I see you got the point, Jerry. đ
Gary f.
From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com]
Sent: 22-Jun-17 19:20
gary f, list:
"I have given the reader such a dose of mathematics, psychology, and all that
is most abstruse, that I fear he may already have left me, and that what I am
Gary r, list:
Speaking then, of rheme and reason in:
âMan,â if it can be said to mean anything by itself,
means âwhat I am thinking of is a man.â
What do you suppose is the method that gives only one meaning to the
following?
âFor only he who is man enough, will - save the woman in woman
Gary F wrote: " I was referring to the larger text or dialogue in which the
term is embedded, not to the context of the readerâs personal history."
Jerry R asked: how do you tell the two apart?
I personally see no difficulty in distinguishing them--indeed, they are
*quite* distinct in my view--al
gary f, list:
"I have given the reader such a dose of mathematics, psychology, and all
that is most abstruse, that I fear he may already have left me, and that
what I am now writing is for the compositor and proof-reader exclusively. I
trusted to the importance of the subject."
Best,
J
On Thu, J
Jerry R,
http://gnusystems.ca/TS/ntx.htm
gary f.
From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com]
Sent: 22-Jun-17 18:26
Gary f,
how do you tell the two apart?
Best,
jerry r
On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 4:08 PM, mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> > wrote:
Jon, I'm not sure what you're d
Gary f,
how do you tell the two apart?
Best,
jerry r
On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 4:08 PM, wrote:
> Jon, I'm not sure what you're driving at on these roads, but when I
> suggested that terms should always be âtaken in contextâ by a
> reader/listener, I was referring to the larger text or dialogue i
Jon, I'm not sure what you're driving at on these roads, but when I suggested
that terms should always be âtaken in contextâ by a reader/listener, I was
referring to the larger text or dialogue in which the term is embedded, not to
the context of the readerâs personal history.
Gary f.
--
Peircers,
I would like to return to a point where the roads began to diverge
and then bifurcate rather chaotically so far as I could track them,
namely, here:
JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-06/msg00036.html
GF:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-06/msg00037.html
I
Kirsti, ...
I have a sense of what Peirce meant by the âLogic of Scienceâ
and what Dewey meant by calling Logic the âTheory of Inquiryâ.
Maybe that's logic in the narrow nerdy sense and not Logic in
the Grandest All-Fired Metaphysical Sense, but it's long been
enough for me, ever since I said far
Jon,
I like your tenor, but do not quite agree.
Yes, linguistics has changed just as you say. But logic?
In my view, the very grounds of modern logic are groumbling down. But it
is an ongoing process, with no predictable end.
Now we live in late modern ot early post modern times. Just to giv
Thank you, John (again) for clearing up the issue with utmost clarity!
Gratefully,
Kirsti
John F Sowa kirjoitti 18.6.2017 16:39:
On 6/17/2017 5:45 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
The term "positive" is the word that Peirce uses to describe
the character of the philosophical sciences--as well
On 6/19/2017 12:38 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
Iâve just read your article on âPeirce's contributions to the 21st
centuryâ (http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/csp21st.pdf)... I couldnât explain
whatâs wrong with it as clearly as you have. (especially in your section
on âlogical negativism.â
I got th
e completely false" (CP 5.11).
Anyway, thanks for that article!
Gary f.
} It takes a long time to learn that life is short. [gnox] {
http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway
-Original Message-
From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net]
Sent: 18-Jun
On 6/18/2017 3:50 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
few workers in these fields today would consider semiotics, or logic,
or philosophy, to be âempirical sciencesâ according to current usage,
although they are all âpositive sciencesâ for Peirce, so we canât
really substitute the one for the other i
pirical sciences" according to current usage,
although they are all "positive sciences" for Peirce, so we can't really
substitute the one for the other in discourse.
Gary f.
-Original Message-
From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net]
Sent: 18-Jun-17 09:40
To:
On 6/17/2017 5:45 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
The term "positive" is the word that Peirce uses to describe
the character of the philosophical sciences--as well as the
special sciences. They are positive (and not merely ideal)
in that they study real things and not idealizations.
In the 19t
:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 17-Jun-17 17:59
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason
Gary F, Jeff, John S, list,
A half hour or so I wrote to Jeff off-list to say regarding his most recent
post: The crucial distinction you've made here between the theoretic and th
__
From: Gary Richmond
Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2017 2:58 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason
Gary F, Jeff, John S, list,
A half hour or so I wrote to Jeff off-list to say regarding his most recent
post: The crucial distinction you've made here between the
Gary F, Jeff, John S, list,
A half hour or so I wrote to Jeff off-list to say regarding his most recent
post: The crucial distinction you've made here between the theoretic and
the idioscopic sciences is, I believe, at the heart of the matter, whatever
the 'normative' concerns may be.
So I'm cl
om: John F Sowa
Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2017 1:52 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason
On 6/17/2017 3:22 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
> I think we are general agreement.
I think we mostly agree. But I don't see any need for the term
'p
On 6/17/2017 3:22 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
I think we are general agreement.
I think we mostly agree. But I don't see any need for the term
'positive science'. I would say 'empirical' instead of 'positive'
in the sentence "Every positive science must describe and make
testable predict
Jeff, Gary R (and list),
I think John has dealt with your question here, Jeff, in a way that I can't
improve on. But I also wonder if you are classifing speculative grammar
(which is part of "logic" in Peirce's broad sense) as "normative" simply
because you've subsumed all of semiotics under "l
ate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
From: John F Sowa
Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2017 11:42 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason
Jon A, Gary F, and Jeff BD,
Jon
> The mo
Jon A, Gary F, and Jeff BD,
Jon
The most important difference between linguistics and logic
is that linguistics is descriptive while logic is normative.
No. Grammars and dictionaries have traditionally been considered
normative. Note l'Académie française. Modern linguists emphasize
the desc
nt of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
From: g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>
mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>>
Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2017 4:53 AM
To: 'Jon Awbrey'; 'Peirce List'
Subject: RE: [PEIRC
wbrey'; 'Peirce List'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason
Jon, what you say is true of logic in the narrow sense. But Peirce invested the
greater part of his attention to semiotics in what he called speculative
grammar, which is not a normative science but a descriptive
t of his attention to semiotics in what he called speculative
grammar, which is not a normative science but a descriptive one. The connection
between logical âgrammarâ and linguistic âgrammarâ is by no means accidental.
I say âamenâ to Johnâs remarks here.
Gary f.
-
means accidental.
I say âamenâ to Johnâs remarks here.
Gary f.
-Original Message-
From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net]
Sent: 17-Jun-17 00:01
To: Peirce List
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason
John, Kirsti, List ...
The most important difference between
John, Kirsti, List ...
The most important difference between linguistics and logic
is that linguistics is descriptive while logic is normative.
Yes, some grammarians try to treat grammar as prescriptive,
but most in modern times have given up on that and realize
that usage will have its day and
Thanks, Jon, I had not seen that observation from Jappy before.
The operative phrase in what I wrote is âas a substitute forâ.
We always have the task of classifying signs and classifying
objects but the problems arise when your favorite ism thinks
that half the work will do double duty. It hard
On 6/15/2017 1:06 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:
Logic is not linguistics ...
ditto
amen
qed
si
.
Jon
--
inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
isw: http://intersci.ss
Gary F, Jon A, list,
Gary F wrote:
The question is whether silicon-based life forms are evolving, i.e. whether
AI systems are *potential* players in what Gregory Bateson called âlifeâa
game whose purpose is to discover the rules, which rules are always
changing and always undiscoverable.â
And i
Jon,
I think you first have to learn what games are available to you, before you can
choose among them (or choose the null game).
The question is whether silicon-based life forms are evolving, i.e. whether AI
systems are potential players in what Gregory Bateson called âlifeâa game whose
pu
The first thing about intelligence is knowing what games you want to play ...
or whether to play at all.
I'm not seeing any AIs that I yet.
Regards,
Jon
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com
> On Jun 13, 2017, at 8:21 PM, wrote:
>
> John, you've made several important points here, and thanks esp
John, you've made several important points here, and thanks especially for
taking Jerry C's question off my hands. đ
A note about AI ⊠back in the 1970s I played go quite a bit and got reasonably
good at it. At that time, chess-playing programs were just beginning to reach
the higher levels
Gary F, Jerry LRC, and Jerry R,
GF
Computability is not the core issue, when you define logic
pragmatically as âthe science of the laws of the stable
establishment of beliefsâ (CP 3.429).
When you use the term "pragmatically", the issues of how that stable
establishment can be achieved in a fi
Dear list:
h, I like where this conversation is headed, for you cannot have this
conversation without ultimately lighting on syllogism. :)
Best,
J
On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 1:14 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:
> Gary:
>
> On Jun 13, 2017, at 1:02 PM, g...@gnusyst
Gary:
> On Jun 13, 2017, at 1:02 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
>
> but as Peirce always said, logic is a positive science while mathematics is
> not. Computability is not the core issue, when you define logic pragmatically
> as âthe science of the laws of the stable establishment of beliefsâ (C
John, you wrote
âLogicians from Aristotle to Peirce to the present use the *semantic* criterion
of preserving truth to justify their *syntactic* rules.â
Yes, this is crucial! You canât do formal logic without mathematics, but as
Peirce always said, logic is a positive science while mathemati
Jon,
You said that in an earlier note, and I corrected it:
The just-so-story that relative terms got their meanings by blanking out
pieces of meaningful clauses or phrases, along with the analogies to
polyunsaturated chemical valences... They tempt one to confuse the
syntactic accidents used
Jon A., List:
JA: As I am realizing more and more in recent years, analyzing and
classifying signs as a substitute for analyzing and classifying objects is
the first slip of a slide into nominalism, namely, the idea that the
essence or reality of objects is contained in the signs we use to descri
Post : The Difference That Makes A Difference That Peirce Makes : 9
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2017/06/13/the-difference-that-makes-a-difference-that-peirce-makes-9/
Peircers,
I took some pains to trace the threads on rhemes, rhemata, etc. back before
the U.S. holiday disruptions and the home
Gary, all ...
One could hardly dispute the importance of implication relations like A â B.
The set-theoretic analogues are subset relations like A â B, which are almost
the canonical way of expressing constraint, determination, information, etc.
There is again a deep analogy or isomorphism betwee
On 6/11/2017 5:08 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
An icon is an icon when it's interpreted as an icon.
An index is an index when it's interpreted as an index.
The same goes for term, sentence, argument by any name.
The first two sentences are true. But the third is false.
In natural languages and artif
Peircers,
A rather amusing, if slightly ominous illustration of the
main point I am trying to make here has just popped up in
the daily mayhem. Let's call this one:
Syntax Proposes, Pragmatics Disposes,
or,
When Does A Question Become A Command?
http://time.com/4811148/comey-testimony-henry-ii
Peircers,
I am occupied with renovations to our house at the moment, so I'll just submit
the following paragraph for common contemplation until I can get our kitchen
reassembled.
https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_:_Inquiry_and_Analogy#Functional_Conception_of_Quantification_Th
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