Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Gary R, list

Again - we'll just have to disagree.

1] In my view, something that is occurring with the actions of
'chance, spontaneity and freedom' is not amenable to measurement. As
such, the experience of them is subjective, i.e., emerging within the
organism rather than from an external agent. I consider 'quality' to
be the same value - As noted - 'it has no individuality' and as such
- cannot be measured. 

Just because chance/spontaneity etc are vital for actions of
adaptation and evolution does not mean that they are not subjective!
I think that you and I are using the term 'subjective' in different
ways. I do not mean within the human mind, conscious or unconscious. 
I mean within the organism and not caused by an external agent. I
don't consider 'quality' to be amenable to external measurement. It
is 'what it is', in itself, i.e., 1ns, and not measurable. 

2] I don't consider the nature and function of scientific
measurement to be an 'obsession' but a rational and objective action.
I certainly don't want to ride a plane or train that has not been
built according to measurements.  All I have done is to point out
that some actions within our complex infrastructure are not amenable
to such external objective measurements. 

3] I disagree with both your and Jon's outline of the terms of Form,
Matter and Entelechy, which you both put into an ordinal outline. To
say that Form is 1ns, suggests that its identity is pre-established
as a potentiality,  whereas, I believe that the Form that matter/mass
takes only appears within the Interpretant phase, after having been
'moulded' so to speak, by the  rules of the Representamen. These
rules can alter the nature of the incoming matter/mass...

4] The reference Jon gave to NP 2.303-4 is an outline of the
semiosic process -  

"Of the two great tasks of humanity, Theory and Practice, the former
sets out from a sign of a real object with which it is acquainted,
passing from this as its matter, to successive interpretants
embodying more and more fully its form, wishing ultimately to reach a
direct perception of the entelechy;"

NOTE: in the above outline, which refers to the actions of a Sign, I
read this to mean that the action proceeds from being in actual touch
with the matter of an external Object..The semiosic process then
comes up with multiple interpretants which describe more fully the
actual form of this object...to an understanding of the entelechy'
-true identity of the Object. 

5] The section continues..

"while the latter, setting out from a sign signifying a character of
which it has an idea, passes from this as its form, to successive
interpretants realizing more and more precisely its matter, hoping
ultimately to be able to make a direct effort, producing the
entelechy". 

NOTE: In the above outline, I read this semiosic process to mean
that the action moves only from an 'idea' of an external object,
which is understood as a form...and then, you interpret this form to
figure out the matter of that object, and then, hope to figure out
the true identity.

I don't think that the above outline sets out Form as 1ns, Matter as
2ns, and Entelechy as 3ns. It describes two types of semiosis.

Edwina
 On Fri 14/12/18  4:56 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, Jon, list,
 Edwina wrote:

1] With regard to 1ns being understood as 'quality' - well,
'quality', as a subjective rather than objective [and therefore, not
amenable to empirical measurement] - fits in well with chance,
spontaneity and freedom - all of which are subjective and not
amenable to measurement. 

Somewhere Peirce refers to quality as, at best, "pre-conscious,"
which is to say that the color 'green' of a leaf on a tree in one's
garden is what it is in every permutation which the changing sky,
sun, clouds, wind, etc. offer to a consciousness. So is its shape. 
It 'may' become a subjective 'experience', but that is not its
nature. 
So, how are "chance, spontaneity and freedoom" all subjective?
Aren't the necessary for, for example, evolution?

Why should  a 'possible quality' (one of those permutations of
'green' above, say) not yet realized be "amenable to measurement"?
(Btw, much of the English philosopher, Mary Midgley's, last book
before her death, published just prior to it this year) argues
against the modern obsession with "measurement" as if that were the
be all end end all of scientific experience.) 

2] I disagree with your insistence that

"In my view, it is incontrovertible that when he discusses Form,
Matter, and Entelechy as the three modes of being, he is quite
obviously referring to 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns, respectively". I don't see
that as 'incontrovertible or 'quite obvious' ..but don't see the
point of engaging in any kind of debate 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, Jon, list,

Edwina wrote:

1] With regard to 1ns being understood as 'quality' - well, 'quality', as a
subjective rather than objective [and therefore, not amenable to empirical
measurement] - fits in well with chance, spontaneity and freedom - all of
which are subjective and not amenable to measurement.

Somewhere Peirce refers to quality as, at best, "pre-conscious," which is
to say that the color 'green' of a leaf on a tree in one's garden is what
it is in every permutation which the changing sky, sun, clouds, wind, etc.
offer to a consciousness. So is its shape.  It 'may' become a subjective
'experience', but that is not its nature.

So, how are "chance, spontaneity and freedoom" all subjective? Aren't the
necessary for, for example, evolution?

Why should  a 'possible quality' (one of those permutations of 'green'
above, say) not yet realized be "amenable to measurement"? (Btw, much of
the English philosopher, Mary Midgley's, last book before her death,
published just prior to it this year) argues against the modern obsession
with "measurement" as if that were the be all end end all of scientific
experience.)

2] I disagree with your insistence that

"In my view, it is incontrovertible that when he discusses Form, Matter,
and Entelechy as the three modes of being, he is quite obviously referring
to 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns, respectively". I don't see that as 'incontrovertible
or 'quite obvious' ..but don't see the point of engaging in any kind of
debate with you over this perception.

In my view too "it is incontrovertible that when he discusses Form, Matter,
and Entelechy as the three modes of being, he is quite obviously referring
to 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns respectively." The quote Jon offered makes this clear
enough. Form as 1ns is the 'possible' Form something *might* take when it
'takes a form' as a consequence of its being realized, requiring 2ns and
3ns. Again, evolution doesn't necessarily 'know' the form it will take in
actuality when by chance (1ns), as the result of what Peirce calls
'sporting', it brings about, say, a structural change.  Its possibilities
for change are, of course, constrained in myriad ways, yet there isn't
necessarily a way of predicting what chance 'sporting' will bring about
(e.g., a particular species of dinosaur evolves to takes flight as a bird;
its form is modified in a major way).

3] I am aware that Aristotelian 'matter' is not 'mass' [which can be
measured] but is more akin to potential energy which can be formed into
particular 'things'.


This is a peculiar use of the idea of "potential energy" which Britannica
(and the several other sources I just checked) gives as "stored energy that
depends upon the relative position of various parts of a system." And I
think it is dangerous to conflate modern notions in physics with
Aristotle's.

Throughout his career Peirce identifies 'quality' with 1ns. Here are a  few
from the *Commens Dictionary* selected merely for their brevity.

1899 | On Topical Geometry, in General (T) | CP 7.538

…a quality is merely something that *might* be realized, while an
occurrence is something that *actually* takes place. [—] A quality […] has
no individuality. Two qualities are different only so far as they are
unlike. Individuality is an aggressive unity, arising from an absolute
refusal to be in any degree responsible for anything else. This a quality
cannot have since it is too utterly irrespective of anything else even to
deny it.
1903 | CSP's Lowell Lectures of 1903. 2nd Part of 3rd Draught of Lecture
III | Quality

The mode of being of the quality is that of Firstness. That is to say, it
is a possibility. It is related to the matter accidentally; and this
relation does not change the quality at all, except that it imparts
*existence*, that is to say, this very relation of inherence, to it.
1903 [c.] | Topics. Chapter I. Singular Systems | MS [R] 151

Elements of Firstness, or *Qualities*, are positive respects in each of
which something might be determinate regardless of anything else, such
as *being
marketable*.
1904 | On the Foundations of Mathematics | MS [R] 8:1-2

A quality is whatever it is in itself. It has such mode of being as it has
independently of any other quality, of existing in any subject, and of
being represented.


(I just read Jon's latest note and, it should be obvious from what I've
just written, that I concur with him.)

Best,

Gary


*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*

*718 482-5690*


On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 4:09 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon, list
>
> We will, as usual, continue to disagree.
>
> 1] With regard to 1ns being understood as 'quality' - well, 'quality', as
> a subjective rather than objective [and therefore, not amenable to
> empirical measurement] - fits in well with chance, spontaneity and freedom
> - all of which are subjective and not amenable to measurement.
>
> 2] I disagree with your insistence 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

1ns as quality has nothing whatsoever to do with subjectivity or
non-measurability.  It pertains to characters such as color (e.g., redness)
and shape (e.g., roundness) that are real possibilities in themselves, but
only exist where embodied.

In the passages that I have referenced--most notably, NEM 4:292-300 and EP
2:303-304 (both 1904)--Peirce described Form as quality in this sense,
Matter as individual reaction/existence, and Entelechy as that which brings
them together.  They clearly correspond to 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns, respectively.

Again, as Gary F. pointed out, Aristotelian Matter is more of a logical
term than a physical term.  Associating it with the modern notion of energy
is just as misleading as associating it with the modern notion of
matter/mass.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 3:09 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon, list
>
> We will, as usual, continue to disagree.
>
> 1] With regard to 1ns being understood as 'quality' - well, 'quality', as
> a subjective rather than objective [and therefore, not amenable to
> empirical measurement] - fits in well with chance, spontaneity and freedom
> - all of which are subjective and not amenable to measurement.
>
> 2] I disagree with your insistence that
>
> "In my view, it is incontrovertible that when he discusses Form, Matter,
> and Entelechy as the three modes of being, he is quite obviously referring
> to 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns, respectively". I don't see that as 'incontrovertible
> or 'quite obvious' ..but don't see the point of engaging in any kind of
> debate with you over this perception.
>
> 3] I am aware that Aristotelian 'matter' is not 'mass' [which can be
> measured] but is more akin to potential energy which can be formed into
> particular 'things'.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Fri 14/12/18 3:50 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> As I have acknowledged before, there are passages in Peirce's writings
> where he uses the term "form" in a way more consistent with 3ns than 1ns,
> but the ones that I have quoted recently are not among them.  In my view,
> it is incontrovertible that when he discusses Form, Matter, and Entelechy
> as the three modes of being, he is quite obviously referring to 1ns, 2ns,
> and 3ns, respectively.  Chance, spontaneity, and freedom do not exhaust the
> scope of 1ns for Peirce; in fact, quality is the element of experience that
> is its paradigmatic manifestation, "that which is what it is in itself, and
> as prior to any embodiment."  Gary F. has already pointed out that
> Aristotelian Matter is not at all the same thing as physical matter in the
> modern sense.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 8:16 AM Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> List:
>>
>> I disagree that this section states that Form is associated with 1ns
>> and Matter with 2ns. After all, that would suggest that Form is an
>> action of chance, spontaneity and freedom. I consider that Form, which is
>> not simply external appearance but 'how' matter is organized into its
>> identity cannot function with such randomness. And - It is important, I
>> think, not to confuse the three modes of Firstness, Secondness and
>> Thirdness, with ordinality. That is, I consider it an error to think that
>> the term 'Firstness' means  - first in order of existence etc.
>>
>>  Peirce writes "Form, as that which is what it is in itself, and as prior
>> to any embodiment of it.  It is looking upon being as created, and regards
>> its evolution as having the mode of movement of practice" . This suggests
>> instead to me, that Form is 3ns and its priority is akin to its nature, not
>> of ordinality but of continuity. This does NOT mean that it is
>> pre-existent! It simply means that Form or habits of organization are
>> continuous rules rather than individual embodiments. And that matter, which
>> is to say, the individual,  or 'that which simply exists' is 2ns and exists
>> within the constraints of continuous rules/habits.
>>
>> See also 'matter prior to form' 6.388 where he outlines but does not
>> reject, Aristotle.
>>
>> As to what emerged, ordinally first in our cosmos - matter or form,
>> Peirce's outline of cosmology suggests that 'bits of matter' [which are
>> existent in 2ns] spontaneously [1ns] emerged first and the 'habits' of
>> their interactions emerged gradually afterwards and became rules 3ns].
>> [1.412]. As to what 'matter' is, apart from its being constituted within
>> discrete individual units, I'd suggest it's energy.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>

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[PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jon, list

We will, as usual, continue to disagree.

1] With regard to 1ns being understood as 'quality' - well,
'quality', as a subjective rather than objective [and therefore, not
amenable to empirical measurement] - fits in well with chance,
spontaneity and freedom - all of which are subjective and not
amenable to measurement.

2] I disagree with your insistence that 

"In my view, it is incontrovertible that when he discusses Form,
Matter, and Entelechy as the three modes of being, he is quite
obviously referring to 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns, respectively". I don't see
that as 'incontrovertible or 'quite obvious' ..but don't see the
point of engaging in any kind of debate with you over this
perception.

3] I am aware that Aristotelian 'matter' is not 'mass' [which can be
measured] but is more akin to potential energy which can be formed
into particular 'things'.

Edwina
 On Fri 14/12/18  3:50 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 As I have acknowledged before, there are passages in Peirce's
writings where he uses the term "form" in a way more consistent with
3ns than 1ns, but the ones that I have quoted recently are not among
them.  In my view, it is incontrovertible that when he discusses
Form, Matter, and Entelechy as the three modes of being, he is quite
obviously referring to 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns, respectively.  Chance,
spontaneity, and freedom do not exhaust the scope of 1ns for Peirce;
in fact, quality is the element of experience that is its
paradigmatic manifestation, "that which is what it is in itself, and
as prior to any embodiment."  Gary F. has already pointed out that
Aristotelian Matter is not at all the same thing as physical matter
in the modern sense. 
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] 
 On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 8:16 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
List: 

I disagree that this section states that Form is associated with 1ns
and Matter with 2ns. After all, that would suggest that Form is an
action of chance, spontaneity and freedom. I consider that Form,
which is not simply external appearance but 'how' matter is organized
into its identity cannot function with such randomness. And - It is
important, I think, not to confuse the three modes of Firstness,
Secondness and Thirdness, with ordinality. That is, I consider it an
error to think that the term 'Firstness' means  - first in order of
existence etc. 

 Peirce writes "Form, as that which is what it is in itself, and as
prior to any embodiment of it.  It is looking upon being as created,
and regards its evolution as having the mode of movement of practice"
. This suggests instead to me, that Form is 3ns and its priority is
akin to its nature, not of ordinality but of continuity. This does
NOT mean that it is pre-existent! It simply means that Form or habits
of organization are continuous rules rather than individual
embodiments. And that matter, which is to say, the individual,  or
'that which simply exists' is 2ns and exists within the constraints
of continuous rules/habits.  

See also 'matter prior to form' 6.388 where he outlines but does not
reject, Aristotle.

As to what emerged, ordinally first in our cosmos - matter or form,
Peirce's outline of cosmology suggests that 'bits of matter' [which
are existent in 2ns] spontaneously [1ns] emerged first and the
'habits' of their interactions emerged gradually afterwards and
became rules 3ns]. [1.412]. As to what 'matter' is, apart from its
being constituted within discrete individual units, I'd suggest it's
energy. 

Edwina 


Links:
--
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

In the evolution of being, Peirce clearly held (with the scholastics) that
Form is first and Matter is second, while recognizing that Aristotle had it
the other way around.

CSP:  Aristotle, on the other hand, whose system, like all the greatest
systems, was evolutionary, recognized besides an embryonic kind of being,
like the being of a tree in its seed, or like the being of a future
contingent event, depending on how a man shall decide to act. In a few
passages Aristotle seems to have a dim *aperçue *of a third mode of being
in the *entelechy*. The embryonic being for Aristotle was the being he
called matter, which is alike in all things, and which in the course of its
development took on form. Form is an element having a different mode of
being. The whole philosophy of the scholastic doctors is an attempt to
mould this doctrine of Aristotle into harmony with christian truth. This
harmony the different doctors attempted to bring about in different ways.
But all the realists agree in reversing the order of Aristotle's evolution
by making the form come first, and the individuation of that form come
later. Thus, they too recognized two modes of being; but they were not the
two modes of being of Aristotle. (CP 1.22; 1903)


In terms of his categories, Peirce just as clearly held that Form is 1ns,
Matter is 2ns, and Entelechy is 3ns.  This is probably most evident at NEM
4:295 (1904), where he spells out the same seven systems of metaphysics
that he identified in the Harvard Lectures of 1903 (CP 5.77n1, EP 2:180).
The main difference is classifying Aristotle as "a nominalist with vague
intimations of realism," rather than a full-blown three-Category realist;
presumably because, as Peirce wrote above and elsewhere, Aristotle did not
quite grasp the reality of 3ns as Entelechy.

FYI, based on other fragmentary pages of the same manuscript, it appears
that the first ellipsis in your quote below ends with "never lasts," while
the second can be replaced more or less with "an orderly succession, so far
as there is space here for them" (R 283:[116,118]).

Regards,

Jon S.

On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 9:16 AM  wrote:

> Jon, you seem determined to take a firm stand that for Peirce, “Form is
> first and Matter is second” — although Peirce does not explicitly mention
> the phaneroscopic categories either in the excerpt you’ve quoted or in “The
> Basis of Pragmaticism in the Normative Sciences” (MS 283), the article I’ve
> been quoting from. Insofar as this is a metaphysical issue, I agree with
> Peirce that the logician had better remain aloof from it, since metaphysics
> derives its principles from logic and not vice versa. As the excerpt I
> quoted shows, Peirce’s focus in this article is *growth* as a key concept
> in logic (the methodeutic of inquiry).
>
> For purposes of clarifying the concepts of Matter and Form, though, I
> think the place to start would be Peirce’s entry on the subject in *Baldwin’s
> Dictionary*,
> http://www.gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Matter%20and%20Form, which I
> won’t quote here because it’s very long. By the way, concerning the
> scholastics, toward the end of that entry there’s a long section on
> “substantial form,” which Peirce does mention in MS 283 in his discussion
> of “the precise sense which we are to attach to the term *determination*”
> (EP2:392).
>
> Also in MS 283 (among the fragmentary drafts included in it) is that
> passage on “the perfect sign” which I continue to find fascinating. This
> was published in EP2:544, but with some ellipses in it, and I’ve often
> wondered what the EP2 editors chose to omit from it. Well, I finally
> tracked down images of that part of MS 283 and managed to fill in the gaps,
> except for a few words that were cut off in the images. (The pages are not
> numbered by Peirce.) So here’s a more complete transcription, which I find
> even more intriguing than the EP2 version. It is certainly relevant to the
> semiotic concepts of quasi-mind and of *growth* — and maybe even to the
> physics of “vibrations” which was discussed on the list recently.
>
> [[ Consider then the aggregate formed by a sign and all the signs which
> its occurrence carries with it. This aggregate will itself be a sign; and
> we may call it a *perfect* sign, in the sense that it involves the
> present existence of no other sign except such as are ingredients of
> itself. Now no perfect sign is in a statical condition: you might as well
> suppose a portion of matter to remain at rest during a thousandth of a
> second, or any other long interval of time. The only signs which are
> tolerably fixed are non-existent abstractions. We cannot deny that such a
> sign is real; only its mode of reality is not that active kind which we
> call existence. The existent acts, and whatsoever acts changes. Perhaps the
> reader may demur to this, saying that the earth acts to press him against
> the floor, but does not thereby undergo any change. But the floor is
> elastic, and 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

As I have acknowledged before, there are passages in Peirce's writings
where he uses the term "form" in a way more consistent with 3ns than 1ns,
but the ones that I have quoted recently are not among them.  In my view,
it is incontrovertible that when he discusses Form, Matter, and Entelechy
as the three modes of being, he is quite obviously referring to 1ns, 2ns,
and 3ns, respectively.  Chance, spontaneity, and freedom do not exhaust the
scope of 1ns for Peirce; in fact, quality is the element of experience that
is its paradigmatic manifestation, "that which is what it is in itself, and
as prior to any embodiment."  Gary F. has already pointed out that
Aristotelian Matter is not at all the same thing as physical matter in the
modern sense.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 8:16 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> List:
>
> I disagree that this section states that Form is associated with 1ns
> and Matter with 2ns. After all, that would suggest that Form is an
> action of chance, spontaneity and freedom. I consider that Form, which is
> not simply external appearance but 'how' matter is organized into its
> identity cannot function with such randomness. And - It is important, I
> think, not to confuse the three modes of Firstness, Secondness and
> Thirdness, with ordinality. That is, I consider it an error to think that
> the term 'Firstness' means  - first in order of existence etc.
>
>  Peirce writes "Form, as that which is what it is in itself, and as prior
> to any embodiment of it.  It is looking upon being as created, and regards
> its evolution as having the mode of movement of practice" . This suggests
> instead to me, that Form is 3ns and its priority is akin to its nature, not
> of ordinality but of continuity. This does NOT mean that it is
> pre-existent! It simply means that Form or habits of organization are
> continuous rules rather than individual embodiments. And that matter, which
> is to say, the individual,  or 'that which simply exists' is 2ns and exists
> within the constraints of continuous rules/habits.
>
> See also 'matter prior to form' 6.388 where he outlines but does not
> reject, Aristotle.
>
> As to what emerged, ordinally first in our cosmos - matter or form,
> Peirce's outline of cosmology suggests that 'bits of matter' [which are
> existent in 2ns] spontaneously [1ns] emerged first and the 'habits' of
> their interactions emerged gradually afterwards and became rules 3ns].
> [1.412]. As to what 'matter' is, apart from its being constituted within
> discrete individual units, I'd suggest it's energy.
>
> Edwina
>

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Aw: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic

[Helmut Raulien]

Gary, list,

Just now I am guessing, that there are two different approaches: Individuation and evolution:

If we talk about individuation, matter (as you and Old Stotle said) has no individuality, so matter is that what is worked upon by individuation (which is formal, with form as a first), so matter is a second. Though this would be ordinal thinking, which is wrong, as you and Edwina said (lest we agree with the similarity of onto- and phyllogenesis).

If we talk about evolution, we assume forms emerging out of amorphous matter (in the Aristotelian sense, and also in modern physics´ concepts of symmetry-break).

I propose to allow both views (individuation and evolution), because the attempt to decide between the two would raise a futile theological discussion.

My conclusion would be, that one cannot assign the nesses to the things without telling which sign s*he is talking about. In this case, the question whether matter or form is first, the answer is due to whether the sign is "individuation" or "evolution".

It is always good to mess things up a little, make simple-seeming things complicated, to find the seem.

Best, Helmut

 14. Dezember 2018 um 17:19 Uhr
Von: g...@gnusystems.ca
 




Helmut, list,

When we talk about “matter” in the English of our time, we tend to think of it as tangible stuff, or in physics, as stuff that has mass. Aristotle’s “matter” (ὕλη) is a very different concept, pertaining more to logic than to physics, and Peirce says in the excerpt Jon quoted, “it is always the Aristotelian matter I speak of” — not physical matter in the modern sense. Aristotelian matter is simply that which has no individuality. I think this might be clarified by reading Peirce’s Baldwin’s Dictionary article,  http://www.gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Matter%20and%20Form.

And of course Peirce was not talking about sexuality in the physical sense either …

I also agree with Edwina that if we are going to talk about Peircean Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, we should not take them in an ordinal sense, as if we were talking about the temporal order of events.

Gary f.

 



From: Helmut Raulien 
Sent: 14-Dec-18 10:26
To: h.raul...@gmx.de
Cc: g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic



 



  


  



Supplement: Meaning, that we see, hear, etc. very much about sex (e.g. in literature, music, advertisement, the conventional and new media), but dont receive enough of it. I imho agree.



Form and matter: After having read JAS´ post with the CSP-quotation, I am not so sure anymore. I guess, Platon would have said, that form (ideas) are first, Einstein and Mach, that both are conditions for each other (like hen and egg)...





  


Yes, sorry, I was a bit too happy to have had learnt a new English term. There is a theory that assumes, that people in the western civilization are "oversexed and (term)". Best, Helmut 



 13. Dezember 2018 um 20:20 Uhr
Von: g...@gnusystems.ca
 





Helmut, that’s an interesting new term you’ve introduced into metaphysical discourse, but I wonder whether it will stick … it might help if you explain what it means. (But maybe that would make the discussion overfucked?)

 

Anyway … your reason for asserting that “matter is first, and form second” does seem consistent (or paraconsistent?) with Aristotle’s matter/form distinction as given in De Anima. You imply that Peirce held the opposite view; but do you know of any text where Peirce actually said that “form” was first and “matter” second?

 

Gary f.

 



From: Helmut Raulien 
Sent: 13-Dec-18 13:19
Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic





  


  



Supplement: Or was he just underfucked?






List,



I think the question, whether matter is 1ns, and form 2ns, or the other way round, does not have to do with sex. This discussion is underfucked. Form requires matter, because a form must consist of something. Matter does not require form, matter may be amorphous. So matter is first, and form second. If Peirce said it differently, maybe he was wrong. Is that possible, that Peirce was wrong, or was he God?



Best, Helmut



  










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- PEIRCE-L 

RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic

[gnox]

Helmut, list,

When we talk about “matter” in the English of our time, we tend to think of it 
as tangible stuff, or in physics, as stuff that has mass. Aristotle’s “matter” 
(ὕλη) is a very different concept, pertaining more to logic than to physics, 
and Peirce says in the excerpt Jon quoted, “it is always the Aristotelian 
matter I speak of” — not physical matter in the modern sense. Aristotelian 
matter is simply that which has no individuality. I think this might be 
clarified by reading Peirce’s Baldwin’s Dictionary article,  
http://www.gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Matter%20and%20Form.

And of course Peirce was not talking about sexuality in the physical sense 
either …

I also agree with Edwina that if we are going to talk about Peircean Firstness, 
Secondness and Thirdness, we should not take them in an ordinal sense, as if we 
were talking about the temporal order of events.

Gary f.

 

From: Helmut Raulien  
Sent: 14-Dec-18 10:26
To: h.raul...@gmx.de
Cc: g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic

 

  

  

Supplement: Meaning, that we see, hear, etc. very much about sex (e.g. in 
literature, music, advertisement, the conventional and new media), but dont 
receive enough of it. I imho agree.

Form and matter: After having read JAS´ post with the CSP-quotation, I am not 
so sure anymore. I guess, Platon would have said, that form (ideas) are first, 
Einstein and Mach, that both are conditions for each other (like hen and egg)...

  

Yes, sorry, I was a bit too happy to have had learnt a new English term. There 
is a theory that assumes, that people in the western civilization are 
"oversexed and (term)". Best, Helmut 

 13. Dezember 2018 um 20:20 Uhr
Von: g...@gnusystems.ca  
 

Helmut, that’s an interesting new term you’ve introduced into metaphysical 
discourse, but I wonder whether it will stick … it might help if you explain 
what it means. (But maybe that would make the discussion overfucked?)

 

Anyway … your reason for asserting that “matter is first, and form second” does 
seem consistent (or paraconsistent?) with Aristotle’s matter/form distinction 
as given in De Anima. You imply that Peirce held the opposite view; but do you 
know of any text where Peirce actually said that “form” was first and “matter” 
second?

 

Gary f.

 

From: Helmut Raulien mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de> >
Sent: 13-Dec-18 13:19
Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic

  

  

Supplement: Or was he just underfucked?

List,

I think the question, whether matter is 1ns, and form 2ns, or the other way 
round, does not have to do with sex. This discussion is underfucked. Form 
requires matter, because a form must consist of something. Matter does not 
require form, matter may be amorphous. So matter is first, and form second. If 
Peirce said it differently, maybe he was wrong. Is that possible, that Peirce 
was wrong, or was he God?

Best, Helmut

  

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Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic

[Helmut Raulien]

 
 

Supplement: Meaning, that we see, hear, etc. very much about sex (e.g. in literature, music, advertisement, the conventional and new media), but dont receive enough of it. I imho agree.

Form and matter: After having read JAS´ post with the CSP-quotation, I am not so sure anymore. I guess, Platon would have said, that form (ideas) are first, Einstein and Mach, that both are conditions for each other (like hen and egg)...



 
Yes, sorry, I was a bit too happy to have had learnt a new English term. There is a theory that assumes, that people in the western civilization are "oversexed and (term)". Best, Helmut

 13. Dezember 2018 um 20:20 Uhr
Von: g...@gnusystems.ca
 




Helmut, that’s an interesting new term you’ve introduced into metaphysical discourse, but I wonder whether it will stick … it might help if you explain what it means. (But maybe that would make the discussion overfucked?)

 

Anyway … your reason for asserting that “matter is first, and form second” does seem consistent (or paraconsistent?) with Aristotle’s matter/form distinction as given in De Anima. You imply that Peirce held the opposite view; but do you know of any text where Peirce actually said that “form” was first and “matter” second?

 

Gary f.

 



From: Helmut Raulien 
Sent: 13-Dec-18 13:19
Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic





  


  



Supplement: Or was he just underfucked?






List,



I think the question, whether matter is 1ns, and form 2ns, or the other way round, does not have to do with sex. This discussion is underfucked. Form requires matter, because a form must consist of something. Matter does not require form, matter may be amorphous. So matter is first, and form second. If Peirce said it differently, maybe he was wrong. Is that possible, that Peirce was wrong, or was he God?



Best, Helmut



  









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RE: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic

[gnox]

Jon, you seem determined to take a firm stand that for Peirce, “Form is first 
and Matter is second” — although Peirce does not explicitly mention the 
phaneroscopic categories either in the excerpt you’ve quoted or in “The Basis 
of Pragmaticism in the Normative Sciences” (MS 283), the article I’ve been 
quoting from. Insofar as this is a metaphysical issue, I agree with Peirce that 
the logician had better remain aloof from it, since metaphysics derives its 
principles from logic and not vice versa. As the excerpt I quoted shows, 
Peirce’s focus in this article is growth as a key concept in logic (the 
methodeutic of inquiry).

For purposes of clarifying the concepts of Matter and Form, though, I think the 
place to start would be Peirce’s entry on the subject in Baldwin’s Dictionary, 
http://www.gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Matter%20and%20Form, which I won’t 
quote here because it’s very long. By the way, concerning the scholastics, 
toward the end of that entry there’s a long section on “substantial form,” 
which Peirce does mention in MS 283 in his discussion of “the precise sense 
which we are to attach to the term determination” (EP2:392).

Also in MS 283 (among the fragmentary drafts included in it) is that passage on 
“the perfect sign” which I continue to find fascinating. This was published in 
EP2:544, but with some ellipses in it, and I’ve often wondered what the EP2 
editors chose to omit from it. Well, I finally tracked down images of that part 
of MS 283 and managed to fill in the gaps, except for a few words that were cut 
off in the images. (The pages are not numbered by Peirce.) So here’s a more 
complete transcription, which I find even more intriguing than the EP2 version. 
It is certainly relevant to the semiotic concepts of quasi-mind and of growth — 
and maybe even to the physics of “vibrations” which was discussed on the list 
recently.

[[ Consider then the aggregate formed by a sign and all the signs which its 
occurrence carries with it. This aggregate will itself be a sign; and we may 
call it a perfect sign, in the sense that it involves the present existence of 
no other sign except such as are ingredients of itself. Now no perfect sign is 
in a statical condition: you might as well suppose a portion of matter to 
remain at rest during a thousandth of a second, or any other long interval of 
time. The only signs which are tolerably fixed are non-existent abstractions. 
We cannot deny that such a sign is real; only its mode of reality is not that 
active kind which we call existence. The existent acts, and whatsoever acts 
changes. Perhaps the reader may demur to this, saying that the earth acts to 
press him against the floor, but does not thereby undergo any change. But the 
floor is elastic, and … [The image of this MS page is cut off at the top.] He 
vibrates up and down, and action and reaction being equal, the centre of 
gravity of the earth vibrates up and down. It is abstractly conceivable that a 
particle should remain at rest; but in fact, it never does so. 

Every real ingredient of the perfect sign is aging, its energy of action upon 
the interpretant is running low, its sharp edges are wearing down, its outlines 
becoming more indefinite. 

On the other hand, the perfect sign is perpetually being acted upon by its 
object, from which it is perpetually receiving the accretions of new signs, 
which bring it fresh energy, and also kindle energy that it already had, but 
which had lain dormant. 

In addition, the perfect sign never ceases to undergo changes of the kind we 
rather drolly call spontaneous, that is, they happen sua sponte but not by its 
will. They are phenomena of growth. 

Such perfect sign is a quasi-mind. It is the sheet of assertion of Existential 
Graphs. This description must remain, inadequate though it is, or we should 
throw open the doors at once to a jam of considerations, which must be taken 
into account, if at all, in … [another line cut off at the top of the MS page 
image]. 

This quasi-mind is an object which from whatever standpoint it be examined, 
must evidently have, like anything else, its special qualities of 
susceptibility to determination. Moreover, the determinations come as events 
each one once for all and never again. Furthermore, it must have its rules or 
laws, the more special ones variable, others invariable. 

But we may ask, what is the nature of the action of the sign upon the 
quasi-mind when it determines the interpretant? The answer will be better 
understood if it is made disjunctive rather than general. ]]

Gary f.

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt  
Sent: 13-Dec-18 23:01
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic

 

Gary F., Helmut, List:

 

GF:  ... do you know of any text where Peirce actually said that “form” was 
first and “matter” second?

 

I offered several representative quotes in a previous post to demonstrate that 
Peirce consistently associated Form with 1ns and 

Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic

[Helmut Raulien]

 
Yes, sorry, I was a bit too happy to have had learnt a new English term. There is a theory that assumes, that people in the western civilization are "oversexed and (term)". Best, Helmut

 13. Dezember 2018 um 20:20 Uhr
Von: g...@gnusystems.ca
 




Helmut, that’s an interesting new term you’ve introduced into metaphysical discourse, but I wonder whether it will stick … it might help if you explain what it means. (But maybe that would make the discussion overfucked?)

 

Anyway … your reason for asserting that “matter is first, and form second” does seem consistent (or paraconsistent?) with Aristotle’s matter/form distinction as given in De Anima. You imply that Peirce held the opposite view; but do you know of any text where Peirce actually said that “form” was first and “matter” second?

 

Gary f.

 



From: Helmut Raulien 
Sent: 13-Dec-18 13:19
Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic





  


  



Supplement: Or was he just underfucked?






List,



I think the question, whether matter is 1ns, and form 2ns, or the other way round, does not have to do with sex. This discussion is underfucked. Form requires matter, because a form must consist of something. Matter does not require form, matter may be amorphous. So matter is first, and form second. If Peirce said it differently, maybe he was wrong. Is that possible, that Peirce was wrong, or was he God?



Best, Helmut



  









- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .





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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic

[Stephen Curtiss Rose]

The notion that either form or matter mean a hill of beans in terms of
triadic thinking assumes we know the nature of reality. Insofar as we know
what came first ir is first it is shrouded in mystery but it is most
certainly not all chance and formless. I do not know what Peirce had in
mind and I feel his  effort to assign more than ontological significance to
his categories is responsible for generations of fruitless efforts to
construct a theory that cannot work. It involves too much hair splitting.
First is reality and insofar as we can infer it it is One and one contains
freedom, truth, beauty and love. Second is some index that advances
thinking to a potential act or expression. And third is the stage at which
one thinks the world as it were -- eventuating in the continuing creation
of the world.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose


On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 9:16 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> List:
>
> I disagree that this section states that Form is associated with 1ns
> and Matter with 2ns. After all, that would suggest that Form is an
> action of chance, spontaneity and freedom. I consider that Form, which is
> not simply external appearance but 'how' matter is organized into its
> identity cannot function with such randomness. And - It is important, I
> think, not to confuse the three modes of Firstness, Secondness and
> Thirdness, with ordinality. That is, I consider it an error to think that
> the term 'Firstness' means  - first in order of existence etc.
>
>  Peirce writes "Form, as that which is what it is in itself, and as prior
> to any embodiment of it.  It is looking upon being as created, and regards
> its evolution as having the mode of movement of practice" . This suggests
> instead to me, that Form is 3ns and its priority is akin to its nature, not
> of ordinality but of continuity. This does NOT mean that it is
> pre-existent! It simply means that Form or habits of organization are
> continuous rules rather than individual embodiments. And that matter, which
> is to say, the individual,  or 'that which simply exists' is 2ns and exists
> within the constraints of continuous rules/habits.
>
> See also 'matter prior to form' 6.388 where he outlines but does not
> reject, Aristotle.
>
> As to what emerged, ordinally first in our cosmos - matter or form,
> Peirce's outline of cosmology suggests that 'bits of matter' [which are
> existent in 2ns] spontaneously [1ns] emerged first and the 'habits' of
> their interactions emerged gradually afterwards and became rules 3ns].
> [1.412]. As to what 'matter' is, apart from its being constituted within
> discrete individual units, I'd suggest it's energy.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Thu 13/12/18 11:01 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Gary F., Helmut, List:
>
> GF:  ... do you know of any text where Peirce actually said that “form”
> was first and “matter” second?
>
>
> I offered several representative quotes in a previous post to demonstrate
> that Peirce consistently associated Form with 1ns and Matter with 2ns,
> rather than the other way around.  The following is the most relevant to
> your question as posed here, this time without any omissions.
>
> CSP:  Aristotle's metaphysics undoubtedly belongs to the general type of
> evolutionary systems, as does for example, that of Hegel.  As I understand
> it, he identifies the mode of the evolution of being with that of the
> evolution of theory, notwithstanding his incessant oppositions of πρότερον
> ούσίᾳ and πρότερον λόγῳ.  Matter is, for him, that which is what it is in
> itself.  Form is that which is only so far as it is embodied in matter, and
> is essentially dichotomic, as Plato made it.  The scholastic metaphysics,
> on the other hand, looks upon the pure nature, or Form, as that which is
> what it is in itself, and as prior to any embodiment of it.  It is looking
> upon being as created, and regards its evolution as having the mode of
> movement of practice.  Scotus appears to look upon individuation as an
> unintelligible act of force.  From this point of view, matter (it is always
> the Aristotelian matter I speak of, or that which simply exists) ought to
> be held to exist only by reaction, and so to be that which is what it is by
> force of another.  It is not necessary for the logician to embrace either
> of these theories (of which I prefer the second.)  He had better remain
> aloof. (R 517:92-93[18-19]; 1904)
>
>
> In the evolution of being, what comes first is "that which is what it is
> in itself," and what comes second is either "that which is only so far as
> it is embodied" or "that which is what it is by force of another."  Hence
> for Aristotle, Matter is first and Form is second; but for the scholastics
> and Peirce, Form is first and Matter is second.  It is Matter, not Form,
> that corresponds to force.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}List: 

I disagree that this section states that Form is associated with 1ns
and Matter with 2ns. After all, that would suggest that Form is an
action of chance, spontaneity and freedom. I consider that Form,
which is not simply external appearance but 'how' matter is organized
into its identity cannot function with such randomness. And - It is
important, I think, not to confuse the three modes of Firstness,
Secondness and Thirdness, with ordinality. That is, I consider it an
error to think that the term 'Firstness' means  - first in order of
existence etc.

 Peirce writes "Form, as that which is what it is in itself, and as
prior to any embodiment of it.  It is looking upon being as created,
and regards its evolution as having the mode of movement of practice"
. This suggests instead to me, that Form is 3ns and its priority is
akin to its nature, not of ordinality but of continuity. This does
NOT mean that it is pre-existent! It simply means that Form or habits
of organization are continuous rules rather than individual
embodiments. And that matter, which is to say, the individual,  or
'that which simply exists' is 2ns and exists within the constraints
of continuous rules/habits. 

See also 'matter prior to form' 6.388 where he outlines but does not
reject, Aristotle.

As to what emerged, ordinally first in our cosmos - matter or form,
Peirce's outline of cosmology suggests that 'bits of matter' [which
are existent in 2ns] spontaneously [1ns] emerged first and the
'habits' of their interactions emerged gradually afterwards and
became rules 3ns]. [1.412]. As to what 'matter' is, apart from its
being constituted within discrete individual units, I'd suggest it's
energy.

Edwina 
 On Thu 13/12/18 11:01 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Gary F., Helmut, List:
 GF:  ... do you know of any text where Peirce actually said that
“form” was first and “matter” second? 
 I offered several representative quotes in a previous post to
demonstrate that Peirce consistently associated Form with 1ns and
Matter with 2ns, rather than the other way around.  The following is
the most relevant to your question as posed here, this time without
any omissions.
  CSP:  Aristotle's metaphysics undoubtedly belongs to the general
type of evolutionary systems, as does for example, that of Hegel.  As
I understand it, he identifies the mode of the evolution of being with
that of the evolution of theory, notwithstanding his incessant
oppositions of πρότερον ούσίᾳ and πρότερον
λόγῳ.  Matter is, for him, that which is what it is in itself. 
Form is that which is only so far as it is embodied in matter, and is
essentially dichotomic, as Plato made it.  The scholastic metaphysics,
on the other hand, looks upon the pure nature, or Form, as that which
is what it is in itself, and as prior to any embodiment of it.  It is
looking upon being as created, and regards its evolution as having the
mode of movement of practice.  Scotus appears to look upon
individuation as an unintelligible act of force.  From this point of
view, matter (it is always the Aristotelian matter I speak of, or
that which simply exists) ought to be held to exist only by reaction,
and so to be that which is what it is by force of another.  It is not
necessary for the logician to embrace either of these theories (of
which I prefer the second.)  He had better remain aloof. (R
517:92-93[18-19]; 1904)
 In the evolution of being, what comes first is "that which is what
it is in itself," and what comes second is either "that which is only
so far as it is embodied" or "that which is what it is by force of
another."  Hence for Aristotle, Matter is first and Form is second;
but for the scholastics and Peirce, Form is first and Matter is
second.  It is Matter, not Form, that corresponds to force. 
 Regards,
 Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] 


Links:
--
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

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