Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism

Edwina, List: ET: No- my reading of Peirce is that there are real possibilities [i.e. in a mode of Firstness] that are never actualized ... Firstness, as a 'set' of categorical possibilities is real - all of those possibilities - *when operational within a triadic morphology* ... The same with

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism

Clark, Edwina, List: CG: I’d say it’s quite a bit earlier than that, although again I think a lot depends upon what we mean by the terms. Fisch argued, convincingly I think, that Peirce did not accept the reality of possibilities until about 1896. ET: And Firstness cannot be defined as

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism

Jon - list First - and yet again - please do not unilaterally define my views as 'unlike Peirce'. I would appreciate it if you would instead say something like: 'My reading of Peirce is different from your reading; I read Peirce as ... No- my reading of Peirce is that there are real

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism

Edwina, List: ET: [Not within Secondness, Jon, but within a triadic Sign]. I did not say *within *Secondness, I said *with *Secondness; and I essentially meant exactly what you said, that you "don't consider that Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness have non-embedded reality." Unlike Peirce,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism

Clark, list My field is not philosophy - so I have no knowledge of Armstrong. Aren't Plato's Forms 'real' - even when NOT embedded within matter/concepts? I don't have 6.612 in my collection. Those few pages are missing! And I don't see any of the categories as 'existent' or operational or

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism

> On Oct 24, 2016, at 4:28 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > Edwina and I have gone back and forth on this on multiple occasions. My > understanding--which she will presumably correct if I am mistaken--is that > she denies that Peirce held Firstness (possibilities,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism

Clark, Jon, list: Aristotle certainly admitted that generals are real! You don't have to be a Platonist to accept that! That's a basic component of his metaphysics. The difference is that for Aristotle, they function only when embedded within the particular. Again, I don't consider that

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism

Clark, List: CG: It seems to me Peirce is a Platonist in several senses. First he admits generals into his ontology as real. Thus he was on the platonic side of the nominalist debates of the medieval era and modern era. Edwina and I have gone back and forth on this on multiple occasions. My

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Clark, List: CG: I do hope you’ll comment on the Kantian point I raised. I’m curious as to your thoughts there. Are you referring to your last post in the thread on Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories? I am not very well-versed on Kant, so unfortunately I am not equipped to respond to

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 24, 2016, at 10:55 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > At this point, it seems appropriate to shift this conversation to the > spin-off thread that I started last week based on Ben Novak's post and the > ones to which he was responding, which I have

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism

I’ve changed the subject line to better reflect the theme. > On Oct 24, 2016, at 12:59 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 1:12 PM, Edwina Taborsky > wrote: > > As for Peirce's Platonism -[ which is

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

Jon- I'm not going to get into 'practical effects' of the two actions Rejection of a theory is an active, conscious, analytic choice. 'No comment' is none of these. As for an assumption that 'something written later is a more accurate representation' - that's subjective and I won't get

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

Edwina, List: ET: I'm not going to get into 'practical effects' of the two actions. If you cannot identify different practical effects of the two concepts, then according to Peirce, they are identical. ET: After all, one could write something tomorrow that rejected the argument just written

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

1) Jon- surely you know the difference between the active [a rejection of a theory] and the passive [no comment]. And I didn't differentiate the two into 'early' and 'late, as you do, with you also suggesting that the 'late' is 'a more accurate representation of Peirce's views. You wrote: "

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Auke: I was referring to the question of whether if firstness is first, then what is it for a firstness to be first for a community when that community is comprised of both experts and novices? Is it to know things as they first come to us or to know things by nature? If by nature, then what

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

Edwina, List: ET: No- you aren't accurate but I don't see that I should have to defend myself; if you have inaccurate views of my views - then, I am hardly going to fight you about your views of me! My apologies, I did not intend to misrepresent you; but how is having "no comment" on "A

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

Jon, list No- you aren't accurate but I don't see that I should have to defend myself; if you have inaccurate views of my views - then, I am hardly going to fight you about your views of me! BUT - you adamantly told us that Peirce effectively abandoned his use of the Categories, which you

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

Clark, List: ET: I tend to agree with you here Edwina. I don’t quite see big contradictions between his later more Hegelian work with the more neoplatonic work of the late 1880’s. Evolution yes. But I don’t see him moving away from the earlier positions. This actually sounds more like my

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

> On Oct 22, 2016, at 2:52 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > The problem is, Gary, that you and Jon are both theists and both of you > reject the 'Big Bang'. I am an atheist and support the 'Big Bang'. Therefore, > both sides in this debate select sections from Peirce to

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Clark, List: At this point, it seems appropriate to shift this conversation to the spin-off thread that I started last week based on Ben Novak's post and the ones to which he was responding, which I have reproduced below. As we have previously discussed under the heading of Peirce's Cosmology,

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Dear Kirsti, Thank you for your kind reply and especially for your historical remarks and your remarks on feeling. I did not read Tetens, but I recognize the point you are making with it. Fitzgerald for instance only takes the 'feeling of recognition' when he discusses the emotional

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

> On Oct 22, 2016, at 10:14 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard > wrote: > > As far as I can tell, Peirce never stopped talking about the categories in > the context of the phenomenology or phaneroscopy. Furthermore, he never > stopped talking about the categories in the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 24, 2016, at 8:43 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > Edwina, List: > > ET: After all, chaos IS something - i.e., it is the absence of order within > a collection of bits of unorganized matter. > > Not according to Peirce--he explicitly held that chaos is

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Edwina, List: Thanks for clarifying. I mainly just wanted to emphasize Peirce's consistent usage, and the conclusion that he ultimately drew from it. Regards, Jon On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 9:53 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > Jon, - to offer up a collection of quotes, via a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 22, 2016, at 11:47 AM, Søren Brier wrote: > > All conceptual knowledge need language of some sort and -as Wittgenstein > says – there are no private language. Thus you must assume the existence of > other embodied experiential conscious subject in language, - and you

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Jon, - to offer up a collection of quotes, via a digital search of the term 'chaos' from the Peirce collections, doesn't negate that I was saying the same thing as he was with regard to the primoridal 'nothing. So, please don't try a 'gotcha' post. This term, the 'absence of order' as a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Edwina, List: ET: After all, chaos IS something - i.e., it is the absence of order within a collection of bits of unorganized matter. Not according to Peirce--he explicitly held that chaos is *nothing*. CSP: The original chaos, therefore, where there was no regularity, was in effect a state

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Auke: > On Oct 24, 2016, at 6:27 AM, Auke van Breemen wrote: > > “It is my contention that although Peirce had a keen eye on both strains of > thought and enterprise, he was hampered in building a system of semiotics by > his preference for the communal or scientific

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Kirsti, list: Kirsti, I like your outlines of embryos and the 'firstness' of Feelings. [I think that more research should be done on the bonding in utero between multiple birth embryos, i.e., twins, triplets etc]. I also have a problem with the notion of primordial chaos. After all, chaos

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Dear Auke, I got very delighted by your response! Right now, I have very little time, but I wish to share some of my thoughts on and about it. First: The idea of primordial chaos is very, very popular. Even so popular that one should get suspicios in front of the popularity. It is commonly

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Jerry, I still fail to see the point of your remarks. I do get the impression that you don’t agree with my: “It is my contention that although Peirce had a keen eye on both strains of thought and enterprise, he was hampered in building a system of semiotics by his preference for the