.  But there is strong development of new computational 
paradigms and even if they are not completely established, they 
already exist in some fragmentary form.)


 

"But I would rather risk such reproaches than accept the present 
situation,
in which philosophers argue only with dead biologists and biologists 
only with dead philosophers... "

Michael Morange,  Life Explained

 

So I think this list is a good example of living philosophers talking 
with living biologists and other living FISers which makes it much 
more exciting and difficult.


 


Best regards,

Gordana

 




--
-
Pedro C. Marijuán
Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group
Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud
Avda. Gómez Laguna, 25, Pl. 11ª
50009 Zaragoza, Spain
Telf: 34 976 71 3526 (& 6818) Fax: 34 976 71 5554
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
http://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/
-

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Re: [Fis] Hannam's Contentious Postulate. The Peircean Mirror

[Gavin Ritz]

Can you specify exactly what this "Logic in Reality" is?

Its framework?
Its connectives?
Its categorical-identity?

Reagrds
Gavin

-Original Message-
From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On 
Behalf Of Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic
Sent: Wednesday, 23 March 2011 10:09 a.m.
To: joe.bren...@bluewin.ch; Loet Leydesdorff; fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: Re: [Fis] Hannam's Contentious Postulate. The Peircean Mirror

Dear Joseph,

Thank you for this precise clarification. I agree completely and I also follow 
tensions and changes in our discussions in the list.
Especially interesting to me is how theories or frameworks communicate, use 
each other and internalize each other. 
(I believe that is essentially the same process as the one you mention for the 
change of Logic in Reality itself).
Currently there are ongoing paradigm shifts in computing, logic, biology, 
cognitive science, information science and several others. 
Not all research fields get “updated” instantly, it takes time. 
Interdisciplinary discussions sometimes contain criticisms built on 
presupposition about other research fields as they looked like some time before.
(I meet often the idea that computing is the same as the Turing Machine model.  
But there is strong development of new computational paradigms and even if they 
are not completely established, they already exist in some fragmentary form.)

“But I would rather risk such reproaches than accept the present situation, 
in which philosophers argue only with dead biologists and biologists only with 
dead philosophers… “ 
Michael Morange,  Life Explained

So I think this list is a good example of living philosophers talking with 
living biologists and other living FISers which makes it much more exciting and 
difficult.

Best regards,
Gordana


From: joe.bren...@bluewin.ch [mailto:joe.bren...@bluewin.ch] 
Sent: den 22 mars 2011 21:08
To: Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic; Loet Leydesdorff; fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: AW: RE: [Fis] Hannam's Contentious Postulate. The Peircean Mirror

Dear Gordana,

Thank you for your very pertinent illustration of what Logic in Reality "is". 
There are (at least) two dynamics possible, 1) the tension between two existing 
frameworks, from which a new one (jump) may emerge and 2) that between an 
existing framework, for example Logic in Reality itself and what it could 
potentially become. I would just emend your phrase the "the world is more than 
a theory we have at hand" to "more than we have at hand in actual form" to make 
clearer that what is potential is also "at hand".

That these tensions are real is illustrated almost every day in these 
discussions . . .

Best regards,

Joseph
Ursprüngliche Nachricht
Von: gordana.dodig-crnko...@mdh.se
Datum: 21.03.2011 08:40
An: "Loet Leydesdorff", 
"joe.bren...@bluewin.ch", 
"fis@listas.unizar.es"
Betreff: RE: [Fis] Hannam's Contentious Postulate. The Peircean Mirror

Dear Loet, Joe, Fis colleagues
 
 
>Nowadays, the possibility of theory-free observations – e.g., Carnap – is much 
>more doubtful. Most of >us will have given up on this “realistic” position.
 
This is a very interesting issue. It seems to me very reasonable to claim that 
for any observation one has at least a rudimentary “theory” – as this process 
goes in a loop. Observation is done in time and during observation we act, 
which demands at least basic theoretical understanding. Of course sophisticated 
observations like those made in CERN are loaded with tons of theory. But there 
is a difference between acting within some system, or acting on a premise that 
what is studied maybe goes outside that systems box. One example is 
generalization of physics from Aristotelian to Newtonian. Within a system, one 
introduces more and more complicated assumptions in order to accommodate for 
observations, but at some point framework must change. There are jumps to more 
generalized frameworks in this process of learning. I see Joe’s logic in 
reality even here – a tension between an existing framework (which a is not 
enough) and the potential new one capable of accommodating for new knowledge. 
So realism would consist in not denying that the world is more than a theory we 
have at hands.
 
>One would also wonder whether animals without language, would have the 
>possibility to compose and perform music (without human orchestration).
 
Some birds are singing and birdsong sounds like music. Much of modern music is 
produced almost like a birdsong in a sense that it is not following any rules 
of composition, sometimes it is simply a collection of sounds found in nature. ☺
 
Best,
Gordana
 
 
http://www.mrtc.mdh.se/~gdc/
 
 
From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On 
Behalf Of Loet Leydesdorff
Sent: den 21 mars 2011 08:04
To: joe.bren...@bluewin.ch; fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: Re

Re: [Fis] Hannam's Contentious Postulate. The Peircean Mirror

[Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic]

Dear Joseph,

Thank you for this precise clarification. I agree completely and I also follow 
tensions and changes in our discussions in the list.
Especially interesting to me is how theories or frameworks communicate, use 
each other and internalize each other.
(I believe that is essentially the same process as the one you mention for the 
change of Logic in Reality itself).
Currently there are ongoing paradigm shifts in computing, logic, biology, 
cognitive science, information science and several others.
Not all research fields get “updated” instantly, it takes time.
Interdisciplinary discussions sometimes contain criticisms built on 
presupposition about other research fields as they looked like some time before.
(I meet often the idea that computing is the same as the Turing Machine model.  
But there is strong development of new computational paradigms and even if they 
are not completely established, they already exist in some fragmentary form.)

“But I would rather risk such reproaches than accept the present situation,
in which philosophers argue only with dead biologists and biologists only with 
dead philosophers… “
Michael Morange,  Life Explained

So I think this list is a good example of living philosophers talking with 
living biologists and other living FISers which makes it much more exciting and 
difficult.

Best regards,
Gordana


From: joe.bren...@bluewin.ch [mailto:joe.bren...@bluewin.ch]
Sent: den 22 mars 2011 21:08
To: Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic; Loet Leydesdorff; fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: AW: RE: [Fis] Hannam's Contentious Postulate. The Peircean Mirror

Dear Gordana,

Thank you for your very pertinent illustration of what Logic in Reality "is". 
There are (at least) two dynamics possible, 1) the tension between two existing 
frameworks, from which a new one (jump) may emerge and 2) that between an 
existing framework, for example Logic in Reality itself and what it could 
potentially become. I would just emend your phrase the "the world is more than 
a theory we have at hand" to "more than we have at hand in actual form" to make 
clearer that what is potential is also "at hand".

That these tensions are real is illustrated almost every day in these 
discussions . . .

Best regards,

Joseph
Ursprüngliche Nachricht
Von: gordana.dodig-crnko...@mdh.se
Datum: 21.03.2011 08:40
An: "Loet Leydesdorff", 
"joe.bren...@bluewin.ch", 
"fis@listas.unizar.es"
Betreff: RE: [Fis] Hannam's Contentious Postulate. The Peircean Mirror


Dear Loet, Joe, Fis colleagues


>Nowadays, the possibility of theory-free observations – e.g., Carnap – is much 
>more doubtful. Most of >us will have given up on this “realistic” position.

This is a very interesting issue. It seems to me very reasonable to claim that 
for any observation one has at least a rudimentary “theory” – as this process 
goes in a loop. Observation is done in time and during observation we act, 
which demands at least basic theoretical understanding. Of course sophisticated 
observations like those made in CERN are loaded with tons of theory. But there 
is a difference between acting within some system, or acting on a premise that 
what is studied maybe goes outside that systems box. One example is 
generalization of physics from Aristotelian to Newtonian. Within a system, one 
introduces more and more complicated assumptions in order to accommodate for 
observations, but at some point framework must change. There are jumps to more 
generalized frameworks in this process of learning. I see Joe’s logic in 
reality even here – a tension between an existing framework (which a is not 
enough) and the potential new one capable of accommodating for new knowledge. 
So realism would consist in not denying that the world is more than a theory we 
have at hands.

>One would also wonder whether animals without language, would have the 
>possibility to compose and perform music (without human orchestration).

Some birds are singing and birdsong sounds like music. Much of modern music is 
produced almost like a birdsong in a sense that it is not following any rules 
of composition, sometimes it is simply a collection of sounds found in nature. ☺

Best,
Gordana


http://www.mrtc.mdh.se/~gdc/


From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On 
Behalf Of Loet Leydesdorff
Sent: den 21 mars 2011 08:04
To: joe.bren...@bluewin.ch; fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: Re: [Fis] Hannam's Contentious Postulate. The Peircean Mirror

To paraphrase Antonio Salieri's famous "Prima la musica, dopo le parole", I say 
"first reality, then the signs".

Dear Joseph: “allegro, ma non troppo”!

In the 18th century, “nature” is still considered as God’s creation and 
therefore has priority to our (human) wordings and signings. Thus, one was 
interested in “natural philosophy” and “natural law” as manifestations. 
However, th

Re: [Fis] Hannam's Contentious Postulate. The Peircean Mirror

[joe.bren...@bluewin.ch]

Dear Gordana,
Thank you for your very pertinent illustration of what Logic in Reality "is". 
There are (at least) two dynamics possible, 1) the tension between two existing 
frameworks, from which a new one (jump) may emerge and 2) that between an 
existing framework, for example Logic in Reality itself and what it could 
potentially become. I would just emend your phrase the "the world is more than 
a theory we have at hand" to "more than we have at hand in actual form" to make 
clearer that what is potential is also "at hand".
That these tensions are real is illustrated almost every day in these 
discussions . . .
Best regards,
Joseph




Ursprüngliche Nachricht

Von: gordana.dodig-crnko...@mdh.se

Datum: 21.03.2011 08:40

An: "Loet Leydesdorff", 
"joe.bren...@bluewin.ch", 
"fis@listas.unizar.es"

Betreff: RE: [Fis] Hannam's Contentious Postulate. The Peircean Mirror












-->

Dear Loet, Joe, Fis colleagues
 
 
>Nowadays, the possibility of theory-free observations –
e.g., Carnap – is much more doubtful. Most of >us will have given up on this
“realistic” position.
 
This is a very interesting issue. It seems to me very reasonable
to claim that for any observation one has at least a rudimentary “theory” – as
this process goes in a loop. Observation is done in time and during observation
we act, which demands at least basic theoretical understanding. Of course
sophisticated observations like those made in CERN are loaded with tons of
theory. But there is a difference between acting within some system, or acting
on a premise that what is studied maybe goes outside that systems box. One
example is generalization of physics from Aristotelian to Newtonian. Within a
system, one introduces more and more complicated assumptions in order to 
accommodate
for observations, but at some point framework must change. There are jumps to
more generalized frameworks in this process of learning. I see Joe’s logic in
reality even here – a tension between an existing framework (which a is not
enough) and the potential new one capable of accommodating for new knowledge.
So realism would consist in not denying that the world is more than a theory we
have at hands.
 
>One would also wonder whether animals without language,
would have the possibility to compose and perform music (without human
orchestration).
 
Some birds are singing and birdsong sounds like music. Much of
modern music is produced almost like a birdsong in a sense that it is not
following any rules of composition, sometimes it is simply a collection of
sounds found in nature. J
 
Best,
Gordana
 
 
http://www.mrtc.mdh.se/~gdc/
 
 


From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es
[mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Loet Leydesdorff

Sent: den 21 mars 2011 08:04

To: joe.bren...@bluewin.ch; fis@listas.unizar.es

Subject: Re: [Fis] Hannam's Contentious Postulate. The Peircean Mirror


 
To paraphrase Antonio Salieri's famous "Prima
la musica, dopo le parole", I say "first reality, then the
signs".

 
Dear Joseph: “allegro,
ma non troppo”!
 
In the 18th
century, “nature” is still considered as God’s creation and therefore has
priority to our (human) wordings and signings. Thus, one was interested in
“natural philosophy” and “natural law” as manifestations. However, this has
eroded. Nowadays, the possibility of theory-free observations – e.g., Carnap –
is much more doubtful. Most of us will have given up on this “realistic”
position. One would also wonder whether animals without language, would have
the possibility to compose and perform music (without human orchestration).
 
It seems important to
me to distinguish between the order in which things are historically generated
(although we have no access to this process than by reconstructing this order)
and the evolutionary order of control. The latter system emerges from the
former: order is constructed bottom-up, but control is increasingly top-down.
The control arrow feeds back on the historical arrow and from this perspective
the signs come first. 
 
This may not have been
included in Pierce’s writings. J
 
With best wishes, 
Loet
 








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Re: [Fis] Hannam's Contentious Postulate. The Peircean Mirror

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

On Mar 20, 2011, at 4:18 PM, joe.bren...@bluewin.ch wrote:

> ... I am convinced that for further progress in information, let alone other 
> matters, some recognition of the limitations of Peirce may have to be 
> recognized. John's statement that "pragmatics means action" can be applicable 
> to real processes only if the pragmatics in question includes ontological 
> (scientific) principles and not only epistemological classifications. 

Dear Joe,

I do not believe that any Peirce scholar takes Peirce to be definitive. 
Peirce's inquiry is broad and penetrating, but it is also diverse and 
exploratory.

However, I do not think that Peirce would understand your second sentence here 
because it is poorly stated, full of misconceptions about his ideas and 
incomplete. Peirce gave these existential matters deep consideration.

> 
> As Queiroz, Emmeche and El Hani write: "In a Peircean model, Sign, Object and 
> Interpretant are triadically coupled in a dynamically irreducible process. In 
> other words, 'information' requires a triadic pattern of determinative 
> relationships involving the Sign, Object and Interpretant." Information, in 
> this view, has a "processual nature".
> 
> In my view, this simply displaces the problem further, since the Peircean 
> categories themselves are derivative, epistemological constructions which 
> 'mirror', literally and figuratively, the underlying dynamic structure of the 
> universe as Peirce saw it. The processes referred to by Q, E and EH are 
> indeed interpreter-dependent objective processes, but they admit that they 
> cannot be dissociated from the notion of a situated agent. Here, we have gone 
> outside Peirce, since the discussion of the "agent" and his/her interactions 
> requires a physical dialectics and logic that is absent in Peirce.

This is simply a false statement. Peirce gave extensive consideration to what 
you call "agents and their interactions" and physical, existential, aspects as 
they relate to the elements of logic. 

> To try to restate my interpretation, to say that for effective information, 
> or effective semiosis to take place by having a Sign effectively communicate, 
> by mediating the relation between Object and Interpretant, a form from the 
> object to Interpretant by changing the state of the interpreter (emphasis 
> mine) says no more than that information is something that changes the state 
> of an agent. In the statement that an effective Sign, by being actualized 
> (sic), has an actual effect on an interpreter (NOT interpretant), Sign is 
> simply a placeholder for an undefined real process, since a "Sign defined as 
> a medium for the communication of a form" is, again, simply an analytic 
> mirror for some reality that operates according to as yet undefined rules.
> 
> The Peircean processual approach to information seeks to acquire additional 
> dynamics by distinguishing it from some structure considered as a totally 
> static phenomenon. What has been missed are the actual and potential dynamic 
> aspects of structure and form themselves - a sequence of nucleotides, for 
> example, not in abstracto, but in a real cell.

Again, this is simply not the case. I urge you to find a copy of his Collected 
Papers, or the chronological publications of The Peirce Project, where there 
are examples too numerous for me to cite in brief.

One note of my own observation: This notion of "communicate" that you use and 
is often found in discussions of information is a way of speaking about the 
distinct expression and apprehension of marks. Signs do not "communicate" (and 
nor do "marks"). A sign in any semeiotic theory is a feature of, embodied by, 
the apprehender.

With respect,
Steven

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info
http://senses.info








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Re: [Fis] Hannam's Contentious Postulate. The Peircean Mirror

[Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic]

Dear Loet, Joe, Fis colleagues


>Nowadays, the possibility of theory-free observations – e.g., Carnap – is much 
>more doubtful. Most of >us will have given up on this “realistic” position.

This is a very interesting issue. It seems to me very reasonable to claim that 
for any observation one has at least a rudimentary “theory” – as this process 
goes in a loop. Observation is done in time and during observation we act, 
which demands at least basic theoretical understanding. Of course sophisticated 
observations like those made in CERN are loaded with tons of theory. But there 
is a difference between acting within some system, or acting on a premise that 
what is studied maybe goes outside that systems box. One example is 
generalization of physics from Aristotelian to Newtonian. Within a system, one 
introduces more and more complicated assumptions in order to accommodate for 
observations, but at some point framework must change. There are jumps to more 
generalized frameworks in this process of learning. I see Joe’s logic in 
reality even here – a tension between an existing framework (which a is not 
enough) and the potential new one capable of accommodating for new knowledge. 
So realism would consist in not denying that the world is more than a theory we 
have at hands.

>One would also wonder whether animals without language, would have the 
>possibility to compose and perform music (without human orchestration).

Some birds are singing and birdsong sounds like music. Much of modern music is 
produced almost like a birdsong in a sense that it is not following any rules 
of composition, sometimes it is simply a collection of sounds found in nature. ☺

Best,
Gordana


http://www.mrtc.mdh.se/~gdc/


From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On 
Behalf Of Loet Leydesdorff
Sent: den 21 mars 2011 08:04
To: joe.bren...@bluewin.ch; fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: Re: [Fis] Hannam's Contentious Postulate. The Peircean Mirror

To paraphrase Antonio Salieri's famous "Prima la musica, dopo le parole", I say 
"first reality, then the signs".

Dear Joseph: “allegro, ma non troppo”!

In the 18th century, “nature” is still considered as God’s creation and 
therefore has priority to our (human) wordings and signings. Thus, one was 
interested in “natural philosophy” and “natural law” as manifestations. 
However, this has eroded. Nowadays, the possibility of theory-free observations 
– e.g., Carnap – is much more doubtful. Most of us will have given up on this 
“realistic” position. One would also wonder whether animals without language, 
would have the possibility to compose and perform music (without human 
orchestration).

It seems important to me to distinguish between the order in which things are 
historically generated (although we have no access to this process than by 
reconstructing this order) and the evolutionary order of control. The latter 
system emerges from the former: order is constructed bottom-up, but control is 
increasingly top-down. The control arrow feeds back on the historical arrow and 
from this perspective the signs come first.

This may not have been included in Pierce’s writings. ☺

With best wishes,
Loet

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Re: [Fis] Hannam's Contentious Postulate. The Peircean Mirror

[Loet Leydesdorff]

To paraphrase Antonio Salieri's famous "Prima la musica, dopo le parole", I say 
"first reality, then the signs".

 

Dear Joseph: “allegro, ma non troppo”!

 

In the 18th century, “nature” is still considered as God’s creation and 
therefore has priority to our (human) wordings and signings. Thus, one was 
interested in “natural philosophy” and “natural law” as manifestations. 
However, this has eroded. Nowadays, the possibility of theory-free observations 
– e.g., Carnap – is much more doubtful. Most of us will have given up on this 
“realistic” position. One would also wonder whether animals without language, 
would have the possibility to compose and perform music (without human 
orchestration).

 

It seems important to me to distinguish between the order in which things are 
historically generated (although we have no access to this process than by 
reconstructing this order) and the evolutionary order of control. The latter 
system emerges from the former: order is constructed bottom-up, but control is 
increasingly top-down. The control arrow feeds back on the historical arrow and 
from this perspective the signs come first. 

 

This may not have been included in Pierce’s writings. J

 

With best wishes, 

Loet

 

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Re: [Fis] Hannam's Contentious Postulate. The Peircean Mirror

[Gavin Ritz]

No sure why one bothers with Peirce’s logic, modern Mathematical Category
theory (CMT) and Topoi offers significant flexibility within mathematics and
logic.
 
Objects and arrows, association law and law of identity in CMT have at least
a mathematical basis.
 
Objects and arrows in CMT solves the problem of functions (processes) and
structure.
 
Further it is possible to build a qualitative Reality Model from CMT.
 
-Original Message-
From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On
Behalf Of joe.bren...@bluewin.ch
Sent: Monday, 21 March 2011 12:19 p.m.
To: colli...@ukzn.ac.za; Pedro C. Marijuan; fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: Re: [Fis] Hannam's Contentious Postulate. The Peircean Mirror
 
Dear John, Pedro, Jerry and All,
 
Fortunately or unfortunately, I am convinced that for further progress in
information, let alone other matters, some recognition of the limitations of
Peirce may have to be recognized. John's statement that "pragmatics means
action" can be applicable to real processes only if the pragmatics in
question includes ontological (scientific) principles and not only
epistemological classifications. 
 
As Queiroz, Emmeche and El Hani write: "In a Peircean model, Sign, Object
and Interpretant are triadically coupled in a dynamically irreducible
process. In other words, 'information' requires a triadic pattern of
determinative relationships involving the Sign, Object and Interpretant."
Information, in this view, has a "processual nature".
 
In my view, this simply displaces the problem further, since the Peircean
categories themselves are derivative, epistemological constructions which
'mirror', literally and figuratively, the underlying dynamic structure of
the universe as Peirce saw it. The processes referred to by Q, E and EH are
indeed interpreter-dependent objective processes, but they admit that they
cannot be dissociated from the notion of a situated agent. Here, we have
gone outside Peirce, since the discussion of the "agent" and his/her
interactions requires a physical dialectics and logic that is absent in
Peirce. To try to restate my interpretation, to say that for effective
information, or effective semiosis to take place by having a Sign
effectively communicate, by mediating the relation between Object and
Interpretant, a form from the object to Interpretant by changing the state
of the interpreter (emphasis mine) says no more than that information is
something that changes the state of an agent. In the statement that an
effective Sign, by being actualized (sic), has an actual effect on an
interpreter (NOT interpretant), Sign is simply a placeholder for an
undefined real process, since a "Sign defined as a medium for the
communication of a form" is, again, simply an analytic mirror for some
reality that operates according to as yet undefined rules.
 
The Peircean processual approach to information seeks to acquire additional
dynamics by distinguishing it from some structure considered as a totally
static phenomenon. What has been missed are the actual and potential dynamic
aspects of structure and form themselves - a sequence of nucleotides, for
example, not in abstracto, but in a real cell. The consequences for an
augmented theory of information, in which Peirce's work shares the
theoretical space with non-epistemic approaches, follow. To paraphrase
Antonio Salieri's famous "Prima la musica, dopo le parole", I say "first
reality, then the signs".
 
Thank you and best wishes,
 
Joseph
 
      
 
Ursprüngliche Nachricht
Von: colli...@ukzn.ac.za
Datum: 20.03.2011 23:02
An: "Pedro C. Marijuan", 
Betreff: Re: [Fis] Hannam's Contentious Postulate

At 06:09 PM 2011/03/17, Pedro C. Marijuan wrote:
Dear FISers,

Thanks to Loet for his modest proposal "Foundations of the Science of (DIS)
Order"... (when managing the list I really agree!).

The comments by Jerry are much appreciated, indeed: I am eagerly waiting for
opinions and criticisms on the "knowledge recombination" theme. However,
criticisms obliged, his whole approach to science and knowledge looks to me
very interesting though rather biased.  Rhetorically, for our foundations of
info & knowledge we cannot rely on particular philosophical positions
(Peircean philosophy---sorry to disagree with John too) but on
scientific-disciplinary "facts" or theories. When Jerry talks about "new
interpretations of signs from nature" he is cavalierly forgetting the action
side, the practice: "In the beginning was the deed!" (Faustian motto
emphasized by neuroscientist Alain Berthoz in his "The Brain's Sense of
Movement", 2000 the "fact" and not the "concept"). In neuroscience, in
ecological psychology & the motor approach to consciousness, the perceptual
cycle of action-perception can

Re: [Fis] Hannam's Contentious Postulate. The Peircean Mirror

[joe.bren...@bluewin.ch]

Dear John, Pedro, Jerry and All,
Fortunately or unfortunately, I am convinced that for further progress in 
information, let alone other matters, some recognition of the limitations of 
Peirce may have to be recognized. John's statement that "pragmatics means 
action" can be applicable to real processes only if the pragmatics in question 
includes ontological (scientific) principles and not only epistemological 
classifications. 
As Queiroz, Emmeche and El Hani write: "In a Peircean model, Sign, Object and 
Interpretant are triadically coupled in a dynamically irreducible process. In 
other words, 'information' requires a triadic pattern of determinative 
relationships involving the Sign, Object and Interpretant." Information, in 
this view, has a "processual nature".
In my view, this simply displaces the problem further, since the Peircean 
categories themselves are derivative, epistemological constructions which 
'mirror', literally and figuratively, the underlying dynamic structure of the 
universe as Peirce saw it. The processes referred to by Q, E and EH are indeed 
interpreter-dependent objective processes, but they admit that they cannot be 
dissociated from the notion of a situated agent. Here, we have gone outside 
Peirce, since the discussion of the "agent" and his/her interactions requires a 
physical dialectics and logic that is absent in Peirce. To try to restate my 
interpretation, to say that for effective information, or effective semiosis to 
take place by having a Sign effectively communicate, by mediating the relation 
between Object and Interpretant, a form from the object to Interpretant by 
changing the state of the interpreter (emphasis mine) says no more than that 
information is something that changes the state of an agent. In the statement 
that an effective Sign, by being actualized (sic), has an actual effect on an 
interpreter (NOT interpretant), Sign is simply a placeholder for an undefined 
real process, since a "Sign defined as a medium for the communication of a 
form" is, again, simply an analytic mirror for some reality that operates 
according to as yet undefined rules.
The Peircean processual approach to information seeks to acquire additional 
dynamics by distinguishing it from some structure considered as a totally 
static phenomenon. What has been missed are the actual and potential dynamic 
aspects of structure and form themselves - a sequence of nucleotides, for 
example, not in abstracto, but in a real cell. The consequences for an 
augmented theory of information, in which Peirce's work shares the theoretical 
space with non-epistemic approaches, follow. To paraphrase Antonio Salieri's 
famous "Prima la musica, dopo le parole", I say "first reality, then the signs".
Thank you and best wishes,
Joseph
  



Ursprüngliche Nachricht

Von: colli...@ukzn.ac.za

Datum: 20.03.2011 23:02

An: "Pedro C. Marijuan", 

Betreff: Re: [Fis] Hannam's Contentious Postulate



At 06:09 PM 2011/03/17, Pedro C. Marijuan wrote:

Dear
FISers,


Thanks to Loet for his modest proposal "Foundations of the Science
of (DIS) Order"... (when managing the list I really
agree!).


The comments by Jerry are much appreciated, indeed: I am eagerly waiting
for opinions and criticisms on the "knowledge recombination"
theme. However, criticisms obliged, his whole approach to science and
knowledge looks to me very interesting though rather biased. 
Rhetorically, for our foundations of info & knowledge we cannot rely
on particular philosophical positions (Peircean philosophy---sorry to
disagree with John too) but on scientific-disciplinary "facts"
or theories. When Jerry talks about "new interpretations of signs
from nature" he is cavalierly forgetting the action side, the
practice: "In the beginning was the deed!" (Faustian motto
emphasized by neuroscientist Alain Berthoz in his "The Brain's Sense
of Movement", 2000 the "fact" and not the
"concept"). In neuroscience, in ecological psychology & the
motor approach to consciousness, the perceptual cycle of
action-perception cannot be reduced to any of the two branches alone. In
cognitive terms, theory has always to accompany practice, and viceversa.
Methologies, measurements, etc., are a crucial ingredient of knowledge,
that refer to our own actions ---not just to "signs" of
nature.

Sorry, Pedro, but I fail to understand your distinction between a
Peircean view and the one you are advocating. Peirce based his views on
pragmatics, which means action. There is something severely wrong
here.


Regards,

John



Professor John Collier, Acting HoS  and Acting Deputy HoS

  
colli...@ukzn.ac.za

Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South
Africa

T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292   F:
+27 (31) 260 3031


http://collier.ukzn.ac.za/








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Re: [Fis] Hannam's Contentious Postulate

[John Collier]

At 06:09 PM 2011/03/17, Pedro C. Marijuan wrote:
Dear
FISers,
Thanks to Loet for his modest proposal "Foundations of the Science
of (DIS) Order"... (when managing the list I really
agree!).
The comments by Jerry are much appreciated, indeed: I am eagerly waiting
for opinions and criticisms on the "knowledge recombination"
theme. However, criticisms obliged, his whole approach to science and
knowledge looks to me very interesting though rather biased. 
Rhetorically, for our foundations of info & knowledge we cannot rely
on particular philosophical positions (Peircean philosophy---sorry to
disagree with John too) but on scientific-disciplinary "facts"
or theories. When Jerry talks about "new interpretations of signs
from nature" he is cavalierly forgetting the action side, the
practice: "In the beginning was the deed!" (Faustian motto
emphasized by neuroscientist Alain Berthoz in his "The Brain's Sense
of Movement", 2000 the "fact" and not the
"concept"). In neuroscience, in ecological psychology & the
motor approach to consciousness, the perceptual cycle of
action-perception cannot be reduced to any of the two branches alone. In
cognitive terms, theory has always to accompany practice, and viceversa.
Methologies, measurements, etc., are a crucial ingredient of knowledge,
that refer to our own actions ---not just to "signs" of
nature.
Sorry, Pedro, but I fail to understand your distinction between a
Peircean view and the one you are advocating. Peirce based his views on
pragmatics, which means action. There is something severely wrong
here.
Regards,
John




Professor John Collier, Acting HoS  and Acting Deputy HoS
  
colli...@ukzn.ac.za
Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South
Africa
T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292   F:
+27 (31) 260 3031

http://collier.ukzn.ac.za/



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Re: [Fis] Hannam's Contentious Postulate

[Pedro C. Marijuan]

Dear FISers,

Thanks to Loet for his modest proposal "Foundations of the Science of 
(DIS) Order"... (when managing the list I really agree!).


The comments by Jerry are much appreciated, indeed: I am eagerly waiting 
for opinions and criticisms on the "knowledge recombination" theme. 
However, criticisms obliged, his whole approach to science and knowledge 
looks to me very interesting though rather biased.  Rhetorically, for 
our foundations of info & knowledge we cannot rely on particular 
philosophical positions (Peircean philosophy---sorry to disagree with 
John too) but on scientific-disciplinary "facts" or theories. When Jerry 
talks about "new interpretations of signs from nature" he is cavalierly 
forgetting the action side, the practice: "In the beginning was the 
deed!" (Faustian motto emphasized by neuroscientist Alain Berthoz in his 
"The Brain's Sense of Movement", 2000 the "fact" and not the 
"concept"). In neuroscience, in ecological psychology & the motor 
approach to consciousness, the perceptual cycle of action-perception 
cannot be reduced to any of the two branches alone. In cognitive terms, 
theory has always to accompany practice, and viceversa. Methologies, 
measurements, etc., are a crucial ingredient of knowledge, that refer to 
our own actions ---not just to "signs" of nature.


Is "recombination" a narrow window of social-cognitive dynamics? Not at 
all. I am planning a contribution to the GIT 2010 conference in Varna, 
more or less entitled: "Cognizing Commonalities in Cells, Nervous 
Systems and Societies: The Knowledge Recombination Phenomenon". I will 
quote from Brian Arthur (2009), in his recent (and new) approach to 
Technology, so germane of Science: "Conventional thinking ascribes the 
invention of technologies to "thinking outside the box," or vaguely to 
genius or creativity, but this book shows that such explanations are 
inadequate. Rather, technologies are put together from pieces — 
themselves technologies — that already exist. Technologies therefore 
share common ancestries and combine, morph, and combine again to create 
further technologies. Technology evolves much as a coral reef builds 
itself from activities of small organisms — it creates itself from 
itself; all technologies are descended from earlier technologies..."


Mutatis mutandis, this would apply to science as well.

Please, opinions and criticisms are very welcome!

---Pedro


Jerry LR Chandler:

V547.13 (Pedro)

Pedro makes a valuable contribution to the discussion in this post by 
seeking to place our present situation in a wider historical context. 
All such efforts are to be applauded, IMHO.


The creation of new knowledge is, I believe, rather different than 
painted by the simple notion of "recombination" invoked from the 
hypothesis of Scott. Without doubt, many little steps of progress are 
simple recombinants of parts within wholes. Combinatorics is a rich 
branch of mathematics that offers unbounded potential for constructing 
new wholes from an assortment of parts. 

But, in the semantic domain, the question of whether a particular new 
sentence is actually a progressive step or is merely a re-arrangement 
of pre-existing knowledge is a difficult and often questionable 
decision because of the large open neighborhood of interpretation 
about non-numerical terms. The premier example of this is the 
discourse in philosophy where arguments are iterated over centuries, 
century after century, with little if any basic difference in meaning 
or ostension. 

The principle basis of construction of new knowledge is, I suggest, 
new interpretations of signs from nature. It is the construction of 
new methods of communicating knowledge that generates the rich 
informative structures of modern communication. The development of new 
sign systems, new logical and ostensive terms, is a slow process that 
evolves over decades and centuries. Prime examples of this are the 
sign systems for mathematics, for music, for chemistry, and for 
electricity. In particular, in the past two hundred years, the sign 
systems for chemistry (Dalton, Lavoisier, Berzelious) and for 
electricity (Coulomb, Volta, Kirchoff) have led to networks of 
quantitative relations of knowledge systems. I would hasten to add 
that both of these sciences arose from the synthesis of the Western 
European tongues with the classical Latin of Rome and equally 
important the genesis of new ostensive terms founded in Greek.  Of 
course, the crisp logic of mathematical sign systems was essential to 
distinguishing the mere internal mental images of belief from the 
demonstrative signs systems of electricity and chemistry and genetics. 

In short, the creation of new knowledge is an active process of 
interpreting signs from nature in coherent numerical contexts. The 
history of human symbolic communication as a record of thought, 
started with the number system of the Sumerians and continues to 
develop, after 5000 years, with the cons

Re: [Fis] Hannam's Contentious Postulate---John Collier

[Pedro C. Marijuan]

Message from John Collier

 Mensaje original 
Asunto: Fwd: Mail delivery failed: returning message to sender
Fecha:  Wed, 16 Mar 2011 11:29:17 +0200
De: John Collier 
Para:   Pedro C. Marijuan 


A response to Jerry

A series of responses to recent posts of James, Gavin, Steven, Stan, 
Pedro, zyx, Joe, and koichiro.

FIS response March 14, 2011


 I often disagree with Jerry, but in this case I endorse pretty much 
everything he says. Our disagreements have been beneficial to my own 
understanding, even if I have not been able to revise my views.


On a different note, I draw the members of this list to 
http://physicsworld.com/cws/article/indepth/44680



  *An inordinate fondness for bits*


I have a copy of this book, and I find some of the papers quite 
bizarre, which is unusual for me as I am typically open to broad 
notions of the nature of information. There are many  chapters by 
authors I know and greatly respect, and largely agree with, so overall 
I can recommend the book. But I also agree with the reviewer that 
there are rather extreme but interesting views in the last part. My 
brief exposure to Sufism is that God is Hu, the first distinction.The 
idea is that of a breath that separates chaos from order. As I believe 
that information is grounded in distinctions, I cannot reject this 
notion, though I would be very reluctant to call it God.


Best to all,
John


Professor John Collier, Acting HoS  and Acting Deputy HoS
   colli...@ukzn.ac.za
Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South 
Africa

T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292   F: +27 (31) 260 3031
http://collier.ukzn.ac.za/

-

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[Fis] Hannam's Contentious Postulate

[Jerry LR Chandler]

A series of responses to recent posts of James, Gavin, Steven, Stan, Pedro, 
zyx, Joe, and koichiro. 
FIS response March 14, 2011

v547. ? Gavin:

writes:

"Modern chemistry fell out of alchemy."

As far as I am aware, modern chemistry developed its own semantics, grammar and 
logical symbol system virtually independent of alchemy. The authors were 
Priestly, Lavoisier, Dalton, Volta, Bezerlious, and others, mainly in the late 
17 th and early 18 th Century. The ostensive and demonstrative basis of alchemy 
was re-interpreted in terms of the properties of invisible and indivisible 
gases. From these origins, the alchemical ostensions were re-symbolized to 
become mathematical extensions of identity, volume, weight of.. , and other 
properties. These observations became the basis of the "ideal gas laws" and 
later, thermodynamics and eventually, quantum mechanics.

Gavin continues:
"Language still doesn’t have a good definition (or even what it may be). And we 
build our entire knowledge system on it."

I disagree.
The knowledge systems of science are based on observations and the 
correspondence relations between measurements and mathematical calculations. 
I recently published a long discussion of these relations under the title of 
"Algebraic Biology" in Roberto Poli's journal, Axiomathes.

Gavin continues: 
Language has only three types of logic
Declarative statements (like the one below) be either True or False
Imperative statements (commands) can be structure or process.
Interrogative Statements (questions), can be yes or no, and True or false
 
To me, this assertion is simply false. 
Numerous logics are studied.
Particularly interesting is the recent development of 'para-consistent" logics. 
For the past decade, I have been constructing a logic for the chemical sciences 
and medicine, closely related to some of the ideas of C S Peirce and category 
theory. It is called synductive logic and is classified as an inductive logic 
operating on labelled bipartite graphs. The grammar of this logic is an 
abstraction from the calculus of chemistry and electricity.

Gavin continues:
Is Mathematical Category Theory and Topoi Logic together the foundation of all 
Reality?
 
My simplistic view of mathematics is that reality is vastly more perplex than 
anything to do with mathematics.
The great beauty and power of mathematics emerges from those rare cases where 
the mathematical symbol systems can be shown to be in correspondence with 
nature.


v. 547.5 by James Hannam:

First, let us clear up a deep mis-understanding.
My usage of the term calculus is in the traditional sense of "to calculate". 
That is, exact logic that is reproducible by others. Newtonian calculations are 
a sub-set of the more general term. The term comes from Latin, meaning a small 
pebble, referring to the use of an abacus.

Jim, you write:

"So, while I can clearly see you disagree with me, I am afraid that I do not 
really follow why."

I provided you with a short summary of the basic ideas of modern science - 
roughly thirty concepts that were developed in Aristotle's writings roughly 
2300 years ago.  The extension of each of these concepts from Aristotle to 
today is a study of the history of a critical term of modern science.

It is the sort of study of the history of science that I wish you had done 
before you boldly asserted your "contentious postulate."

If you elect to undertake such a multi-year study, then you may find that 
modern science, much like modern mathematics, is a tightly interwoven network 
of both semantic and syntactical terms, glued together with mathematics and 
arcane beliefs about nature. The level of coherence within this network of 
terms is robust. 

v547.6  Joe Brenner writes:

"It would be most interesting if synergies were to appear. For example, how 
might the logic of situations be related to the dynamic logic of processes of 
Logic in Reality, etc.?"


Joe, your messages remain outside the scope of my comprehension.
May I request that you give the list three or four concrete scientific examples 
of your "Logic of Reality"?
In particular, is your usage of the term "reality" either ostensive or 
demonstrable? 
I am of the persuasion that "A rose by any other name is a rose"
or, in this case, phenomenology by any other name is phenomenology.   :-) :-) 
:-) 

v547.7 Stan

Your conceptualization of the concept of properties as a way of knowing appears 
to be grossly deficient with respect to the chemical sciences. Metaphorically 
consistent with category theory, the chemical way of knowing emerges from the 
commutativity of the grammar of chemistry as derived from Dalton's "ratio of 
small whole numbers." 

The critical notion is the the commutativity among the nominative case, the 
properties as "universals" and the arrangement of parts of the whole. This 
commutativity creates a mathematical and logical intimacy among ostension, 
extension and intention. (While this a triadic argument, it differs 
sub

Re: [Fis] Hannam's Contentious Postulate, vol. 547, issue 1

[James Hannam]

Hi Jerry, 

Thank you for your reply.  I have to admit that I am not entirely clear
about all the points that you are making, so please forgive me if I have
barked up the wrong tree at any point. 

You note Aristotle's foundation role in logic.  I completely agree that he
still forms the base upon which modern logic is built.  However, I am not
convinced that this has very much to do with the rise of modern science.
Nor do I think that Aristotle's foundational role in science provides any
reason for believing that ancient natural philosophy could ever, on its own
terms, have developed into what we recognise as science. 

I'm also not sure that molecular biology helps you any more than the physics
of motion.  After all, Aristotle's excellent observational and categorising
role in natural history was blighted by the same lack of experiment as his
work on motion. And his rational/teleological viewpoint was also unhelpful
(although supported by Christians up until the nineteenth century).  His
insistence upon spontaneous generation is an excellent example.  For maggots
appearing in rotten meat, at least, a controlled experiment would easily
have demonstrated his error, even if the case of eels is excusable. 

I'm also confused by your term "the logic of calculus".  Calculus, of
course, is the mathematics of infinitesimals developed by Newton and
Leibniz.  And it is hard to imagine a science that thrives on calculus more
than the physics of motion. 

So, while I can clearly see you disagree with me, I am afraid that I do not
really follow why. 

Best wishes 

James 

 
 The Genesis of Science: How the Christian Middle Ages
Launched the Scientific Revolution by James Hannam is available for
pre-order now.

 

"Well-researched and hugely enjoyable."  New Scientist 

 

"A spirited jaunt through centuries of scientific development. captures the
wonder of the medieval world: its inspirational curiosity and its engaging
strangeness." Sunday Times

 

"This book contains much valuable material summarised with commendable
no-nonsense clarity. James Hannam has done a fine job of knocking down an
old caricature." Sunday Telegraph

 

From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com] 
Sent: 02 March 2011 02:43
To: fis@listas.unizar.es
Cc: ja...@jameshannam.com; Stan Salthe; Pedro Marijuan
Subject: Hannam's Contentious Postulate, vol. 547, issue 1

 

 

(Pedro: Please Post to FIS)

 

James Hannam, Stan, Pedro, List:

 

Thank you for taking the time to express your point of view.  For several
years now, I have been studying the origins of molecular biology, seeking a
coherent explanation for the meaning for its predictive powers and the
methods which lead to scientific predictions. I certainly do not speak for
the metaphysics of the physical information theorists, who, perhaps, may be
more persuaded by your style than I.

 

Your assertion that:

"I sense some scepticism about my contentions that ancient science could
never have developed into what we call modern science. "

is simply illogical and necessarily false.

 

Why do I confront your logic?

The simple facts are that the basic ideas of Aristotle remain the
foundations of Western science.  The developments from Aristotle to the
present day can be traced step-by-step. 

By the basic ideas of Aristotle, I mean five specific notions that Aristotle
wrote of:

1.  Rules of thought [identity, non-contradiction, excluded middle]
2.  Categories [substance, quality, quantity, relation, time, place,
situation, condition, action and passion]
3.  Causality [formal, material efficient, telos]
4.  Logic of premises (sorites, pathways of statements from antecedents
to consequences, graph theory, theory of categories]
5.  hierarchy  [individual, species, genera, alone with ostension to
greater levels]

During the intervening 23 Centuries, our notions of all these terms have
changed substantially. Our very notion of language itself, as well as our
notion of symbol systems, especially mathematics and chemistry has greatly
improved our ability to be specific. Nevertheless, modern science developed
directly from these few simple concepts, particularly of the concept of
identity. The scientific terms of Aristotle continue to serve the sciences
well and continue to be discussed routinely in both the theory and in
practice of modern science.

 

If Western science did not develop from these Aristotelian concepts, what
concepts did modern science develop from? 

 

Your focus on motion, as an example, is, in my opinion, ill-advised for your
thesis. The philosophy of physics continues to churn, century after century,
it remains unsettled today. Personally, I smile a wide grin whenever a
physicist announces once again that the foundations of physics must be
revised. As one of my friends loves to say, physics is the only metaphysics
we ("modern science") have. Th

[Fis] Hannam's Contentious Postulate, vol. 547, issue 1

[Jerry LR Chandler]

(Pedro: Please Post to FIS)



James Hannam, Stan, Pedro, List:

 

Thank you for taking the time to express your point of view.  For several years 
now, I have been studying the origins of molecular biology, seeking a coherent 
explanation for the meaning for its predictive powers and the methods which 
lead to scientific predictions. I certainly do not speak for the metaphysics of 
the physical information theorists, who, perhaps, may be more persuaded by your 
style than I.

 

Your assertion that:

“I sense some scepticism about my contentions that ancient science could never 
have developed into what we call modern science. “

is simply illogical and necessarily false.

 

Why do I confront your logic?

The simple facts are that the basic ideas of Aristotle remain the foundations 
of Western science.  The developments from Aristotle to the present day can be 
traced step-by-step.

By the basic ideas of Aristotle, I mean five specific notions that Aristotle 
wrote of:

Rules of thought [identity, non-contradiction, excluded middle]
Categories [substance, quality, quantity, relation, time, place, situation, 
condition, action and passion]
Causality [formal, material efficient, telos]
Logic of premises (sorites, pathways of statements from antecedents to 
consequences, graph theory, theory of categories]
hierarchy  [individual, species, genera, alone with ostension to greater levels]
During the intervening 23 Centuries, our notions of all these terms have 
changed substantially. Our very notion of language itself, as well as our 
notion of symbol systems, especially mathematics and chemistry has greatly 
improved our ability to be specific. Nevertheless, modern science developed 
directly from these few simple concepts, particularly of the concept of 
identity. The scientific terms of Aristotle continue to serve the sciences well 
and continue to be discussed routinely in both the theory and in practice of 
modern science.

 

If Western science did not develop from these Aristotelian concepts, what 
concepts did modern science develop from?

 

Your focus on motion, as an example, is, in my opinion, ill-advised for your 
thesis. The philosophy of physics continues to churn, century after century, it 
remains unsettled today. Personally, I smile a wide grin whenever a physicist 
announces once again that the foundations of physics must be revised. As one of 
my friends loves to say, physics is the only metaphysics we (“modern science”) 
have. The other sciences, intimately associated with the logic of calculus, 
thrive on the correspondence between observations and predictions.

 

Is it possible, James, that your training has embedded your thinking so deeply 
in the logic of language that the historical role of the logic of calculus in 
the development of science is submerged in your writings?

 

 

Stan:

Two ideas are at issue:

The first is your most recent post on the role of the term, “properties.”
“There ARE NO "properties of things" unmediated by biology and culture.” The 
concept of properties is, of course, the bedrock of predicate logic and the 
grammar of physics. If you deny the existence of properties in your ontology, 
your metaphysics becomes much clearer.

 

 

Secondly, the notion of the term, “ostensive””.  What is it?
The Latin roots suggests the meaning

 “stretch out to view”,

 that is, demonstrable. In particular, are you using this term as if it is 
unrelated to the concept extension that merely stretches a concept out?  

 

Pedro:

 

Your defense of the fertility of Western intellectual history of periods 
between Aquinas and Newton are important in understanding how our world views 
of today are rooted in the deep sense of community that developed during that 
historic timeframe.

 

 I would add that the idea of a “University”, which developed more or less “ad 
hoc” from the Paris model, as place to transmit, reflect and create values 
should be acknowledged. 

 

The separation of the triverum from the quadriverum was a profound step in the 
history of thought as it separated the role of language (rhetoric, grammar and 
logic) from the logic of the calculus. James Hannam, as I noted above, appears 
to devalue this separation.  It is important to keep in mind that the ancient 
Summerians (3 rd millenium BC) concept of informational symbols completely 
lacked this ability to separate concepts in this manner.

 

I believe that this separation was critical to the development of our view of 
mind (the Modistae of the 1300’s), the development of signs (John of Poinsot) 
and most especially the continual development of explication via the technics 
of disputation. I might also add that the conceptualization of 
“Syncategorimaticism” by Peter of Spain became the foundation for extending 
mathematical logic in the 19th Century (by C S Peirce).   Of course, this is a 
further example of the role of Aristotle’s notion of “relational” categories.

 

Cheers to All

 

Jerry