RE: [PEIRCE-L] De Waal seminar chapter 9, section on God, science and religion: text 1

Hi all, I’m very behind on this thread, but have been reading and enjoying it. I just haven’t had the chance to pull my thoughts together enough to post. First of all, a big thank you to Søren for starting us off with such wonderfully erudite postings – even including bibliographies which are

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Unscientific methods of inquiry

Ben what a detailed analytical list you’ve come up with! I’m not sure that I see that your distinction between (antecedent) prejudice and (current) bias makes much real difference pragmatically, though, given that inquiry is always moving forward into the future. I.e. I don’t see a clear differe

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: PEIRCE-L] PEIRCE ARGUES REPEATEDLY

*Gary (R) – the principled realism of 3) and 4) is very nice – thanks for that!* *Cathy* Jim Willgoose once analyzed Peirce's dictum that "Generals are really operative in nature" from the standpoint of semiotic, and I would tend to agree with his analysis: 1) "Really operative" signs are n

RE: [PEIRCE-L] REPLY TO HELMUT RAULIEN on "Peirce's Questions, i.e. "icon" and Destiny?

Eugene that’s a really interesting quote, thank you! One might argue on the other side that although the human is too big-brained to pull together with its fellow organisms in the (apparently) seamless way that bees do – its richer set of capacities allows the agapastic activities it does engage

[PEIRCE-L] Peirce's 1870 “Logic Of Relatives” • Comment 12.5

Post : Peirce's 1870 “Logic Of Relatives” • Comment 12.5 http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2014/06/15/peirces-1870-logic-of-relatives-%e2%80%a2-comment-12-5/ Posted : June 15, 2014 at 3:30 pm Author : Jon Awbrey Peircers, The equation (s^l)^w = s^(lw) can be verified by establishing the correspond

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: determination in semiosis

Sung: On Jun 15, 2014, at 2:34 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote: > (1) Sign is always Firstness formally but can be Firstness, > Secondness or Thirdness ontologically. > (2) Object is always Secondness formally but can be Firstness, Secondness > or Thirdness ontologically. > (3) Interpretant is always Thir

[PEIRCE-L] Peirce on Definition and Determination

Re:Gary Richmond At:http://web.archive.org/web/20140615182354/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/13208 Peircers, Here is one of the more recent threads that I could find just off hand, referring to a set of excerpts from Peirce and a few others that I began collecting ba

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy Introduction

Matt: It is a question of the relation between your usage of the term "us" and how I understood your sentence. My comment was based on my understanding of the term "us" as a 1 st person pronoun. I have copied the entry for "us" from the Apple dictionary below. What is your understanding of yo

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RESPONSE TO GARY RICHMOND FROM GCM

Sung, list, Sung wrote: *Doesn't Statement (061514-7) still imply that"Secondness (obejct) contrains the Firstness (sign),(061514-8)and hence Firstness is second to Secondness."* Again, from the categorially vectorial standpoint, Peirce does not always follow the Hegelian order of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: determination in semiosis

Gary R., list, Sometimes I don't remember my own favorite examples clearly. I said, "E.g., if I see a cloud as resembling somebody's face, the cloud determines the mental icon of that face as part of an interpretant through my collateral experience of that person." The way I usually put it i

[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: determination in semiosis

List, I had asked Ben Udell off-list if he could find list discussions on Peirce's use of "determines" in semiosis. I'd responded to Sung's question before I'd received Ben's response (below). I asked him if I could send it to the list as a supplement and he wrote: Hi, Gary, You can forward it as

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RESPONSE TO GARY RICHMOND FROM GCM

Gary R wrote: "It seems to me that there has come to be a consensus (061514-7) here and in Peirce scholarship more generally that "determines" should not be seen in this usage as analogous to physically "causes" but more along the lines of "constrains" or "limits". This is a logical, not

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Response to Gary Richmond from GCM

Jon, Stephen, Sung, list, Jon makes a deceiving simple but vastly important point, I think, in the conclusion of the message he just linked to. Jon writes: - *Merely to describe how a predicate of reality rises to the* - *level of making any sense at all, we have to be operating* - *wit

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy Introduction

Matt, as I amateurishly understand it, a gravitational field is an accelerational field, so a distant observer outside of it and at rest with respect to it will see the clocks there ticking more slowly (time dilation) than the observer's own. On the other hand, if you were orbiting a planet fas

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RESPONSE TO GARY RICHMOND FROM GCM

Sungchul , list, Sung asks, *"Vector of Determination - The object determines (2ns) (061514-2)a sign (1ns) for an interpretant (3ns)."It seems to me that (061514-2) is consistent with (061514-1) except thefollowing question that arises in connection with the former:"How can F

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy Introduction

Isn't the big bang now considered a slow birth? If so, since General Relativity says clocks in a stronger gravitational field move faster than clocks in weaker fields, and since everything was in such close proximity right after the big bang and thus was in stronger gravity, and since we should

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Response to Gary Richmond from GCM

Stephen C. Rose wrote: Inherent perhaps. I do not think much can be explained regarding what exists before we name things. Vagueness. A penumbra. Or as I would say, all embracingly, reality. That would be the realm of firstness it seems. That said, it seems to me that we keep things in mind verba

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: PEIRCE-L] PEIRCE ARGUES REPEATEDLY

Gary M. Phyllis, list, Gary, here, as in yesterday's long post on the same topic (Peirce's view that generals are real), you keep saying things like "Gary R. said" or, here, referring to "Gary's" point as to what constitutes a nominalist--in that earlier long post even copying snippets of Peirce q

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RESPONSE TO GARY RICHMOND FROM GCM

Inherent perhaps. I do not think much can be explained regarding what exists before we name things. Vagueness. A penumbra. Or as I would say, all embracingly, reality. That would be the realm of firstness it seems. That said, it seems to me that we keep things in mind verbal form so that considerat

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RESPONSE TO GARY RICHMOND FROM GCM

I "Firstness is processed", Firstness must be second to the processor of Firstness, whatever it may be." No ? Sung > Firstness is not so much determined as processed, first by giving it a > term > (word, etc.) and then submitting it to the second. The amalgam of these > yields up the third whic

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy Introduction

I am not part of this immediate discussion but I think the problem is that initially the statement suggested a temporal beginning and end and this declension suggests something much more "general" and to be more acceptable and demonstrable reality. The notion that mind is inherent in reality seems

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy Introduction

Please explain or cite the scientific facts that are opposed to the idea that minds always were and always will be. To answer what I think you meant: The big-bang and accelerating expansion of the universe do not refute the idea that minds always were or that minds won't adapt to the expansion

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy Introduction

Stephen: On Jun 15, 2014, at 6:10 AM, Stephen C. Rose wrote: > But scientific facts are not in opposition to triadic philosophy since its > practice issues in measurable results in the form of expressions and actions. > Matt had posted the following: "The Buddhist logicians Dignaga and Dhar

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy Introduction

Triadic philosophy is a specific method of taking seriously the idea of memorial maxims as an aid to arriving at actions and expressions which reduce harm, etc. Reading the books on the subject (google triadic philosophy plus my name) helps. I am posting here aphorisms from the initial book to pos

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RESPONSE TO GARY RICHMOND FROM GCM

Firstness is not so much determined as processed, first by giving it a term (word, etc.) and then submitting it to the second. The amalgam of these yields up the third which as Gary R. has suggested is the area of life as it is lived. Thus whatever the first is or was survives only as a result of a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RESPONSE TO GARY RICHMOND FROM GCM

Hi, In http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trikonic, I find the following two statements: "Firstness is the mode of being that of which is such (061514-1) as it is, positively and without reference to anything else. Secondness is the mode of being that which is such as it is, with respect to a s

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy Introduction

But scientific facts are not in opposition to triadic philosophy since its practice issues in measurable results in the form of expressions and actions. *@stephencrose * On Sun, Jun 15, 2014 at 12:05 AM, Jerry LR Chandler < jerry_lr_chand...@me.com> wrote: > Ma

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: PEIRCE-L] PEIRCE ARGUES REPEATEDLY

GCM:  GR's point was that he said that Nominalists, like he said we all are as opposed to himself, do not believe in "real generals" or "Thirdness" or the "Interpretant". I proposed purely provisionally that I and Umberto Eco do not believe in "real generals" but do believe in "Thirdness" and th

[PEIRCE-L] PEIRCE’S FIRST FOOTNOTE TO “Questions Concerning Certain Faculties…”

PEIRCE’S FIRST FOOTNOTE TO “Questions Concerning Certain Faculties…”, Ep P. 11 -x-  [EP page 11] The word “intuitus” first occurs as a term in St. Anselm’s MONOLOGIUM. He wished to distinguish between our knowledge of God and our knowledge of finite things (and in the next world, of God, also);