Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET:  No- my reading of Peirce is that there are real possibilities [i.e. in
a mode of Firstness] that are never actualized ... Firstness, as a 'set' of
categorical possibilities is real - all of those possibilities - *when
operational within a triadic morphology* ... The same with Thirdness ... it
functions only within the triad.


Thank you for clarifying this.  However, similar to Clark's comments
earlier, I do not fully understand what you mean by "operational," "triadic
morphology," and "functions" in this context.  As far as I know, Peirce did
not use any of these particular terms as qualifiers when affirming the
reality of Firstness (possibility, qualities) and Thirdness (generality,
habits).  I suspect that we still have a disconnect over Peirce's careful
distinction between reality (all three categories) and existence
(Secondness only).

Furthermore, there are many passages where he discusses the
categories--including the reality of all three--without saying much (if
anything) about signs or "the triad."  For example, this is true of most of
the cosmological/cosmogonic texts, which were the initial jumping-off point
for this thread.

Regards,

Jon

On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 7:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon - list
>
> First - and yet again - please do not unilaterally define my views as
> 'unlike Peirce'. I would appreciate it if you would instead say something
> like: 'My reading of Peirce is different from your reading; I read Peirce
> as ...
>
> No- my reading of Peirce is that there are real possibilities  [i.e. in a
> mode of Firstness]  that are never actualized. I do NOT think that
> Firstness only exists *when a single possibility is actualized. *Firstness,
> as a 'set' of categorical possibilities is real - all of those
> possibilities - *when operational within a triadic morphology*. After all
> - the very essence of a possibility is that it is NOT particularized but
> remains unarticulated but possible. However, I consider that this
> 'state' of Firstness is operational only within the triad.
>
> The same with Thirdness. I do not read Peirce as seeing Thirdness
> operational outside of the triad that forms matter/mind. Thirdness, as a
> basic category, does indeed provide continuity within the morphological
> articulation of specific Signs, but it isn't *in itself* prior to and
> underlying actuality. Again, it is a mode of organization that provides
> habits-of-continuity, generalizations...that mediate and form specific
> triadic Signs. BUT - it functions only within the triad.
>
> I think this is a basic difference in our readings of Peirce. I focus that
> the categories are basic and necessary - but- operate only within the
> Triadic Sign. You seem to interpret Peirce in a different way.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *To:* Edwina Taborsky 
> *Cc:* Peirce-L 
> *Sent:* Monday, October 24, 2016 7:50 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> ET:  [Not within Secondness, Jon, but within a triadic Sign].
>
>
> I did not say *within *Secondness, I said *with *Secondness; and I
> essentially meant exactly what you said, that you "don't consider that
> Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness have non-embedded reality."  Unlike
> Peirce, you deny that there are real possibilities that are never
> actualized, real qualities that are not instantiated in any actual objects,
> a real continuum that is prior to and underlies all actuality as
> represented by the blackboard, and real Platonic worlds out of only one of
> which emerged this universe of actual existence.  Or have I misunderstood
> you all along?
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 5:58 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Clark, Jon, list:
>>
>> Aristotle certainly admitted that generals are real! You don't have to be
>> a Platonist to accept that! That's a basic component of his metaphysics.
>> The difference is that for Aristotle, they function only when embedded
>> within the particular.
>>
>> Again, I don't consider that Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness have
>> non-embedded reality. They are 'real' in that their operational natures
>> [Firstness as spontaneity, freedom, quality; Secondness as discrete
>> separation and Thirdness as habit, continuity of type] are not 'nominalist
>> names'  but they do not function outside of their being embedded *within
>> a triadic Sign*. [Not within Secondness, Jon, but within a *triadic Sign*].
>> And, I agree that Peirce was a scholastic realist - which means that
>> generals are 'real', i.e., not nominalist subjective names - but- again,
>> that doesn't to me mean that they have a separate nature. I see them as
>> real and operational only as embedded within a TRIADIC SIGN. You can have
>> such a triadic sign totally - in a mode of Firstness, after all. It's the
>> triadic 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Clark, Edwina, List:

CG:  I’d say it’s quite a bit earlier than that, although again I think a
lot depends upon what we mean by the terms.


Fisch argued, convincingly I think, that Peirce did not accept the reality
of possibilities until about 1896.

ET:   And Firstness cannot be defined as 'indeterminacy'.


But that is precisely one of Peirce's definitions--just a few paragraphs
before CP 1.412!

CSP:  Indeterminacy, then, or pure firstness, and hæcceity, or pure
secondness, are facts not calling for and not capable of explanation. (CP
1.405, EP 2.475; 1887-1888)


Elsewhere he noted that both Firstness and Thirdness are forms of
indeterminacy, because only Secondness is fully determinate.  Firstness is
vague, and thus not subject to the law of contradiction; while Thirdness is
general, and thus not subject to the law of excluded middle (CP 5.505).
Secondness, by contrast, is subject to both.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 6:46 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Clark, list
> My field is not philosophy - so I have no knowledge of Armstrong.
>
> Aren't Plato's Forms 'real' - even when NOT embedded within
> matter/concepts?
>
> I don't have 6.612 in my collection.  Those few pages are missing!
>
> And I don't see any of the categories as 'existent' or operational or
> whatever term one uses, before the emergence of Matter-Mind. The
> categories, as I understand them, are basic modes of organization of
> Matter-Mind and do so - within the semiosic triad.
>
> Prior to the emergence of Matter-Mind, I don't see the universe as a state
> of 'Firstness'. But - as nothing. After all, in 1-412, Peirce says: "out of
> the womb of indeterminacy, we must say that there would have come
> something, by the principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then
> by the principle of habit there would have been a second flash
>
> Therefore, the way I read the above is NOT that Firstness 'existed' or
> 'was real' within that 'womb of indeterminacy. As he writes, "The original
> chaos, therefore, where there was no regularity, was in effect a state of
> mere indeterminacy, in which nothing existed or really happened" 1.411.
>
> The three categories are fundamental principles of the world. But have
> nothing to do with the pre-Matter/Mind state-of-indeterminacy.  And
> Firstness cannot be defined as 'indeterminacy'.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Clark Goble 
> *To:* Peirce-L 
> *Sent:* Monday, October 24, 2016 7:05 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism
>
> On Oct 24, 2016, at 4:28 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> Edwina and I have gone back and forth on this on multiple occasions.  My
> understanding--which she will presumably correct if I am mistaken--is that
> she denies that Peirce held Firstness (possibilities, qualities) and
> Thirdness (generalities, habits) to be real apart from their instantiation
> with Secondness (actualities, facts).  In fact, her usual blanket
> rejoinder--as reflected in what you quoted--is that Peirce was an
> Aristotelian, and therefore not a Platonist.  On the other hand, I agree
> with Max Fisch and others that he was a robust three-category realist, at
> least after about 1896.
>
> I’d say it’s quite a bit earlier than that, although again I think a lot
> depends upon what we mean by the terms. That may reflect part of the
> disagreement.  (see below)
>
> On Oct 24, 2016, at 4:58 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
>
>
> Aristotle certainly admitted that generals are real! You don't have to be
> a Platonist to accept that! That's a basic component of his metaphysics.
> The difference is that for Aristotle, they function only when embedded
> within the particular.
>
> Depending upon the sense of ‘function’ I’m not sure a Platonist would
> necessarily disagree. Again though there are different ways historically in
> both antiquity and the modern era that self-described Platonists conceived
> of intellectual objects.
>
> Again, I don't consider that Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness have
> non-embedded reality.
>
> I’m not quite sure what you mean by that. My sense is you’re referring to
> something like Armstrong universals. Is that about correct? Only with
> instead of matter the way Armstrong conceived of it you have what you call
> the triadic sign as being ‘matter’ as it were.
>
> ...they do not function outside of their being embedded *within a triadic
> Sign*. [Not within Secondness, Jon, but within a *triadic Sign*].And,
> I agree that Peirce was a scholastic realist - which means that generals
> are 'real', i.e., not nominalist subjective names - but- again, that
> doesn't to me mean that they have a separate nature. I see them as real and
> operational only as embedded 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jon - list

First - and yet again - please do not unilaterally define my views as 'unlike 
Peirce'. I would appreciate it if you would instead say something like: 'My 
reading of Peirce is different from your reading; I read Peirce as ...

No- my reading of Peirce is that there are real possibilities  [i.e. in a mode 
of Firstness]  that are never actualized. I do NOT think that Firstness only 
exists when a single possibility is actualized. Firstness, as a 'set' of 
categorical possibilities is real - all of those possibilities - when 
operational within a triadic morphology. After all - the very essence of a 
possibility is that it is NOT particularized but remains unarticulated but 
possible. However, I consider that this 'state' of Firstness is operational 
only within the triad.

The same with Thirdness. I do not read Peirce as seeing Thirdness operational 
outside of the triad that forms matter/mind. Thirdness, as a basic category, 
does indeed provide continuity within the morphological articulation of 
specific Signs, but it isn't in itself prior to and underlying actuality. 
Again, it is a mode of organization that provides habits-of-continuity, 
generalizations...that mediate and form specific triadic Signs. BUT - it 
functions only within the triad.

I think this is a basic difference in our readings of Peirce. I focus that the 
categories are basic and necessary - but- operate only within the Triadic Sign. 
You seem to interpret Peirce in a different way.

Edwina






  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Monday, October 24, 2016 7:50 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism


  Edwina, List:


ET:  [Not within Secondness, Jon, but within a triadic Sign].


  I did not say within Secondness, I said with Secondness; and I essentially 
meant exactly what you said, that you "don't consider that Firstness, 
Secondness or Thirdness have non-embedded reality."  Unlike Peirce, you deny 
that there are real possibilities that are never actualized, real qualities 
that are not instantiated in any actual objects, a real continuum that is prior 
to and underlies all actuality as represented by the blackboard, and real 
Platonic worlds out of only one of which emerged this universe of actual 
existence.  Or have I misunderstood you all along?


  Regards,


  Jon


  On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 5:58 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

Clark, Jon, list:

Aristotle certainly admitted that generals are real! You don't have to be a 
Platonist to accept that! That's a basic component of his metaphysics. The 
difference is that for Aristotle, they function only when embedded within the 
particular.

Again, I don't consider that Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness have 
non-embedded reality. They are 'real' in that their operational natures 
[Firstness as spontaneity, freedom, quality; Secondness as discrete separation 
and Thirdness as habit, continuity of type] are not 'nominalist names'  but 
they do not function outside of their being embedded within a triadic Sign. 
[Not within Secondness, Jon, but within a triadic Sign].And, I agree that 
Peirce was a scholastic realist - which means that generals are 'real', i.e., 
not nominalist subjective names - but- again, that doesn't to me mean that they 
have a separate nature. I see them as real and operational only as embedded 
within a TRIADIC SIGN. You can have such a triadic sign totally - in a mode of 
Firstness, after all. It's the triadic format that is vital.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Clark Goble 
  Cc: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Monday, October 24, 2016 6:28 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism


  Clark, List: 


CG:  It seems to me Peirce is a Platonist in several senses. First he 
admits generals into his ontology as real. Thus he was on the platonic side of 
the nominalist debates of the medieval era and modern era.


  Edwina and I have gone back and forth on this on multiple occasions.  My 
understanding--which she will presumably correct if I am mistaken--is that she 
denies that Peirce held Firstness (possibilities, qualities) and Thirdness 
(generalities, habits) to be real apart from their instantiation with 
Secondness (actualities, facts).  In fact, her usual blanket rejoinder--as 
reflected in what you quoted--is that Peirce was an Aristotelian, and therefore 
not a Platonist.  On the other hand, I agree with Max Fisch and others that he 
was a robust three-category realist, at least after about 1896.


  Regards,


  Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
  Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
  www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt


  On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 4:53 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:

I’ve changed the subject line to better reflect the 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET:  [Not within Secondness, Jon, but within a triadic Sign].


I did not say *within *Secondness, I said *with *Secondness; and I
essentially meant exactly what you said, that you "don't consider that
Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness have non-embedded reality."  Unlike
Peirce, you deny that there are real possibilities that are never
actualized, real qualities that are not instantiated in any actual objects,
a real continuum that is prior to and underlies all actuality as
represented by the blackboard, and real Platonic worlds out of only one of
which emerged this universe of actual existence.  Or have I misunderstood
you all along?

Regards,

Jon

On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 5:58 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Clark, Jon, list:
>
> Aristotle certainly admitted that generals are real! You don't have to be
> a Platonist to accept that! That's a basic component of his metaphysics.
> The difference is that for Aristotle, they function only when embedded
> within the particular.
>
> Again, I don't consider that Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness have
> non-embedded reality. They are 'real' in that their operational natures
> [Firstness as spontaneity, freedom, quality; Secondness as discrete
> separation and Thirdness as habit, continuity of type] are not 'nominalist
> names'  but they do not function outside of their being embedded *within
> a triadic Sign*. [Not within Secondness, Jon, but within a *triadic Sign*].
> And, I agree that Peirce was a scholastic realist - which means that
> generals are 'real', i.e., not nominalist subjective names - but- again,
> that doesn't to me mean that they have a separate nature. I see them as
> real and operational only as embedded within a TRIADIC SIGN. You can have
> such a triadic sign totally - in a mode of Firstness, after all. It's the
> triadic format that is vital.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *To:* Clark Goble 
> *Cc:* Peirce-L 
> *Sent:* Monday, October 24, 2016 6:28 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism
>
> Clark, List:
>
> CG:  It seems to me Peirce is a Platonist in several senses. First he
> admits generals into his ontology as real. Thus he was on the platonic side
> of the nominalist debates of the medieval era and modern era.
>
>
> Edwina and I have gone back and forth on this on multiple occasions.  My
> understanding--which she will presumably correct if I am mistaken--is that
> she denies that Peirce held Firstness (possibilities, qualities) and
> Thirdness (generalities, habits) to be real apart from their instantiation
> with Secondness (actualities, facts).  In fact, her usual blanket
> rejoinder--as reflected in what you quoted--is that Peirce was an
> Aristotelian, and therefore not a Platonist.  On the other hand, I agree
> with Max Fisch and others that he was a robust three-category realist, at
> least after about 1896.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 4:53 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:
>
>> I’ve changed the subject line to better reflect the theme.
>>
>> On Oct 24, 2016, at 12:59 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
>> wrote:
>>
>> On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 1:12 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
>> wrote:
>>
>> As for Peirce's Platonism -[ which is not the same as neo-Platonism], I
>> find Peirce a thorough Aristotelian - and the debate, for example, by
>> Aristotle vs Platonism [in many areas, including in physics, metaphysics,
>> politics] ...seems to find support in Peirce's views on, for example,
>>  matter and mind; causality; so, I don't find arguments defining him as
>> 'Platonist' very convincing.
>>
>> I confess I always saw neoPlatonism as Platonism that took seriously and
>> embraced many ideas of Aristotle and the Stoics. To such an extent that
>> particularly Aristotle transformed Plato. Of course if you asked the main
>> neoPlatonists like Plotinus, Proclus, Iamblicus and so forth what they were
>> they’d just say Platonists. But then I think that’s more due to the
>> oversized role dogma played in that era’s platonism. Even if you differed
>> from Plato you said you were merely giving Plato’s ideas. In any case to me
>> neoPlatonism is a subset of Platonism.
>>
>> As to Peirce being a Platonist it always helps to ask what we mean by
>> that. After all some call mathematicians who admit to numbers being real as
>> Platonists. It’s such a loosely used term that it misleads often as much as
>> it informs.
>>
>> It seems to me Peirce is a Platonist in several senses. First he admits
>> generals into his ontology as real. Thus he was on the platonic side of the
>> nominalist debates of the medieval era and modern era. I think that was
>> important even if it’s 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism

[Edwina Taborsky]

Clark, list
My field is not philosophy - so I have no knowledge of Armstrong.

Aren't Plato's Forms 'real' - even when NOT embedded within matter/concepts?

I don't have 6.612 in my collection.  Those few pages are missing!

And I don't see any of the categories as 'existent' or operational or whatever 
term one uses, before the emergence of Matter-Mind. The categories, as I 
understand them, are basic modes of organization of Matter-Mind and do so - 
within the semiosic triad. 

Prior to the emergence of Matter-Mind, I don't see the universe as a state of 
'Firstness'. But - as nothing. After all, in 1-412, Peirce says: "out of the 
womb of indeterminacy, we must say that there would have come something, by the 
principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by the principle of 
habit there would have been a second flash

Therefore, the way I read the above is NOT that Firstness 'existed' or 'was 
real' within that 'womb of indeterminacy. As he writes, "The original chaos, 
therefore, where there was no regularity, was in effect a state of mere 
indeterminacy, in which nothing existed or really happened" 1.411.  

The three categories are fundamental principles of the world. But have nothing 
to do with the pre-Matter/Mind state-of-indeterminacy.  And Firstness cannot be 
defined as 'indeterminacy'.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Clark Goble 
  To: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Monday, October 24, 2016 7:05 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism




On Oct 24, 2016, at 4:28 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
wrote:


Edwina and I have gone back and forth on this on multiple occasions.  My 
understanding--which she will presumably correct if I am mistaken--is that she 
denies that Peirce held Firstness (possibilities, qualities) and Thirdness 
(generalities, habits) to be real apart from their instantiation with 
Secondness (actualities, facts).  In fact, her usual blanket rejoinder--as 
reflected in what you quoted--is that Peirce was an Aristotelian, and therefore 
not a Platonist.  On the other hand, I agree with Max Fisch and others that he 
was a robust three-category realist, at least after about 1896.


  I’d say it’s quite a bit earlier than that, although again I think a lot 
depends upon what we mean by the terms. That may reflect part of the 
disagreement.  (see below)




On Oct 24, 2016, at 4:58 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:



Aristotle certainly admitted that generals are real! You don't have to be a 
Platonist to accept that! That's a basic component of his metaphysics. The 
difference is that for Aristotle, they function only when embedded within the 
particular.


  Depending upon the sense of ‘function’ I’m not sure a Platonist would 
necessarily disagree. Again though there are different ways historically in 
both antiquity and the modern era that self-described Platonists conceived of 
intellectual objects. 


Again, I don't consider that Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness have 
non-embedded reality.


  I’m not quite sure what you mean by that. My sense is you’re referring to 
something like Armstrong universals. Is that about correct? Only with instead 
of matter the way Armstrong conceived of it you have what you call the triadic 
sign as being ‘matter’ as it were.


...they do not function outside of their being embedded within a triadic 
Sign. [Not within Secondness, Jon, but within a triadic Sign].And, I agree 
that Peirce was a scholastic realist - which means that generals are 'real', 
i.e., not nominalist subjective names - but- again, that doesn't to me mean 
that they have a separate nature. I see them as real and operational only as 
embedded within a TRIADIC SIGN. You can have such a triadic sign totally - in a 
mode of Firstness, after all. It's the triadic format that is vital.


  I’m not quite sure I understand. This is why I brought up the Armstrong 
parallels. 


  My question is really over the term ‘function.’ I know I’m being pedantic 
here so I apologize in advance. I’m just thinking of what you referred to 
earlier in 1.412 and especially 6.612ff. Do you see that indeterminacy in which 
firstness “occurs” as just triadic signs that are chaotic or do you see the 
firstness there as independent of triadic signs? Genuinely curious as I think 
the texts could perhaps be read both ways. (Although I’d want to reread them 
again before giving a firm opinion)





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PEIRCE-L subscribers: 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism

[Clark Goble]

> On Oct 24, 2016, at 4:28 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Edwina and I have gone back and forth on this on multiple occasions.  My 
> understanding--which she will presumably correct if I am mistaken--is that 
> she denies that Peirce held Firstness (possibilities, qualities) and 
> Thirdness (generalities, habits) to be real apart from their instantiation 
> with Secondness (actualities, facts).  In fact, her usual blanket 
> rejoinder--as reflected in what you quoted--is that Peirce was an 
> Aristotelian, and therefore not a Platonist.  On the other hand, I agree with 
> Max Fisch and others that he was a robust three-category realist, at least 
> after about 1896.

I’d say it’s quite a bit earlier than that, although again I think a lot 
depends upon what we mean by the terms. That may reflect part of the 
disagreement.  (see below)


> On Oct 24, 2016, at 4:58 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> Aristotle certainly admitted that generals are real! You don't have to be a 
> Platonist to accept that! That's a basic component of his metaphysics. The 
> difference is that for Aristotle, they function only when embedded within the 
> particular.

Depending upon the sense of ‘function’ I’m not sure a Platonist would 
necessarily disagree. Again though there are different ways historically in 
both antiquity and the modern era that self-described Platonists conceived of 
intellectual objects. 

> Again, I don't consider that Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness have 
> non-embedded reality.

I’m not quite sure what you mean by that. My sense is you’re referring to 
something like Armstrong universals. Is that about correct? Only with instead 
of matter the way Armstrong conceived of it you have what you call the triadic 
sign as being ‘matter’ as it were.

> ...they do not function outside of their being embedded within a triadic 
> Sign. [Not within Secondness, Jon, but within a triadic Sign].And, I 
> agree that Peirce was a scholastic realist - which means that generals are 
> 'real', i.e., not nominalist subjective names - but- again, that doesn't to 
> me mean that they have a separate nature. I see them as real and operational 
> only as embedded within a TRIADIC SIGN. You can have such a triadic sign 
> totally - in a mode of Firstness, after all. It's the triadic format that is 
> vital.

I’m not quite sure I understand. This is why I brought up the Armstrong 
parallels. 

My question is really over the term ‘function.’ I know I’m being pedantic here 
so I apologize in advance. I’m just thinking of what you referred to earlier in 
1.412 and especially 6.612ff. Do you see that indeterminacy in which firstness 
“occurs” as just triadic signs that are chaotic or do you see the firstness 
there as independent of triadic signs? Genuinely curious as I think the texts 
could perhaps be read both ways. (Although I’d want to reread them again before 
giving a firm opinion)

 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism

[Edwina Taborsky]

Clark, Jon, list:

Aristotle certainly admitted that generals are real! You don't have to be a 
Platonist to accept that! That's a basic component of his metaphysics. The 
difference is that for Aristotle, they function only when embedded within the 
particular.

Again, I don't consider that Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness have 
non-embedded reality. They are 'real' in that their operational natures 
[Firstness as spontaneity, freedom, quality; Secondness as discrete separation 
and Thirdness as habit, continuity of type] are not 'nominalist names'  but 
they do not function outside of their being embedded within a triadic Sign. 
[Not within Secondness, Jon, but within a triadic Sign].And, I agree that 
Peirce was a scholastic realist - which means that generals are 'real', i.e., 
not nominalist subjective names - but- again, that doesn't to me mean that they 
have a separate nature. I see them as real and operational only as embedded 
within a TRIADIC SIGN. You can have such a triadic sign totally - in a mode of 
Firstness, after all. It's the triadic format that is vital.

Edwina


  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Clark Goble 
  Cc: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Monday, October 24, 2016 6:28 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism


  Clark, List:


CG:  It seems to me Peirce is a Platonist in several senses. First he 
admits generals into his ontology as real. Thus he was on the platonic side of 
the nominalist debates of the medieval era and modern era.


  Edwina and I have gone back and forth on this on multiple occasions.  My 
understanding--which she will presumably correct if I am mistaken--is that she 
denies that Peirce held Firstness (possibilities, qualities) and Thirdness 
(generalities, habits) to be real apart from their instantiation with 
Secondness (actualities, facts).  In fact, her usual blanket rejoinder--as 
reflected in what you quoted--is that Peirce was an Aristotelian, and therefore 
not a Platonist.  On the other hand, I agree with Max Fisch and others that he 
was a robust three-category realist, at least after about 1896.


  Regards,


  Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
  Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
  www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt


  On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 4:53 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:

I’ve changed the subject line to better reflect the theme.
  On Oct 24, 2016, at 12:59 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
wrote:
  On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 1:12 PM, Edwina Taborsky  
wrote:
  As for Peirce's Platonism -[ which is not the same as neo-Platonism], I 
find Peirce a thorough Aristotelian - and the debate, for example, by Aristotle 
vs Platonism [in many areas, including in physics, metaphysics, politics] 
...seems to find support in Peirce's views on, for example,  matter and mind; 
causality; so, I don't find arguments defining him as 'Platonist' very 
convincing.
I confess I always saw neoPlatonism as Platonism that took seriously and 
embraced many ideas of Aristotle and the Stoics. To such an extent that 
particularly Aristotle transformed Plato. Of course if you asked the main 
neoPlatonists like Plotinus, Proclus, Iamblicus and so forth what they were 
they’d just say Platonists. But then I think that’s more due to the oversized 
role dogma played in that era’s platonism. Even if you differed from Plato you 
said you were merely giving Plato’s ideas. In any case to me neoPlatonism is a 
subset of Platonism.


As to Peirce being a Platonist it always helps to ask what we mean by that. 
After all some call mathematicians who admit to numbers being real as 
Platonists. It’s such a loosely used term that it misleads often as much as it 
informs.


It seems to me Peirce is a Platonist in several senses. First he admits 
generals into his ontology as real. Thus he was on the platonic side of the 
nominalist debates of the medieval era and modern era. I think that was 
important even if it’s less of an issue in these post-Quine days where we 
quantify regularly over abstract entities. Second, his cosmology relating 
nothing to the categories or universes seems very similar to neoPlatonic 
emmanation theories. Third his notion of abduction is very similar to ideas in 
late Platonism such as by Proclus. That is rather than mystical in a 
stereotypical sense it’s provoking philosophical reflection. 


I rather like Smyth’s arguments in Reading Peirce Reading where he notes 
several neoplatonic parallels. 


  If a commitment to generic or "garden-variety" Platonism is 
understandable enough among mathematicians and mathematically inclined 
logicians, it remains unclear how that position differs from Neoplatonism and 
why Peirce should be attracted to Neoplatonic elements in the Romantic 
tradition. I propose to explore this subject by discussing nine conjectures 
that will 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Clark, List:

CG:  It seems to me Peirce is a Platonist in several senses. First he
admits generals into his ontology as real. Thus he was on the platonic side
of the nominalist debates of the medieval era and modern era.


Edwina and I have gone back and forth on this on multiple occasions.  My
understanding--which she will presumably correct if I am mistaken--is that
she denies that Peirce held Firstness (possibilities, qualities) and
Thirdness (generalities, habits) to be real apart from their instantiation
with Secondness (actualities, facts).  In fact, her usual blanket
rejoinder--as reflected in what you quoted--is that Peirce was an
Aristotelian, and therefore not a Platonist.  On the other hand, I agree
with Max Fisch and others that he was a robust three-category realist, at
least after about 1896.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 4:53 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:

> I’ve changed the subject line to better reflect the theme.
>
> On Oct 24, 2016, at 12:59 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 1:12 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
> As for Peirce's Platonism -[ which is not the same as neo-Platonism], I
> find Peirce a thorough Aristotelian - and the debate, for example, by
> Aristotle vs Platonism [in many areas, including in physics, metaphysics,
> politics] ...seems to find support in Peirce's views on, for example,
>  matter and mind; causality; so, I don't find arguments defining him as
> 'Platonist' very convincing.
>
> I confess I always saw neoPlatonism as Platonism that took seriously and
> embraced many ideas of Aristotle and the Stoics. To such an extent that
> particularly Aristotle transformed Plato. Of course if you asked the main
> neoPlatonists like Plotinus, Proclus, Iamblicus and so forth what they were
> they’d just say Platonists. But then I think that’s more due to the
> oversized role dogma played in that era’s platonism. Even if you differed
> from Plato you said you were merely giving Plato’s ideas. In any case to me
> neoPlatonism is a subset of Platonism.
>
> As to Peirce being a Platonist it always helps to ask what we mean by
> that. After all some call mathematicians who admit to numbers being real as
> Platonists. It’s such a loosely used term that it misleads often as much as
> it informs.
>
> It seems to me Peirce is a Platonist in several senses. First he admits
> generals into his ontology as real. Thus he was on the platonic side of the
> nominalist debates of the medieval era and modern era. I think that was
> important even if it’s less of an issue in these post-Quine days where we
> quantify regularly over abstract entities. Second, his cosmology relating
> nothing to the categories or universes seems very similar to neoPlatonic
> emmanation theories. Third his notion of abduction is very similar to ideas
> in late Platonism such as by Proclus. That is rather than mystical in a
> stereotypical sense it’s provoking philosophical reflection.
>
> I rather like Smyth’s arguments in *Reading Peirce Reading* where he
> notes several neoplatonic parallels.
>
> If a commitment to generic or "garden-variety" Platonism is understandable
> enough among mathematicians and mathematically inclined logicians, it
> remains unclear how that position differs from Neoplatonism and why Peirce
> should be attracted to Neoplatonic elements in the Romantic tradition. I
> propose to explore this subject by discussing nine conjectures that will
> subsequently be seen to have a bearing on his argument in "Faculties." The
> nine are grouped in three sets, each of which deals with an aspect of our
> scientific knowledge. The first set concerns the ontology of knowledg
> itself; the second concerns the subjects of knowledge-the 'I' or the 'v of
> 'I know' or 'we know' (when these expressions are used in the conte of
> scientific inquiry); and the third set of leading ideas concerns the
> objects of scientific knowledge. I hope it will become clear in connection
> with the first set why it is important to distinguish generic Platonic
> Neoplatonism.  (57)
>
> I’d posted that list before. It’s worth considering.
>
> None of this is to simply reduce Peirce to Plotinus or Proclus. Far from
> it. But it is to acknowledge certain commonalities in their thought.
>
> On Oct 24, 2016, at 12:59 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> This actually sounds more like my position than Edwina's.  I have argued
> that Peirce's later cosmological/cosmogonic writings do not *contradict *his
> earlier ones; rather, they *clarify *some details that he had previously
> left vague.  By contrast, Edwina seems to *reject *the later
> writings--especially "A Neglected Argument," which she admits she cannot
> explain and does not even attempt to 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Clark, List:

CG:  I do hope you’ll comment on the Kantian point I raised. I’m curious as
to your thoughts there.


Are you referring to your last post in the thread on Peirce's Logical
Universes and Categories?  I am not very well-versed on Kant, so
unfortunately I am not equipped to respond to that particular point.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 4:53 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:
>
> On Oct 24, 2016, at 10:55 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> At this point, it seems appropriate to shift this conversation to the
> spin-off thread that I started last week based on Ben Novak's post and the
> ones to which he was responding, which I have reproduced below.  As we have
> previously discussed under the heading of Peirce's Cosmology, he explicitly
> referred to multiple "Platonic worlds" as one of the stages preceding the
> emergence of this actual universe of existence.  I have suggested that the
> former correspond to the coalescing chalk marks on the blackboard, which
> then serve as a whiteboard for the "discontinuous mark" that represents the
> latter.
>
> I’ll hold off saying more until I can read some more of the comments from
> last week.
>
> I do hope you’ll comment on the Kantian point I raised. I’m curious as to
> your thoughts there.
>

-
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Clark Goble]

> On Oct 24, 2016, at 10:55 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> At this point, it seems appropriate to shift this conversation to the 
> spin-off thread that I started last week based on Ben Novak's post and the 
> ones to which he was responding, which I have reproduced below.  As we have 
> previously discussed under the heading of Peirce's Cosmology, he explicitly 
> referred to multiple "Platonic worlds" as one of the stages preceding the 
> emergence of this actual universe of existence.  I have suggested that the 
> former correspond to the coalescing chalk marks on the blackboard, which then 
> serve as a whiteboard for the "discontinuous mark" that represents the latter.

I’ll hold off saying more until I can read some more of the comments from last 
week.

I do hope you’ll comment on the Kantian point I raised. I’m curious as to your 
thoughts there.
-
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to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
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http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism

[Clark Goble]

I’ve changed the subject line to better reflect the theme.

> On Oct 24, 2016, at 12:59 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 1:12 PM, Edwina Taborsky  > wrote:
> 
> As for Peirce's Platonism -[ which is not the same as neo-Platonism], I find 
> Peirce a thorough Aristotelian - and the debate, for example, by Aristotle vs 
> Platonism [in many areas, including in physics, metaphysics, politics] 
> ...seems to find support in Peirce's views on, for example,  matter and mind; 
> causality; so, I don't find arguments defining him as 'Platonist' very 
> convincing.

I confess I always saw neoPlatonism as Platonism that took seriously and 
embraced many ideas of Aristotle and the Stoics. To such an extent that 
particularly Aristotle transformed Plato. Of course if you asked the main 
neoPlatonists like Plotinus, Proclus, Iamblicus and so forth what they were 
they’d just say Platonists. But then I think that’s more due to the oversized 
role dogma played in that era’s platonism. Even if you differed from Plato you 
said you were merely giving Plato’s ideas. In any case to me neoPlatonism is a 
subset of Platonism.

As to Peirce being a Platonist it always helps to ask what we mean by that. 
After all some call mathematicians who admit to numbers being real as 
Platonists. It’s such a loosely used term that it misleads often as much as it 
informs.

It seems to me Peirce is a Platonist in several senses. First he admits 
generals into his ontology as real. Thus he was on the platonic side of the 
nominalist debates of the medieval era and modern era. I think that was 
important even if it’s less of an issue in these post-Quine days where we 
quantify regularly over abstract entities. Second, his cosmology relating 
nothing to the categories or universes seems very similar to neoPlatonic 
emmanation theories. Third his notion of abduction is very similar to ideas in 
late Platonism such as by Proclus. That is rather than mystical in a 
stereotypical sense it’s provoking philosophical reflection. 

I rather like Smyth’s arguments in Reading Peirce Reading where he notes 
several neoplatonic parallels. 

If a commitment to generic or "garden-variety" Platonism is understandable 
enough among mathematicians and mathematically inclined logicians, it remains 
unclear how that position differs from Neoplatonism and why Peirce should be 
attracted to Neoplatonic elements in the Romantic tradition. I propose to 
explore this subject by discussing nine conjectures that will subsequently be 
seen to have a bearing on his argument in "Faculties." The nine are grouped in 
three sets, each of which deals with an aspect of our scientific knowledge. The 
first set concerns the ontology of knowledg itself; the second concerns the 
subjects of knowledge-the 'I' or the 'v of 'I know' or 'we know' (when these 
expressions are used in the conte of scientific inquiry); and the third set of 
leading ideas concerns the objects of scientific knowledge. I hope it will 
become clear in connection with the first set why it is important to 
distinguish generic Platonic Neoplatonism.  (57) 

I’d posted that list before. It’s worth considering.

None of this is to simply reduce Peirce to Plotinus or Proclus. Far from it. 
But it is to acknowledge certain commonalities in their thought.

> On Oct 24, 2016, at 12:59 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> This actually sounds more like my position than Edwina's.  I have argued that 
> Peirce's later cosmological/cosmogonic writings do not contradict his earlier 
> ones; rather, they clarify some details that he had previously left vague.  
> By contrast, Edwina seems to reject the later writings--especially "A 
> Neglected Argument," which she admits she cannot explain and does not even 
> attempt to explain--as incompatible with the earlier ones, which she favors.  
> She also seems to bristle at any suggestion that Peirce was a (neo-)Platonist 
> in any sense whatsoever.  Of course, these are my impressions of her 
> positions, and I hope that they are accurate; if not, I would welcome her 
> correction/clarification.

I confess I missed a week of the list when it was particularly active. I mean 
to go back and read those posts. So forgive me if I assign things incorrectly.

As I’ve said I’m not sure what ultimately to make of the NA either beyond it 
being an excellent way to understand abduction.

I do think Peirce is very nePlatonic in certain ways though. Again Kelly Parker 
and Richard Smyth are worth reading here. For a while Smyths book was available 
for free as a PDF but it appears that now it’s only for sale as hardcover or 
paperback — I have the paperback version along with the PDF if people need 
excerpts.
-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jon- I'm not going to get into 'practical effects' of the two actions 
Rejection of a theory is an active, conscious, analytic choice. 'No comment' is 
none of these.

As for an assumption that 'something written later is a more accurate 
representation' - that's subjective and I won't get into that. After all, one 
could write something tomorrow that rejected the argument just written today! 

You didn't give up the 'universe' theory that easily; you wrote on it for 
several weeks, and if the term 'adamant' bothers you..well...

Edwina


  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Monday, October 24, 2016 4:27 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories


  Edwina, List:


ET:  Jon- surely you know the difference between the active [a rejection of 
a theory] and the passive [no comment].


  In this case, what practical effects are different between "rejection" and 
"no comment," besides the words that we use for them?


ET:  And I didn't differentiate the two into 'early' and 'late, as you do, 
with you also suggesting that the 'late' is 'a more accurate representation of 
Peirce's views.


  Which would be a more accurate representation of your views--what you wrote 
20 years ago, or what you wrote this morning?


ET:  I don't see that the NA is a development nor a 'final or near-final 
view; nor do I see that it clarifies or that 1.412 is vague.


  Peirce wrote CP 1.412 in 1887-1888, and "A Neglected Argument" in 1908.  So 
far, I have not found any discussion of cosmology/comogony in his writings from 
the five years subsequent to the latter and prior to his death.  Unless and 
until something else turns up from that time frame, I think that there is 
considerable warrant for characterizing CP 6.490 as his final or near-final 
view.


ET:  Yes, you eventually abandoned the hypothesis.


  If I was really so "adamant" about it, would I have given it up so quickly 
and easily?  One counterexample was all it took.  I brought it up a lot lately 
because I was seeking either confirmation or disconfirmation from the List 
community, and I ultimately (and happily) received the latter.  With that 
question resolved, I am now seeking input from the List community on whether 
and how we should distinguish Universes vs. Categories, since Peirce refers to 
the former and not the latter in certain late writings--including, of course, 
"A Neglected Argument."


  Regards,


  Jon


  On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 2:53 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

1) Jon- surely you know the difference between the active [a rejection of a 
theory] and the passive [no comment]. And I didn't differentiate the two into 
'early' and 'late, as you do, with you also suggesting that the 'late' is 'a 
more accurate representation of Peirce's views.

You wrote: " his thought (obviously) continued to develop in the years that 
followed. In particular, I suggested that CP 6.490 reflects his final (or 
near-final) views on the origin of the universe, and clarifies some aspects 
that he left vague in CP 1.412."

I don't see that the NA is a development nor a 'final or near-final view; 
nor do I see that it clarifies or that 1.412 is vague. 

2) As for my view that you were 'adamantly' in favour of rejecting the 
category theory, which you described as 'early Peirce' in favour of the later 
'three universes - that is certainly my view - perhaps because of the number of 
posts you made on this topic over several weeks. Yes, you eventually abandoned 
the hypothesis. 

Edwina 
  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: Clark Goble ; Peirce-L 
  Sent: Monday, October 24, 2016 2:59 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories


  Edwina, List: 


ET:  No- you aren't accurate but I don't see that I should have to  
defend myself; if you have inaccurate views of my views - then, I am hardly 
going to fight you about your views of me!


  My apologies, I did not intend to misrepresent you; but how is having "no 
comment" on "A Neglected Argument" any different (in the pragmaticist sense) 
from rejecting it?  You just reiterated that you "don't find that it fits in 
with the emergence-evolution arguments found elsewhere in Peirce"; how is this 
at odds with my statement that you find it incompatible with his earlier 
cosmological/cosmogonic writings, which you favor?


ET:  BUT - you adamantly told us that Peirce effectively abandoned his 
use of the Categories, which you defined as 'early' and instead, moved on to 
consider the Three Universes.


  I believe that a fair review of the List archives would show that I was 
never "adamant" about this, but rather consistently characterized it as merely 
an "impression," or at most a "hypothesis"; and in any case, I immediately 
changed my mind and 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET:  I'm not going to get into 'practical effects' of the two actions.


If you cannot identify different practical effects of the two concepts,
then according to Peirce, they are identical.

ET:  After all, one could write something tomorrow that rejected the
argument just written today!


Right--and my point is that if one were to pass away the day after
tomorrow, without saying anything more about the matter, then others would
have considerable warrant for taking the *rejection* to be one's final view
on it, rather than the previously articulated position.

ET:  You didn't give up the 'universe' theory that easily; you wrote on it
for several weeks ...


I kept writing about it because no one had refuted it yet.  As soon as
someone did so, I gave it up immediately.  The only thing that bothers me
about "adamant" is that it is clearly not an accurate description of my
stance in this particular case.  Of course, I have been (and remain) quite
adamant about some *other *things.

Regards,

Jon

On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 3:41 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon- I'm not going to get into 'practical effects' of the two actions
> Rejection of a theory is an active, conscious, analytic choice. 'No
> comment' is none of these.
>
> As for an assumption that 'something written later is a more accurate
> representation' - that's subjective and I won't get into that. After all,
> one could write something tomorrow that rejected the argument just written
> today!
>
> You didn't give up the 'universe' theory that easily; you wrote on it for
> several weeks, and if the term 'adamant' bothers you..well...
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *To:* Edwina Taborsky 
> *Cc:* Peirce-L 
> *Sent:* Monday, October 24, 2016 4:27 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> ET:  Jon- surely you know the difference between the active [a rejection
> of a theory] and the passive [no comment].
>
>
> In this case, what *practical *effects are different between "rejection"
> and "no comment," besides the words that we use for them?
>
> ET:  And I didn't differentiate the two into 'early' and 'late, as you do,
> with you also suggesting that the 'late' is 'a more accurate representation
> of Peirce's views.
>
>
> Which would be a more accurate representation of *your *views--what you
> wrote 20 years ago, or what you wrote this morning?
>
> ET:  I don't see that the NA is a development nor a 'final or near-final
> view; nor do I see that it clarifies or that 1.412 is vague.
>
>
> Peirce wrote CP 1.412 in 1887-1888, and "A Neglected Argument" in 1908.
> So far, I have not found any discussion of cosmology/comogony in his
> writings from the five years subsequent to the latter and prior to his
> death.  Unless and until something else turns up from that time frame, I
> think that there is considerable warrant for characterizing CP 6.490 as his
> final or near-final view.
>
> ET:  Yes, you eventually abandoned the hypothesis.
>
>
> If I was really so "adamant" about it, would I have given it up so quickly
> and easily?  One counterexample was all it took.  I brought it up a lot
> lately because I was seeking either confirmation or disconfirmation from
> the List community, and I ultimately (and happily) received the latter.
> With that question resolved, I am now seeking input from the List community
> on whether and how we should distinguish Universes vs. Categories, since
> Peirce refers to the former and not the latter in certain late
> writings--including, of course, "A Neglected Argument."
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 2:53 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> 1) Jon- surely you know the difference between the active [a rejection of
>> a theory] and the passive [no comment]. And I didn't differentiate the two
>> into 'early' and 'late, as you do, with you also suggesting that the 'late'
>> is 'a more accurate representation of Peirce's views.
>>
>> You wrote: " his thought (obviously) continued to *develop *in the years
>> that followed. In particular, I suggested that CP 6.490 reflects his final
>> (or near-final) views on the origin of the universe, and clarifies some
>> aspects that he left vague in CP 1.412."
>>
>> I don't see that the NA is a *development* nor a '*final or near-final*
>> view; nor do I see that it *clarifies* or that 1.412 is vague.
>>
>> 2) As for my view that you were 'adamantly' in favour of rejecting the
>> category theory, which you described as 'early Peirce' in favour of the
>> later 'three universes - that is certainly my view - perhaps because of
>> the number of posts you made on this topic over several weeks. Yes, you
>> eventually abandoned the hypothesis.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> - Original Message -
>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
>> *To:* Edwina 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Edwina Taborsky]

1) Jon- surely you know the difference between the active [a rejection of a 
theory] and the passive [no comment]. And I didn't differentiate the two into 
'early' and 'late, as you do, with you also suggesting that the 'late' is 'a 
more accurate representation of Peirce's views.

You wrote: " his thought (obviously) continued to develop in the years that 
followed. In particular, I suggested that CP 6.490 reflects his final (or 
near-final) views on the origin of the universe, and clarifies some aspects 
that he left vague in CP 1.412."

I don't see that the NA is a development nor a 'final or near-final view; nor 
do I see that it clarifies or that 1.412 is vague. 

2) As for my view that you were 'adamantly' in favour of rejecting the category 
theory, which you described as 'early Peirce' in favour of the later 'three 
universes - that is certainly my view - perhaps because of the number of posts 
you made on this topic over several weeks. Yes, you eventually abandoned the 
hypothesis. 

Edwina




  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: Clark Goble ; Peirce-L 
  Sent: Monday, October 24, 2016 2:59 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories


  Edwina, List:


ET:  No- you aren't accurate but I don't see that I should have to  defend 
myself; if you have inaccurate views of my views - then, I am hardly going to 
fight you about your views of me!


  My apologies, I did not intend to misrepresent you; but how is having "no 
comment" on "A Neglected Argument" any different (in the pragmaticist sense) 
from rejecting it?  You just reiterated that you "don't find that it fits in 
with the emergence-evolution arguments found elsewhere in Peirce"; how is this 
at odds with my statement that you find it incompatible with his earlier 
cosmological/cosmogonic writings, which you favor?


ET:  BUT - you adamantly told us that Peirce effectively abandoned his use 
of the Categories, which you defined as 'early' and instead, moved on to 
consider the Three Universes.


  I believe that a fair review of the List archives would show that I was never 
"adamant" about this, but rather consistently characterized it as merely an 
"impression," or at most a "hypothesis"; and in any case, I immediately changed 
my mind and disavowed it when Gary R. reminded me that Peirce discussed the 
Categories at some length in at least one of his 1907 drafts on "Pragmatism."  
In other words, I have come to agree with you "that Peirce never abandoned the 
Categories"; however, I still see the discussion of "Universes" rather than 
"Categories" in both "A Neglected Argument" and the December 1908 draft letter 
to Lady Welby as calling for an explanation.  If they are not two subtly 
different expressions of the same thing, perhaps in the sense that the three 
Universes are the phaneroscopic and/or metaphysical manifestations of the three 
(logical?) Categories, then what exactly is the distinction between the two 
terms?


  Regards,


  Jon


  On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 1:12 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

Jon, list
No- you aren't accurate but I don't see that I should have to  defend 
myself; if you have inaccurate views of my views - then, I am hardly going to 
fight you about your views of me!

BUT - you adamantly told us that Peirce effectively abandoned his use of 
the Categories, which you defined as 'early' and instead, moved on to consider 
the Three Universes. That was my argument with you - that you rejected his 
Categories as 'early Peirce' while the 'mature Peirce' discusssed only the 
Three Universes. I maintained that Peirce never abandoned the Categories and 
indeed, don't find them comparable in any way with the Three Universes.

As far as the emergence of the universe, I tend to support his 1.412 
outline, which is a physico-chemical-biological outline, along with his outline 
of evolution and adaptation [tychasm, agapasm] - none of which make any 
reference to a non-immanent a priori Creator/God - as outlined in the NA.  I 
didn't find your attempt to correlate 1.412 with the NA a convincing argument.

Therefore - I said, and repeat, that I have no comment on the NA, since I 
don't find that it fits in with the emergence-evolution arguments found 
elsewhere in Peirce.

As for Peirce's Platonism -[ which is not the same as neo-Platonism], I 
find Peirce a thorough Aristotelian - and the debate, for example, by Aristotle 
vs Platonism [in many areas, including in physics, metaphysics, politics] 
...seems to find support in Peirce's views on, for example,  matter and mind; 
causality; so, I don't find arguments defining him as 'Platonist' very 
convincing.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Clark Goble 
  Cc: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Monday, October 24, 2016 1:47 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories


  

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jerry Rhee]

Auke:



I was referring to the question of whether if firstness is first, then what
is it for a firstness to be first for a community when that community is
comprised of both experts and novices?  Is it to know things as they first
come to us or to know things by nature?  If by nature, then what is by
nature from an expert’s point of view or is that necessarily the same as by
nature?  I don't believe that is clear.



With respect to: “respect in which *it is less* (not connecting both
divisions of interpretants, what prevented him given that all ingredients
are there) are of more interest than an assessment in general terms like
more or less.”



Yes, I agree he succeeded there, too.

That is, I believe you believe that he did not succeed in producing a
solution that treats of connecting both divisions.  That is to which I
disagree.  Instead, I believe it is not Peirce who failed but we, who
failed.



Best,
Jerry R

On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 11:46 AM, Auke van Breemen 
wrote:

> Dear Kirsti,
>
> Thank  you for your kind reply and especially for your historical remarks
> and your remarks on feeling. I did not read Tetens, but I recognize the
> point you are making with it. Fitzgerald for instance only takes the
> 'feeling of recognition' when he discusses the emotional interpretant. Not
> 'feeling' as a technical term dealt with by Peirce:
>
> By a feeling, I mean an instance of that kind of consciousness which
> involves no analysis, comparison or any process whatsoever, nor consists
> in whole or in part of any act by which one stretch of consciousness
> is distinguished from another, which has its own positive quality
> which consists in nothing else, and which is of itself all that it is,
> however it may have been brought about; so that if this feeling is
> present during a lapse of time, it is wholly and equally present at
> every moment of that time. To reduce this description to a simple
> definition, I will say that by a feeling I mean an instance of that sort
> of element of consciousness which is all that it is positively, in itself,
> regardless of anything else. CP 1.306.
>
> and again:
> Among phanerons there are certain qualities of feeling, such as the
> color of magenta, the odor of attar, the sound of a railway whistle,
> the taste of quinine, the quality of the emotion upon contemplating
> a mathematical demonstration, the quality of feeling of love,
> etc. I do not mean the sense of actually experiencing these feelings,
> whether primarily or in any memory or imagination. That is something
> that involves these qualities as an element of it. But I mean
> the qualities themselves which, in themselves, are mere may-bes, not
> necessarily realized. CP 1.304
> --
>
> As you said:
> But: Feelings do not classify themselves. They do not appear with name tag.
>
> And, so I would add after Peirce: once gone they are gone forever. In
> Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed For Man (if I remember
> correctly 1867, plus or minus 1) Peirce writes about the unintellectual,
> etc that runs in a continuous stream through our lives. Feeling
> (phenomenology), qualisign (sign aspects), emotional interpretant
> (interpretant aspect of the process of interpretation that leads to a
> response), designate the same phenomenon from three perspectives, in my
> opinion.
>
> I did not use the combination primordial chaos, but primordial soup. It is
> a term coined by Sarbo. The avoidance of chaos is on purpose. As you justly
> argued with your embryo example, it definitely is not chaos. For two
> reasons, lousily formulted:
> 1. from an analytical point of view
>  In our opinion already in the qualisign position everything is present,
> but as long as we don't evolve what is involved in the primordial soup or
> collection of qualia, it only indistinctly is present, without its nametag
> and, also important, without the habits that are associated with this input
> in habitual interpretation, which is the rule. It is very hard
> phaneroscopic work to get at this basic 'material' of any interpretation.
> We have to get rid of, only to name the proximate interpretation moments,
> name (sinsign, legisign) and form (icon) that are inherent in the
> primordial soup.
>
> 2. from the unfolding reality point of view
> The world we interpret is infused with reason, if we interpret we
> interpret an over all orderly reality, not chaos.
>
> Here https://storyconnect.nl/glossary/knowledge-in-formation/?lang=en, (
> even the image-author connections suggested for the three images, are mixed
> up) might reside the reason for your reading 'primordial chaos'. I assure
> you that the only relation between my work and these images that can be
> established can be expressed thus; I make a painting,  somebody cut parts
> out of it, replaces them with other stuff or displaces them and
> subsequently pretends that it is a joint work.
>
> I found one place in Peirce where he placed himself in a
> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET:  No- you aren't accurate but I don't see that I should have to  defend
myself; if you have inaccurate views of my views - then, I am hardly going
to fight you about your views of me!


My apologies, I did not intend to misrepresent you; but how is having "no
comment" on "A Neglected Argument" any different (in the pragmaticist
sense) from rejecting it?  You just reiterated that you "don't find that it
fits in with the emergence-evolution arguments found elsewhere in Peirce";
how is this at odds with my statement that you find it incompatible with
his earlier cosmological/cosmogonic writings, which you favor?

ET:  BUT - you adamantly told us that Peirce effectively abandoned his use
of the Categories, which you defined as 'early' and instead, moved on to
consider the Three Universes.


I believe that a fair review of the List archives would show that I was
never "adamant" about this, but rather consistently characterized it as
merely an "impression," or at most a "hypothesis"; and in any case, I
immediately changed my mind and disavowed it when Gary R. reminded me that
Peirce discussed the Categories at some length in at least one of his 1907
drafts on "Pragmatism."  In other words, I have come to agree with you
"that Peirce never abandoned the Categories"; however, I still see the
discussion of "Universes" rather than "Categories" in both "A Neglected
Argument" and the December 1908 draft letter to Lady Welby as calling for
an explanation.  If they are not two subtly different expressions of the
same thing, perhaps in the sense that the three Universes are the
phaneroscopic and/or metaphysical manifestations of the three (logical?)
Categories, then what exactly is the distinction between the two terms?

Regards,

Jon

On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 1:12 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon, list
> No- you aren't accurate but I don't see that I should have to  defend
> myself; if you have inaccurate views of my views - then, I am hardly going
> to fight you about your views of me!
>
> BUT - you adamantly told us that Peirce effectively abandoned his use of
> the Categories, which you defined as 'early' and instead, moved on to
> consider the Three Universes. That was my argument with you - that you
> rejected his Categories as 'early Peirce' while the 'mature Peirce'
> discusssed only the Three Universes. I maintained that Peirce never
> abandoned the Categories and indeed, don't find them comparable in any way
> with the Three Universes.
>
> As far as the emergence of the universe, I tend to support his 1.412
> outline, which is a physico-chemical-biological outline, along with his
> outline of evolution and adaptation [tychasm, agapasm] - none of which make
> any reference to a non-immanent a priori Creator/God - as outlined in the
> NA.  I didn't find your attempt to correlate 1.412 with the NA a convincing
> argument.
>
> Therefore - I said, and repeat, that I have *no comment* on the NA, since
> I don't find that it fits in with the emergence-evolution arguments found
> elsewhere in Peirce.
>
> As for Peirce's Platonism -[ which is not the same as neo-Platonism], I
> find Peirce a thorough Aristotelian - and the debate, for example, by
> Aristotle vs Platonism [in many areas, including in physics, metaphysics,
> politics] ...seems to find support in Peirce's views on, for example,
>  matter and mind; causality; so, I don't find arguments defining him as
> 'Platonist' very convincing.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *To:* Clark Goble 
> *Cc:* Peirce-L 
> *Sent:* Monday, October 24, 2016 1:47 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories
>
> Clark, List:
>
> ET:  I tend to agree with you here Edwina. I don’t quite see big
> contradictions between his later more Hegelian work with the more
> neoplatonic work of the late 1880’s. Evolution yes. But I don’t see him
> moving away from the earlier positions.
>
>
> This actually sounds more like my position than Edwina's.  I have argued
> that Peirce's later cosmological/cosmogonic writings do not *contradict *his
> earlier ones; rather, they *clarify *some details that he had previously
> left vague.  By contrast, Edwina seems to *reject *the later
> writings--especially "A Neglected Argument," which she admits she cannot
> explain and does not even attempt to explain--as incompatible with the
> earlier ones, which she favors.  She also seems to bristle at *any *suggestion
> that Peirce was a (neo-)Platonist in *any *sense whatsoever.  Of course,
> these are my impressions of her positions, and I hope that they are
> accurate; if not, I would welcome her correction/clarification.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jon, list
No- you aren't accurate but I don't see that I should have to  defend myself; 
if you have inaccurate views of my views - then, I am hardly going to fight you 
about your views of me!

BUT - you adamantly told us that Peirce effectively abandoned his use of the 
Categories, which you defined as 'early' and instead, moved on to consider the 
Three Universes. That was my argument with you - that you rejected his 
Categories as 'early Peirce' while the 'mature Peirce' discusssed only the 
Three Universes. I maintained that Peirce never abandoned the Categories and 
indeed, don't find them comparable in any way with the Three Universes.

As far as the emergence of the universe, I tend to support his 1.412 outline, 
which is a physico-chemical-biological outline, along with his outline of 
evolution and adaptation [tychasm, agapasm] - none of which make any reference 
to a non-immanent a priori Creator/God - as outlined in the NA.  I didn't find 
your attempt to correlate 1.412 with the NA a convincing argument.

Therefore - I said, and repeat, that I have no comment on the NA, since I don't 
find that it fits in with the emergence-evolution arguments found elsewhere in 
Peirce.

As for Peirce's Platonism -[ which is not the same as neo-Platonism], I find 
Peirce a thorough Aristotelian - and the debate, for example, by Aristotle vs 
Platonism [in many areas, including in physics, metaphysics, politics] ...seems 
to find support in Peirce's views on, for example,  matter and mind; causality; 
so, I don't find arguments defining him as 'Platonist' very convincing.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Clark Goble 
  Cc: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Monday, October 24, 2016 1:47 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories


  Clark, List:


ET:  I tend to agree with you here Edwina. I don’t quite see big 
contradictions between his later more Hegelian work with the more neoplatonic 
work of the late 1880’s. Evolution yes. But I don’t see him moving away from 
the earlier positions.


  This actually sounds more like my position than Edwina's.  I have argued that 
Peirce's later cosmological/cosmogonic writings do not contradict his earlier 
ones; rather, they clarify some details that he had previously left vague.  By 
contrast, Edwina seems to reject the later writings--especially "A Neglected 
Argument," which she admits she cannot explain and does not even attempt to 
explain--as incompatible with the earlier ones, which she favors.  She also 
seems to bristle at any suggestion that Peirce was a (neo-)Platonist in any 
sense whatsoever.  Of course, these are my impressions of her positions, and I 
hope that they are accurate; if not, I would welcome her 
correction/clarification.


  Regards,


  Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
  Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
  www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt


  On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 10:04 AM, Clark Goble  wrote:

  On Oct 22, 2016, at 2:52 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:


  The problem is, Gary, that you and Jon are both theists and both of you 
reject the 'Big Bang'. I am an atheist and support the 'Big Bang'. Therefore, 
both sides in this debate select sections from Peirce to which we feel 
compatible. Yet - as I keep saying, both views are empirically outside of any 
possibility of proof or TRUTH. You either believe in one OR the other [or some 
other theory].
I confess I don’t understand this disagreement, especially if it is coming 
in with our priors regarding theology. It seems to me the big bang is largely 
orthogonal to such questions. For one, most physics doesn’t see the big bang as 
the beginning of everything. The inflationary models at this point are quite 
old and widely accepted. String theory has its branes which float in higher 
dimensional space. Loop quantum gravity has bubble universes more akin to the 
original inflationary models. And some theorists reject them all and say all we 
have empirical evidence for is this universe.


i.e. it would seem both options are pretty open to atheists and theists of 
various stripes
  You try to substantiate that Peirce followed the same view as yours by 
defining his 'earlier work' as something that he moved away from and rejected. 
I don't see any evidence of this. I admit that I can't explain the NA - and I 
don't even attempt to do so - but - I don't find any evidence of Peirce 
rejecting the 1.412 argument - and other arguments about the self-organization 
and evolution of the universe [tychasm, agapasm].
I tend to agree with you here Edwina. I don’t quite see big contradictions 
between his later more Hegelian work with the more neoplatonic work of the late 
1880’s. Evolution yes. But I don’t see him moving away from the earlier 
positions.


But I suspect part of this is how to interpret those earlier passages 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Clark, List:

ET:  I tend to agree with you here Edwina. I don’t quite see big
contradictions between his later more Hegelian work with the more
neoplatonic work of the late 1880’s. Evolution yes. But I don’t see him
moving away from the earlier positions.


This actually sounds more like my position than Edwina's.  I have argued
that Peirce's later cosmological/cosmogonic writings do not *contradict *his
earlier ones; rather, they *clarify *some details that he had previously
left vague.  By contrast, Edwina seems to *reject *the later
writings--especially "A Neglected Argument," which she admits she cannot
explain and does not even attempt to explain--as incompatible with the
earlier ones, which she favors.  She also seems to bristle at *any *suggestion
that Peirce was a (neo-)Platonist in *any *sense whatsoever.  Of course,
these are my impressions of her positions, and I hope that they are
accurate; if not, I would welcome her correction/clarification.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 10:04 AM, Clark Goble  wrote:

> On Oct 22, 2016, at 2:52 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
>
> The problem is, Gary, that you and Jon are both theists and both of you
> reject the 'Big Bang'. I am an atheist and support the 'Big Bang'.
> Therefore, both sides in this debate select sections from Peirce to which
> we feel compatible. Yet - as I keep saying, both views are empirically
> outside of any possibility of proof or TRUTH. You either believe in one OR
> the other [or some other theory].
>
> I confess I don’t understand this disagreement, especially if it is coming
> in with our priors regarding theology. It seems to me the big bang is
> largely orthogonal to such questions. For one, most physics doesn’t see the
> big bang as the beginning of everything. The inflationary models at this
> point are quite old and widely accepted. String theory has its branes which
> float in higher dimensional space. Loop quantum gravity has bubble
> universes more akin to the original inflationary models. And some theorists
> reject them all and say all we have empirical evidence for is this universe.
>
> i.e. it would seem both options are pretty open to atheists and theists of
> various stripes
>
> You try to substantiate that Peirce followed the same view as yours by
> defining his 'earlier work' as something that he moved away from and
> rejected. I don't see any evidence of this. I admit that I can't explain
> the NA - and I don't even attempt to do so - but - I don't find any
> evidence of Peirce rejecting the 1.412 argument - and other arguments about
> the self-organization and evolution of the universe [tychasm, agapasm].
>
> I tend to agree with you here Edwina. I don’t quite see big contradictions
> between his later more Hegelian work with the more neoplatonic work of the
> late 1880’s. Evolution yes. But I don’t see him moving away from the
> earlier positions.
>
> But I suspect part of this is how to interpret those earlier passages in
> 1.412. I’m largely convinced by Parker here. (Regarding Peirce anyway - I’m
> not sure I buy the ontology itself)
>

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PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Clark Goble]

> On Oct 22, 2016, at 2:52 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> The problem is, Gary, that you and Jon are both theists and both of you 
> reject the 'Big Bang'. I am an atheist and support the 'Big Bang'. Therefore, 
> both sides in this debate select sections from Peirce to which we feel 
> compatible. Yet - as I keep saying, both views are empirically outside of any 
> possibility of proof or TRUTH. You either believe in one OR the other [or 
> some other theory].

I confess I don’t understand this disagreement, especially if it is coming in 
with our priors regarding theology. It seems to me the big bang is largely 
orthogonal to such questions. For one, most physics doesn’t see the big bang as 
the beginning of everything. The inflationary models at this point are quite 
old and widely accepted. String theory has its branes which float in higher 
dimensional space. Loop quantum gravity has bubble universes more akin to the 
original inflationary models. And some theorists reject them all and say all we 
have empirical evidence for is this universe.

i.e. it would seem both options are pretty open to atheists and theists of 
various stripes

> You try to substantiate that Peirce followed the same view as yours by 
> defining his 'earlier work' as something that he moved away from and 
> rejected. I don't see any evidence of this. I admit that I can't explain the 
> NA - and I don't even attempt to do so - but - I don't find any evidence of 
> Peirce rejecting the 1.412 argument - and other arguments about the 
> self-organization and evolution of the universe [tychasm, agapasm].

I tend to agree with you here Edwina. I don’t quite see big contradictions 
between his later more Hegelian work with the more neoplatonic work of the late 
1880’s. Evolution yes. But I don’t see him moving away from the earlier 
positions.

But I suspect part of this is how to interpret those earlier passages in 1.412. 
I’m largely convinced by Parker here. (Regarding Peirce anyway - I’m not sure I 
buy the ontology itself)





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to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Clark, List:

At this point, it seems appropriate to shift this conversation to the
spin-off thread that I started last week based on Ben Novak's post and the
ones to which he was responding, which I have reproduced below.  As we have
previously discussed under the heading of Peirce's Cosmology, he explicitly
referred to multiple "Platonic worlds" as one of the stages preceding the
emergence of this actual universe of existence.  I have suggested that the
former correspond to the coalescing chalk marks on the blackboard, which
then serve as a whiteboard for the "discontinuous mark" that represents the
latter.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 11:28 AM, Clark Goble  wrote:

> On Oct 24, 2016, at 8:43 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> ET:  After all, chaos IS something - i.e., it is the absence of order
> within a collection of bits of unorganized matter.
>
>
> Not according to Peirce--he explicitly held that chaos is *nothing*.
>
> It’s worth noting that the word ‘nothing’ is ambiguous in most western
> languages. An obvious example of this is the infamous debate between
> Heidegger and Carnap over nothing. Carnap and most positivists came away
> thinking Heidegger a loon because of statements like ‘the nothing nothings.’
>
> If one reads Peirce, particularly the passages from the late 80’s that
> Edwina brought up, as a neoplatonist then he’s clearly much more in that
> Heidegger camp. The main distinction is between nothing as ‘empty set’
> versus ‘not a thing.’ With the neoplatonic conception you have ‘thingness’
> as ideas, soul, spirit and so forth. You then have the One which typically
> is a nothing that is not a thing but clearly also not an empty set. In some
> forms of platonism in late antiquity such as Plotinus’ you also have prime
> matter which is conceive of as not a thing but a place to receive things
> and make them possible. All of this ends up going back to the Timaeus and
> the notions there - especially that of chora or khora which is usually
> translated as receptacle or space.
>
> When you look at Peirce subject is a kind of place for predication. So
> chaos for him is this receptical or space. It’s very much the prime matter
> that was common in neoplatonism (and which obviously arose out of Aristotle
> as much as Plato’s Timaeus)
>
> I’d add that Duns Scotus’ conception of the *ouisia *of God as nothing
> might also be playing into Peirce’s conception. I don’t know if anyone’s
> done anything on that though.
>
> One of the quotes you provided also is quite platonic in its nature.
>
> If what is demanded is a theological backing, or rational antecedent, to
> the chaos, that my theory fully supplies. The chaos is a state of intensest
> feeling, although, memory and habit being totally absent, it is sheer
> nothing still. *Feeling has existence only so far as it is welded into
> feeling. Now the welding of this feeling to the great whole of feeling* is
> accomplished only by the reflection of a later date. *In itself,
> therefore, it is nothing; but in its relation to the end it is everything*.
> (CP 6.612; 1893)
>
> This is very much a kind of relationship of prime matter to the One in
> neoplatonism. The big shift from Platonism is that prime matter is put
> first rather than the One. Although this inversion of the usual process of
> emanation can be found in various types of neoPlatonism as well despite its
> more heretical character. It’s also common in 20th century post-Husserlian
> phenomenology.
>
> I should add that 6.215-219 is well worth reading on this subject as well,
> especially relative to the Heidegger/Carnap debate.
>
> Again, let me note that this part of Peirce’s thought seems to me to be
> the most controversial. I’m not sure it’s necessary for his thought as a
> whole.
>
> "Chaos" in Peirce's usage means no regularity, no determinacy, no
> existence, no happenings, no relations, no connection, no law, no memory,
> no habit, no causation, no generality--*sheer* nothing, *blank* nothing,
> *pure *nothing--and that is precisely how he characterized mere feeling
> (Firstness) and action (Secondness) without continuity (Thirdness).  In
> other words, unless the blackboard (Thirdness) is already in
> place--"theological backing, or rational antecedent"--there can never be a
> spontaneous chalk mark with its whiteness (Firstness) and boundary
> (Secondness) in the first place.
>
> In a similar way, I might add, to us from a platonic point of view without
> Soul there is nothing. Peirce’s notion of thirdness is very similar to the
> third emanation in Plotinus’ system of emanations. It’s interesting that
> for some, such as Proclus, each of these is a separate god. It’s also here
> that the late platonists tended to inject a lot of Stoicism into 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Auke van Breemen]

Dear Kirsti,

Thank  you for your kind reply and especially for your historical remarks and 
your remarks on feeling. I did not read Tetens, but I recognize the point you 
are making with it. Fitzgerald for instance only takes the 'feeling of 
recognition' when he discusses the emotional interpretant. Not 'feeling' as a 
technical term dealt with by Peirce:

By a feeling, I mean an instance of that kind of consciousness which
involves no analysis, comparison or any process whatsoever, nor consists
in whole or in part of any act by which one stretch of consciousness
is distinguished from another, which has its own positive quality
which consists in nothing else, and which is of itself all that it is,
however it may have been brought about; so that if this feeling is
present during a lapse of time, it is wholly and equally present at
every moment of that time. To reduce this description to a simple
definition, I will say that by a feeling I mean an instance of that sort
of element of consciousness which is all that it is positively, in itself,
regardless of anything else. CP 1.306.

and again:
Among phanerons there are certain qualities of feeling, such as the
color of magenta, the odor of attar, the sound of a railway whistle,
the taste of quinine, the quality of the emotion upon contemplating
a mathematical demonstration, the quality of feeling of love,
etc. I do not mean the sense of actually experiencing these feelings,
whether primarily or in any memory or imagination. That is something
that involves these qualities as an element of it. But I mean
the qualities themselves which, in themselves, are mere may-bes, not
necessarily realized. CP 1.304
--

As you said:
But: Feelings do not classify themselves. They do not appear with name tag.

And, so I would add after Peirce: once gone they are gone forever. In Questions 
Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed For Man (if I remember correctly 1867, 
plus or minus 1) Peirce writes about the unintellectual, etc that runs in a 
continuous stream through our lives. Feeling (phenomenology), qualisign (sign 
aspects), emotional interpretant (interpretant aspect of the process of 
interpretation that leads to a response), designate the same phenomenon from 
three perspectives, in my opinion.

I did not use the combination primordial chaos, but primordial soup. It is a 
term coined by Sarbo. The avoidance of chaos is on purpose. As you justly 
argued with your embryo example, it definitely is not chaos. For two reasons, 
lousily formulted:
1. from an analytical point of view
 In our opinion already in the qualisign position everything is present, but as 
long as we don't evolve what is involved in the primordial soup or collection 
of qualia, it only indistinctly is present, without its nametag and, also 
important, without the habits that are associated with this input in habitual 
interpretation, which is the rule. It is very hard phaneroscopic work to get at 
this basic 'material' of any interpretation.  We have to get rid of, only to 
name the proximate interpretation moments, name (sinsign, legisign) and form 
(icon) that are inherent in the primordial soup.

2. from the unfolding reality point of view
The world we interpret is infused with reason, if we interpret we interpret an 
over all orderly reality, not chaos. 

Here https://storyconnect.nl/glossary/knowledge-in-formation/?lang=en, ( even 
the image-author connections suggested for the three images, are mixed up) 
might reside the reason for your reading 'primordial chaos'. I assure you that 
the only relation between my work and these images that can be established can 
be expressed thus; I make a painting,  somebody cut parts out of it, replaces 
them with other stuff or displaces them and subsequently pretends that it is a 
joint work.

I found one place in Peirce where he placed himself in a Buddhist/Christian 
tradition.  I always thought this is connected to meditation/phaneroscopy. The 
6 doors of perception mirroring the six senses.

It is a very complicated, and I add, rewarding, issue. That can be regarded 
from different angles, as your comments aptly show. I hope you continue your 
comments. I agree with Jerry that (scientific) progress needs the honest 
communion of minds. Alas, that is not the only game played by mankind.  But, I 
always was of the opinion, that it is the game you play and I value that.

With gratitude,

Auke


-Oorspronkelijk bericht-
Van: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi] 
Verzonden: maandag 24 oktober 2016 15:21
Aan: Auke van Breemen 
CC: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Onderwerp: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Dear Auke,

I got very delighted by your response! Right now, I have very little time, but 
I wish to share some of my thoughts on and about it.

First: The idea of primordial chaos is very, very popular. Even so popular that 
one should get suspicios in front of the popularity. It is 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Clark Goble]

> On Oct 22, 2016, at 10:14 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard  
> wrote:
> 
> As far as I can tell, Peirce never stopped talking about the categories in 
> the context of the phenomenology or phaneroscopy. Furthermore, he never 
> stopped talking about the categories in the context of the semiotics. 

I was having trouble with my email Friday due to those denial of service 
attacks. If my post on this did make it to the list I apologize. I’ll just 
requote one section of it that I was hoping you or someone else would comment 
on.

Kant has his 12 categories in four classes. The forth class of modality is 
possibiltiy, existence and necessity. The other three classes are quantity, 
quality, and relation. If I’m following Peirce correctly he’s just separating 
modes of being from these first three classes as the categories. 

While I’d missed the beginning of the discussion, I didn’t see anyone address 
this Kantian context. It seems quite natural to read Peirce as simply breaking 
Kant’s categories up into the universes of modality and then the categories for 
everything else.



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Clark Goble]

> On Oct 24, 2016, at 8:43 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Edwina, List:
> 
> ET:  After all, chaos IS something - i.e., it is the absence of order within 
> a collection of bits of unorganized matter.
> 
> Not according to Peirce--he explicitly held that chaos is nothing.

It’s worth noting that the word ‘nothing’ is ambiguous in most western 
languages. An obvious example of this is the infamous debate between Heidegger 
and Carnap over nothing. Carnap and most positivists came away thinking 
Heidegger a loon because of statements like ‘the nothing nothings.’

If one reads Peirce, particularly the passages from the late 80’s that Edwina 
brought up, as a neoplatonist then he’s clearly much more in that Heidegger 
camp. The main distinction is between nothing as ‘empty set’ versus ‘not a 
thing.’ With the neoplatonic conception you have ‘thingness’ as ideas, soul, 
spirit and so forth. You then have the One which typically is a nothing that is 
not a thing but clearly also not an empty set. In some forms of platonism in 
late antiquity such as Plotinus’ you also have prime matter which is conceive 
of as not a thing but a place to receive things and make them possible. All of 
this ends up going back to the Timaeus and the notions there - especially that 
of chora or khora which is usually translated as receptacle or space.

When you look at Peirce subject is a kind of place for predication. So chaos 
for him is this receptical or space. It’s very much the prime matter that was 
common in neoplatonism (and which obviously arose out of Aristotle as much as 
Plato’s Timaeus)

I’d add that Duns Scotus’ conception of the ouisia of God as nothing might also 
be playing into Peirce’s conception. I don’t know if anyone’s done anything on 
that though.

One of the quotes you provided also is quite platonic in its nature.

If what is demanded is a theological backing, or rational antecedent, to the 
chaos, that my theory fully supplies. The chaos is a state of intensest 
feeling, although, memory and habit being totally absent, it is sheer nothing 
still. Feeling has existence only so far as it is welded into feeling. Now the 
welding of this feeling to the great whole of feeling is accomplished only by 
the reflection of a later date. In itself, therefore, it is nothing; but in its 
relation to the end it is everything. (CP 6.612; 1893)

This is very much a kind of relationship of prime matter to the One in 
neoplatonism. The big shift from Platonism is that prime matter is put first 
rather than the One. Although this inversion of the usual process of emanation 
can be found in various types of neoPlatonism as well despite its more 
heretical character. It’s also common in 20th century post-Husserlian 
phenomenology.

I should add that 6.215-219 is well worth reading on this subject as well, 
especially relative to the Heidegger/Carnap debate.

Again, let me note that this part of Peirce’s thought seems to me to be the 
most controversial. I’m not sure it’s necessary for his thought as a whole.

> "Chaos" in Peirce's usage means no regularity, no determinacy, no existence, 
> no happenings, no relations, no connection, no law, no memory, no habit, no 
> causation, no generality--sheer nothing, blank nothing, pure nothing--and 
> that is precisely how he characterized mere feeling (Firstness) and action 
> (Secondness) without continuity (Thirdness).  In other words, unless the 
> blackboard (Thirdness) is already in place--"theological backing, or rational 
> antecedent"--there can never be a spontaneous chalk mark with its whiteness 
> (Firstness) and boundary (Secondness) in the first place.

In a similar way, I might add, to us from a platonic point of view without Soul 
there is nothing. Peirce’s notion of thirdness is very similar to the third 
emanation in Plotinus’ system of emanations. It’s interesting that for some, 
such as Proclus, each of these is a separate god. It’s also here that the late 
platonists tended to inject a lot of Stoicism into their thought. The third god 
who is at the level of soul is the sensible world that is able to think 
discursively. 

Going back to the Neglected Argument I should note that a lot of how Peirce 
talks about God parallels Proclus. But this isn’t an area I’m really that well 
versed. Peirce clearly is well read on these authors though. They do form an 
important context for a lot of his thinking. (Although shouldn’t be reduced to 
it) While it’s not an area I’m that well versed on, some have dealt with the 
issue.

https://books.google.com/books?id=zHDnlYfrbMcC=PA85=peirce+proclus=en=X=0ahUKEwirysj57PPPAhVH1WMKHc-HDfgQ6AEIIDAA#v=onepage=peirce%20proclus=false

The relationship of abduction to Proclus in that paper is quite interesting. 
(As an aside, this is the same book that Kelly Parker’s paper on Peirce as a 
neoPlatonist appears)




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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

Thanks for clarifying.  I mainly just wanted to emphasize Peirce's
consistent usage, and the conclusion that he ultimately drew from it.

Regards,

Jon

On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 9:53 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon, - to offer up a collection of quotes, via a digital search of the
> term 'chaos' from the Peirce collections, doesn't negate that I was saying
> the same thing as he was with regard to the primoridal 'nothing.  So,
> please don't try a 'gotcha' post.
>
>  This term, the 'absence of order' as a meaning of 'chaos, is the *popular
> current meaning of *chaos. That *current usage of the term*  is what I
> was referring to as a response to Kirsti's post where she also was
> referring also to the current very common use of the term. I was NOT
> referring to Peirce's usage. And as I said - I consider the primordial as
> nothing. Peirce is quite specific about that in 1.412 - and as you point
> out, I refer to that quote very often.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *To:* Edwina Taborsky 
> *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Sent:* Monday, October 24, 2016 10:43 AM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's
> Cosmology)
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> ET:  After all, chaos IS something - i.e., it is the absence of order
> within a collection of bits of unorganized matter.
>
>
> Not according to Peirce--he explicitly held that chaos is *nothing*.
>
> CSP:  The original chaos, therefore, where there was no regularity, was in
> effect a state of mere indeterminacy, in which nothing existed or really
> happened. (CP 1.411; 1887-1888)
>
> CSP:  The first chaos consisted in an infinite multitude of unrelated
> feelings. As there was no continuity about them, it was, as it were, a
> powder of feelings. It was worse than that, for of particles of powder some
> are nearer together, others farther apart, while these feelings had no
> relations, for relations are general. (CP 8.318; 1891)
>
> CSP:  Without going into other important questions of philosophical
> architectonic, we can readily foresee what sort of a metaphysics would
> appropriately be constructed from those conceptions. Like some of the most
> ancient and some of the most recent speculations it would be a Cosmogonic
> Philosophy. It would suppose that in the beginning--infinitely
> remote--there was a chaos of unpersonalized feeling, which being without
> connection or regularity would properly be without existence. (CP 6.33;
> 1891)
>
> CSP:  But I only propose to explain the regularities of nature as
> consequences of the only uniformity, or general fact, there was in the
> chaos, namely, the general absence of any determinate law. (CP 6.606; 1893)
>
> CSP:  If what is demanded is a theological backing, or rational
> antecedent, to the chaos, that my theory fully supplies. The chaos is a
> state of intensest feeling, although, memory and habit being totally
> absent, it is sheer nothing still. Feeling has existence only so far as it
> is welded into feeling. Now the welding of this feeling to the great whole
> of feeling is accomplished only by the reflection of a later date. In
> itself, therefore, it is nothing; but in its relation to the end it is
> everything. (CP 6.612; 1893)
>
> CSP:  In the original chaos, where there was no regularity, there was no
> existence. It was all a confused dream. (CP 1.175; c.1897)
>
> CSP:  Efficient causation without final causation, however, is worse than
> helpless, by far; it is mere chaos; and chaos is not even so much as chaos,
> without final causation; it is blank nothing. (CP 1.220; 1902)
>
> CSP:  Generality is, indeed, an indispensable ingredient of reality; for
> mere individual existence or actuality without any regularity whatever is a
> nullity. Chaos is pure nothing. (CP 5.431; 1905)
>
> CSP:  Had a purposed article concerning the principle of continuity and
> synthetising the ideas of the other articles of a series in the early
> volumes of *The Monist* ever been written, it would have appeared how,
> with thorough consistency, that theory involved the recognition that
> continuity is an indispensable element of reality, and that continuity is
> simply what generality becomes in the logic of relatives, and thus, like
> generality, and more than generality, is an affair of thought, and is the
> essence of thought. Yet even in its truncated condition, an
> extra-intelligent reader might discern that the theory of those
> cosmological articles made reality to consist in something more than
> feeling and action could supply, inasmuch as the primeval chaos, where
> those two elements were present, was explicitly shown to be pure nothing.
> (CP 5.436; 1905)
>
> "Chaos" in Peirce's usage means no regularity, no determinacy, no
> existence, no happenings, no relations, no connection, no law, no memory,
> no habit, no causation, no generality--*sheer* nothing, 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Clark Goble]

> On Oct 22, 2016, at 11:47 AM, Søren Brier  wrote:
> 
> All conceptual knowledge need language of some sort and  -as Wittgenstein 
> says – there are no private language. Thus you must assume the existence of 
> other embodied experiential conscious subject in language, - and you must 
> assume something this language is about.

This seems to be the point of Heidegger’s take (against Husserl) on 
phenomenology. We are always already fallen and embedded in a shared world. 
That’s the starting point. Others like Levinas react against this.

>  I end up with the gnostic feeling that some basic aspect of us must have 
> been there form “the beginning”. If it makes any sense at all to talk about 
> one beginning. All zeroes, empty sets, vacuum fields and so on are a form of 
> logical  backtracking. But as Skt. Augustine says in Book XI of his 
> Confessions then the universe is not made in time but with time. It makes no 
> sense asking what God was doing before the creation. When we try to determine 
> the time of big bang, the physicists do it by backtracking the internal time 
> of the universe. There is no universal time  “outside” the universe to place 
> this event in, just like the universe is the place for all things, but it 
> does not have a place of its own to be. There is nothing “outside”  or 
> “before” the universe, because these concepts stop making sense outside. We 
> can only talk about emptiness and eternity.

I think in physics even with the rising skepticism of string theory that some 
inflationary multiverse without beginning is the mainstream view. (Not everyone 
accepts it of course given the lack of empirical evidence)  Like you I think 
thought time is always wrapped up with existence to the point we can’t talk 
about an outside. I think it’s interesting that at minimum we need physical 
laws but again I’m not sure it makes sense to talk about that as ‘outside.’

Sticking with Peirce his foundational cosmology that Edwina mentioned seems 
quite neoplatonic. Of course Kelly Parker has written a lot on that which is 
quite persuasive.



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jon, - to offer up a collection of quotes, via a digital search of the term 
'chaos' from the Peirce collections, doesn't negate that I was saying the same 
thing as he was with regard to the primoridal 'nothing.  So, please don't try a 
'gotcha' post.

 This term, the 'absence of order' as a meaning of 'chaos, is the popular 
current meaning of chaos. That current usage of the term  is what I was 
referring to as a response to Kirsti's post where she also was referring also 
to the current very common use of the term. I was NOT referring to Peirce's 
usage. And as I said - I consider the primordial as nothing. Peirce is quite 
specific about that in 1.412 - and as you point out, I refer to that quote very 
often.

Edwina


  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 
  Sent: Monday, October 24, 2016 10:43 AM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)


  Edwina, List:


ET:  After all, chaos IS something - i.e., it is the absence of order 
within a collection of bits of unorganized matter.


  Not according to Peirce--he explicitly held that chaos is nothing.


CSP:  The original chaos, therefore, where there was no regularity, was in 
effect a state of mere indeterminacy, in which nothing existed or really 
happened. (CP 1.411; 1887-1888)


CSP:  The first chaos consisted in an infinite multitude of unrelated 
feelings. As there was no continuity about them, it was, as it were, a powder 
of feelings. It was worse than that, for of particles of powder some are nearer 
together, others farther apart, while these feelings had no relations, for 
relations are general. (CP 8.318; 1891)


CSP:  Without going into other important questions of philosophical 
architectonic, we can readily foresee what sort of a metaphysics would 
appropriately be constructed from those conceptions. Like some of the most 
ancient and some of the most recent speculations it would be a Cosmogonic 
Philosophy. It would suppose that in the beginning--infinitely remote--there 
was a chaos of unpersonalized feeling, which being without connection or 
regularity would properly be without existence. (CP 6.33; 1891)



CSP:  But I only propose to explain the regularities of nature as 
consequences of the only uniformity, or general fact, there was in the chaos, 
namely, the general absence of any determinate law. (CP 6.606; 1893)



CSP:  If what is demanded is a theological backing, or rational antecedent, 
to the chaos, that my theory fully supplies. The chaos is a state of intensest 
feeling, although, memory and habit being totally absent, it is sheer nothing 
still. Feeling has existence only so far as it is welded into feeling. Now the 
welding of this feeling to the great whole of feeling is accomplished only by 
the reflection of a later date. In itself, therefore, it is nothing; but in its 
relation to the end it is everything. (CP 6.612; 1893)


CSP:  In the original chaos, where there was no regularity, there was no 
existence. It was all a confused dream. (CP 1.175; c.1897)


CSP:  Efficient causation without final causation, however, is worse than 
helpless, by far; it is mere chaos; and chaos is not even so much as chaos, 
without final causation; it is blank nothing. (CP 1.220; 1902)


CSP:  Generality is, indeed, an indispensable ingredient of reality; for 
mere individual existence or actuality without any regularity whatever is a 
nullity. Chaos is pure nothing. (CP 5.431; 1905)



CSP:  Had a purposed article concerning the principle of continuity and 
synthetising the ideas of the other articles of a series in the early volumes 
of The Monist ever been written, it would have appeared how, with thorough 
consistency, that theory involved the recognition that continuity is an 
indispensable element of reality, and that continuity is simply what generality 
becomes in the logic of relatives, and thus, like generality, and more than 
generality, is an affair of thought, and is the essence of thought. Yet even in 
its truncated condition, an extra-intelligent reader might discern that the 
theory of those cosmological articles made reality to consist in something more 
than feeling and action could supply, inasmuch as the primeval chaos, where 
those two elements were present, was explicitly shown to be pure nothing. (CP 
5.436; 1905)


  "Chaos" in Peirce's usage means no regularity, no determinacy, no existence, 
no happenings, no relations, no connection, no law, no memory, no habit, no 
causation, no generality--sheer nothing, blank nothing, pure nothing--and that 
is precisely how he characterized mere feeling (Firstness) and action 
(Secondness) without continuity (Thirdness).  In other words, unless the 
blackboard (Thirdness) is already in place--"theological backing, or rational 
antecedent"--there can never be a spontaneous chalk mark with its whiteness 
(Firstness) and 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET:  After all, chaos IS something - i.e., it is the absence of order
within a collection of bits of unorganized matter.


Not according to Peirce--he explicitly held that chaos is *nothing*.

CSP:  The original chaos, therefore, where there was no regularity, was in
effect a state of mere indeterminacy, in which nothing existed or really
happened. (CP 1.411; 1887-1888)

CSP:  The first chaos consisted in an infinite multitude of unrelated
feelings. As there was no continuity about them, it was, as it were, a
powder of feelings. It was worse than that, for of particles of powder some
are nearer together, others farther apart, while these feelings had no
relations, for relations are general. (CP 8.318; 1891)

CSP:  Without going into other important questions of philosophical
architectonic, we can readily foresee what sort of a metaphysics would
appropriately be constructed from those conceptions. Like some of the most
ancient and some of the most recent speculations it would be a Cosmogonic
Philosophy. It would suppose that in the beginning--infinitely
remote--there was a chaos of unpersonalized feeling, which being without
connection or regularity would properly be without existence. (CP 6.33;
1891)

CSP:  But I only propose to explain the regularities of nature as
consequences of the only uniformity, or general fact, there was in the
chaos, namely, the general absence of any determinate law. (CP 6.606; 1893)

CSP:  If what is demanded is a theological backing, or rational antecedent,
to the chaos, that my theory fully supplies. The chaos is a state of
intensest feeling, although, memory and habit being totally absent, it is
sheer nothing still. Feeling has existence only so far as it is welded into
feeling. Now the welding of this feeling to the great whole of feeling is
accomplished only by the reflection of a later date. In itself, therefore,
it is nothing; but in its relation to the end it is everything. (CP 6.612;
1893)

CSP:  In the original chaos, where there was no regularity, there was no
existence. It was all a confused dream. (CP 1.175; c.1897)

CSP:  Efficient causation without final causation, however, is worse than
helpless, by far; it is mere chaos; and chaos is not even so much as chaos,
without final causation; it is blank nothing. (CP 1.220; 1902)

CSP:  Generality is, indeed, an indispensable ingredient of reality; for
mere individual existence or actuality without any regularity whatever is a
nullity. Chaos is pure nothing. (CP 5.431; 1905)

CSP:  Had a purposed article concerning the principle of continuity and
synthetising the ideas of the other articles of a series in the early
volumes of *The Monist* ever been written, it would have appeared how, with
thorough consistency, that theory involved the recognition that continuity
is an indispensable element of reality, and that continuity is simply what
generality becomes in the logic of relatives, and thus, like generality,
and more than generality, is an affair of thought, and is the essence of
thought. Yet even in its truncated condition, an extra-intelligent reader
might discern that the theory of those cosmological articles made reality
to consist in something more than feeling and action could supply, inasmuch
as the primeval chaos, where those two elements were present, was
explicitly shown to be pure nothing. (CP 5.436; 1905)

"Chaos" in Peirce's usage means no regularity, no determinacy, no
existence, no happenings, no relations, no connection, no law, no memory,
no habit, no causation, no generality--*sheer* nothing, *blank* nothing, *pure
*nothing--and that is precisely how he characterized mere feeling
(Firstness) and action (Secondness) without continuity (Thirdness).  In
other words, unless the blackboard (Thirdness) is already in
place--"theological backing, or rational antecedent"--there can never be a
spontaneous chalk mark with its whiteness (Firstness) and boundary
(Secondness) in the first place.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 8:51 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Kirsti, list:
>
> Kirsti, I like your outlines of embryos and the 'firstness' of Feelings.
> [I think that more research should be done on the bonding in utero between
> multiple birth embryos, i.e., twins, triplets etc].
>
> I also have a problem with the notion of primordial chaos. After all,
> chaos IS something - i.e., it is the absence of order within a collection
> of bits of unorganized matter. But, following Peirce's 1.412, I see the
> primordial as - nothing. As undifferentiated mass. As 'indeterminancy'
> [1.409, 412] . NOT matter, but mass.
>
> As mass, which is in a mode of Firstness, it can start to take on habits -
> and your example of the heartbeat of the mother affecting the embryo-fetus
> is a good one. Therefore, in my view,  Thirdness is 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Auke:

> On Oct 24, 2016, at 6:27 AM, Auke van Breemen  wrote:
> 
> “It is my contention that although Peirce had a keen eye on both strains of 
> thought and enterprise, he was hampered in building a system of semiotics by 
> his preference for the communal or scientific ideal.”

Your contention has considerable merit.

In particular, it is my view, that CSP views were strongly shaped by his 
experiences in the chemical sciences and the logic of the chemical sciences.

Unfortunately, the science of chemistry during his lifespan was merely a 
massive collection of empirical observations that provided a basis for 
reproducible experimentation and inquiry.

But it lacked a coherent theory.  Hence, his view of how arguments are formed, 
particularly the assertions about the relations between “blanks”, in the path 
from icons to rhema illustrates your contention very nicely.

Cheers

Jerry



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Kirsti, list:

Kirsti, I like your outlines of embryos and the 'firstness' of Feelings. [I 
think that more research should be done on the bonding in utero between 
multiple birth embryos, i.e., twins, triplets etc].


I also have a problem with the notion of primordial chaos. After all, chaos 
IS something - i.e., it is the absence of order within a collection of bits 
of unorganized matter. But, following Peirce's 1.412, I see the primordial 
as - nothing. As undifferentiated mass. As 'indeterminancy' [1.409, 412] . 
NOT matter, but mass.


As mass, which is in a mode of Firstness, it can start to take on habits - 
and your example of the heartbeat of the mother affecting the embryo-fetus 
is a good one. Therefore, in my view,  Thirdness is not a priori or 
non-immanent, as some would suggest, but, a fundamental immenent aspect of 
the conversion of mass to matter.


Edwina


- Original Message - 
From: 

To: "Auke van Breemen" 
Cc: 
Sent: Monday, October 24, 2016 9:20 AM
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's 
Cosmology)




Dear Auke,

I got very delighted by your response! Right now, I have very little
time, but I wish to share some of my thoughts on and about it.

First: The idea of primordial chaos is very, very popular. Even so
popular that one should get suspicios in front of the popularity. It is
commonly taken as granted that all human as well as other living beings
start our individual lives in the midst of chaos.

Even Prigogine's work Time and Change in Modern Physics has been often
classified as a CHAOS theory, though it is nothing of the kind.

All human beings start as embryos, developing into fetus.  But, as I
have shown in detail, there is no chaos necessarily involved in the
experiential flow of an embryo, nor of a fetus. Heart beat, for example
gives a rhythm even to the earliest modes of experiencing. First comes
the heartbeat of the mother. It is something FELT, not something KNOWN.
The rhythm is primordial. The syncopatic rhythm of hearbeat thus feels
unanimously as something associated with eternity. (Which is fact to be
revealed and confirmed by phenomenological studies)In the Peircean
sensse, not in the sense offered by European phenomenologies.

An utterly neglected part of CSP's conception of feeling can be found in
his critical comments on Kant and his threepartite division of mind.
Peirce states that Kant, in outlining the old division mistorted the
notion of FEELING, he (Kant) had derived from Tetens, his teacher.

CSP then states that he has retained the meaning Tetens gave.

Now, during all the decades of participating in Peirce related
conferences, I have never met a Peircean scholar who would even
recognize Tetens. - I took the time to get a copy of main works by
Tetens.  - Nor did  any of the Kantians I ever met know Tetens. (Which I
find most peculiar).

The change Kant made was to take pleasure and pain as the basic
division. This mistake was later made immensely popular by Freud.

Another mistake in the twists of history comes from distortions in
interpreting the peripathetic axiom originating from Thomas (De
Veritate):

"Nihil in intellectu quod non sit prius in sensu." Later to become a
corner stone of nominalism.

However, in medieval times the Latin "in sensu" (in the senses) carried
a very different meaning than in modern times. "Sensus communis" was a
part and parcel of the meaning.( Also "intellectu" carried a different
meaning.)

As we all know CSP took back "common sense".

In medieval times, with Christianity, sensus communis had a very clear
meaning. Concience, the moral sense, given by God.
With the teaching that one should consult one's heart. in order to feel
and hear the voice of God. - Note: to feel and hear IN THIS ORDER.

For Aristotle, just as well, the sensus communis (i.e the Greek
counterpart) was situated in the heart. But of course not with the
Christian overtones.

It was in modern times that the senses were restricted to the five
special senses. And the sixth sense was doomed into oblivions of
mysticism. - But it was only after sciences (and humanities) were
secularized, that mysticism was rejected.

And the herintance of history was then cleansed of this stuff. So we are
passing on a distorted view of history. Chemistry, let alone
electromagnetism were originally taken as mystical and occult. - About
which CSP gives a sensible account of the why's (see e.g. Moore's
collecion of CSP's mathematical writings).

Electricity still remains a mystery to be solved. But it is a mystery
already tackled (by Jerry L.C. Chandler, for instance).

Well, this is just to get started. I hope to continue later...

These are very complicated issues.

But: Feelings do not classify themselves. They do not appear with name
tag.

With warmest wishes!

Kirsti Määttänen










Thus feeling comes first.

Auke van Breemen kirjoitti 23.10.2016 19:35:

Dear 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[kirstima]

Dear Auke,

I got very delighted by your response! Right now, I have very little 
time, but I wish to share some of my thoughts on and about it.


First: The idea of primordial chaos is very, very popular. Even so 
popular that one should get suspicios in front of the popularity. It is 
commonly taken as granted that all human as well as other living beings 
start our individual lives in the midst of chaos.


Even Prigogine's work Time and Change in Modern Physics has been often 
classified as a CHAOS theory, though it is nothing of the kind.


All human beings start as embryos, developing into fetus.  But, as I 
have shown in detail, there is no chaos necessarily involved in the 
experiential flow of an embryo, nor of a fetus. Heart beat, for example 
gives a rhythm even to the earliest modes of experiencing. First comes 
the heartbeat of the mother. It is something FELT, not something KNOWN. 
The rhythm is primordial. The syncopatic rhythm of hearbeat thus feels 
unanimously as something associated with eternity. (Which is fact to be 
revealed and confirmed by phenomenological studies)In the Peircean 
sensse, not in the sense offered by European phenomenologies.


An utterly neglected part of CSP's conception of feeling can be found in 
his critical comments on Kant and his threepartite division of mind. 
Peirce states that Kant, in outlining the old division mistorted the 
notion of FEELING, he (Kant) had derived from Tetens, his teacher.


CSP then states that he has retained the meaning Tetens gave.

Now, during all the decades of participating in Peirce related 
conferences, I have never met a Peircean scholar who would even 
recognize Tetens. - I took the time to get a copy of main works by 
Tetens.  - Nor did  any of the Kantians I ever met know Tetens. (Which I 
find most peculiar).


The change Kant made was to take pleasure and pain as the basic 
division. This mistake was later made immensely popular by Freud.


Another mistake in the twists of history comes from distortions in 
interpreting the peripathetic axiom originating from Thomas (De 
Veritate):


"Nihil in intellectu quod non sit prius in sensu." Later to become a 
corner stone of nominalism.


However, in medieval times the Latin "in sensu" (in the senses) carried 
a very different meaning than in modern times. "Sensus communis" was a 
part and parcel of the meaning.( Also "intellectu" carried a different 
meaning.)


As we all know CSP took back "common sense".

In medieval times, with Christianity, sensus communis had a very clear 
meaning. Concience, the moral sense, given by God.
With the teaching that one should consult one's heart. in order to feel 
and hear the voice of God. - Note: to feel and hear IN THIS ORDER.


For Aristotle, just as well, the sensus communis (i.e the Greek 
counterpart) was situated in the heart. But of course not with the 
Christian overtones.


It was in modern times that the senses were restricted to the five 
special senses. And the sixth sense was doomed into oblivions of 
mysticism. - But it was only after sciences (and humanities) were 
secularized, that mysticism was rejected.


And the herintance of history was then cleansed of this stuff. So we are 
passing on a distorted view of history. Chemistry, let alone 
electromagnetism were originally taken as mystical and occult. - About 
which CSP gives a sensible account of the why's (see e.g. Moore's 
collecion of CSP's mathematical writings).


Electricity still remains a mystery to be solved. But it is a mystery 
already tackled (by Jerry L.C. Chandler, for instance).


Well, this is just to get started. I hope to continue later...

These are very complicated issues.

But: Feelings do not classify themselves. They do not appear with name 
tag.


With warmest wishes!

Kirsti Määttänen










Thus feeling comes first.

Auke van Breemen kirjoitti 23.10.2016 19:35:

Dear Kirsti,

As in our past exchanges I value your response and its tone of voice.
In discussions I always try to be short as possible. Maybe this time
to my detriment. I do thank you for te opportunity you offer to try to
become more clear.

I will add some words between the lines.

K:
Dear Auke & al.

It seems to me that you are on the right tract, but in a way CSP did
not share. And going along a tract, wich leads nowhere.
--

AvB: If your criticism holds, I agree.


K:
Although the main interest of CSP lied in science, his starting point
was "babes and suclings", (just google this) As have been mine, even
before I had any knowledge whatsoever of Peirce.

This is were my work, since 1970's comes in. In English their is not
much to rely on. See, however, my astract for Applying Peirde
conference, at Helsinki 2007. Available in internet.I have provided
Eugene Halton with the handout in the conference. Which he has quoted
several times. Lately in a book chapter of his.

The problem with your approach, as with almost all others, lies in
taking ADULTS as the starting point. And then 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Auke van Breemen]

Jerry,

 

I still fail to see the point of your remarks. I do get the impression that you 
don’t agree with my:

“It is my contention that although Peirce had a keen eye on both strains of 
thought and enterprise, he was hampered in building a system of semiotics by 
his preference for the communal or scientific ideal.”

Because you hold:

I tend to think he succeeded but to say this is a statement of more or less.  

More or less, depending on to what you are looking. 

--

 

But I am not sure about this estimation of your remark. However if this is what 
you mean, then maybe you have the opinion that I hold to the statement that 
Peirce’s work was a complete failure or that he completely was on the wrong 
track. For me the respects in which it is more successful (sign aspects 
interpretant apects, the idea of a sheet, man as a sign, architectonic, X-box, 
both devisions of interpretants, etc) and the respect in which it is less (not 
connecting both divisions of interpretants, what prevented him given that all 
ingredients are there) are of more interest than an assessment in general terms 
like more or less.

 

Best,

Auke

 

 

 

Van: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com] 
Verzonden: zondag 23 oktober 2016 23:07
Aan: Auke van Breemen 
CC: Peirce-L 
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

 

Auke, list:

 

I think what you just said is expressible by seeking explanations for 
same/different in the following:

 

“Only everybody can know the truth.” ~Goethe, more or less…

 

“The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, 
is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the 
real.” ~Peirce

___

 

As to the individual/community issue, here is an excerpt from Peirce,

 

“…the progress of science cannot go far except by collaboration; or, to speak 
more accurately, no mind can take one step without the aid of other minds.”…

 

I don’t think this has to be taken literally (since education of young and 
old), but it does speak to the reality of how complicated knowledge is, 
nowadays.  Regardless, the community cannot be happy without individuals of 
that community; us and our neighbors.  We seek to do well and by doing well, to 
fare well.  

 

What better than to know something of great benefit to mankind and to share it? 
 But how to share it when a single method appears to lead to different 
convictions about problems and solutions?  I think this is implied of your 
statement:

“It is my contention that although Peirce had a keen eye on both strains of 
thought and enterprise, he was hampered in building a system of semiotics by 
his preference for the communal or scientific ideal.”

 

I tend to think he succeeded but to say this is a statement of more or less.  

More or less, depending on to what you are looking.  

 

Semiotic or abduction?  …Or abduction using semiotic?  Or abduction using 
computation?... Or abduction using experimentation?… Or abduction using 
experimentation and computation and semiotic…

Which are all ways of saying abduction…. Or experimentation… or semiosis… or 
science… or….

 

Best,

Jerry R

 

On Sun, Oct 23, 2016 at 3:38 PM, Auke van Breemen  > wrote:

Jerry,

 

I don’t grasp your point. Especially the introduction of the individual 
(whether as a singular or an atom?) escapes my understanding.

 

With regard to your remark about the community knowing and science, I just 
remark that in my opinion the community knowing is only a sub-section of the 
community acting in pursuit of personal and individual goals. In the indefinite 
truth, research being pushed far enough, it may be that truth prevails, on the 
short term, I myself just experienced some hazards along that way.  It is my 
contention that although Peirce had a keen eye on both strains of thought and 
enterprise, he was hampered in building a system of semiotics by his preference 
for the communal or scientific ideal. For, a sustem of semiotics must not only 
account for the scientific enterprise, but also for our day to day 
communication, not regulated by a knowledge ideal, but by other interests.

 

Best, Auke

 

Van: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com  ] 
Verzonden: zondag 23 oktober 2016 21:27
Aan: Auke van Breemen  >
CC: Peirce-L  >
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

 

Auke, Kirsti, list:

 

You said:

AvB: For me it is the interplay of all. After Aristotle, in the order of things 
firstness is first, in the order of knowledge secondness is first. I would add, 
in the order of understanding thirdness is first…

 

But Aristotle also said:

“For learning proceeds for all in this way-through that which is less