List,
Here is a simple illustration with explanations of degenerate forms of conic
curves: http://www.open.edu/openlearnworks/mod/page/view.php?id=43857
There are two interesting features of this analogy. The first is that there
are continuous transformations between the various curves and th
Edwina, List,
There are a number of claims that you make about how we should read Peirce's
texts that call out for some digging in the texts to see whether they fit with
what Peirce says. Let me start with this one about the character of relatively
degenerate signs. ET: "Therefore, I reject
List,
GF: There is no vagueness in a percept; it’s a singular. So I don’t see how
the concept of qualisign can serve the purpose you suggest here. I think the
qualisign is simply a necessary result of Peirce’s introduction of the
trichotomy of signs based on the sign’s mode of being in itself.
Hello Franklin, Gary F., List,
If a person sees smoke billowing in the distance, is the percept the "smoke
itself," or is the percept the visual impression of the smoke? Peirce
indicates that it is the latter when he provides the following explanation of a
percept: "A visual percept obtrudes
one else, but in any case,
anyone’s judgment of its “success” is superfluous to the inquiry.
Gary f.
-Original Message-
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu]
Sent: 9-Dec-15 16:46
To: 'Peirce-L'
Hi Gary F., List,
G.F: Perhaps, but I think it’s b
Jon S., Gary F.,
Peirce does say that the percept serves, in the first instance, as the
immediate object, where the qualisign is brought into a relation to the
percipuum--so that the percipuum is determined to be in relation to the same
object as the qualisign. Collecting a group of percepts t
sor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
From: g...@gnusystems.ca [g...@gnusystems.ca]
Sent: Wednesday, December 09, 2015 10:39 AM
To: 'Peirce-L'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relation
University
(o) 928 523-8354
From: Jon Alan Schmidt [jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: Monday, December 07, 2015 1:29 PM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Jeff, List:
To ans
than’s table.
Gary f.
} {
http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway
-Original Message-
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu]
Sent: 5-Dec-15 17:02
To: 'Peirce-L'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Hello G
Hello Gary F., List,
Having looked a bit at how Peirce is drawing distinctions between various
aspects of the phenomenological categories--conceived of in terms of both
relations and relationships--in their more genuine and degenerative forms, I'd
like to see if we can apply these ideas to the
o) 928 523-8354
From: Edwina Taborsky [tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: Sunday, December 06, 2015 7:22 AM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard; Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Jeffrey, list - I think the differentiation between 2-2 and 2-1 as modal
ca
essor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [jeffrey.down...@nau.edu]
Sent: Saturday, December 05, 2015 8:16 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Gary R., List,
My suggestio
ting a discussion. But my
'bones' may be different from yours. So what bothers you here?
Best,
Gary R
[Gary Richmond]
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690
On Sat, Dec 5, 2015 at 5:02 P
Hello Gary F., List,
I'd like to learn more about the way Peirce is drawing on the phenomenological
categories as he categorizes different kinds of signs and sign relations.
Focusing on this first division between qualisign, sinsign and legisign, what
guidance are we getting from Peirce's acco
Gary F., Jon, List,
In a discussion of elementary relatives, you ask: "Perhaps correlates which
are not relations are 'individual relatives'?"
Here is a nice passage from "On an Improvement in Boole's Calculus of Logic:
"There are in the logic of relatives three kinds of terms which involv
Michael, List,
You say: "My hero, Charles Peirce, rightly says that logic exists in the
service of ethics, and ethics in the service of aesthetics."
I am not able to find a place where Peirce says that one of these is in the
service of another. I do, however, see where he says that one these
Hello Gary F., List,
You raise a few points. Let me respond.
1. You say that my message was garbled in the middle. I've revised it a bit
to make the points less garbled and inserted it below. In the revised version,
I respond to next two points that you make.
2. Some of the trichotomies
Hello Gary F.
In the remarks on the opening pages of NDTR (CP 2.238-9): "This would give us
a second set of trichotomies that would generate ten classes of triadic
relation, but again, Peirce uses only the first of those trichotomies in his
analysis of sign types. This trichotomy is according
Hello Gary F., Gary, R., List,
I've tried the same reversal of the pattern. One nicely captures a more
genetic understanding of how more complex signs are built from simpler
elements. The other approach starts with the patterns of inference and then
looks at the component pieces. One represe
Hello Claudio, Clark, List,
The idea that one sign may be dominant is nicely highlighted in Peirce's
discussion of focusing attention on one thing and letting others fade into the
background. This ability to focus one's attention is, on Peirce's account,
central to the explanation of how we ca
ith this?
--Jeff
Salto de La Estanzuela
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
From: Jon Awbrey [jawb...@att.net]
Sent: Friday, November 20, 2015 9:02 AM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard; John Collier
Cc: biosemiot...@lis
Hello John, Jon, Lists,
As you might expect, there are quite a number of points of disagreement and
also agreement between Descartes and Peirce. Let's pick one, and let's set to
the side all questions of metaphysics. Here is a question that both try to
answer: for the purposes of engaging in
Franklin, list,
You asked: Would you be willing to offer some references for the works from
1896-1902 and others that you have been drawing from, with respect to relations?
For my money, I think the clearest explanations of how relations are formed
between other relations is in “The Logic of M
nstead of showing how propositions and arguments can be turned into
terms through erasure, we assume instead that propositions and arguments
already admit of at least one more blank left to be determined, and they would
be like rhemes in this respect.
I don't really have time at the
judgment,
because it was that very idea he cautioned me about. This is not really any
argument against the idea, but I have the greatest respect for his judgment
when it comes to all things Peirce. Then again, I could be mis-remembering,
though I don't think so. Perhaps this is all just to
get into the deeper analysis shown in
the attachments. I'll say something later if I find the time to dig into it.
-- Franklin
On Tue, Nov 10, 2015 at 11:48 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard
mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:
Gary F., Ben, Franklin, List,
Off the top of my head, I would
Gary F., Ben, Franklin, List,
Off the top of my head, I would think that there is a straightforward way of
interpreting the passage: “every proposition and every argument can be
regarded as a term”. What is, at one stage of inquiry, a fully formed and
isolated proposition (i.e., medadic in fo
chapter. What might this chapter teach us about the kind of reasoning
that that is needed in phenomenology?
--Jeff
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
From: Jon Awbrey [jawb...@att.net]
Sent: Sunday, November 01, 2015
interpretation of this passage. It is quite short, and Peirce is saying a lot
more than I am.
--Jeff
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
____
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [jeffrey.down...@nau.edu]
Sent: Saturday, Octobe
brey [jawb...@att.net]
Sent: Saturday, October 31, 2015 7:36 AM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; PEIRCE-L
Subject: Re: Peirce's Categories
Jeff, List,
It seems to me there is something slightly off about looking for
the hypotheses that underlie phenomenology. I do not th
enomenological discernments possible, and the like?
Does that make sense? Does it seem at all promising?
Best, Ben
On 10/29/2015 6:14 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
Hi Ben, Clark, List,
I'm working on an essay for the conference on Peirce and mathematics that
Fernando has organized in
aces as hypothetical
objects. Digging those quotes up is another little research project.
Best, Ben
On 10/29/2015 3:20 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
> Clark, List,
>
> You ask: I wonder how we deal with things like quasi-empirical methods in
> mathematics (started I think by Putnam
Clark, List,
You ask: I wonder how we deal with things like quasi-empirical methods in
mathematics (started I think by Putnam who clearly was influenced by Peirce in
his approach). Admittedly the empirical isn’t the phenomenological (or at least
it’s a complex relationship). I’m here thinking
__
I think that this bears out that Peirce was thinking much as you say he was.
Best, Ben
On 10/21/2015 5:14 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
Ben, Lists,
Let me a add a piece to what you've said to see if we are on the same track. I
add this point in order to highlight some features
sciences, can phenomenology really be said to draw from
formal logic, logica docens? If so, how?
Best,
Gary
R
[Gary Richmond]
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690
On Thu, Oct 29, 201
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690
On Wed, Oct 28, 2015 at 9:10 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard
mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:
Gary F., Gary R., List,
If Redness is understood, in t
Gary F., Gary R., List,
If Redness is understood, in the first instance, as the result of an
abstraction from the conception of red, why not think of Firstness, in the
first instance, as the result of an abstraction from the conception of what is
first? In this way, we focus the attention not
Gary R., Gary F., List,
The first occurrence of first, second third that shows up in the index of the
Chronological Writings is in Lowell Lecture IX, of 1866 (pg. 486):
It is important to ask of a theory of logic whether it presents a systematic
and homogeneous whole, for thought it may do this
Hello Christina, List,
Take a look at the first volume of Peirce's Chronological Writings. In the two
series of lectures (Harvard and Lowell, 1865-6), we see Peirce digging into
Kant's way of thinking about the syllogism. It seems clear to me that he has
copies of Kant's lectures on logic and
counted. [William Bruce Cameron] {
http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway
-Original Message-
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu]
Sent: 28-Oct-15 08:02
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; PEIRCE-L
Subject: [biosemiotics:8914] RE: Peirce's categor
Hello Kobus,
I happen to think that is a very good question, and one that is not adequately
explained in the secondary literature. Having spent some time digging through
Peirce's works for clearer answers, I think the answers can be found in the
texts--but I sure wish Peirce had made things cl
Gary F., Gene, List,
Let me set to the side the rancor that has been expressed about the general
idea that appears to be expressed in the quote: A road is made by people
walking on it; things are so because they are called so.
— Chuangtse 2 (Watson 1968, 40)
Gary, it looks to me like you are
Ben, Lists,
Let me a add a piece to what you've said to see if we are on the same track. I
add this point in order to highlight some features of what Peirce is trying to
accomplish in thinking architectonically about inquiry. Many philosophers in
the 20th century, especially those who are mor
AU
(o) 523-8354
From: Stephen Jarosek [sjaro...@iinet.net.au]
Sent: Wednesday, October 14, 2015 12:57 AM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Cc: 'Peirce-L'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality
Jeff, one of the surprises that I have come to in my own thinking in recent
yea
List,
Stephen's characterization of the conception of what is innate seems to differ,
in a number of important respects, from the way Peirce is using the term. The
notion that" innate ideas" are those that are biologically inherited appears to
fit with the explanations given, for instance, in
Hi Ben, List,
I meant to send the following response to the full List, and not solely to Ben.
What kind of analysis should we give for the phenomena associated with the
kinds of surprise (e.g., wonder, bewilderment, failure of the world to meet my
expectations for order or lack thereof, etc.) t
Clark, List,
Thanks, that is quite clearly put.
--Jeff
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
From: Clark Goble [cl...@lextek.com]
Sent: Tuesday, September 15, 2015 11:28 AM
To: PEIRCE-L
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] The problem with ins
Jon, Lists
I believe that, at one level of the semiotic process, we can treat the sign as
one of the three relata in the triad. Of course, at the next stage of
interpretation, the interpretant may itself function as a sign. Are there any
restrictions on having some combination of interpretant
he unit of selection rather than the individual), which I think
some biologists are skeptical about.
Gary f.
-Original Message-
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu]
Sent: July 15, 2015 4:35 PM
Gary F, list,
Yes, that is the approach I would adopt as an interpr
y Richmond]
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690
On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 11:49 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard
mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:
Gary, John, list,
I agree that this pass
picture of how instincts fit
into his account of the interpretative process.
--Jeff
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
From: Ozzie [ozzie...@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 9:51 AM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downa
Gary, John, list,
I agree that this passage is particularly important for understanding Peirce's
account of instinct. The first step in developing a better explanation of the
nature of instinct is to provide a more adequate natural classification of the
different kinds of instincts. It appear
List,
John, I was not trying to suggest that the Century definitions of instinct are
unhelpful. Rather, my suggestion was that they are good place to start if you
want to understand how Peirce is using the word. The definitions show the
generality of his conception--and how it fits with estab
sor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
From: charles murray [charlesmurray1...@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, July 04, 2015 8:55 AM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Cc: Peirce List
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Survey of Relation Theory • 1
Jeff,
I would like to communicate a few quest
Hello Bev, List,
I have been a member of the Peirce list only for the last couple of years.
Here is my understanding of what Ben and Gary R. are trying to do. There are a
set of guidelines that were established by the Peirce-list when Joe Ransdall
set it up. Gary and Ben have responsibility
Jon, Lists,
It appears that I somehow missed your May post on Chapter 3, so thank you for
re-sending the link to comment 7.5. You make quite a number of interesting
points, one of which is future looking. You say; "Looking back from the
ascent we see that the two-point universe ... manifests
Jon, List,
The arithmetic example you offer in "Relations & Their Relatives: 9" is quite
clear. Having said that, what should we say about a number system that only
allows positive integers starting with 1? In this number system, the number 1
can serve in the role of a subtrahend or a differ
Hi John, Lists,
In the The Diversity of Life, E.O. Wilson devotes of few chapters to the
conception of a species. As far as I can tell, he takes the account he is
arguing for to be a mainstream position amongst evolutionary theorists and
ecologists. Is your account consistent the position he
t;preferably some that are surprising".
A self is something surprising, but surprise can only be felt by somebody who
is surprised. So maybe there is no way of getting a better grip, or is there?
Helmut
Von: "Jeffrey Brian Downard"
Ben, Lists,
I, too, find the thread puzzling.
Hi Gary R., Lists,
A little while back, you made the following claim about the nature of a
percept: "The percept within the perceptual judgment--as I noted Nathan Houser
as saying--is a firstness. The percept is not an abstraction. As a sign its a
rhematic iconic qualisign."
I've been trying
t he called the
sign's object the _agent_ and the sign itself the _patient_, but didn't call
the interpretant the _act_.
- Best, Ben
On 5/6/2015 1:48 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
Lists,
When it comes to Peirce's explanation the distinction between subject and
object, I would
Lists,
When it comes to Peirce's explanation the distinction between subject and
object, I would think that we might start with his account of the ordered
dyadic relation between patient and agent. From these humble beginnings, we
are able to build systems of richer relations--such as those in
epartment of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
From: Catherine Legg [cl...@waikato.ac.nz]
Sent: Monday, April 27, 2015 10:15 AM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8468] Re: Natural Propositions,
Jeff your post strikes m
Lists,
The conversation about whether or not there are real general properties,
natural kinds, habitual regularities an/or laws in nature--and where such
things might or might not be at work governing actual things--continues to
surface on both lists with remarkable regularity. It would seem t
Gary R., John, Lists,
Here is what Peirce says in his essay on Telepathy (CP 7.604) as he tries to
clarify the division he is drawing between percept and perceptual judgment:
Analysis of the experience of the chair as it appears before me now.
a. The chair I appear to see makes no professio
Lists,
Nathan has made his paper "The Scent of Truth" available here:
https://www.academia.edu/611929/The_scent_of_truth
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
From: Gary Richmond [gary.richm...@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturd
rays of symbols as visual diagrams, then we can state that
mathematics, not in the narrow sense in which it is usually understood today,
but as the science that models (diagrams) relations in areas under study, would
be among the finer tools for "drawing pictures" that humankind has yet
Tommi, Jon, Lists,
Agreed, Jon. Just as Kant had no brief against things-in-themselves, but only
against those (like the celebrated Wolff) who hold that we can know such things
through logical analysis of concepts alone. The thesis is that our knowledge
of positive matters of fact must be tes
Tommi, Lists,
You appear to interpret what Kant was doing by working with conceptions of the
a priori and the thing in itself very differently from the way I understand the
texts. For starters, I hope that we can agree that Kant was working within a
tradition that took Leibniz as a central inf
Jon, Gary, Lists,
Jon has raised two concerns about Ketner's statement in the "Thief". Here are
some quick responses to the concerns:
(1) A major problem is that icons are not the most general types of signs and
so the leap to signs in general falls a bit short.
Response: if we agree that ev
Hi Cathy, lists,
There are a number of ways of thinking about the relation between breadth,
depth and information. Like Frederik, I believe Peirce is trying to think
about the underlying relation as some kind of logical law that involves a
product of the breadth and depth. We could try to wor
Lists,
Peirce provides us with a definition of the distinction between what is a
priori and what is a posteriori in the Century Dictionary.
Here it is: from the former, from that which precedes; hence from antecedent
to consequent, from condition to conditioned, or from cause to effect.
Peirc
Frank, Lists,
You say: "That's why I find it so frustrating to not see an updated account in
the context of his mature semiotic theory..."
From the discussion of modal dyadic relations:
CP 3.608 Dyadic relations between symbols, or concepts, are matters of logic,
so far as they are not deriv
Hello Anny,
I am sorry to hear about the loss of your niece. A recommendation for a
reading from Peirce is "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God." Or, for
something that Peirce drew inspiration from, I suggest reading some of
Emerson's essays--especially "Experience." Emerson lost his
Hello Jon,
Thanks for the explanation of an uncertainty measure and the link to your work
on information. If you have worked on Peirce's general account of measurement
(e.g., the account laid out in the CP at CP 7.280), I'd like to see what you
have to say. I see that you have a subchapter in
thesis that has explanatory virtues that are
lacking in the other options.
--Jeff
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
____
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [jeffrey.down...@nau.edu]
Sent: Tuesday, March 31, 2015 9:17 A
Lists,
I've seen a few people say that they have worries about Peirce's monism. Some
have gone so far as to say that they reject this part of his position. Given
the prevalence of monads, dyads and triads in all parts of his phenomenology,
normative sciences and metaphysics, I must admit that
Hello,
Or see: http://vordenker.de/ggphilosophy/mcculloch_whats-in-the-brain.pdf
--Jeff
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
From: Jon Awbrey [jawb...@att.net]
Sent: Thursday, March 26, 2015 11:56 AM
To: Danko Nikoli
Hi Jon, Lists,
I have been comparing the steps Peirce takes in the 1870 "Notation for Logic of
Relatives" to the path he lays out in the 1880 "On the Algebra of Logic." Your
notes on the earlier essay are quite helpful to me, but they stop at CP 3.77
where he introduces the sign of involution.
Hi Frederik, Gary F., Lists
I've been thinking a bit more about Frederik's account of optimal iconicity.
One point I'd like to note is that Peirce does not appear to use "optimal" when
talking about iconicity, at least not in the CP. He does, however, use
"perfect" as a modifier of iconicity.
Hello Lists,
Following Peirce's classification of the different kinds of molecules that can
be built from the combinations of dyads and triads that he provides in "The
Logic of Mathematics", we should be able to sort out what kinds of dyadic and
triadic relations obtain within and between the s
ct: Re: [biosemiotics:8079] RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic Relations
At 02:10 PM 2/3/2015, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
So, to restate the point, relations involving representation don't determine
the things that are represented in the way that the laws of fact determine the
relations between exis
nd of determination is a matter
of mere accidental relations of dynamical and productive difference."\
Sorry about that.
--Jeff
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
____________
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [jeffrey.down...@nau.e
Hello Jon, Lists,
Two things:
1. As you prepare to explain in greater detail what Peirce is doing in this
1880 essay on the algebra of logic, let me ask if you are reading the essay in
light of C.S. Peirce's reflections on his father's work on linear associative
algebra? In particular, in wh
Hi Jon, Lists,
I've been thinking about the way you are characterizing triadic relations in
terms of ordered triples. For a while now, I've been wondering if there are
limits to such an approach that might make it difficult to explain what is
special about a genuinely triadic relation. Here a
"PEIRCE-L" ; "biosemiotics"
Sent: Sunday, January 25, 2015 9:54 PM
Subject: [biosemiotics:7995] Re: NP 8.3 and the
> At 09:02 PM 1/25/2015, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
>
>>While he [Peirce] does explore this idea in places, he suggests elsewhere
>>that can'
ent: Sunday, January 25, 2015 7:54 PM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; Sungchul Ji; PEIRCE-L; biosemiotics
Subject: [biosemiotics:7995] Re: NP 8.3 and the
At 09:02 PM 1/25/2015, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
>While he [Peirce] does explore this idea in places, he suggests
>elsewhere that can&#x
@gmail.com] on behalf of Sungchul
Ji [s...@rci.rutgers.edu]
Sent: Sunday, January 25, 2015 5:59 PM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard; PEIRCE-L; biosemiotics
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:7983] Re: NP 8.3 and the
Jeffrey wrote:
"In Sung’s response to you, he seems t
mation. Those are colligation, iteration and erasure.
>(CP, 5.579) My assumption is that he is making a point about any kind of
>illative transformation when he says this, and not just the
>transformation involved in a deductive inference. After all, his main
>point in this passage
tion.
--Jeff
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
________
From: Benjamin Udell [bud...@nyc.rr.com]
Sent: Thursday, January 22, 2015 11:19 AM
To: Gary Fuhrman; Jeffrey Brian Downard
Subject: R
se answers.
gary f.
-Original Message-
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu]
Sent: 19-Jan-15 11:45 AM
Hi Ben, Lists,
Your reflections on this matter are quite helpful--including where you pause to
note a mental glitch that has tripped you up in the past. One of the ni
Hi Ben, Lists,
Your reflections on this matter are quite helpful--including where you pause to
note a mental glitch that has tripped you up in the past. One of the nice
things about "An Improvement of the Gamma Graphs" is that Peirce draws together
in one place an explains in plain English a n
Frederik, Lists,
On the second question that Gary R. has raised, the main point I was trying to
make is that we should not lose sight of how Peirce's approach to these kinds
of questions is supposed to work. As such, let me start by setting to the side
the interesting question of what, precise
Gary R., Lists,
You've asked a series of questions.
1. Do list members find Frederik's notion of two kinds of iconicity of
interest and value? If so, what is that value? It isn't clear to me what the
value is of suggesting that Peirce is working with two notions of
iconicity--despite Peirce'
Jon, Robert, List,
The idea of a "sign relational manifold" is intriguing. One historical
approach to thinking about such matters is to take a cue from Kant's analysis
of the conditions necessary for our perceptions to form a manifold of
experience that is--in one way or another--brought into
Gary F., Lists,
As we try to interpret the key passages where Peirce tries to spell out what is
special about the nature of triadic relations, I think it might be helpful to
look at the way Peirce tries to work through three grades of increasing clarity
about the nature of such relations (CP 3.
mely the descriptive,
classificatory, and nomonological. So trichotomies do occur within the branches
of the two special sciences
Best,
Gary R
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690
On Mon, Dec 8
Ben, Lists,
Given the principles that are being used to guide the formation of the
classification of the sciences, why is the division between the physical and
the physical sciences a dichotomy and not a trichotomy? If this is a natural
divisions between kinds of special sciences, then there s
Ben, Lists,
Here are paraphrases from three definitions that Peirce wrote for the century
dictionary.
Sensation (n):
1. The action, faculty, or immediate mental result of receiving a mental
impression from any affection of the bodily organism; sensitive apprehension;
corporeal feeling; an
ysical antecedents, and
this inquiry must be turned over unreservedly to the physiologists. (CP, 7.579)
Here is a question: how might we draw on Peirce's account of genuine triadic
relations in order to gain more insight into the relations between these two
points of view?
--Jeff
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