Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's Theory of Thinking

Jerry, list, On first glance I completely disagree. "First glance", because my contradiction may contain false suppositions about what your opinion might be like. Religion, I think, should always be connected with reason, otherwise it becomes dangerous. Dangerous as well is to look for

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > [2] > > On Tue, Sep 6, 2016 at 4:18 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> > wrote: > >> Jon, Jerry, list, >&g

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt   On Tue, Sep 6, 2016 at 4:18 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: Jon, Jerry, list, is all this anything else than

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

Jon, Jerry, list, is all this anything else than the ontologic argument for the existence of God by Anselm of Canterbury? Best, Helmut    05. September 2016 um 22:40 Uhr  "Jerry Rhee" wrote:   Jon, list:   Perhaps it is our conceit that we should only look for the

Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Original Message ----- From: Helmut Raulien To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: Jon Alan Schmidt ; jerryr...@gmail.com ; Peirce-L Sent: Thursday, August 18, 2016 4:37 PM Subject: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation   Edwina, list, I dont want to argue, j

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

ere is the Relation that the Representamen, in a mode of Thirdness in itself [Legisign] has with the Interpretant in a mode of Firstness [rheme] and the Relation the Representamen has with the Object in a mode of Thirdness [symbolic].   Edwina         - Original Message - From: Hel

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

he Object in a mode of Thirdness [symbolic].   Edwina         - Original Message - From: Helmut Raulien To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: Jon Alan Schmidt ; jerryr...@gmail.com ; Peirce-L Sent: Thursday, August 18, 2016 3:43 PM Subject: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

as spoken by the biologist; the other, the internalization of the words as heard by the listener. Then, each of them mediates/transforms these sounds via their Representamen...and ends up with two different Immediate and Dynamic Interpretants!   Edwina     - Original Message - From: Helmut R

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Abductive Form of Inference - CP 5.189 vs. CP 6.469

Jerry, Jon, list, I think that this example shows, that ordinality is not necessarily in accord with categoriality, because categorically induction is secondness and deduction thirdness. So, what is ordinality? Does it merely mean the sequence in time, or does it mean the causation /

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, Thought and Representation

        Suppsupplement: Please replace, in the third line from here, "induction" with "abduction". Supplement: But maybe too, what I have written below is wrong: An abduction delivers a possibility, i.e., before the abduction was done, one didnt know whether something was possible or not,

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, Thought and Representation

    Supplement: But maybe too, what I have written below is wrong: An abduction delivers a possibility, i.e., before the abduction was done, one didnt know whether something was possible or not, and after the induction it is known that it is possible. So there is a concrete step, a grown

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, Thought and Representation

List, about growth of concrete reasonableness: I think, this is mostly done by induction. Abduction delivers a reasonableness without a value or predicate such as "concrete". Induction delivers a growth of the reasonableness, and deduction makes the reasonableness concrete in the meaning of

Aw: RE: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, Thought and Representation

ond.   And on the third hand, the sign in its propositional function brings together index and icon, subject and predicate, Second and First, so the sign is a Third.   That’s how I would put it in a nutshell, if I were to attempt anything so foolhardy. (The Fool is Firstness, of course.)   Gary

Aw: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, Thought and Representation

point of view of time, and observe the changes which take place in them during infinite ages” (Plato, Laws).   For what reason is CP 5.189 the normative form of abduction, the form to which abduction ought to conform?  I would recommend thinking through that question.   Best, Jerry Rhee   O

Aw: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, Thought and Representation

Gary f., Jerry, Jeff, list,   I guess, the question about ordinality and categoriality is an interesting and relevant one. Maybe firstness, secondness, thirdness are not identical with a first, a second, a third, but maybe too, that there is a connection between these two concepts. Some months

Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, Thought and Representation

jects and interpretants? I probably also picked up this idea from Stjernfelt’s Natural Propositions, but I haven’t gone back to see if I can find it explicitly stated there.   Anyway, I’m happy that it clarified things for you to some extent!   Gary f.   From: Helmut Raulien [mailt

Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, Thought and Representation

m happy that it clarified things for you to some extent!   Gary f.   From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de] Sent: 10-Aug-16 17:00   Gary, list,   I think, your post is extremely helpful to clear the terms. So it eventually might be agreed, that a Peircean sign is not the

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, Thought and Representation

Gary, list,   I think, your post is extremely helpful to clear the terms. So it eventually might be agreed, that a Peircean sign is not the triad "representamen-object-interpretant". It is only the representamen, but only, if this representamen is interpreted. In this case it is a sign, and

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Percepts and control

Clark, Jerry, list, That is interesting. This way a neuron can be simulated. However, to have a learning process, I think that they should also have some other crystal that simulates a synapse. I think, "Hebbian learning" is based on connection between two neurons increasing when both neurons

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Percepts and control

    Supplement: You wrote: "That is to be conscious would seem to have a connection so we experience a flow. But if we tie it just to the swerve it’d seem like each conscious moment is unconnected." I guess, the states of the primisense are not directly connected with each other, but the

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Percepts and control

Clark, list, Now I have started looking up about externalism- David Chalmers and so on- very complicated. But I will tend towards externalism too, I think. If a mind is not extended into the environment, it cannot develop, I guess, like Kaspar Hausers mind couldnt. And somewhere I have read the

Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Percepts and control

representations rather seem indexical to me- communication between plants for example. Best, Helmut    03. August 2016 um 14:42 Uhr  g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:   Helmut, my responses inserted:   From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de] Sent: 2-Aug-16 15:12   Dear Gary f., list, I think

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Percepts and control

Dear Gary f., list, I think, to this topic suit Peirces three categorical modes of consciousness. Primisense, altersense, medisense:   "nd | Forms of Consciousness [R] | CP 7.551 There are no other forms of consciousness except the three that have been mentioned, Feeling, Altersense, and

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mind evolving

rent font size > than the ones before..., but you can find the whole essay in a > singular font online at: > http://www.cse.dmu.ac.uk/~mward/gkc/books/orthodoxy/ch4.html [5] > > Best, > Ben Novak > > BEN NOVAK [6] > 5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142 > Telephone

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Mind evolving

Dear Gary F., list, you wrote: "Peirce says here that ‘the law of habit’ – as opposed to the ‘fundamental law of mind,’ which is the tendency of all things to take habits – ‘is a simple formal law, a law of efficient causation.’".   I donot think, that things can take habits. I think, only

Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The auhor's claim: There is no *distinctly* scientific method

y.  That Plato was aware can simply be gleaned from Laws, Republic and Timaeus. “And very unlike a divine man would he be, who is unable to count one, two, three”   Hth, Jerry Rhee   On Mon, Jul 11, 2016 at 9:24 AM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: Dear Jerry, list, The

Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The auhor's claim: There is no *distinctly* scientific method

last, and brings them into relationship.” ~A Guess at the Riddle   Best, Jerry R   On Sun, Jul 10, 2016 at 3:56 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: Jerry, list, yes, and I think that there is a distinctly scientific method, and it is politically good to believe or ev

Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The auhor's claim: There is no *distinctly* scientific method

ething befitting to belong to the ancestry of pragmaticism.   best, Jerry Rhee   On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 at 12:59 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:     Supplement: Ok, Karl Marx would have needed a time machine. Bad example. Jerry, list, yes, that was my question: N

Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The auhor's claim: There is no *distinctly* scientific method

sion of the topic: "The distinction between nature and convention, between physis and nomos, is therefore coeval with the discovery of nature and hence with philosophy." ~Strauss, Natural Right and History   Hth, Jerry Rhee     On Fri, Jul 8, 2016 at 3:52 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.

Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The auhor's claim: There is no *distinctly* scientific method

een physis and nomos, is therefore coeval with the discovery of nature and hence with philosophy." ~Strauss, Natural Right and History   Hth, Jerry Rhee     On Fri, Jul 8, 2016 at 3:52 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: Jerry, indeed, maybe even in German, "Muster&

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The auhor's claim: There is no *distinctly* scientific method

  ...but doesn't CP 5.189 satisfy as a schema with all criteria you just imposed?   What's natural about a schema?   best, Jerry R   On Fri, Jul 8, 2016 at 1:27 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:     Supplement: Please replace in my below post "scheme" with "

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The auhor's claim: There is no *distinctly* scientific method

    Supplement: Please replace in my below post "scheme" with "pattern". I am not a native speaker, and the german term "Schema" means in English both "pattern" and "scheme", but in this case "pattern" is more appropiate, as it does not suggest a personal intention like "scheme" does, but may as

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The auhor's claim: There is no *distinctly* scientific method

Jerry, John, Gary, Olga, (...), list, Gary wrote: "Yet throwing that proverbial baby out with the bath water is exactly what some scientists would like to do, and in attempting and recommending and nearly insisting on this, they are in effect meaning to reduce all 'true' knowledge to that which

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Copula and Being

Strauss says, that "a pious man will therefore not investigate the divine things", because "the gods do not approve..." (of that). But how does Strauss know, that the gods do not approve? He must have investigated the divine things to know that, and also, that there is more than one God, as he

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Copula and Being

re is also the additional complication of those who are vulgar, vulgar only for now and the learned/philosophers.  But this is how things are.   Best, Jerry Rhee   On Tue, Jun 28, 2016 at 6:54 PM, CLARK GOBLE <cl...@lextek.com> wrote:   On Jun 28, 2016, at 4:56 PM, Helmut Raulien <h

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Copula and Being

rage.   hth, Jerry R   On Tue, Jun 28, 2016 at 1:48 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote:   On Jun 24, 2016, at 3:30 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:   I understand it like "mean", "average" and "normal" are necessary traits of any pred

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Copula and Being

    supplement: assuming that the definition of "average" as "agreed-about aspect" is viable, then it would be appliable for information flow in the technical sense as well, like, the technically achieved agrrement for example might be, that a voltage between zero and one volt is agreed to be a

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Copula and Being

List, I guess, what is meant by "average", can be explained with what Jeffrey wrote three or four posts before: " What role, if any, does the conception of a mean, or an average, or a normal, play in the account of being when he says: "We do not obtain the conception of Being, in the sense

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Relations among categories of simple logics. Linguistics and References

    SupplemenT: That was a momentary mood of mine, sorry, I dont want to be arrogant. Of course I too do need to take a close look at all the -duction- inferences in the paper, and think that the paper is very interesting and relevant! You know, my temporal impression is that it is a

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns

Clark, John, list, still having in mind "reverse-engineering", which does not underly copyright: I think, when Duhem says, that the real causes are supernatural, and physics only saves the appearances, these two aspects are not contradictorial or contingent with each other, i.e. not parallel

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns

miotics, based on the idea that sign and interpretant do not convey experience with their object, I add a fourth stage, a 'recognizant', that does just that. There's a parallel with information theory's scenario of source, encoding, decoding, destination. Best, Ben On 5/22/2016 4:04 PM, Helmut Raulien w

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns

Ben, list, Your fourism I find interesting, and it reminds me of Peirces four methods of fixating belief. Would that be justified, and, to loosely do the following connections: Will with tenacity, ability with authority, affectivity with a-priori, and cognition with the scientific method? Now,

Aw: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns

s a much tighter relationship than required for successful reverse engineering.   John Collier Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate University of KwaZulu-Natal http://web.ncf.ca/collier   From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de] Sent: Friday, 20 May 2016 6:28 PM To: g...@

Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns

    Supplement: Just read about Ezra Pound at Wikipedia. A fascist, oops. But this poeia-thing is a good idea of his, anyway. People donot have only good or only bad ideas, I guess. Probably he has had this idea before his mind obscured. List, when I read about the comparison of science /

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns

  Dear list members, here is some thoughts, of which I dont know whether they may help to solve the disagreement, but who knows. Starting from the form of deduction:   Rule: All beans from the bag are white Case: These beans are from the bag Result: These beans are white,   and turning it

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] rule-case-result, deduction, induction, abduction

A E AAA with A = Abraham and AAA = possibility of being a man   All a bit far fetched, I admit. What does not fit is being made to fit.   Best, Helmut         Gesendet: Samstag, 07. Mai 2016 um 23:26 Uhr Von: "Helmut Raulien" <h.raul...@gmx.de> An: Peirce-L <peirce-l

[PEIRCE-L] rule-case-result, deduction, induction, abduction

Dear list members (esp. Jerry, Jon, Gary...) I have started a new thread, because this is a different way of sequencing the inferences, I have tinkered out, and I dont know how it might fit into the other threads, and if it is interesting. So far, I have not compared it yet to Peirce and to

Aw: Re: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Is CP 5.189 A Syllogism? Can Categorial Analysis Be Worthwhile?

: Dienstag, 03. Mai 2016 um 22:37 Uhr Von: "Jerry Rhee" <jerryr...@gmail.com> An: "Helmut Raulien" <h.raul...@gmx.de> Cc: frances.ke...@sympatico.ca, Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Betreff: Re: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Is CP 5.189 A Syllogism? Can Categorial Anal

Aw: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Is CP 5.189 A Syllogism? Can Categorial Analysis Be Worthwhile?

Frances, list, Did you say, that not all signs are inferences? This I would agree with. Or did you also say, that inferences are not signs, but only interpretant- relations? Hm, may be, though I like psychical drama. But in this case, i think, that any inference can only be an argument, because

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Is CP 5.189 A Syllogism? Can Categorial Analysis Be Worthwhile?

t; <jerryr...@gmail.com> An: "Helmut Raulien" <h.raul...@gmx.de> Cc: "Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca>, "Jon Awbrey" <jawb...@att.net>, "Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>, "Gary Richmond" <gary.richm.

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Is CP 5.189 A Syllogism? Can Categorial Analysis Be Worthwhile?

, so, subjectively, it is the second thing perceived, after the event. Best, Helmut Gesendet: Dienstag, 03. Mai 2016 um 00:12 Uhr Von: "Jerry Rhee" <jerryr...@gmail.com> An: "Helmut Raulien" <h.raul...@gmx.de> Cc: "Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.c

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Is CP 5.189 A Syllogism? Can Categorial Analysis Be Worthwhile?

List, Going back to what Jon Alan Schmidt wrote about rule, case and result, I would like to make a detour concerning representamen, object, interpretant. That is, because I first  want to avoid the question (Edwina), whether rule, case, and result are essences, or relations, and postpone it or

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Three inference patterns

Gary, list, in my understanding, the conclusion is always the last of the three lines, and the three lines are written underneath each other according to time, in the sense of what comes first to mind, what then and what then, so for me it would go like this:   Deduction: Rule: All men die

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce on the Definition of Determination

Jerry, Jeff, List, this problem has long been a mystery to me, and I have often changed my opinion, whether object or representamen is first or second. At last i had made up an interpretation, which I would like you all to ask if it is ok. It is like this: Starting from the irreduciblity-claim,

Aw: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Determination, etc.

the same with yours, as it seems to be quite different from Peirce’s, if you’re going to post it here.   Gary f.   From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de] Sent: 11-Apr-16 14:46     Gary, list, I think, that there is continuous determination only in inanimate nature, efficient

Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Determination, etc.

Gary, list, I think, that there is continuous determination only in inanimate nature, efficient causation. Organisms act due to their needs, final causation, and nervous animals, or at least animals with a brain, also act due to their wishes. Needs and wishes rather occur than are determined.

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is there a phaneron?

jelly fish with a nail, but can talk about both. Best, Helmut    19. Februar 2016 um 22:27 Uhr "Clark Goble" <cl...@lextek.com> wrote:     On Feb 19, 2016, at 1:47 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:   "[B]y the phaneron I mean the collective total of al

[PEIRCE-L] Is there a phaneron?

Dear list members, recently at Peirce-list there was the (justified, I think) warning, that the categories-theory should not be used in a way that reminds of astrology. I understand it like to not found a theory on premisses, which are either not proven, or not axiomatic (not a part of

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] How do Peirce's categories best fit the study of the arts?

    Supplement: But I like this triad "experience, representation, materiality", and the way it categorically inverts due to perspective change: ERM-RME-MER are inversions, like those of a musical trichord, eg C major: CEG-EGC-GCE. A similar thing there is with case-reason-result in Peirces

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] How do Peirce's categories best fit the study of the arts?

Adrian, Eugene, list, I agree with Eugene, that in semiotic terms it is not possible to just so assign "materiality" with one of the categories. Assignment depends on what sign it is, i.e. what the situation is. I tentatively propose three types of situation or point of view concerning a piece

Aw: Working to resolve posting issue, was, Re: [PEIRCE-L] SV: [Sadhu Sanga] Darwin's theory is Problematic and incompatible idealization of Reality

Gary, List, thank you for trying to solve this problem. For me this topic of Darwin-critique is quite interesting: On one hand, Darwin was inspired my Malthus, and the resulting social darwinism has caused a great lot of poverty and suffering, up to such things like fascism and nazis. On the

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, coupling and merging

    Supplement: After looking in my bible, I say: "Sorry, error". First sentence is "In the beginning God created sky and earth". I am not sure, from where I had remembered the sentence "In the beginning there was the word", I guess it is an old song by Peter Tosh. Stephen, list, The way you

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, coupling and merging

n Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt   On Sat, Jan 23, 2016 at 9:54 AM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: Supplement: After looking in my bible, I say: "Sorry, error". First sentence is "In the beginning God created sky and earth". I a

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, coupling and merging

AlanSchmidt   On Sat, Jan 23, 2016 at 9:54 AM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: Supplement: After looking in my bible, I say: "Sorry, error". First sentence is "In the beginning God created sky and earth". I am not sure, from where I had remembered the sen

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] SV: [Sadhu Sanga] Re: Idols of the Mind vs. True Reality

    Supplement: Now a crude proposal to triadize the "good versus bad"- problem of rating qualia and to solve the "dualism versus monism" problem by (reconstructingly after Peirce) introducing triadism (which may be looked at as a kind of monism, due to the irreducibility of the triad): "Good" in

Aw: SV: [PEIRCE-L] SV: [Sadhu Sanga] Re: Idols of the Mind vs. True Reality

could get the idea of a Buddhisto-Christianism as he considered both religions to be based on love. An idea which Hartshorne further developed. See attached document.     Best          Søren   Fra: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de] Sendt: 1. januar 2016 21:44 Til: Pei

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] SV: [Sadhu Sanga] Re: Idols of the Mind vs. True Reality

"Reply all" has failed, I dont know why, so I send it to the Peirce list now. I am not sure, whether this is correct, but this thread should have something to do with the Peirce list, because, as far as I know, I am not a member of the Sadhu-Sangha-list. In the "concerns" line, the Peirce list

[PEIRCE-L] Aw: Re: Relations & Their Relatives

quite complex. Best, Helmut     Gesendet: Montag, 28. Dezember 2015 um 05:10 Uhr Von: "Jon Awbrey" <jawb...@att.net> An: "Helmut Raulien" <h.raul...@gmx.de> Cc: "Peirce List" <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Betreff: Re: Relations & Their Relatives I

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Relations & Their Relatives

result, the classification of single triples and their components gets us only so far in the classification of triadic relations proper, and except in very special cases not very far at all. Regards, Jon On 12/12/2015 4:32 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > Supplement: I suspect, that my below con

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Relations & Their Relatives

mentary triadic relations or triples. As a result, the classification of single triples and their components gets us only so far in the classification of triadic relations proper, and except in very special cases not very far at all. Regards, Jon On 12/12/2015 4:32 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote: &g

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

John, Sung, list, for me, as far as I understand, "types" and "classes" are synonyms. The difference between the "9 types of signs" and the "10 classes of signs" is not, as I understand it, a matter of "type" versus "class", but of what it is a type/class of. Id say, the 10 classes are classes

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

    Supplement: I think: The 10 classes of (triadic) signs are 3 classes, that have 6 subclasses (modes), that have 10 subclasses. The 9 types of representamen relations are 3 classes with 9 modes. These three classes are: Relation of the representamen with itself, with the object, and with the

Aw: FW: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

But forgot. I see that Helmut has addressed my concern in a post to the list that crossed mine to him.   John Collier Professor Emeritus, UKZN http://web.ncf.ca/collier   From: John Collier Sent: Monday, 21 December 2015 01:36 To: 'Helmut Raulien' Subject: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, co

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Clark, list, you wrote: " If you have the form but not the matter then it’s degenerate.". Thank you: This way eventually, after a long time,  I think I understand why it is called degenerate. Maybe it is like this: "matter" may be understood for "reason", like in the question "Whats the

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

  Supplement: So, degeneracy is not a de-evolution or reverse (de-) generation, but an incomplete or wrong comprehension of how something has been generated (and so the reason why it has), based on the fact, that the generation process is not easily observable, not observable at all, or not

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Degenerateness, I think, is a relation too. So, something may be (regarded for) degenerate, if you look at it as a mode. Because degeneracy is a trait of modes. But if you look at the same thing regarding it for a sign (a triadic sign), then degeneracy is not something you can assign to it. And

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Relations & Their Relatives

d its theoretical importance, the extensional > aspect of relations is the interface where relations make contact with > empirical phenomena and ground logical theories in observational data. > > Well, it's later than I thought, so I'll have to break here. > > Regards, > > Jo

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Relations & Their Relatives

ake contact with > empirical phenomena and ground logical theories in observational data. > > Well, it's later than I thought, so I'll have to break here. > > Regards, > > Jon > > On 12/8/2015 11:42 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote: >> Jon, list, >> thank you, Jon. >>

[PEIRCE-L] Aw: Re: Elementary Relatives or Individual Relatives

n relations, almost all the literature so far has tackled only the case of elementary sign relations.   Regards,   Jon http://inquiryintoinquiry.com On Dec 3, 2015, at 5:52 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:   Hi Jon, All, I dont want to interrupt the discussion a

Aw: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

    Supplement: I just have looked into Stans papers, and I think, I wrote something wrong in the mice-example. The highest level in subsumptive (eg. classification) hierarchy is the observer level, that should be the individual level. Or is it the biologist, who is exploring mice? I dont know.

Aw: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Gary f, list, Thank you, Gary F., and I should not so quickly have asked this silly question. I understand it like this: Quali-, sin,- legisign is the first level of classification, then in the second level there are six, and ten in the third level. The third level (the ten classes) is the level

Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Hi! Have I understood correctly: --Embodiment means, that it is a complete triadic sign, eg.: (1), qualisign, is not embodied, (1.1), iconic qualisign, is not completely embodied either, but (1.1.1), rhematic iconic qualisign, is embodied? --Degenerate is everything that is not all thirdness,

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Elementary Relatives or Individual Relatives

Hi Jon, All, I dont want to interrupt the discussion about terms, but I have a question that is about the mathematical relation- but I think this consideration might be expanded to semantics and semiotics. In mathematics, I have read somewhere, a relation is a subset of a cartesian product. Now

Aw: Re: [biosemiotics:8987] Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

writes:   "Real potentiality. . . is only possible if Thirdness is First."    (Evolutionary Metaphysics: the development of Peirce's theory of categories, 191).   Best,   Gary R     Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College o

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Clark, lists, you wrote: "Yet his broad notion of mind and habits actually fits cosmology quite well." I always have a problem at this point. Isnt it so, that natural laws and natural constants havent change at all since the big bang? I like tychism, synechism, and agapism very much though, as

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Gary R., Gary F., list, Yes! It is very helpful, and your post too! To me it points at two different kinds of analysis: The analysis of the laws of a general affair, and the analysis of specialization possibilities (Im sure there may be better terms). In both kinds of analysis the Peircean modal

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Re: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Dear All, Regarding the three types of triadic relations (comparison, performance, thought), I would say, that the thought-type, which is of category three, is the one about semiotical 3adic relations, or signs. The comparison type, I think, is eg. a mathematical elementary 3adic relation, a

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Dear list members, I think, that the connection between thirdness and triadicity is, that thirdness has three modes (subcategories): 3.1, 3.2, 3.3. So maybe with this respect, one can say, that thirdness is triadic, is that so? Relation, I think, is secondness, as written in the "New List of

[PEIRCE-L] Aw: [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Stan, all, am I right with guessing, that "logic"  is, what Peirce calls "argumentation", and may lead to a cosmological concept of "universe", and what might lead to an idea, a guess, or a perception of "everything", might be, what Peirce calls "neglected argument", or "humble argument"?  So,

Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

ore things, we become able to interpret physical connections we were not able to before. And this is not true of us simply as individual interpreters, but as a community of inquiry, or scientific community.   -- Franklin   ---   On Mon, Nov 16, 2015 at 3:28

Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

of us simply as individual interpreters, but as a community of inquiry, or scientific community.   -- Franklin   ---   On Mon, Nov 16, 2015 at 3:28 AM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:   Franklin, right! For example, the idea, that a common knowledge

Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

understanding or interpreting a sign leads one to infer the object.   Okay, perhaps I could somehow go through and comment on something else, but that's enough for now, I need a break for a bit. I hope what I have said has been helpful.   -- Franklin   ---

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

scussing these ideas.   -- Franklin   -   On Fri, Nov 13, 2015 at 6:06 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:   Franklin, Gary, list, I guess that a sign has an outside respect (of the dynamical object concerning an externa

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

  Franklin, Gary, list, I guess that a sign has an outside respect (of the dynamical object concerning an external meaning) and an inside (self, eigen) respect of what kind of sign it is, which class it belongs to. The dynamical object there is not the external meaning, but the sign itself,

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Vol. 2 of Collected Papers, on Induction

cular functional connection among those two trichotomies. Best, Ben On 11/9/2015 12:47 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > Ben, List, > > I am sorry for having not known this (scientifical) meaning of > "degenerate". Now, do you think, that abduction, induction, and > deduction

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Vol. 2 of Collected Papers, on Induction

and 3rd with 3rd, as ideas. On the other hand, for my part I haven't noticed a particular functional connection among those two trichotomies. Best, Ben On 11/9/2015 12:47 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > Ben, List, > > I am sorry for having not known this (scientifical) meaning of > &qu

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's Categories

Jon, Jeff, List, I like Jeffs term: "Starting point". I suspect, that -isms are not necessarily ideologies, but often just concepts specific to their starting points of consideration. If this is so, then they can meet and agree. For example: Is nominalism an ideology that denies the existence of

Aw: [biosemiotics:8932] [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's Categories

    Supplement: In what I wrote, there is a sort of fallacy: It is not only about starting points, but rather about choice of method. One method is eager to look for parallelities between the evolution of knowledge in the observers mind and the (suggested) historical evolution of the observed.

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

2   Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU Art: http://buff.ly/1wXAxbl  Gifts: http://buff.ly/1wXADj3   On Tue, Oct 27, 2015 at 11:19 AM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:   You are right: It is random, i.e. meaningless. I had not focused on "meaning", but on "

Aw: Re: Fwd: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

I'm looking at this wrong, feel free to set me straight.    Regards, Tom Wyrick        On Oct 26, 2015, at 4:15 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:         Sung, List, And is a physical interaction a triadic Sign? Eg: A photon hits an atom: The photon and the atom (tok

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