Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Francesco, List:

FB:  Also, to say that a given combination is perfectly consistent would
mean that the order of the ten trichotomies has been determined, which
Peirce was far from having done.


We are discussing only the trichotomies that Peirce *did *clearly arrange
in an order of determination--Dynamic Object, Immediate Object, Sign, S-DO
Relation.  The sequence of the first three is explicitly given at both EP
2:481 and EP 2:488-489 (1908), and the fourth comes after the third in
accordance with the 1903 taxonomy.  We also know that the Interpretant
trichotomies come after the one for the Sign, and their order is Destinate
(Final), Effectual (Dynamic), Explicit (Immediate).  We further know that
the one for the S-FI Relation comes after the one for the S-DO Relation,
and that the one for the S-DI Relation comes after that (CP 8.338; 1904).

In short, there are only a handful of evaluations to make in order to
ascertain the most viable linear arrangement of all ten trichotomies of the
1908 taxonomy.  I made my case on the List for one particular solution a
few months ago (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2018-04/msg00016.
html).

FB:   I guess many of your comments depend on such ordering, but since
Peirce did not provide a definitive ordering, I wonder whether we are going
beyond exegesis.


As Gary Fuhrman can attest, I readily acknowledge that my approach is more
systematic than exegetical.  I am seeking to situate Signs and semiosis
within an overall framework that makes sense to me, while remaining as
faithful as possible to Peirce's concepts and terminology.  You stated in
your recent book that you "have not attempted to finish what Peirce left
unfinished or to eliminate 'rubs and botches' from his work," such that
your "exposition of Peirce’s theory of semiotics is no less incomplete than
that theory itself was" (p. 10).  I, on the other hand, am trying to fill
in some of those gaps and further plow the ground that he has cleared and
opened up for us as "a pioneer, or rather a backwoodsman" (CP 5.488, EP
2:413; 1907)

That being the case, I am very much open to being *persuaded *that some (or
even all) of my recent suggestions are off-track.  After all, they "are but
opinions at most; and the whole list is provisional.  The scientific man is
not in the least wedded to his conclusions.  He risks nothing upon them.
He stands ready to abandon one or all as soon as experience opposes them"
(CP 1.635, EP 2:33; 1898).

FB:  From your use of "therefore" I infer that you think that propositions
can only be symbolic. Do you exclude the possibility of indexical
propositions?


I generally reserve "term" and "proposition" for Rhematic and Dicent
Symbols, respectively.  I do not exclude the possibility of Dicent Indices.

FB:  Are you using general in the sense of necessitant? And if yes, what's
the purpose of doing this, given that three other kinds of semiotic
generality are around?


I am receptive to alternatives for naming the Object that I take to be
in a *genuine
*triadic relation with the Sign (Type) and Final Interpretant.  Ideally it
would be an adjective applicable to both a discrete collection and a
continuum.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 3:41 PM, Francesco Bellucci  wrote:

> Now I understand better wath Jon meant with the following
>
> JAS: the generality of the Object *itself *(Abstractive/Concretive/Collective)
> has absolutely no bearing on the nature of its *relation *to the Sign
> (Icon/Index/Symbol), since these correspond to *different *trichotomies
> for classifying Signs.
>
> He meant that the fact that an object is general does not imply that the
> sign is a symbol. If with "general" it is meant "whatever possesses certain
> characters", this is obviosuly and patently false:
>
> CSP: "There are three kinds of representamens, or signs: icons, or images;
> indices; and symbols, or general signs" (R 492, 1903)
>
> CSP: "All general, or definable, Words, whether in the sense of Types or
> of Tokens, are certainly Symbols. That is to say, they denote the objects
> that they do by virtue only of there being a habit that associates their
> signification with them." (Prolegomena, 1906)
>
> "Deduction involves the analysis of the meanings of general signs, i.e. of
> symbols", CSP to F. A. Woods, R L 477 (1913).
>
> Best
> Francesco
>
> On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 10:26 PM, Francesco Bellucci <
> bellucci.france...@googlemail.com> wrote:
>
>> Jon, List
>>>
>>> JAS: As I understand it, the subject of a proposition is a Rheme whose
>>> Object is also an Object of the proposition.  Should we understand the
>>> Immediate Object of a proposition to be a Sign?
>>>
>>
>> If one agrees that the subject of a proposition is its imemdiate object,
>> of course yes, the immediate object of the proposition is a sign (usually,
>> a 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Francesco, List:

FB:  As I mentioned, I think we should recognize that Peirce uses "general"
in at least 3 senses: 1) symbols have a general object (vs indices, which
have an individual object), 2) legisigns are general in themselves (as
types that occur in replicas), 3) and universally quantified sentences are
also said to be "general" by Peirce ("distributively general" his preferred
term).


Where did Peirce state that (only) Symbols have a general Object and (only)
Indices have an individual Object?  Again, my current understanding is
instead that *every *Sign is a Type, has a General Object, and only exists
in Replicas, each of which has an individual Dynamic Object.

FB:  Suppose that the object of "---is a man", i.e. the object that
possesses the set of characters that corresponds to its definition, is the
immediate object. What it is that possesses the set of characters that
corresponds to the definition of man? Of course, every really existing man,
as well as those existed and those that will exist. If this is the
immediate object of the rheme "--is a man", what's its dynamic object?


I can see now that this is indeed unclear.  How should we explain the
difference between the Essential, Informed, and Substantial Breadth of a
Sign?  Peirce's definitions for them similarly require careful
differentiation.

CSP:  By the *informed breadth* of a term, I shall mean all the real things
of which it is predicable, with logical truth on the whole in a supposed
state of information ... we define the *essential breadth* of a term as
those real things of which, according to its very meaning, a term is
predicable ... *Substantial breadth* is the aggregate of real substances of
which alone a
term is predicable with absolute truth. (CP 2.407,412,414; 1867)


I suggest that any Sign's Immediate, Dynamic, and General *Objects *correspond
to its Essential, Informed, and Substantial *Breadth*, respectively.  As
such, the Immediate Object is what a Sign-Replica *could *denote to someone
with mere Sign System Acquaintance; the Dynamic Object is what a
Sign-Replica *does *denote to someone with Collateral Experience; and the
General Object is what a Sign-Replica *would *denote to someone with
omniscience.  Likewise ...

CSP:  By the informed depth of a term, I mean all the real characters (in
contradistinction to mere names) which can be predicated of it* (with
logical truth, on the whole) in a supposed state of information ... By
the *essential
depth* of a term, then, I mean the really conceivable qualities predicated
of it in its definition ... Substantial depth is the real concrete form
which belongs to everything of which a term is predicable with absolute
truth.
*That is, of whatever things it is applicable to. (CP 2.408,410,414; 1867)


I suggest that any Sign's Immediate, Dynamic, and Final *Interpretants
*correspond
to its Essential, Informed, and Substantial *Depth*, respectively.  As
such, the Immediate Interpretant is what a Sign-Replica *could *signify to
someone with *minimal *Interpretative Habits, the Dynamic Interpretant is
what a Sign-Replica *does *signify to someone with *fallible *Interpretative
Habits, and the Final Interpretant is what a Sign-Replica *would *signify
to someone with *infallible *Interpretative Habits.

Although these passages are from Peirce's *early *writings, my warrant for
applying them in this way comes from a *late *manuscript that cited the
very article in which they originally appeared.

CSP:  ... Breadth and Depth, which the logic-books restrict to one class of
signs, namely to terms, are equally applicable, by a legitimate and easy
generalization of their meanings, not only to propositions and to
arguments, but also to *icons*, *indices*, and all kinds of signs ...
Breadth refers to the Object, which occasions the use of the sign, while
Depth refers to the Interpretant, or proper determinate of the sign ... (R
200:E87; 1908)


Gary Fuhrman deserves some credit for helping me sort out this
correspondence of Breadth and Depth with Object and Interpretant, since the
1867 article instead aligned Depth with Ground and Information with
Interpretant.

FB:  Peirce says that a sentence's subject, i.e. the proper name, is its
"object" (he says so in very many places).


Please provide at least a couple of citations.  My understanding is that
each of a sentence's subjects *indicates *one of its Objects, rather
than *being
*one of its Objects; i.e., it is a Rheme whose own Object is one of the
Objects of the corresponding proposition.  The General Object of "_ is
Napoleon" is the Real historical person, its Dynamic Object is that person
as* actually *denoted by a Replica when employed in an Instance of the
Sign, and its Immediate Object is whatever its Replica *could *denote to
someone who knows only the definitions of English words.

FB:  You get the rheme "--- is lethargic". This rheme has no hint by which
its object is indicated, i.e. has no immediate object.


On the 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Brief note on the passing of V. Tejera at 95 years

[Gary Richmond]

Dear Atila Bayat,

Thank you for providing this excellent short biography of Victorino Tejera,
a man who was not only an extraordinary scholar, but also teacher, poet,
translator, and diplomat. What an extraordinary life!

If feasible, we would like to place some of his scholarly work in the
Peirce-Related Papers section of the Arisbe website:
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/ so that if you know how that might possibly
be facilitated, please do not hesitate to contact me or Ben Udell.

And now I must locate my old copy of Jack Kerouac's *On the Road* to see
how V.Tejera (aka 'Victor Villanueva') is characterized in that iconic
piece of American biofiction.

Best,

Gary

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*

*718 482-5690*


On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 6:38 PM Atila Bayat  wrote:

> Dear All,
>
> Professor Tejera was a sometime contributor to the Peirce list in the mid
> 1990's in contact with J. Ransdell. He wrote two books in Semiotics, and
> many articles as well. I can supply a complete bibliography upon request.
> He contributed "The Centrality of Art in Classic American Philosophy" to
> the Peirce sesquicentennial at Harvard in 1989 (which he asked me to read
> on his behalf).
>
> His 2 semiotics books were;
>
> *1) Semiotics From Peirce to Barthes: A Conceptual Introduction to the
> Study of Communication, Interpretation, and Expression* published by E.J.
> Brill in 1988.
>
> *2) Literature, Criticism, and the Theory of Signs* published by John
> Benjamins in 1995.
>
> My brief -
>
> *Victorino Tejera, Scholar, Teacher, and Philosopher dies at 95.*
>
> Victorino Tejera, Professor of Humanities emeritus of SUNY at Stony Brook
> died suddenly on Saturday August 25 at a nursing rehabilitation home in New
> York City. He was 95 years old and lived in New York City. Professor Tejera
> was a Professor of Philosophy, Comparative Literature, and Humanities. He
> taught at Stony Brook for more than 29 years, and taught previously at
> Howard University, Rensselaer Polytechnic, and Georgetown University. He
> wrote and published more than 15 books in the areas of Aesthetics,
> Metaphysics, History of Philosophy, American Philosophy, and especially in
> Classical Greek Thought.  He was made an honorary citizen of Lindos,
> Rhodes, for his work on classical Greek culture.
>
> Dr. Tejera was born in Caracas, Venezuela. His grandfather was the
> President of Venezuela, Victorino Marquez Bustillos
> , his
> paternal great uncle was a notable Venezuelan writer and historian Felipe
> Tejera. Tejera attended St. Mary's College in Southampton, England
> , a boarding school, from
> 1930-1938, receiving his London Matriculate (university entry status
> certificate) in 1939. He received a fellowship to study at Columbia
> University  in the
> U.S., completing his Bachelor of Arts degree at the undergraduate college
> in philosophy (Phi Beta Kappa
> ) in 1948. He also
> completed his *docente* (teacher's training) at the Central University of
> Venezuela in 1951.
>
> His early philosophic passion was Greek Philosophy, and he received
> instruction in Classical Greek from Fred Householder
> . He studied History of
> Philosophy, Aesthetics, and Literary Theory. He also attended summer
> sessions in the late 1940's at the Kenyon School of English. In those early
> years, Tejera’s teachers included the renowned intellectual and cultural
> historians John H. Randall Jr.
> , Justus Buchler
> , Herbert W. Schneider
> , Irwin
> Edman , Mark Van Doren
> , Jacques Barzun
> , and Lionel Trilling
> . While a PhD candidate,
> he was graduate assistant to Irwin Edman
> . He counts Andrew Chiappe,
> Alan Willard Brown, and Quentin Anderson
>  all among his other
> outstanding teachers at Columbia. He was profoundly affected by the
> writings of John Dewey ,
> Charles S. Peirce, and George Santayana
> , as well as by the work
> and literature of the New Critics
>  John Crowe Ransom
> , and Ivor Winters. His
> art and literary interests in New York City enabled encounters with noted
> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Brief note on the passing of V. Tejera at 95 years

[Stephen Curtiss Rose]

Most interesting. The Plato remarks especially. I wish aesthetics was more
noted as essential to Peirce's notions.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 6:37 PM, Atila Bayat  wrote:

> Dear All,
>
> Professor Tejera was a sometime contributor to the Peirce list in the mid
> 1990's in contact with J. Ransdell. He wrote two books in Semiotics, and
> many articles as well. I can supply a complete bibliography upon request.
> He contributed "The Centrality of Art in Classic American Philosophy" to
> the Peirce sesquicentennial at Harvard in 1989 (which he asked me to read
> on his behalf).
>
> His 2 semiotics books were;
>
> *1) Semiotics From Peirce to Barthes: A Conceptual Introduction to the
> Study of Communication, Interpretation, and Expression* published by E.J.
> Brill in 1988.
>
> *2) Literature, Criticism, and the Theory of Signs* published by John
> Benjamins in 1995.
>
> My brief -
>
> *Victorino Tejera, Scholar, Teacher, and Philosopher dies at 95.*
>
> Victorino Tejera, Professor of Humanities emeritus of SUNY at Stony Brook
> died suddenly on Saturday August 25 at a nursing rehabilitation home in New
> York City. He was 95 years old and lived in New York City. Professor Tejera
> was a Professor of Philosophy, Comparative Literature, and Humanities. He
> taught at Stony Brook for more than 29 years, and taught previously at
> Howard University, Rensselaer Polytechnic, and Georgetown University. He
> wrote and published more than 15 books in the areas of Aesthetics,
> Metaphysics, History of Philosophy, American Philosophy, and especially in
> Classical Greek Thought.  He was made an honorary citizen of Lindos,
> Rhodes, for his work on classical Greek culture.
>
> Dr. Tejera was born in Caracas, Venezuela. His grandfather was the
> President of Venezuela, Victorino Marquez Bustillos
> , his
> paternal great uncle was a notable Venezuelan writer and historian Felipe
> Tejera. Tejera attended St. Mary's College in Southampton, England
> , a boarding school, from
> 1930-1938, receiving his London Matriculate (university entry status
> certificate) in 1939. He received a fellowship to study at Columbia
> University  in the
> U.S., completing his Bachelor of Arts degree at the undergraduate college
> in philosophy (Phi Beta Kappa
> ) in 1948. He also
> completed his *docente* (teacher's training) at the Central University of
> Venezuela in 1951.
>
> His early philosophic passion was Greek Philosophy, and he received
> instruction in Classical Greek from Fred Householder
> . He studied History of
> Philosophy, Aesthetics, and Literary Theory. He also attended summer
> sessions in the late 1940's at the Kenyon School of English. In those early
> years, Tejera’s teachers included the renowned intellectual and cultural
> historians John H. Randall Jr.
> , Justus Buchler
> , Herbert W. Schneider
> , Irwin
> Edman , Mark Van Doren
> , Jacques Barzun
> , and Lionel Trilling
> . While a PhD candidate,
> he was graduate assistant to Irwin Edman
> . He counts Andrew Chiappe,
> Alan Willard Brown, and Quentin Anderson
>  all among his other
> outstanding teachers at Columbia. He was profoundly affected by the
> writings of John Dewey ,
> Charles S. Peirce, and George Santayana
> , as well as by the work
> and literature of the New Critics
>  John Crowe Ransom
> , and Ivor Winters. His
> art and literary interests in New York City enabled encounters with noted
> artists, writers, and poets of the Beat generation writers such as Allen
> Ginsberg , Jack Kerouac
> , and the artist Jacob Kainen
> , with whom he formed an
> enduring friendship. He was identified as the character 'Victor Villanueva'
> in Kerouac's *On the Road *,
> a Latin
> American poet. Tejera published and translated poems as well.
>
> In his early professional career, Tejera held diplomatic posts at the UN.
> He worked for the 

[PEIRCE-L] Brief note on the passing of V. Tejera at 95 years

[Atila Bayat]

Dear All,

Professor Tejera was a sometime contributor to the Peirce list in the mid
1990's in contact with J. Ransdell. He wrote two books in Semiotics, and
many articles as well. I can supply a complete bibliography upon request.
He contributed "The Centrality of Art in Classic American Philosophy" to
the Peirce sesquicentennial at Harvard in 1989 (which he asked me to read
on his behalf).

His 2 semiotics books were;

*1) Semiotics From Peirce to Barthes: A Conceptual Introduction to the
Study of Communication, Interpretation, and Expression* published by E.J.
Brill in 1988.

*2) Literature, Criticism, and the Theory of Signs* published by John
Benjamins in 1995.

My brief -

*Victorino Tejera, Scholar, Teacher, and Philosopher dies at 95.*

Victorino Tejera, Professor of Humanities emeritus of SUNY at Stony Brook
died suddenly on Saturday August 25 at a nursing rehabilitation home in New
York City. He was 95 years old and lived in New York City. Professor Tejera
was a Professor of Philosophy, Comparative Literature, and Humanities. He
taught at Stony Brook for more than 29 years, and taught previously at
Howard University, Rensselaer Polytechnic, and Georgetown University. He
wrote and published more than 15 books in the areas of Aesthetics,
Metaphysics, History of Philosophy, American Philosophy, and especially in
Classical Greek Thought.  He was made an honorary citizen of Lindos,
Rhodes, for his work on classical Greek culture.

Dr. Tejera was born in Caracas, Venezuela. His grandfather was the
President of Venezuela, Victorino Marquez Bustillos
, his
paternal great uncle was a notable Venezuelan writer and historian Felipe
Tejera. Tejera attended St. Mary's College in Southampton, England
, a boarding school, from
1930-1938, receiving his London Matriculate (university entry status
certificate) in 1939. He received a fellowship to study at Columbia
University  in the U.S.,
completing his Bachelor of Arts degree at the undergraduate college in
philosophy (Phi Beta Kappa
) in 1948. He also
completed his *docente* (teacher's training) at the Central University of
Venezuela in 1951.

His early philosophic passion was Greek Philosophy, and he received
instruction in Classical Greek from Fred Householder
. He studied History of
Philosophy, Aesthetics, and Literary Theory. He also attended summer
sessions in the late 1940's at the Kenyon School of English. In those early
years, Tejera’s teachers included the renowned intellectual and cultural
historians John H. Randall Jr.
, Justus Buchler
, Herbert W. Schneider
, Irwin Edman
, Mark Van Doren
, Jacques Barzun
, and Lionel Trilling
. While a PhD candidate, he
was graduate assistant to Irwin Edman
. He counts Andrew Chiappe, Alan
Willard Brown, and Quentin Anderson
 all among his other
outstanding teachers at Columbia. He was profoundly affected by the
writings of John Dewey , Charles
S. Peirce, and George Santayana
, as well as by the work
and literature of the New Critics
 John Crowe Ransom
, and Ivor Winters. His
art and literary interests in New York City enabled encounters with noted
artists, writers, and poets of the Beat generation writers such as Allen
Ginsberg , Jack Kerouac
, and the artist Jacob Kainen
, with whom he formed an
enduring friendship. He was identified as the character 'Victor Villanueva'
in Kerouac's *On the Road *,
a Latin
American poet. Tejera published and translated poems as well.

In his early professional career, Tejera held diplomatic posts at the UN.
He worked for the United Nations Secretariat, NY (Linguistic Consultant,
1946–49). He participated in the first simultaneous translations from
French and Spanish into English for the UN, serving under UN Secretary
Trygve.  Both Tejera and George
L. Sherry (Shershevsky) were acknowledged as the first at the UN for that
task. Additionally, 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jeff, Francesco, List:

JD:  My understanding is that the sign and not the immediate object that is
being classified as a vague, singular or general.


I agree; what I should have said was, "Consistent with his earlier division
of Signs according to the Immediate Object into vague/singular/general ..."

FB:  I think it is clear that the immediate object is an indication, and
does not "describe" or "predicate" anything of the object (unlike what Jon,
in a previous post, has suggested: "the object's characters/qualities
which, taken together, constitute its Immediate Object").


I agree; again, my view of the Immediate Object has evolved since I made
that comment a couple of months ago.  I currently see it as whatever
possesses the characters/qualities predicated by the Immediate
Interpretant, in accordance with the definitions of the Sign System
(Essential Information).

JD:  Do you have any suggestions for how we might understand this triadic
production of the proper effect of the sign?


As you might guess, my suggestion is that what Peirce meant by "the
intended, or proper, effect of the sign" in that particular passage
was the *Immediate
*Interpretant; especially since later in the same paragraph he described
the Interpretant that he had in mind as "all that is *explicit in the sign
itself* apart from its context and circumstances of utterance" (CP 5.473;
1907, bold added).  "Triadic production" in this case would then correspond
to what I have posited as the *doubly degenerate* triadic relation between
the Immediate Object, the Sign-Qualities (Tones) that facilitate
recognition of the Sign-Replica (Token) as an Instance of the Sign (Type)
within a given Sign System, and the Immediate Interpretant.

JD:  What, do you think, is the connection between the role of the
immediate object that stands in the triadic relation described at 5.473 and
the triadic relation of assurance that is part and parcel of inferential
processes (e.g., of thought)?


Let me respond to this question by posing another question--what should we
identify as the Immediate Object and Immediate Interpretant of an Argument?

JD:  What can we learn from the existential graphs and phenomenology about
... the role of the immediate object ... ?


My (admittedly limited) understanding of Existential Graphs is that they
can only represent Symbols, although as always those may *involve *Indices
and/or Icons.  Therefore, any Signs scribed on the Phemic Sheet are
Copulants.  On the other hand, Peirce's tentative 1908 division of Signs
according to the Mode of Presentation of the Immediate *Interpretant *was
Hypothetic/Categorical/Relative.  Like vague/singular/general, these terms
ordinarily name different kinds of *propositions*; and in the EGs, they are
distinguished by how many lines of identity are required to represent
them--zero for hypothetical, one for categorical, and more than one for
relative.  Does this shed any light on the nature and role of the Immediate
Interpretant?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 2:50 PM, Francesco Bellucci <
bellucci.france...@googlemail.com> wrote:

> Jeff, List
>
> thanks for your comments. Further thoughts are interspersed:
>
>> My understanding is that the *sign *and not the *immediate object* that
>> is being classified as a vague, singular or general. The classification is
>> based on the immediate object having the character of a presentation that
>> is a possible, existent or necessitant. In the case of the immediate
>> object, things are somewhat more complicated than in the case of, say, the
>> classification of signs based on the nature of the dynamical object. The
>> reason, of course, is that the immediate object is, in some sense, a part
>> of or an aspect of the sign.
>>
> Right, it's the sign that is vague, singular, or general. Of course, we
> should take notice of Peirce's caveat "in the same respect"(R 9, pp. 2–3).
> The multiple quantified sign "Every catholic adores some woman" is general
> with respect to catholics and vague with respect to women.
>
>> Having said that, I am supposing that the immediate object serves a
>> particular function in its relation to the sign and interpretant. Peirce
>> suggests at CP 8.314 where he offers the example of a conversation he had
>> with Juliette about the weather that the immediate object serves the
>> function of conveying the "notion of the present weather so far as this
>> is common to her mind and mine -- not the character of it, but the identity
>> of it." There are two interesting suggestions here. One that the
>> immediate object seems to serve as a mark of the identity of the object
>> under discussion. The second suggestion is that the immediate object can be
>> something that is held in common by two people who are part of a dialogue.
>>
> I think it is clear that the 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Francesco, list:



In London, a person gets mugged every ten minutes.

And he’s getting mighty sick of it!



Why is this joke funny?



~Katy Sarah Jones,

Towards an understanding of the use of indefinite expressions for definite
reference in English discourse



With best wishes,
Jerry R


On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 3:41 PM, Francesco Bellucci <
bellucci.france...@googlemail.com> wrote:

> Now I understand better wath Jon meant with the following
>
> JAS: the generality of the Object *itself *(Abstractive/Concretive/Collective)
> has absolutely no bearing on the nature of its *relation *to the Sign
> (Icon/Index/Symbol), since these correspond to *different *trichotomies
> for classifying Signs.
>
> He meant that the fact that an object is general does not imply that the
> sign is a symbol. If with "general" it is meant "whatever possesses certain
> characters", this is obviosuly and patently false:
>
> CSP: "There are three kinds of representamens, or signs: icons, or images;
> indices; and symbols, or general signs" (R 492, 1903)
>
> CSP: "All general, or definable, Words, whether in the sense of Types or
> of Tokens, are certainly Symbols. That is to say, they denote the objects
> that they do by virtue only of there being a habit that associates their
> signification with them." (Prolegomena, 1906)
>
> "Deduction involves the analysis of the meanings of general signs, i.e. of
> symbols", CSP to F. A. Woods, R L 477 (1913).
>
> Best
> Francesco
>
>
>
> On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 10:26 PM, Francesco Bellucci <
> bellucci.france...@googlemail.com> wrote:
>
>> Jon, List
>>>
>>> JAS: As I understand it, the subject of a proposition is a Rheme whose
>>> Object is also an Object of the proposition.  Should we understand the
>>> Immediate Object of a proposition to be a Sign?
>>>
>>
>> If one agrees that the subject of a proposition is its imemdiate object,
>> of course yes, the immediate object of the proposition is a sign (usually,
>> a rhematic index).
>>
>>>
>>> FB:  The statue is an Actisign, but its object is general, and thus is a
>>> Symbol. But according to the rules, a Symbol cannot be an Actisign. The
>>> problem is already here.
>>>
>>>
>>> JAS: The second sentence here is true, but the first sentence is false;
>>> the generality of the Object *itself *(Abstractive/Concretive/Collective)
>>> has absolutely no bearing on the nature of its *relation *to the Sign
>>> (Icon/Index/Symbol), since these correspond to *different *trichotomies
>>> for classifying Signs.  A Collective Actisign Icon is perfectly consistent
>>> with Peirce's later taxonomies.
>>>
>>
>> Is the generality of the object itself still a fourth kind of generality?
>> Where does Peirce speaks of a general dynamic object in itself? As I see
>> it, when a sign has a general dynamic object, that sign is a symbol.
>> Talking of abstractive, concretive and collective in this context only
>> confuses things I think. Unless you use "general" in the sense of
>> "necessitant" (see below).
>>
>> Also, to say that a given combination is perfectly consistent would mean
>> that the order of the ten trichotomies has been determined, which Peirce
>> was far from having done. I guess many of your comments depend on such
>> ordering, but since Peirce did not provide a definitive ordering, I wonder
>> whether we are going beyond exegesis.
>>
>>
>>>
>>> JAS: he thus classified a particular proposition ("Some *S* is *P*") as
>>> a Descriptive Symbol, which is *impossible*; all Symbols, and therefore
>>> all propositions, are Copulatives.  Even if we treat it as a
>>> Sinsign/Actisign serving as a Replica, it could only be either a
>>> Designative or a Copulative.
>>>
>>
>> In order for a descriptive symbol to be impossible, the trichotomy
>> descriptives, designative, and copulants has to precede in order the
>> trichotomy icon, index, symbol. Do you have any evidence that Peirce
>> established such ordering?
>>
>> Also, and more importantly, you say that "all Symbols, and therefore all
>> propositions, are Copulatives". Leaving aside whether it is true that they
>> are copulatives. From your use of "therefore" I infer that you think that
>> propositions can only be symbolic. Do you exclude the possibility of
>> indexical propositions?
>>
>>
>>>
>>> FB:  Also, I don't understand whether you are using "general object" in
>>> the sense of the object of a symbol or in the sense of distributive
>>> generality, or in neither sense.
>>>
>>>
>>> JAS: By "General Object" I mean basically what Peirce called the Dynamic
>>> Object of a Collective Sign.
>>>
>>
>> Peirce says "For a Sign whose Dynamoid Object is a Necessitant, I have at
>> present no better designation than a Collective" (EP 2: 480). Are you using
>> general in the sense of necessitant? And if yes, what's the purpose of
>> doing this, given that three other kinds of semiotic generality are around?
>>
>> Francesco
>>
>> On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 12:14 PM, Francesco Bellucci <
>>> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Francesco Bellucci]

Now I understand better wath Jon meant with the following

JAS: the generality of the Object *itself *(Abstractive/Concretive/Collective)
has absolutely no bearing on the nature of its *relation *to the Sign
(Icon/Index/Symbol), since these correspond to *different *trichotomies for
classifying Signs.

He meant that the fact that an object is general does not imply that the
sign is a symbol. If with "general" it is meant "whatever possesses certain
characters", this is obviosuly and patently false:

CSP: "There are three kinds of representamens, or signs: icons, or images;
indices; and symbols, or general signs" (R 492, 1903)

CSP: "All general, or definable, Words, whether in the sense of Types or of
Tokens, are certainly Symbols. That is to say, they denote the objects that
they do by virtue only of there being a habit that associates their
signification with them." (Prolegomena, 1906)

"Deduction involves the analysis of the meanings of general signs, i.e. of
symbols", CSP to F. A. Woods, R L 477 (1913).

Best
Francesco



On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 10:26 PM, Francesco Bellucci  wrote:

> Jon, List
>>
>> JAS: As I understand it, the subject of a proposition is a Rheme whose
>> Object is also an Object of the proposition.  Should we understand the
>> Immediate Object of a proposition to be a Sign?
>>
>
> If one agrees that the subject of a proposition is its imemdiate object,
> of course yes, the immediate object of the proposition is a sign (usually,
> a rhematic index).
>
>>
>> FB:  The statue is an Actisign, but its object is general, and thus is a
>> Symbol. But according to the rules, a Symbol cannot be an Actisign. The
>> problem is already here.
>>
>>
>> JAS: The second sentence here is true, but the first sentence is false;
>> the generality of the Object *itself *(Abstractive/Concretive/Collective)
>> has absolutely no bearing on the nature of its *relation *to the Sign
>> (Icon/Index/Symbol), since these correspond to *different *trichotomies
>> for classifying Signs.  A Collective Actisign Icon is perfectly consistent
>> with Peirce's later taxonomies.
>>
>
> Is the generality of the object itself still a fourth kind of generality?
> Where does Peirce speaks of a general dynamic object in itself? As I see
> it, when a sign has a general dynamic object, that sign is a symbol.
> Talking of abstractive, concretive and collective in this context only
> confuses things I think. Unless you use "general" in the sense of
> "necessitant" (see below).
>
> Also, to say that a given combination is perfectly consistent would mean
> that the order of the ten trichotomies has been determined, which Peirce
> was far from having done. I guess many of your comments depend on such
> ordering, but since Peirce did not provide a definitive ordering, I wonder
> whether we are going beyond exegesis.
>
>
>>
>> JAS: he thus classified a particular proposition ("Some *S* is *P*") as
>> a Descriptive Symbol, which is *impossible*; all Symbols, and therefore
>> all propositions, are Copulatives.  Even if we treat it as a
>> Sinsign/Actisign serving as a Replica, it could only be either a
>> Designative or a Copulative.
>>
>
> In order for a descriptive symbol to be impossible, the trichotomy
> descriptives, designative, and copulants has to precede in order the
> trichotomy icon, index, symbol. Do you have any evidence that Peirce
> established such ordering?
>
> Also, and more importantly, you say that "all Symbols, and therefore all
> propositions, are Copulatives". Leaving aside whether it is true that they
> are copulatives. From your use of "therefore" I infer that you think that
> propositions can only be symbolic. Do you exclude the possibility of
> indexical propositions?
>
>
>>
>> FB:  Also, I don't understand whether you are using "general object" in
>> the sense of the object of a symbol or in the sense of distributive
>> generality, or in neither sense.
>>
>>
>> JAS: By "General Object" I mean basically what Peirce called the Dynamic
>> Object of a Collective Sign.
>>
>
> Peirce says "For a Sign whose Dynamoid Object is a Necessitant, I have at
> present no better designation than a Collective" (EP 2: 480). Are you using
> general in the sense of necessitant? And if yes, what's the purpose of
> doing this, given that three other kinds of semiotic generality are around?
>
> Francesco
>
> On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 12:14 PM, Francesco Bellucci <
>> bellucci.france...@googlemail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Jon, List
>>>
>>> thanks for these observations. My comments are interspersed below.
>>>
>>> On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 5:39 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
>>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
 Francesco, List:

 I need to digest your latest reply before responding, but it seems to
 move on to more fundamental issues than the quantification aspect of the
 Immediate Object, and I wanted to offer a few more comments about the
 latter.

>>>
>>> I beg you to notice that my posts have all been about the 

[PEIRCE-L] A brief introduction/exploration of 'type' (Gary Fuhrman)

[Gary Richmond]

List,

I would encourage all here who are interested in the type/token distinction
to read Gary Fuhrman's most recent, and useful blog entry, "Earthtypes"
http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2018/09/earthtypes/
which includes the informative Online Etymology entry on 'type'
https://www.etymonline.com/word/type

(Here's a link to the Etymology site itself https://www.etymonline.com
where you can, for example, also look up the much shorter entry on 'token'.)

In todays blog post, Gary also provides a link to an excellent and visually
beautiful slide show he created principally on 'type'
http://gnusystems.ca/TS/Type.pdf
and, as is often the case in his blog entries, comments on and references
to Peirce are made, including Peirce quotations on the topic at hand.

Within his blog entries Gary also typically(!) points to short sections of
his book, *Turning Signs*, http://gnusystems.ca/TS/TWindex.htm  these being
passages directly relating to the current blog entry, today, naturally, to
a discussion of Peirce's comments on 'type'
http://gnusystems.ca/TS/dlg.htm#typtok

I read Gary's book in part as he was writing it and finally in its
'completed' versions (there's an aspect of it which is, by design, never
meant to be completed), that is both on-line and in hard copy. I highly
recommend it. The book has both an unusual, quite original content, and a
very unique structure. In the introduction to the book he briefly discusses
both:

*Turning Signs* is an essay about life, the universe and everything that
*means* something. It's also an interlinked network of thoughts and
observations about such things, written or transcribed by the author or by
anyone else who cares to contribute their ideas.

The essay part (or Obverse side) of *Turning Signs* was completed in
September 2015 and is now available as a printed book
. It took 15 years of research and
revision, and 70 years of a human life, to reach that state of completion.
It serves as a stable context for the other (Reverse) side of *Turning
Signs*, which is incomplete and open-ended (rather like life itself). This
consists of current thoughtnotes appearing daily on the author's blog
, along with comments and questions by other
readers and writers. These thoughtnotes are also collected into *rePatches*,
listed above next to the Chapters they correspond to, and named according
to their content.

This netbook draws upon various arts, sciences and religious traditions in
an attempt to throw some light on the deeper qualities of life we are often
too busy to notice. I have documented my sources, to the best of my
ability, by means of parenthetical citations and a reference list
 so that interested readers can locate
them if they wish to. But no specialized or academic background is
required. I've also included hypertext links so that readers who are so
inclined can take side trips from the main train of thought running through
the sequential chapters of the book's Obverse side.

All readers are invited to post comments or questions on the Turning Signs
blog  or e-mail me privately by using the
Contact Me button on th

I joined Gary's blog when it was first created and always very much look
forward to reading it, occasionally posting responses to his blog entries
which, by the way, do not come with too great a frequency (so I'm able to
digest each completely). I'd encourage all, perhaps especially those with
"no specialized or academic background," to read his book and follow his
blog.

Best,

Gary







*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*

*718 482-5690*

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Francesco Bellucci]

>
> Jon, List
>
> JAS: As I understand it, the subject of a proposition is a Rheme whose
> Object is also an Object of the proposition.  Should we understand the
> Immediate Object of a proposition to be a Sign?
>

If one agrees that the subject of a proposition is its imemdiate object, of
course yes, the immediate object of the proposition is a sign (usually, a
rhematic index).

>
> FB:  The statue is an Actisign, but its object is general, and thus is a
> Symbol. But according to the rules, a Symbol cannot be an Actisign. The
> problem is already here.
>
>
> JAS: The second sentence here is true, but the first sentence is false;
> the generality of the Object *itself *(Abstractive/Concretive/Collective)
> has absolutely no bearing on the nature of its *relation *to the Sign
> (Icon/Index/Symbol), since these correspond to *different *trichotomies
> for classifying Signs.  A Collective Actisign Icon is perfectly consistent
> with Peirce's later taxonomies.
>

Is the generality of the object itself still a fourth kind of generality?
Where does Peirce speaks of a general dynamic object in itself? As I see
it, when a sign has a general dynamic object, that sign is a symbol.
Talking of abstractive, concretive and collective in this context only
confuses things I think. Unless you use "general" in the sense of
"necessitant" (see below).

Also, to say that a given combination is perfectly consistent would mean
that the order of the ten trichotomies has been determined, which Peirce
was far from having done. I guess many of your comments depend on such
ordering, but since Peirce did not provide a definitive ordering, I wonder
whether we are going beyond exegesis.


>
> JAS: he thus classified a particular proposition ("Some *S* is *P*") as a
> Descriptive Symbol, which is *impossible*; all Symbols, and therefore all
> propositions, are Copulatives.  Even if we treat it as a Sinsign/Actisign
> serving as a Replica, it could only be either a Designative or a Copulative.
>

In order for a descriptive symbol to be impossible, the trichotomy
descriptives, designative, and copulants has to precede in order the
trichotomy icon, index, symbol. Do you have any evidence that Peirce
established such ordering?

Also, and more importantly, you say that "all Symbols, and therefore all
propositions, are Copulatives". Leaving aside whether it is true that they
are copulatives. From your use of "therefore" I infer that you think that
propositions can only be symbolic. Do you exclude the possibility of
indexical propositions?


>
> FB:  Also, I don't understand whether you are using "general object" in
> the sense of the object of a symbol or in the sense of distributive
> generality, or in neither sense.
>
>
> JAS: By "General Object" I mean basically what Peirce called the Dynamic
> Object of a Collective Sign.
>

Peirce says "For a Sign whose Dynamoid Object is a Necessitant, I have at
present no better designation than a Collective" (EP 2: 480). Are you using
general in the sense of necessitant? And if yes, what's the purpose of
doing this, given that three other kinds of semiotic generality are around?

Francesco

On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 12:14 PM, Francesco Bellucci <
> bellucci.france...@googlemail.com> wrote:
>
>> Jon, List
>>
>> thanks for these observations. My comments are interspersed below.
>>
>> On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 5:39 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Francesco, List:
>>>
>>> I need to digest your latest reply before responding, but it seems to
>>> move on to more fundamental issues than the quantification aspect of the
>>> Immediate Object, and I wanted to offer a few more comments about the
>>> latter.
>>>
>>
>> I beg you to notice that my posts have all been about the immediate
>> object intended as the subject of a proposition
>>
>>>
>>> Consistent with his earlier division of the Immediate Object into
>>> vague/singular/general, Peirce in 1908 explicitly characterized particular
>>> and universal propositions as Descriptives and Copulatives, respectively,
>>> while discussing the example of the many statues of Civil War soldiers that
>>> one could find throughout the northern United States in the early 20th
>>> century.
>>>
>>> CSP:  That statue is one piece of granite, and not a Famisign. Yet it is
>>> what we call a "General" sign, meaning that it is *applicable *to many
>>> singulars. It is not *itself* General: it is its Object which is taken
>>> to be General. And yet this Object is not truly Universal, in the sense of
>>> implying a truth of the kind of "Any *S* is *P*"; it only expresses
>>> "Some *S* is *P*." This makes it *not *a //*Copulant*/*Copulative*//
>>> but only a *Descriptive*. (EP 2:486)
>>>
>>>
>>> As an actual piece of granite, the statue is obviously an Actisign;
>>> i.e., an individual Instance (Token) of a general Sign (Type).  Peirce here
>>> further classified it as a Descriptive, because he held that the equivalent
>>> proposition would be 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Francesco, list,



Thanks for being patient with me for it is not obvious to me, yet.



You said:

The statue of Peirce's example is an Actisign because it is a singular that
acts as a sign



But what I was asking is, given that that is the rule to which you refer
when you say,

As an actual piece of granite, *the* statue is obviously an Actisign



Do you mean to say that is how you were intending to mean by “the” statue?

That is, why did you say *the* statue and not *that* statue, when Peirce
used the demonstrative pronoun, *that,* and not the definite article, *the*?


That is what is not obvious to me.



With best wishes,

Jerry R


On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 3:03 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Francesco, List:
>
> FB:  I beg you to notice that my posts have all been about the immediate
> object intended as the subject of a proposition
>
>
> As I understand it, the subject of a proposition is a Rheme whose Object
> is also an Object of the proposition.  Should we understand the Immediate
> Object of a proposition to be a Sign?
>
> FB:  The statue is an Actisign, but its object is general, and thus is a
> Symbol. But according to the rules, a Symbol cannot be an Actisign. The
> problem is already here.
>
>
> The second sentence here is true, but the first sentence is false; the
> generality of the Object *itself *(Abstractive/Concretive/Collective) has
> absolutely no bearing on the nature of its *relation *to the Sign
> (Icon/Index/Symbol), since these correspond to *different *trichotomies
> for classifying Signs.  A Collective Actisign Icon is perfectly consistent
> with Peirce's later taxonomies.
>
> FB:  Perhaps the solution is that a Symbol cannot be a "normal" Actisign
> but it can be an Actisign which is a replica of a Famisign. The distinction
> between standard Sinsigns and Replicas comes from the Syllabus.
>
>
> Indeed--what I have been suggesting on the List for some time now is that *all
> *Signs are general Types, such that there are no Sinsigns/Actisigns other
> than Replicas (Tokens), and there are no Qualisigns/Potisigns other than
> significant characters (Tones) embodied in Replicas.  This is my
> interpretation of Peirce's statements that "a sign is not a real thing.  It
> is of such a nature as to exist in *replicas*" (EP 2:303; 1904); and "the
> sign's mode of being is ... such that it consists in the existence of
> replicas destined to bring its interpreter into relation to some object ...
> The sign only exists in replicas" (NEM 4:297,300; 1904).  That which is a
> real *thing*--i.e., that which exists in itself (Matter) or as embodied
> characters (Form)--*cannot *be a Sign (Entelechy).
>
> FB:  I think he was not wrong to classify particular propositions as
> Descriptives, the passage clearly shows that with "Descriptive" he means
> "Some S is P".
>
>
> Yes, but he thus classified a particular proposition ("Some *S* is *P*")
> as a Descriptive Symbol, which is *impossible*; all Symbols, and
> therefore all propositions, are Copulatives.  Even if we treat it as a
> Sinsign/Actisign serving as a Replica, it could only be either a
> Designative or a Copulative.
>
> FB:  Also, I don't understand whether you are using "general object" in
> the sense of the object of a symbol or in the sense of distributive
> generality, or in neither sense.
>
>
> By "General Object" I mean basically what Peirce called the Dynamic Object
> of a Collective Sign.  If I am right that all Signs are Types, then it
> follows that all Signs have General Objects; i.e., all Signs are
> Collectives.  However, rather than *classifying *Signs, my organizing
> principle is recognizing that there are three kinds of *triadic relations*
> in semiosis--genuine, between the General Object, Sign (Type), and Final
> Interpretant; degenerate, between each individual Dynamic Object,
> Sign-Replica (Token), and Dynamic Interpretant; and doubly degenerate,
> between an Immediate Object, a set of Sign-Qualities (Tone), and an
> Immediate Interpretant.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 12:14 PM, Francesco Bellucci  googlemail.com> wrote:
>
>> Jon, List
>>
>> thanks for these observations. My comments are interspersed below.
>>
>> On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 5:39 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Francesco, List:
>>>
>>> I need to digest your latest reply before responding, but it seems to
>>> move on to more fundamental issues than the quantification aspect of the
>>> Immediate Object, and I wanted to offer a few more comments about the
>>> latter.
>>>
>>
>> I beg you to notice that my posts have all been about the immediate
>> object intended as the subject of a proposition
>>
>>>
>>> Consistent with his earlier division of the Immediate Object into
>>> vague/singular/general, Peirce in 1908 explicitly characterized 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Francesco, List:

FB:  I beg you to notice that my posts have all been about the immediate
object intended as the subject of a proposition


As I understand it, the subject of a proposition is a Rheme whose Object is
also an Object of the proposition.  Should we understand the Immediate
Object of a proposition to be a Sign?

FB:  The statue is an Actisign, but its object is general, and thus is a
Symbol. But according to the rules, a Symbol cannot be an Actisign. The
problem is already here.


The second sentence here is true, but the first sentence is false; the
generality of the Object *itself *(Abstractive/Concretive/Collective) has
absolutely no bearing on the nature of its *relation *to the Sign
(Icon/Index/Symbol), since these correspond to *different *trichotomies for
classifying Signs.  A Collective Actisign Icon is perfectly consistent with
Peirce's later taxonomies.

FB:  Perhaps the solution is that a Symbol cannot be a "normal" Actisign
but it can be an Actisign which is a replica of a Famisign. The distinction
between standard Sinsigns and Replicas comes from the Syllabus.


Indeed--what I have been suggesting on the List for some time now is that *all
*Signs are general Types, such that there are no Sinsigns/Actisigns other
than Replicas (Tokens), and there are no Qualisigns/Potisigns other than
significant characters (Tones) embodied in Replicas.  This is my
interpretation of Peirce's statements that "a sign is not a real thing.  It
is of such a nature as to exist in *replicas*" (EP 2:303; 1904); and "the
sign's mode of being is ... such that it consists in the existence of
replicas destined to bring its interpreter into relation to some object ...
The sign only exists in replicas" (NEM 4:297,300; 1904).  That which is a
real *thing*--i.e., that which exists in itself (Matter) or as embodied
characters (Form)--*cannot *be a Sign (Entelechy).

FB:  I think he was not wrong to classify particular propositions as
Descriptives, the passage clearly shows that with "Descriptive" he means
"Some S is P".


Yes, but he thus classified a particular proposition ("Some *S* is *P*") as
a Descriptive Symbol, which is *impossible*; all Symbols, and therefore all
propositions, are Copulatives.  Even if we treat it as a Sinsign/Actisign
serving as a Replica, it could only be either a Designative or a Copulative.

FB:  Also, I don't understand whether you are using "general object" in the
sense of the object of a symbol or in the sense of distributive generality,
or in neither sense.


By "General Object" I mean basically what Peirce called the Dynamic Object
of a Collective Sign.  If I am right that all Signs are Types, then it
follows that all Signs have General Objects; i.e., all Signs are
Collectives.  However, rather than *classifying *Signs, my organizing
principle is recognizing that there are three kinds of *triadic relations*
in semiosis--genuine, between the General Object, Sign (Type), and Final
Interpretant; degenerate, between each individual Dynamic Object,
Sign-Replica (Token), and Dynamic Interpretant; and doubly degenerate,
between an Immediate Object, a set of Sign-Qualities (Tone), and an
Immediate Interpretant.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 12:14 PM, Francesco Bellucci <
bellucci.france...@googlemail.com> wrote:

> Jon, List
>
> thanks for these observations. My comments are interspersed below.
>
> On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 5:39 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  > wrote:
>
>> Francesco, List:
>>
>> I need to digest your latest reply before responding, but it seems to
>> move on to more fundamental issues than the quantification aspect of the
>> Immediate Object, and I wanted to offer a few more comments about the
>> latter.
>>
>
> I beg you to notice that my posts have all been about the immediate object
> intended as the subject of a proposition
>
>>
>> Consistent with his earlier division of the Immediate Object into
>> vague/singular/general, Peirce in 1908 explicitly characterized particular
>> and universal propositions as Descriptives and Copulatives, respectively,
>> while discussing the example of the many statues of Civil War soldiers that
>> one could find throughout the northern United States in the early 20th
>> century.
>>
>> CSP:  That statue is one piece of granite, and not a Famisign. Yet it is
>> what we call a "General" sign, meaning that it is *applicable *to many
>> singulars. It is not *itself* General: it is its Object which is taken
>> to be General. And yet this Object is not truly Universal, in the sense of
>> implying a truth of the kind of "Any *S* is *P*"; it only expresses "Some
>>  *S* is *P*." This makes it *not *a //*Copulant*/*Copulative*// but only
>> a *Descriptive*. (EP 2:486)
>>
>>
>> As an actual piece of granite, the statue is obviously an Actisign; i.e.,
>> an individual Instance (Token) of a 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Francesco Bellucci]

Dear Jerry R.

The statue of Peirce's example is an Actisign because it is a singular that
acts as a sign

Best
Francesco

On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 9:46 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:

> Dear Francesco, list,
>
>
>
> Peirce said:
>
> *That* statue is one piece of granite, and not a Famisign.
>
>
>
> You said:
>
> As an actual piece of granite, *the* statue is obviously an Actisign
>
>
>
> Is there here a difference between *that* statue and *the* statue?
>
> That is, why is the statue an Actisign, and obviously so?
>
>
>
> Thanks,
> Jerry R
>
>
> On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 2:24 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <
> jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:
>
>> List, Jeff:
>>
>> On Sep 5, 2018, at 1:43 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
>> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:
>>
>> Following the suggestion that John Sowa has made, I think that an appeal
>> to Peirce's work in formal logic--especially the later work on the
>> existential graphs--might provide us with useful tools for making a more
>> minute analysis of examples. What is more, I think that the application of
>> such formal tools would be considerably aided if we also employed the tools
>> of phenomenological analysis when looking at particular cases of
>> inference--such as when we are looking at the role of the immediate object
>> in Peirce's discussion with Juliette about the weather. What can we learn
>> from the existential graphs and phenomenology about the dialogue that is
>> taking place between the two--and the role of the immediate object in
>> explaining what it is being conveyed as the conversation progresses from
>> Juliette's question to Peirce's reply to the decisions she makes about how
>> to prepare for her day?
>>
>> Yours,
>>
>> Jeff
>>
>>
>> Your suggestion is an important one.
>>
>> I feel that it part of the deeper issue of the role of the concept of
>> identity in bridging the communications gap between the origin of the sign
>> and the meaning of the sign for someone who may also be interpreting the
>> same sign.
>>
>> As I have previously noted, the issue of the capability of interpreting a
>> form of a sign with a form of responding conceptually to the sign, varies
>> widely.  In part, it is a matter of feelings about earlier events which can
>> trigger recall of similar signs.  Such feelings may exist in one observer
>> but not the other.
>>
>> (Metaphorically, the two observers may have elaborated two radically
>> different sheets of assertion before the sign-event became a shared
>> experience.)
>>
>> Cheers
>>
>> Jerry
>>
>>
>> -
>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
>> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
>> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce
>> -l/peirce-l.htm .
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Francesco Bellucci]

Jeff, List

thanks for your comments. Further thoughts are interspersed:

My understanding is that the *sign *and not the *immediate object* that is
> being classified as a vague, singular or general. The classification is
> based on the immediate object having the character of a presentation that
> is a possible, existent or necessitant. In the case of the immediate
> object, things are somewhat more complicated than in the case of, say, the
> classification of signs based on the nature of the dynamical object. The
> reason, of course, is that the immediate object is, in some sense, a part
> of or an aspect of the sign.
>
Right, it's the sign that is vague, singular, or general. Of course, we
should take notice of Peirce's caveat "in the same respect"(R 9, pp. 2–3).
The multiple quantified sign "Every catholic adores some woman" is general
with respect to catholics and vague with respect to women.

> Having said that, I am supposing that the immediate object serves a
> particular function in its relation to the sign and interpretant. Peirce
> suggests at CP 8.314 where he offers the example of a conversation he had
> with Juliette about the weather that the immediate object serves the
> function of conveying the "notion of the present weather so far as this
> is common to her mind and mine -- not the character of it, but the identity
> of it." There are two interesting suggestions here. One that the immediate
> object seems to serve as a mark of the identity of the object under
> discussion. The second suggestion is that the immediate object can be
> something that is held in common by two people who are part of a dialogue.
>
I think it is clear that the immediate object is an indication, and does
not "describe" or "predicate" anything of the object (unlike what Jon, in a
previous post, has suggested: "the object's characters/qualities which,
taken together, constitute its Immediate Object"). And since it is an
indication, it is something that utterer and interpreter must share: so if
I say "Napoleon is lethargic" I presume that you know what the proper name
"Napoleon" designes. The same is true of the quantifiers: if I say
"everything is lethargic" I presume that you understand what universe of
discourse the variable may range in.

> What other functions does the immediate object serve?  At CP 5.473, he
> says that "a mental representation of the index is produced, which mental
> representation is called the *immediate object *of the sign; and this
> object does triadically produce the intended, or proper, effect of the sign
> strictly by means of another mental sign;..." One thing that strikes me
> about this passage is that it is the immediate object and not, apparently,
> the dynamical object, that has a role in triadically producing the proper
> effect of the sign. Do you have any suggestions for how we might understand
> this triadic production of the proper effect of the sign?
>
No suggestion, this passage is obscure to me.

> In the late classification of signs, Peirce characterizes the assurance in
> the relationship between the object, sign and interpretant in terms of a
> triadic relation. He indicates that the sign is classified in terms of an
> assurance of instinct where the inference is abductive, experience where
> the inference is inductive, or form where the inference is deductive. What,
> do you think, is the connection between the role of the immediate object
> that stands in the triadic relation described at 5.473 and the triadic
> relation of assurance that is part and parcel of inferential processes
> (e.g., of thought)?
>
No idea. I only note that the "triadic" description of the three forms of
inference in that context is probably meant to signalize that the "perfect"
(i.e. perfectly triadic) sign-relation is only found in arguments.

Best
F


>
> Following the suggestion that John Sowa has made, I think that an appeal
> to Peirce's work in formal logic--especially the later work on the
> existential graphs--might provide us with useful tools for making a more
> minute analysis of examples. What is more, I think that the application of
> such formal tools would be considerably aided if we also employed the tools
> of phenomenological analysis when looking at particular cases of
> inference--such as when we are looking at the role of the immediate object
> in Peirce's discussion with Juliette about the weather. What can we learn
> from the existential graphs and phenomenology about the dialogue that is
> taking place between the two--and the role of the immediate object in
> explaining what it is being conveyed as the conversation progresses from
> Juliette's question to Peirce's reply to the decisions she makes about how
> to prepare for her day?
>
>
> Yours,
>
>
> Jeff
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
> --
> *From:* Francesco Bellucci 
> *Sent:* Wednesday, 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Francesco, list,



Peirce said:

*That* statue is one piece of granite, and not a Famisign.



You said:

As an actual piece of granite, *the* statue is obviously an Actisign



Is there here a difference between *that* statue and *the* statue?

That is, why is the statue an Actisign, and obviously so?



Thanks,
Jerry R


On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 2:24 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> List, Jeff:
>
> On Sep 5, 2018, at 1:43 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard 
> wrote:
>
> Following the suggestion that John Sowa has made, I think that an appeal
> to Peirce's work in formal logic--especially the later work on the
> existential graphs--might provide us with useful tools for making a more
> minute analysis of examples. What is more, I think that the application of
> such formal tools would be considerably aided if we also employed the tools
> of phenomenological analysis when looking at particular cases of
> inference--such as when we are looking at the role of the immediate object
> in Peirce's discussion with Juliette about the weather. What can we learn
> from the existential graphs and phenomenology about the dialogue that is
> taking place between the two--and the role of the immediate object in
> explaining what it is being conveyed as the conversation progresses from
> Juliette's question to Peirce's reply to the decisions she makes about how
> to prepare for her day?
>
> Yours,
>
> Jeff
>
>
> Your suggestion is an important one.
>
> I feel that it part of the deeper issue of the role of the concept of
> identity in bridging the communications gap between the origin of the sign
> and the meaning of the sign for someone who may also be interpreting the
> same sign.
>
> As I have previously noted, the issue of the capability of interpreting a
> form of a sign with a form of responding conceptually to the sign, varies
> widely.  In part, it is a matter of feelings about earlier events which can
> trigger recall of similar signs.  Such feelings may exist in one observer
> but not the other.
>
> (Metaphorically, the two observers may have elaborated two radically
> different sheets of assertion before the sign-event became a shared
> experience.)
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Jeff: 
> On Sep 5, 2018, at 1:43 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard  
> wrote:
> 
> Following the suggestion that John Sowa has made, I think that an appeal to 
> Peirce's work in formal logic--especially the later work on the existential 
> graphs--might provide us with useful tools for making a more minute analysis 
> of examples. What is more, I think that the application of such formal tools 
> would be considerably aided if we also employed the tools of phenomenological 
> analysis when looking at particular cases of inference--such as when we are 
> looking at the role of the immediate object in Peirce's discussion with 
> Juliette about the weather. What can we learn from the existential graphs and 
> phenomenology about the dialogue that is taking place between the two--and 
> the role of the immediate object in explaining what it is being conveyed as 
> the conversation progresses from Juliette's question to Peirce's reply to the 
> decisions she makes about how to prepare for her day?
> 
> Yours,
> 
> Jeff
> 

Your suggestion is an important one.

I feel that it part of the deeper issue of the role of the concept of identity 
in bridging the communications gap between the origin of the sign and the 
meaning of the sign for someone who may also be interpreting the same sign. 

As I have previously noted, the issue of the capability of interpreting a form 
of a sign with a form of responding conceptually to the sign, varies widely.  
In part, it is a matter of feelings about earlier events which can trigger 
recall of similar signs.  Such feelings may exist in one observer but not the 
other. 

(Metaphorically, the two observers may have elaborated two radically different 
sheets of assertion before the sign-event became a shared experience.)

Cheers

Jerry
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to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Jon S, Francesco, List,


Let me start with a quick and minor remark.


Jon says:  "Consistent with his earlier division of the Immediate Object into 
vague/singular/general,..."


My understanding is that the sign and not the immediate object that is being 
classified as a vague, singular or general. The classification is based on the 
immediate object having the character of a presentation that is a possible, 
existent or necessitant. In the case of the immediate object, things are 
somewhat more complicated than in the case of, say, the classification of signs 
based on the nature of the dynamical object. The reason, of course, is that the 
immediate object is, in some sense, a part of or an aspect of the sign.


Having said that, I am supposing that the immediate object serves a particular 
function in its relation to the sign and interpretant. Peirce suggests at CP 
8.314 where he offers the example of a conversation he had with Juliette about 
the weather that the immediate object serves the function of conveying the 
"notion of the present weather so far as this is common to her mind and mine -- 
not the character of it, but the identity of it." There are two interesting 
suggestions here. One that the immediate object seems to serve as a mark of the 
identity of the object under discussion. The second suggestion is that the 
immediate object can be something that is held in common by two people who are 
part of a dialogue.


What other functions does the immediate object serve?  At CP 5.473, he says 
that "a mental representation of the index is produced, which mental 
representation is called the immediate object of the sign; and this object does 
triadically produce the intended, or proper, effect of the sign strictly by 
means of another mental sign;..." One thing that strikes me about this passage 
is that it is the immediate object and not, apparently, the dynamical object, 
that has a role in triadically producing the proper effect of the sign. Do you 
have any suggestions for how we might understand this triadic production of the 
proper effect of the sign?


In the late classification of signs, Peirce characterizes the assurance in the 
relationship between the object, sign and interpretant in terms of a triadic 
relation. He indicates that the sign is classified in terms of an assurance of 
instinct where the inference is abductive, experience where the inference is 
inductive, or form where the inference is deductive. What, do you think, is the 
connection between the role of the immediate object that stands in the triadic 
relation described at 5.473 and the triadic relation of assurance that is part 
and parcel of inferential processes (e.g., of thought)?


Following the suggestion that John Sowa has made, I think that an appeal to 
Peirce's work in formal logic--especially the later work on the existential 
graphs--might provide us with useful tools for making a more minute analysis of 
examples. What is more, I think that the application of such formal tools would 
be considerably aided if we also employed the tools of phenomenological 
analysis when looking at particular cases of inference--such as when we are 
looking at the role of the immediate object in Peirce's discussion with 
Juliette about the weather. What can we learn from the existential graphs and 
phenomenology about the dialogue that is taking place between the two--and the 
role of the immediate object in explaining what it is being conveyed as the 
conversation progresses from Juliette's question to Peirce's reply to the 
decisions she makes about how to prepare for her day?


Yours,


Jeff






Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Francesco Bellucci 
Sent: Wednesday, September 5, 2018 10:14:24 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Jon, List

thanks for these observations. My comments are interspersed below.

On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 5:39 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote:
Francesco, List:

I need to digest your latest reply before responding, but it seems to move on 
to more fundamental issues than the quantification aspect of the Immediate 
Object, and I wanted to offer a few more comments about the latter.

I beg you to notice that my posts have all been about the immediate object 
intended as the subject of a proposition

Consistent with his earlier division of the Immediate Object into 
vague/singular/general, Peirce in 1908 explicitly characterized particular and 
universal propositions as Descriptives and Copulatives, respectively, while 
discussing the example of the many statues of Civil War soldiers that one could 
find throughout the northern United States in the early 20th century.

CSP:  That statue is one piece of granite, and not a Famisign. Yet it is what 
we call a "General" sign, meaning that it is applicable 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Francesco Bellucci]

>
>
> Would you mind clarifying, please?
>
> What’s the problem again and what rules?
>

According to the Syllabus, a Symbol can only be a Legisign (= Famisign in
the 1908 terminology), and thus cannot be a Sinsign (=Actisign in the 1908
terminology).

Best
F

>
>
> On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 12:19 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Francesco, list
>>
>> Thanks for your very clear outline of the term of 'general' as used by
>> Peirce.
>>
>> One thing to note, in my view,  is that at no time does Peirce move away
>> from using this term as embedded within the semiosic process. That is, the
>> term 'general' refers to that which is referred to by a symbol; by a
>> legisign; and by a full sentence. This pragmatic embedded nature suggests
>> that the term cannot be set up to operate as a pure intellectual construct,
>> akin to a Platonic Form.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed 05/09/18 2:57 AM , Francesco Bellucci
>> bellucci.france...@googlemail.com sent:
>>
>> Jon, Gary, List
>>
>> thanks for your replies.
>>
>> As I mentioned, I think we should recognize that Peirce uses "general" in
>> at least 3 senses: 1) symbols have a general object (vs indices, which
>> have an individual object), 2) legisigns are general in themselves (as
>> types that occur in replicas), 3) and universally quantified sentences are
>> also said to be "general" by Peirce ("distributively general" his preferred
>> term).
>>
>> GR: May I ask just one question for now: In light of the several
>> quotations which Jon offered (in another thread which you may not have had
>> occasion to read)  [...] [w]hy do write that the notion of a general
>> object  appears to you as "very unPeircean"?
>>
>>
>> At CP 5.426 and 5.430 Peirce say general objects are real. It's the
>> object of a symbol which is real. "Man" is a symbol, its object is whatever
>> possesses the characters of men. Since, according to Peirce, generals are
>> real, the object of a symbol is real. At EP 2, p. 368 "general object"
>> is used in another sense: "distributively general object" means the
>> universal quantifier: "any man ". That's why the notion of a general
>> object (as opposed to immediate and dynamic, and not as a species of the
>> immediate) looks very unPeircean to me: if we mean the object of a symbol,
>> it's the dynamic object which is general; if we mean the object of a
>> universally quantified sentence, it's the immediate object that is general;
>> if we mean a legisign, it's the sign, not the object, that is general. I
>> don't see what other uses of "general object" are relevant or needed in the
>> interpretation of Peirce.
>>
>>
>> JAS: I am afraid that I am not following the argument here.  As I
>> already quoted Peirce explicitly stating, "general" is  not equivalent
>> to "universally quantified"; both universal ("All men are mortal") and
>> particular ("Some men are mortal") propositions are general, as opposed
>> to singular ("This man is mortal").  Moreover, any common noun, such as
>> "man," is a  general Rheme ("_ is a man," cf. EP 2:309-310; 1904)
>> despite not being quantified at all; and it does have an Immediate
>> Object, which is whatever possesses the set of characters that corresponds
>> to its definition--i.e., its Immediate Interpretant.  Quantification
>> only comes into play when this general Rheme is employed in a proposition
>> .
>>
>>
>> The first point is easily answerable. In those contexts (such as  CP
>> 2.324) in which "general" includes universal and existental and is
>> opposed to singular, Peirce most often uses the term "indefinite". Cf. e.g.
>> R 9, pp. 2–3. But in most contexts, when general is opposed to vague and
>> singular, it means "distributively general". That the sense in which
>> "general" is used in the division of signs according to the immediate
>> object is "distributively general" is clear from R 339, p. 253 and R 284,
>> p. 67
>>
>>
>> According to the Immediate Object (how represented)
>> Indefinite Sign
>> Singular Sign
>> Distributively General Sign (R 339, p. 253)
>>
>> General Sign. The sign represents its Immediate Object in the logically
>> formal character of the Tertian, which is Distributive Generality. (R
>> 284, p. 67)
>>
>> Second, I perfectly agree that any common noun, such as "man" or the
>> rheme "---is a man"; is general: but in the sense of being a symbol, i.e. a
>> sign whose object is, as Jon justly says, whatever possesses the set of
>> characters that corresponds to its definition. But the general object of a
>> symbol, i.e. the object that possesses the set of characters that
>> corresponds to the symbol's definition, is the dynamic, not the immediate
>> object. For icon/index/symbol is a division according to the dynamic, not
>> the immediate object.
>>
>> Suppose that the object of "---is a man", i.e. the object that possesses
>> the set of characters that corresponds to its definition, is the immediate
>> object. What it is that possesses the set of characters that 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Jerry Rhee]

Welcome Francesco;

dear list,



You said:



The statue is an Actisign, but its object is general, and thus is a Symbol.

But according to the rules, a Symbol cannot be an Actisign.

*The problem is already here*.



Would you mind clarifying, please?

What’s the problem again and what rules?



Thanks,



With best wishes,
Jerry R


On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 12:19 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Francesco, list
>
> Thanks for your very clear outline of the term of 'general' as used by
> Peirce.
>
> One thing to note, in my view,  is that at no time does Peirce move away
> from using this term as embedded within the semiosic process. That is, the
> term 'general' refers to that which is referred to by a symbol; by a
> legisign; and by a full sentence. This pragmatic embedded nature suggests
> that the term cannot be set up to operate as a pure intellectual construct,
> akin to a Platonic Form.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Wed 05/09/18 2:57 AM , Francesco Bellucci
> bellucci.france...@googlemail.com sent:
>
> Jon, Gary, List
>
> thanks for your replies.
>
> As I mentioned, I think we should recognize that Peirce uses "general" in
> at least 3 senses: 1) symbols have a general object (vs indices, which
> have an individual object), 2) legisigns are general in themselves (as
> types that occur in replicas), 3) and universally quantified sentences are
> also said to be "general" by Peirce ("distributively general" his preferred
> term).
>
> GR: May I ask just one question for now: In light of the several
> quotations which Jon offered (in another thread which you may not have had
> occasion to read)  [...] [w]hy do write that the notion of a general
> object  appears to you as "very unPeircean"?
>
>
> At CP 5.426 and 5.430 Peirce say general objects are real. It's the object
> of a symbol which is real. "Man" is a symbol, its object is whatever
> possesses the characters of men. Since, according to Peirce, generals are
> real, the object of a symbol is real. At EP 2, p. 368 "general object" is
> used in another sense: "distributively general object" means the
> universal quantifier: "any man ". That's why the notion of a general
> object (as opposed to immediate and dynamic, and not as a species of the
> immediate) looks very unPeircean to me: if we mean the object of a symbol,
> it's the dynamic object which is general; if we mean the object of a
> universally quantified sentence, it's the immediate object that is general;
> if we mean a legisign, it's the sign, not the object, that is general. I
> don't see what other uses of "general object" are relevant or needed in the
> interpretation of Peirce.
>
>
> JAS: I am afraid that I am not following the argument here.  As I already
> quoted Peirce explicitly stating, "general" is  not equivalent to
> "universally quantified"; both universal ("All men are mortal") and
> particular ("Some men are mortal") propositions are general, as opposed
> to singular ("This man is mortal").  Moreover, any common noun, such as
> "man," is a  general Rheme ("_ is a man," cf. EP 2:309-310; 1904)
> despite not being quantified at all; and it does have an Immediate
> Object, which is whatever possesses the set of characters that corresponds
> to its definition--i.e., its Immediate Interpretant.  Quantification
> only comes into play when this general Rheme is employed in a proposition.
>
>
> The first point is easily answerable. In those contexts (such as  CP
> 2.324) in which "general" includes universal and existental and is
> opposed to singular, Peirce most often uses the term "indefinite". Cf. e.g.
> R 9, pp. 2–3. But in most contexts, when general is opposed to vague and
> singular, it means "distributively general". That the sense in which
> "general" is used in the division of signs according to the immediate
> object is "distributively general" is clear from R 339, p. 253 and R 284,
> p. 67
>
>
> According to the Immediate Object (how represented)
> Indefinite Sign
> Singular Sign
> Distributively General Sign (R 339, p. 253)
>
> General Sign. The sign represents its Immediate Object in the logically
> formal character of the Tertian, which is Distributive Generality. (R
> 284, p. 67)
>
> Second, I perfectly agree that any common noun, such as "man" or the rheme
> "---is a man"; is general: but in the sense of being a symbol, i.e. a sign
> whose object is, as Jon justly says, whatever possesses the set of
> characters that corresponds to its definition. But the general object of a
> symbol, i.e. the object that possesses the set of characters that
> corresponds to the symbol's definition, is the dynamic, not the immediate
> object. For icon/index/symbol is a division according to the dynamic, not
> the immediate object.
>
> Suppose that the object of "---is a man", i.e. the object that possesses
> the set of characters that corresponds to its definition, is the immediate
> object. What it is that possesses the set of characters that corresponds to
> the definition of man? 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Francesco, list

Thanks for your very clear outline of the term of 'general' as used
by Peirce.

One thing to note, in my view,  is that at no time does Peirce move
away from using this term as embedded within the semiosic process.
That is, the term 'general' refers to that which is referred to by a
symbol; by a legisign; and by a full sentence. This pragmatic
embedded nature suggests that the term cannot be set up to operate as
a pure intellectual construct, akin to a Platonic Form.

Edwina
 On Wed 05/09/18  2:57 AM , Francesco Bellucci
bellucci.france...@googlemail.com sent:
 Jon, Gary, List
 thanks for your replies. 
 As I mentioned, I think we should recognize that Peirce uses
"general" in at least 3 senses: 1) symbols have a general object (vs
indices, which have an individual object), 2) legisigns are general
in themselves (as types that occur in replicas), 3) and universally
quantified sentences are also said to be "general" by Peirce
("distributively general" his preferred term).  
 GR: May I ask just one question for now: In light of the several
quotations which Jon offered (in another thread which you may not
have had occasion to read)  [...] [w]hy do write that the notion of a
general object  appears to you as "very unPeircean"?
 At CP 5.426 and 5.430 Peirce say general objects are real. It's the
object of a symbol which is real. "Man" is a symbol, its object is
whatever possesses the characters of men. Since, according to Peirce,
generals are real, the object of a symbol is real. At EP 2, p. 368
"general object" is used in another sense: "distributively general
object" means the universal quantifier: "any man ". That's why
the notion of a general object (as opposed to immediate and dynamic,
and not as a species of the immediate) looks very unPeircean to me:
if we mean the object of a symbol, it's the dynamic object which is
general; if we mean the object of a universally quantified sentence,
it's the immediate object that is general; if we mean a legisign,
it's the sign, not the object, that is general. I don't see what
other uses of "general object" are relevant or needed in the
interpretation of Peirce. 
JAS: I am afraid that I am not following the argument here.  As I
already quoted Peirce explicitly stating, "general" is  not
equivalent to "universally quantified"; both universal ("All men are
mortal") and particular ("Some men are mortal") propositions are
general, as opposed to singular ("This man is mortal").  Moreover,
any common noun, such as "man," is a  general Rheme ("_ is a
man," cf. EP 2:309-310; 1904) despite not being quantified at all;
and it does have an Immediate Object, which is whatever possesses the
set of characters that corresponds to its definition--i.e., its
Immediate Interpretant.  Quantification  only comes into play when
this general Rheme is employed in a proposition.
The first point is easily answerable. In those contexts (such as  CP
2.324) in which "general" includes universal and existental and is
opposed to singular, Peirce most often uses the term "indefinite".
Cf. e.g. R 9, pp. 2–3. But in most contexts, when general is
opposed to vague and singular, it means "distributively general".
That the sense in which "general" is used in the division of signs
according to the immediate object is "distributively general" is
clear from R 339, p. 253 and R 284, p. 67 
 According to the Immediate Object (how represented)
 Indefinite Sign
 Singular Sign
 Distributively General Sign (R 339, p. 253)
 General Sign. The sign represents its Immediate Object in the
logically formal character of the Tertian, which is Distributive
Generality. (R 284, p. 67) 
 Second, I perfectly agree that any common noun, such as "man" or the
rheme "---is a man"; is general: but in the sense of being a symbol,
i.e. a sign whose object is, as Jon justly says, whatever possesses
the set of characters that corresponds to its definition. But the
general object of a symbol, i.e. the object that possesses the set of
characters that corresponds to the symbol's definition, is the
dynamic, not the immediate object. For icon/index/symbol is a
division according to the dynamic, not the immediate object.  
 Suppose that the object of "---is a man", i.e. the object that
possesses the set of characters that corresponds to its definition,
is the immediate object. What it is that possesses the set of
characters that corresponds to the definition of man? Of course,
every really existing man, as well as those existed and those that
will exist. If this is the immediate object of the rheme "--is a
man", what's its dynamic object? 
 Another example. Take the sign "Napoleon is lethargic". It contains
a proper name, "Napoleon", which refers to the real Napoleon, the
historical figure. Peirce says that a sentence's subject, i.e. the
proper name, is its "object" (he says so in very many 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Francesco Bellucci]

Jon, List

thanks for these observations. My comments are interspersed below.

On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 5:39 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Francesco, List:
>
> I need to digest your latest reply before responding, but it seems to move
> on to more fundamental issues than the quantification aspect of the
> Immediate Object, and I wanted to offer a few more comments about the
> latter.
>

I beg you to notice that my posts have all been about the immediate object
intended as the subject of a proposition

>
> Consistent with his earlier division of the Immediate Object into
> vague/singular/general, Peirce in 1908 explicitly characterized particular
> and universal propositions as Descriptives and Copulatives, respectively,
> while discussing the example of the many statues of Civil War soldiers that
> one could find throughout the northern United States in the early 20th
> century.
>
> CSP:  That statue is one piece of granite, and not a Famisign. Yet it is
> what we call a "General" sign, meaning that it is *applicable *to many
> singulars. It is not *itself* General: it is its Object which is taken to
> be General. And yet this Object is not truly Universal, in the sense of
> implying a truth of the kind of "Any *S* is *P*"; it only expresses "Some
> *S* is *P*." This makes it *not *a //*Copulant*/*Copulative*// but only a
> *Descriptive*. (EP 2:486)
>
>
> As an actual piece of granite, the statue is obviously an Actisign; i.e.,
> an individual Instance (Token) of a general Sign (Type).  Peirce here
> further classified it as a Descriptive, because he held that the equivalent
> proposition would be particular, rather than singular or universal;
> presumably "*S*" corresponds to "Civil War soldier" and "*P*" to "a
> person who looked like this."  However, that conflicts with what he went on
> to say later in the very same manuscript.
>

The statue is an Actisign, but its object is general, and thus is a Symbol.
But according to the rules, a Symbol cannot be an Actisign. The problem is
already here. Perhaps the solution is that a Symbol cannot be a "normal"
Actisign but it can be an Actisign which is a replica of a Famisign. The
distinction between standard Sinsigns and Replicas comes from the Syllabus.

>
> CSP:  But an Actual Occurrence always determines the Possibility of its
> character; whence no Descriptive can be a Famisign ... As an example of
> this, no number of Descriptive propositions of the type "Some *S* is *P*"
> can ever determine the truth of a Copulative Proposition "Any *S* is *P*."
> It is, if possible, still more obvious that Possibility can never determine
> Actuality and therefore *a Descriptive cannot be an Actisign* ... (EP
> 2:488; bold added)
>
>
> I am a strong proponent of the principle of charity, seeking to harmonize
> any author's writings as much as possible; but Peirce clearly must have
> been incorrect in one or the other of these passages, because they are
> directly contradictory.  The latter one is fully consistent with the order
> of determination for the semeiotic Correlates as spelled out in something
> that he wrote no more than a few days earlier (EP 2:481), so my judgment is
> that he was wrong to classify the statue--and, for that matter, a
> particular proposition--as a Descriptive.
>

I think he was not  wrong to classify particular propositions as
Descriptives, the passage clearly shows that with "Descriptive" he means
"Some S is P". Since he says that a Descriptive cannot be an Actisign, in
order for this to be an instance of the furst rule (R1, a first determines
only a first) the trichotomy Descriptive/Designative/Copulant has to
precede the trichotomy Potisign/Actisign/Famisign.



> Again, my current proposal is that instead we treat quantification as the
> aspect of a proposition's *Immediate *Object that converts the Sign's
> *General *Object into the Replica's *Dynamic *Object.
>

 If quantification really were an aspect of a proposition's immediate
object, while didn't Peirce say, in all his writings on the classification
of signs, that the vague/singular/general division does not exhaust the
immediate object of propositions, and is inapplicable to non-propositional
signs. Also, I don't understand whether you are using "general object" in
the sense of the object of a symbol or in the sense of distributive
generality, or in neither sense.  If you use "general object" in neither
sense, I think your use is unPeircean.

>
> Every proposition in itself, as a Symbol and therefore a general Sign,
> must be a Copulative.  As with "Any man is mortal," the continuous
> predicate in this case is "_ possesses the character of _," where
> the two blanks correspond to a Designative as the subject ("*S*" with a
> quantifier) and a Descriptive as the predicate ("*P*").  The subject of
> each *Replica *of the proposition must have an *individual *Dynamic
> Object, which is why a quantifier--which Peirce sometimes tellingly called
> a "Selective"--is necessary; 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

 Francesco, List:

I need to digest your latest reply before responding, but it seems to move
on to more fundamental issues than the quantification aspect of the
Immediate Object, and I wanted to offer a few more comments about the
latter.

Consistent with his earlier division of the Immediate Object into
vague/singular/general, Peirce in 1908 explicitly characterized particular
and universal propositions as Descriptives and Copulatives, respectively,
while discussing the example of the many statues of Civil War soldiers that
one could find throughout the northern United States in the early 20th
century.

CSP:  That statue is one piece of granite, and not a Famisign. Yet it is
what we call a "General" sign, meaning that it is *applicable *to many
singulars. It is not *itself* General: it is its Object which is taken to
be General. And yet this Object is not truly Universal, in the sense of
implying a truth of the kind of "Any *S* is *P*"; it only expresses "Some
*S* is *P*." This makes it *not *a //*Copulant*/*Copulative*// but only a
*Descriptive*. (EP 2:486)


As an actual piece of granite, the statue is obviously an Actisign; i.e.,
an individual Instance (Token) of a general Sign (Type).  Peirce here
further classified it as a Descriptive, because he held that the equivalent
proposition would be particular, rather than singular or universal;
presumably "*S*" corresponds to "Civil War soldier" and "*P*" to "a person
who looked like this."  However, that conflicts with what he went on to say
later in the very same manuscript.

CSP:  But an Actual Occurrence always determines the Possibility of its
character; whence no Descriptive can be a Famisign ... As an example of
this, no number of Descriptive propositions of the type "Some *S* is *P*"
can ever determine the truth of a Copulative Proposition "Any *S* is *P*."
It is, if possible, still more obvious that Possibility can never determine
Actuality and therefore *a Descriptive cannot be an Actisign* ... (EP
2:488; bold added)


I am a strong proponent of the principle of charity, seeking to harmonize
any author's writings as much as possible; but Peirce clearly must have
been incorrect in one or the other of these passages, because they are
directly contradictory.  The latter one is fully consistent with the order
of determination for the semeiotic Correlates as spelled out in something
that he wrote no more than a few days earlier (EP 2:481), so my judgment is
that he was wrong to classify the statue--and, for that matter, a
particular proposition--as a Descriptive.  Again, my current proposal is
that instead we treat quantification as the aspect of a proposition's
*Immediate *Object that converts the Sign's *General *Object into the
Replica's *Dynamic *Object.

Every proposition in itself, as a Symbol and therefore a general Sign, must
be a Copulative.  As with "Any man is mortal," the continuous predicate in
this case is "_ possesses the character of _," where the two blanks
correspond to a Designative as the subject ("*S*" with a quantifier) and a
Descriptive as the predicate ("*P*").  The subject of each *Replica *of the
proposition must have an *individual *Dynamic Object, which is why a
quantifier--which Peirce sometimes tellingly called a "Selective"--is
necessary; it indicates whether the *choice* of that individual from the
Sign's (collective or continuous) General Object is left up to the Utterer
("Some *S*"), the Interpreter ("Any *S*"), or neither ("This *S*").

CSP:  A sign (under which designation I place every kind of thought, and
not alone external signs) that is in any respect objectively indeterminate
(i.e., whose object is undetermined by the sign itself) is objectively
*general *in so far as it extends to the interpreter the privilege of
carrying its determination further ... A sign that is objectively
indeterminate in any respect is objectively *vague *in so far as it
reserves further determination to be made in some other conceivable sign,
or at least does not appoint the interpreter as its deputy in this office
... Every utterance naturally leaves the right of further exposition in the
utterer; and therefore, in so far as a sign is indeterminate, it is vague,
unless it is expressly or by a well-understood convention rendered general.
(CP 5.447, EP 2:350-351; 1906)


Peirce's 1908 example could perhaps be taken either way.  On the one hand,
each statue is vague/particular ("Some *S* is *P*") in the sense that the
sculptor as the Utterer determined the specific appearance of the person
depicted by it, which might or might not correspond to an actual person.
On the other hand, each statue is general/universal ("Any *S* is *P*")  in
the sense that for many different local families as the Interpreters, "that
very realistic statue represents the mourned one who fell in the war" (EP
2:486).  Such ambiguity is all the more reason not to tie the
classification of such a Sign-Replica to *its *quantification, but rather
to the fact 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[John F Sowa]

On 9/5/2018 2:57 AM, Francesco Bellucci wrote:
As I mentioned, I think we should recognize that Peirce uses "general" 
in at least 3 senses: 1) symbols have a general object (vs indices, 
which have an individual object), 2) legisigns are general in themselves 
(as types that occur in replicas), 3) and universally quantified 
sentences are also said to be "general" by Peirce ("distributively 
general" his preferred term).


I agree.  But I believe that it's important to use Peirce's own
tools for stating the criteria precisely:  his versions of logic.

For each of those three senses, any definition in his algebraic
notation of 1885 would have a universal quantifier, and any
definition in existential graphs would have a line of identity
in a negative area.

That kind of explanation would have several advantages:

 1. It would show the common feature that is present in all
uses of the word 'general'.

 2. By the differences in the logical expressions, it would
show exactly how those three senses differ.

 3. It would illustrate Peirce's claims about the utility
of his writings on formal logic.

 4. It would enable anyone who knows logic, but has not yet
studied Peirce to get a better appreciation for Peirce's
work -- and perhaps begin to dig deeper into his writings.

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The nature of the Dynamic Object, was, Genuine and Degenerate (was Possibility and actuality)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., List:

Thanks for the feedback.  I will answer a couple of specific questions that
you posed, and then make another attempt to tie together the various
threads (as you put it).

GR:  But, should we speak of a General Object (singular) or General Objects
(plural)?


I lean toward "General Object" (singular), because it is always either a
collection or a continuum; i.e., a universe.

GR:   What would you imagine that the *non-general Objects* at the end of
infinite inquiry by an infinite community might be?


I honestly have no idea; I simply did not want to go beyond Peirce's own
statement that the beliefs comprising the ultimate opinion would be general
"for the most part."  I happen to think that he was right when he wrote
decades earlier that "no cognition of ours is absolutely determinate" (CP
5.312; 1868); i.e., *all *of our knowledge is general to some degree.  That
is one reason for viewing all *Signs *as general (Types) in themselves.

GR:  ... I should note that sometimes I feel that I'm reading a logical
analysis, sometimes a metaphysical one.


I have struggled with where to draw that line for quite some time now,
going back to when I was discussing everything in terms of Form, Matter,
and Entelechy.  Again, I believe that the solution is to recognize that the
employment of metaphysical concepts in this context is a form of hypostatic
abstraction.

CSP:  The logician is not concerned with any metaphysical theory; still
less, if possible, is the mathematician. But it is highly convenient to
express ourselves in terms of a metaphysical theory; and we no more bind
ourselves to an acceptance of it than we do when we use substantives such
as "humanity," "variety," etc., and speak of them as if they were
substances, in the metaphysical sense. (EP 2:304; 1904)


Nevertheless, as you already noted by invoking a different quote,
"Metaphysics consists in the results of the absolute acceptance of logical
principles not merely as regulatively valid, but as truths of being" (CP
1.487; c. 1896).  In other words, once we get the logical principles right,
the metaphysics will follow.

GR:  ... I wasn't able to get across even the idea that "a Sign is not a
real thing."


Perhaps you can now empathize with my plight a while back when I first
floated the suggestion on the List that all Signs are Types.  It has been
quite difficult to express this idea without importing the "baggage" that
much of the relevant terminology already carries for anyone who has studied
it extensively--myself included.  The notion that the three or six or ten
trichotomies are all divisions of Signs that must be arranged in a linear
order of determination to identify ten or 28 or 66 classes is deeply
embedded in the community of Peirce scholars--and understandably so.

What I am now proposing is an alternative framework that focuses on three
different *triadic relations*--one genuine, one degenerate, and one doubly
degenerate.  Rather than a division of Signs themselves, I am treating
Tone/Token/Type respectively as the Sign-*Qualities *that are embodied in
Sign-*Replicas *that serve as Instances of Signs *proper*.  Rather than
dividing Signs according to the Dynamic Object into
Abstractive/Concretive/Collective, I am positing that the Sign (Type)
relates to the General Object and Final Interpretant, the Sign-Replica
(Token) relates to the Dynamic Object and Dynamic Interpretant, and the
Sign-Qualities (Tone) relate to the Immediate Object and Immediate
Interpretant.

Does that make things any clearer?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Sep 4, 2018 at 2:59 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jon, List,
>
> JAS: I am going to continue making the case for distinguishing the
> *General* Object, which is in a *genuine* triadic relation with the Sign
> (Type) and the Final Interpretant, from the *Dynamic* Object, which is in
> a *degenerate* triadic relation with the Sign-Replica (Token) and the
> Dynamic Interpretant.  It turns out that Peirce referred explicitly to the
> notion of a "general object" on a few occasions.
>
>
> It seems to me that the several Peirce quotes you've provided, where he
> explicitly refers to a "general object," and your summing up of the
> implications of each of these--and all taken together--bolsters your case
> for distinguishing the General Object from the Dynamic Object. The very
> first quotation strongly supports the notion not only of there being
> dynamic objects, but also general objects such as "the laws of nature,"
> and, furtherl, explicitly connects the idea of the general object to
> pragmaticism and Peirce's "extreme realism" ("what is conditionally true *in
> futuro*"):
>
>
>
> CSP:  And do not overlook the fact that the pragmaticist maxim says
> nothing of single experiments or of single experimental phenomena (for what
> is conditionally true *in