Hi Mara,
You've asked: "What role did Peirce think that science (as he defined science)
should play in the development of religious thought?"
I don't believe that Peirce tried to answer this question in "How to Make Our
Ideas Clear." We could look to the broader context of his other writings-
Post : Peirce's 1870 “Logic Of Relatives” • Comment 11.5
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2014/05/02/peirces-1870-logic-of-relatives-%e2%80%a2-comment-11-5/
Posted : May 2, 2014 at 5:00 pm
Author : Jon Awbrey
Peircers,
Everyone knows that the right sort of diagram can be a great aid in rendering
Jeffrey,
Thank you for the explanatory context; it helps to see the entire issue
explained. The echo of the different methods of the fixation of belief here
would suggests that the pragmatic maxim is applicable only to science
because that's the only method that would require making such practical
Jeremiah, Jeffrey D., list,
Jeremiah's paper was ill-starred, it seems. Jeremiah supplied Joe
Ransdell with a version that Joe put pretty much wholesale into html and
posted at Arisbe. Some symbolic expressions were formatted in this or
that font perhaps commonly installed in computers at the
Thanks Phyllis - I think part of CSPs desire was to establish the
scholastic elements of his thinking. But he may also have had a genuine
desire to have his philosophy distinguished from pragmatism. If that is the
case there might be some consideration of whether we should assume and
honor that wis
Gary R., Gary F., Cathy, List
Having pointed to an alternate basis for classifying the other methods for
fixing belief, let me offer a comment on your suggestion. The methods of
tenacity and authority need not be random. In fact, great effort in reasoning
can be spent defending one's own beli
Jerry, List,
I've read your paper, it is quite a rich reconstruction of the detailed steps
of inference in the lectures--and of the overarching aim. Having said that,
your reconstruction is rich with suggestions. As such, I'll study it more
closely before offering any comments.
Thanks for re
Cathy, List,
Here is an alternate way of reading the argument in Fixation. Let us suppose
that one of the main questions in Fixation is: "Why should I be logical?" If
Peirce is drawing on the general strategy Kant employs in the second critique
for answering the question "why should I be mo
Good point, Stephen.
Listers, Does anyone know whether Peirce referred to the name of this proof
differently after he coined the word pragmaticism in his 1905 essay, What
Pragmatism Is? Was he consistent in using pragmaticism rather than pragmatism
after that time?
Phyllis
"Stephen C. Rose"
Jeremiah,
I would think that any proof of any hypothesis would require
premissy-conclusiony type stuff, with testing in between those two and
abduction/retroduction for formulating the hypothesis from which premises and
explications of these flow. Otherwise all we'd have is deduction. I will re
Gary R. Gary F & Cathy,
Very nice. I'm saving this somewhere that i won't lose it.
Phyllis
Gary Richmond wrote:
>Gary, Cathy, list,
>
>So, slightly modifying Cathy's list in consideration of Gary F's comments
>we get (and, personally, with an eye to introducing these methods to
>students):
>
>
Gary, Cathy, list,
So, slightly modifying Cathy's list in consideration of Gary F's comments
we get (and, personally, with an eye to introducing these methods to
students):
*Method of Tenacity: private, randomMethod of Authority: public,
randomMethod of Consensus: public, reasonedMethod of Sci
Peirce-Listers:
Peirce claimed that there was a proof of pragmatism in the 1903 “Lectures on
Pragmatism.” For a detailed account of that proof, I would refer
Peirce-Listers to Jeremiah McCarthy’s 1990 paper, “An Account of Peirce’s Proof
of Pragmatism,” which is available at the Arisbe web sit
I wonder, if we are talking proof, whether we should not apply it to
pragmaticism rather than pragmatism. CSP would not have coined the term had
he not wished to underline a distinction. And I suspect it deserves to be
used posthumously as the name he gave to his evolved philosophy.
*@stephencrose
Mara & listers,
Mara noted in an earlier post that she did not see a proof of pragmatism in
Chapter 7. I hope she and others will pipe in on this. I especially wonder
whether others consider the proving abduction necessary to proving pragmatism
(or that proving one proves the other).
Kees writ
Jeffrey, List,
Let me put it this way:
Here are your two hypotheses:
1. The bread changes form without changing sensible effects.
2. The bread doesn’t change in form.
What could possibly be the difference in one’s understanding of these?
An answer “I don’t know” does not necessarily mean “noth
Welcome back, Cathy!
Your classification of the four methods of fixing belief describes the "A
Priori Method" as "private, reasoned". But as Peirce describes it (EP1:118-19),
it is no more "private" than the method of Authority; indeed it is more public,
in that it recognizes a broader range of
Hi everyone,
Having not been able to wrest open my peirce-l inbox for some time, I was
able to peruse the chapter 6 thread pretty much in one reading last night.
It was very nice to see the various themes unfold and develop before my
eyes.
Thank you Jeff K for your rich account of Peircean episte
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