Re: CP2.230 (1910) ] Systems of Meaning was Re: [PEIRCE-L] 123, abc

[John F Sowa]

Stefan B, Stephen CR, Bev, and Kirsti,

I drew a new diagram based on Peirce's classification of the
sciences.  I'll send it to the list in a separate thread.

Stephan

I believe you are seeing this from a very different viewpoint.
I am interested in the sociology and history of knowledge.


So am I.  And so was Peirce.  I believe that the new diagram
will show how all these issues are related.


[The cycle] isn't useful if i want to point out that there are
possible differences in the kind of abduction and the kind of
induction used and if i want to point out that there is difference
between guessing a word one hasn't clearly understood from context
and guessing whether saturn has "ears", moons or rings.


I'm not claiming that all possible relationships can be explained
with a single diagram.  When Peirce was talking about diagrammatical
reasoning, he had intended different diagrams to highlight different
relations for different purposes.

Stephen

Do W's atomic facts fit in?


Yes.  When Peirce talked about induction, abduction, and deduction,
he didn't place any restriction on the subject matter or how it
happened to be represented.

Bev

What about bad habits?


A bad habit is learned in the same way as a good habit.
The only difference is that the goal of the bad habit is some
short-term gratification, which happens to conflict with a
more important long-term good.

An example would be procrastination.  The short-term goal of
avoiding some onerous task can cause the long-term loss of
something more important.

Kirsti,

But Peirce did write on cyclical arithmetics. With detailed
instructions on how demonstrate the rules by experimenting with
a pack of cards.


Yes.  But he used that cycle for a different purpose.  That
cycle represents patterns in a particular mathematical subject.

The cycle in the logic of pragmatism is a cycle among the
steps of reasoning.  It's not a cycle in the subject matter.

John

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Re: CP2.230 (1910) ] Systems of Meaning was Re: [PEIRCE-L] 123, abc

[kirstima]

John,

Your posts greatly  appreciated. But Peirce did write on cyclical 
arithmetics. With detailed instructions on how demonstrate the rules by 
experimenting with a pack of cards.


Detailed instructions include strict rules on how to achieve a random 
order with the pack of cards at hand. Only after doing this, the 
experimentations may duly be executed.


CSP describes eg. a procedure to demonstrate the birth of a habit, for 
instance. You start with a random pack and end up with, say, spades 
only.


Thus his cyclical arithmetics is deeply bound together with his ideas on 
the relation between probability and rules. What happens with true 
randonmess with a rule (any rule) applied to it?


This, for CSP was a question in need of experimentation as well as 
pre-locical (math!) demonstration.. The rule CSP choosed was that of 
cyclicity.


Nowhere have I seen this relation studied. Not in Moore's collection, 
nowhere.


A pack of cards contains 52 cards. - Well, there is a pattern of 
patience I have known since childhood. It may be called Napoleon' grave 
or not. Anyway, it consists of three cycles of ten. So, 52 ends up 
uneven with cycles of ten.


Does this make a significant difference with as few cycles as three? - 
CSP does not tell. - In this context, anyway.


All Peirce writes on cyclical arithmetics can be tested AND personally 
exprienced by really doing exactly as he minutely advices. Also 
repeatedly, as any experiment worth anything  should be done.


I have been experimenting systematically with a pack of cards for 
several, several decades. In order to truly understand the principles of 
cyclical arithmetics, by CSP.


What I have found out, for example is the huge difference between 
repeating, for three times in a cycle of ten, a pack of random 52 to a 
pack of 50. Really doing the patience includes that one counts down wins 
and losses as something personal, It is you who wins or loses. - It 
makes a difference, too.


There is no way any collection of quotes may replace experimentation. 
Inferences should be based on those, not just by leaning on any kind of 
hear-say. Not on  even well-selected quotes ripped from manuscrips by 
CSP.


With best wishes,

Kirsti







John F Sowa kirjoitti 16.8.2017 23:42:

Jerry,

JFS

In his late writings on the logic of pragmatism, he emphasized the
multiple cycles of observations, induction, abduction, deduction,
testing (actions) and repeat.


JLRC> Do you have specific citations?

I wish that Peirce had used the word 'cycle' and had drawn a diagram
similar to the one I frequently use.  See the attached soup1.jpg.

I pieced together passages from many of Peirce's writings about
induction, abduction, and deduction to construct that cycle.
There are many such comments scattered all through his writings.
(His lectures on pragmatism in EP vol. 2 contain many of them.)

Following is a passage (CP 5.171) that mentions all four arrows of the
cycle:  abduction, deduction, testing (action), and induction:
Abduction merely suggests that something may be. Its only 
justification

is that from its suggestion deduction can draw a prediction which can
be tested by induction, and that, if we are ever to learn anything or
to understand phenomena at all, it must be by abduction that this is
to be brought about.


See Section 7, pp. 26 to 34, of http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf .
Diagram 7 (p. 31) is soup1.jpg.  On page 32, I use that diagram to
explain Peirce's point "truth can be nothing more nor less than the
last result to which the following out of this method would ultimately
carry us." (EP 2.379-380)

That passage implies a cycle.  Peirce's lectures on pragmatism would
have been much clearer if he had drawn such a cycle.

John



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Re: CP2.230 (1910) ] Systems of Meaning was Re: [PEIRCE-L] 123, abc

[sb]

John,

thank for your response. I believe you are seeing this from a very 
different viewpoint. I am interested in the sociology and history of 
knowledge. That's why i am thinking in a different diagram.



On 8/16/2017 6:29 PM, sb wrote:
in my opinion the diagram should contain two cycles. A "habit" cycle 
and a "something unexpected happens" cycle. The diagram should also 
address the fact, that the stock of knowledge changes with every turn 
on the "something unexpected happens" cycle.


All those options can be represented by a single kind of cycle
that may be traversed at different speeds and may include nested
cycles of cycles. 
Yes , of course it can be represented in a single cycle. But it isn't 
useful if i want to point out that there are possible differences in the 
kind of abduction and the kind of induction used and if i want to point 
out that there is difference between guessing a word one hasn't clearly 
understood from context and guessing whether saturn has "ears", moons or 
rings.

As Peirce said, every perception is an abduction:

the abductive faculty, whereby we divine the secrets of nature,
is, as we may say, a shading off, a gradation of that which we
call a perception.  (EP 2.224)


An if-then rule is a generalization of a habit.  In fact, if we
simulate human reasoning in a computer, we would represent a habit
by an if-then rule:
Just a sidenote: I never believed that computers are very good at 
simulating human reasoning. That is the reason why the future of AI is 
since 60 years what it used to be: In ten years we will have a computer 
that... What we see today in AI is brute force statistics and as far as 
my knowledge goes there is no computer with abductive skills.


 1. Anything perceptible by any means in any species or with any
technical aid (microscopes, telescopes, microphones, chemical
detectors...) is a mark.

 2. Every percept is a general pattern (or predicate in logic),
which may be used to classify an open ended variety of marks
as tokens of the type -- and with varying degrees of fidelity.

 3. The act of perception may interpret the same mark in different
ways.  Therefore, any choice of type is a potentially fallible
abduction.

 4. Any habit (if-then rule) may be used in deduction to make
a prediction from the chosen type in the given context.

 5. Then the prediction must be tested by some action followed by
another observation.  If the prediction is correct, the cycle
may stop (reach a satisfactory conclusion).

 6. If the prediction is false, that is a surprise.  Then the cycle
must continue with more observations, inductions, abductions,
belief revisions, deductions, and testing.


The levels are not divided by a sharp border, they are more like
the extremes of a continuum.


Yes.  The world is a continuum, and all our methods of perception
and reasoning must deal with it.  Following is an article I wrote
on "What is the source of fuzziness?"  This was published in a
Festschrift for Lotfi Zadeh -- but it uses Peircean ideas to
analyze and explain fuzziness:  http://jfsowa.com/pubs/fuzzy.pdf
Just wrote that to make clear, that i don't think this in a dichotomy. 
Nevertheless thanks for the tip!



when something becomes a habit we (can) forget existing doubts,
premisses or rare results - the stock of knowledge shrinks.


No.  I would say that it becomes better organized.  Whitehead said
that intellectual progress can be measured by the amount of reasoning
we can do without thinking about it.  Whitehead was talking about
mathematics.  But just compare a child who is learning to play the
piano and professional musicians who have all the patterns at their
fingertips (actually, in their cerebellum instead of the cerebrum).
Here we are really on different pages. If we don't forget the reasons 
why we do something, why did then Wassermann try to detect syphillis in 
the "blood"?


see: Ludwik Fleck: /Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact/, 
transl. by Fred Bradley and Thaddeus J. Trenn, Thaddeus J. Trenn and 
Robert K. Merton (eds.), “Foreword” by Thomas S. Kuhn, Chicago: Chicago 
University Press 1979.


But i don't want to waste your time with things you are maybe not 
interested in. How to think sociology and history of knowledge with 
Peirce is just the way i roll...


Best,
Stefan


John



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Re: CP2.230 (1910) ] Systems of Meaning was Re: [PEIRCE-L] 123, abc

[sb]

John,

in my opinion the diagram should contain two cycles. A "habit" cycle and 
a "something unexpected happens" cyle. The diagram should also address 
the fact, that the stock of knowledge changes with every turn on the 
"something unexpected happens" cycle.


Maybe it would be even better to think of it as a progressing spiral, 
which progresses on different levels (see attached diagram). A 
unconscious habit level and a conscious something-has-happend level. 
Using the dichotomy conscious/unconscious is a distinction too hard . 
The levels are not divided by a sharp border, they are more like the 
extremes of a continuum.


As an example: We can have these shock experiences when something 
doesn't work like expected. Then it is possible that something 
unconscious suddenly becomes conscious and problematic. But it also 
happens that our doubt slowly grows, because many small disturbing 
experiences add up (not in my diagram).


When we find a solution that settles our doubt, this solution becomes a 
habit and slowly becomes more and more unconscious. It happens that we 
are perfectly conditioned like pawlovian dogs. But often it is just the 
case that becoming a habit means, we take premisses and results for 
granted. It also happens often that there is no shock in the beginning, 
instead we gradually change our beliefs and the shock experience comes 
afterwards, when we realize our world view has changed dramatically.


Coming back to the change of the stock of knowledge: It is obvious that 
we add information to our stock of knowledge when we have a new idea. 
But it is less obvious that when something becomes a habit we (can) 
forget existing doubts, premisses or rare results - the stock of 
knowledge shrinks.


Depending on the position of the continuum there are differences in the 
kind of abdcution involved. Using Ecos terms: On the habit side there is 
overcoded abduction involved, but on the something-has-happend side it 
is in contrast abduction ex novo, meta abduction etc.


Just my two cents, clearly peircean in a way, but in no sense a 
interpretation close to the text.


Best,
Stefan

P.S. The diagram becomes more complex when we take into account that the 
stock of knowledge is social entity.


"Man makes the word, and the word means nothing which the man has not  
made it mean, and that only to some man. But since man can think only 
by  means of words or other external symbols, these might turn around 
and say:  "You mean nothing which we have not taught you, and then only 
so far as you  address some word as the interpretant of your thought." 
In fact, therefore, men  and words reciprocally educate each other; each 
increase of a man's information involves and is involved by, a 
corresponding increase of a word's  information."


Am 16.08.17 um 22:42 schrieb John F Sowa:

Jerry,

JFS

In his late writings on the logic of pragmatism, he emphasized the
multiple cycles of observations, induction, abduction, deduction,
testing (actions) and repeat.


JLRC> Do you have specific citations?

I wish that Peirce had used the word 'cycle' and had drawn a diagram
similar to the one I frequently use.  See the attached soup1.jpg.

I pieced together passages from many of Peirce's writings about
induction, abduction, and deduction to construct that cycle.
There are many such comments scattered all through his writings.
(His lectures on pragmatism in EP vol. 2 contain many of them.)

Following is a passage (CP 5.171) that mentions all four arrows of the
cycle:  abduction, deduction, testing (action), and induction:

Abduction merely suggests that something may be. Its only justification
is that from its suggestion deduction can draw a prediction which can
be tested by induction, and that, if we are ever to learn anything or
to understand phenomena at all, it must be by abduction that this is
to be brought about.


See Section 7, pp. 26 to 34, of http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf .
Diagram 7 (p. 31) is soup1.jpg.  On page 32, I use that diagram to
explain Peirce's point "truth can be nothing more nor less than the
last result to which the following out of this method would ultimately
carry us." (EP 2.379-380)

That passage implies a cycle.  Peirce's lectures on pragmatism would
have been much clearer if he had drawn such a cycle.

John



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Re: CP2.230 (1910) ] Systems of Meaning was Re: [PEIRCE-L] 123, abc

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, John: 
> On Aug 16, 2017, at 10:15 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> In his late writings on the logic of pragmatism, he emphasized the
> multiple cycles of observations, induction, abduction, deduction,
> testing (actions) and repeat.

Do you have specific citations?

(BTW, these steps are essential to the systematic organization and logic of 
chemical systems.)

Cheers

Jerry 


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Re: Aw: Re: CP2.230 (1910) ] Systems of Meaning was Re: [PEIRCE-L] 123, abc

[John F Sowa]

On 8/12/2017 4:23 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
I have problems with the term "final" or "end" anyway. I guess that the 
pragmatic maxim is only a proposal how to make our ideas clearer, in 
order to be able to talk more reasonably, but not absolutely end-clear.


That 1878 article about the gates of perception and action was early
in Peirce's career.  He certainly knew logic, and he realized that
many arguments take a long path from the starting observations to the
concluding actions.

In his late writings on the logic of pragmatism, he emphasized the
multiple cycles of observations, induction, abduction, deduction,
testing (actions) and repeat.

He never gave up the idea that meaningful concepts must be
related to perception and action.  But there may be multiple
steps along the way.

John

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Aw: Re: CP2.230 (1910) ] Systems of Meaning was Re: [PEIRCE-L] 123, abc

[Helmut Raulien]

Stephen, John, List,

that  a token is often one of "an open-ended variety of types", I find interesting and very agreeable. I have problems with the term "final" or "end" anyway. I guess that the pragmatic maxim is only a proposal how to make our ideas clearer, in order to be able to talk more reasonably, but not absolutely end-clear. The nirvana of absolute truth I imagine as very boring, because static, and therefore do not want to believe in it.

Best,

Helmut

 

12. August 2017 um 21:37 Uhr
 "John F Sowa" 
 

On 8/12/2017 10:43 AM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:
> Isn't the point of considering anything the end? And isn't the end
> a practical actionable something (_expression_, act) that contains
> the initial sign and the index.

Peirce said that the interpretant of any sign is always another sign.
He also said that every meaningful sign must show its passport at the
gates of perception and action. But he put no limits on the number
of intermediate steps.

> In which case the sign would already have been predefined by the
> logical end, though requiring the cogitative process to get there.
> Isn't the end the point of the pragmaticist maxim.

Both gates are essential for meaningful signs. But any mark
may be interpreted as a token of an open-ended variety of types.
A meaningful sign could be encountered on many different steps
of many different paths from perceptible marks to purposive actions.

John

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Re: CP2.230 (1910) ] Systems of Meaning was Re: [PEIRCE-L] 123, abc

[Stephen C. Rose]

Thanks. That makes sense. I think to popularize Peirce in the best sense is
to create a model that has three stages but which is clearly as you say,
not a rote affair. The best popular iteration of a general approach that
seems to me triadic is "Madam Secretary" whose theme is not merely thinking
beyond the box but beyond it. I read your paper you mentioned and am very
glad to see some consonance between Peirce and Wittgenstein as they seemed
to arrive at much the same point by somewhat different ways.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sat, Aug 12, 2017 at 3:37 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> On 8/12/2017 10:43 AM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:
>
>> Isn't the point of considering anything the end? And isn't the end
>> a practical actionable something (expression, act) that contains
>> the initial sign and the index.
>>
>
> Peirce said that the interpretant of any sign is always another sign.
> He also said that every meaningful sign must show its passport at the
> gates of perception and action.  But he put no limits on the number
> of intermediate steps.
>
> In which case the sign would already have been predefined by the
>> logical end, though requiring the cogitative process to get there.
>> Isn't the end the point of the pragmaticist maxim.
>>
>
> Both gates are essential for meaningful signs.  But any mark
> may be interpreted as a token of an open-ended variety of types.
> A meaningful sign could be encountered on many different steps
> of many different paths from perceptible marks to purposive actions.
>
> John
>
>
> -
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Aw: Re: CP2.230 (1910) ] Systems of Meaning was Re: [PEIRCE-L] 123, abc

[Helmut Raulien]

John, List,

the plot type is a sign type, but is it a sign? Or are only the tokens signs, because only they are perceived? Like a book that is read. And is the book only a sign when it is being read, because only then it is interpreted, and when it is closed, it sort of sleeps and is not a sign?

And is a complex system, like a person or a society, a sign too? If so, maybe a systems theory is not necessary, but a box-in-box-theory of signs, like a person who reads a book is a sign which interprets another sign. And when nothing is happening, the book is closed and the person asleep, there are no signs, but sign tokens and sign types.

So maybe it would be possible to translate all systems theory terms into Peircean "sign-" terms, and not use the term "system" at all?

Best,

Helmut

 

 12. August 2017 um 15:03 Uhr
 "John F Sowa" 
wrote:

 

On 8/11/2017 5:09 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
> A system, I think, is defined by the part of its structure, that does
> not change. The system exists as long as this part of structure (set of
> relations) exists. Which part of the structure is used to define the
> system, can be arbitrary choice, but usually is something essential,
> whatever this means.

You could apply Peirce's classification of signs to this analysis.

As an example, consider the book _War and Peace_. Peirce would call
the physical book a sign token. The corresponding type would be
the entire text, considered as a string of chapters, paragraphs,
sentences, words -- independent of any method of presentation
or storage.

That type is an abstraction from the physical book. But there is
an even more general abstraction: the detailed plot of the book,
which is the same type for Tolstoy's original Russian and the
translation to English or any other language.

A very similar, but somewhat simplified plot type could be used
to classify a movie made from the book. The plot type for the
movie and the plot type for the book would both be special cases
of a more general plot type.

> Every system has a "Now". This is the signs, that happen every now,
> and this "now" travels through time.

You could apply that description to the movie as it is projected
on a screen (in a theater or on a computer).

But you could also apply it to the process of a person sitting
in a chair and reading the book -- in any language. That process
may be discontinuous, since people don't read _War and Peace_
in a single sitting.

John

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Re: CP2.230 (1910) ] Systems of Meaning was Re: [PEIRCE-L] 123, abc

[John F Sowa]

On 8/12/2017 10:43 AM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:

Isn't the point of considering anything the end? And isn't the end
a practical actionable something (expression, act) that contains
the initial sign and the index.


Peirce said that the interpretant of any sign is always another sign.
He also said that every meaningful sign must show its passport at the
gates of perception and action.  But he put no limits on the number
of intermediate steps.


In which case the sign would already have been predefined by the
logical end, though requiring the cogitative process to get there.
Isn't the end the point of the pragmaticist maxim.


Both gates are essential for meaningful signs.  But any mark
may be interpreted as a token of an open-ended variety of types.
A meaningful sign could be encountered on many different steps
of many different paths from perceptible marks to purposive actions.

John

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Re: CP2.230 (1910) ] Systems of Meaning was Re: [PEIRCE-L] 123, abc

[Stephen C. Rose]

Isn't the point of considering anything the end? And isn't the end a
practical actionable something (expression, act) that contains the initial
sign and the index. In which case the sign would already have been
predefined by the logical end, though requiring the cogitative process to
get there. Isn't the end the point of the pragmaticist maxim.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sat, Aug 12, 2017 at 9:03 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> On 8/11/2017 5:09 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
>
>> A system, I think, is defined by the part of its structure, that does not
>> change. The system exists as long as this part of structure (set of
>> relations) exists. Which part of the structure is used to define the
>> system, can be arbitrary choice, but usually is something essential,
>> whatever this means.
>>
>
> You could apply Peirce's classification of signs to this analysis.
>
> As an example, consider the book _War and Peace_.  Peirce would call
> the physical book a sign token.  The corresponding type would be
> the entire text, considered as a string of chapters, paragraphs,
> sentences, words -- independent of any method of presentation
> or storage.
>
> That type is an abstraction from the physical book.  But there is
> an even more general abstraction:  the detailed plot of the book,
> which is the same type for Tolstoy's original Russian and the
> translation to English or any other language.
>
> A very similar, but somewhat simplified plot type could be used
> to classify a movie made from the book.  The plot type for the
> movie and the plot type for the book would both be special cases
> of a more general plot type.
>
> Every system has a "Now". This is the signs, that happen every now,
>> and this "now" travels through time.
>>
>
> You could apply that description to the movie as it is projected
> on a screen (in a theater or on a computer).
>
> But you could also apply it to the process of a person sitting
> in a chair and reading the book -- in any language.  That process
> may be discontinuous, since people don't read _War and Peace_
> in a single sitting.
>
> John
>
>
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>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: CP2.230 (1910) ] Systems of Meaning was Re: [PEIRCE-L] 123, abc

[John F Sowa]

On 8/11/2017 5:09 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
A system, I think, is defined by the part of its structure, that does 
not change. The system exists as long as this part of structure (set of 
relations) exists. Which part of the structure is used to define the 
system, can be arbitrary choice, but usually is something essential, 
whatever this means.


You could apply Peirce's classification of signs to this analysis.

As an example, consider the book _War and Peace_.  Peirce would call
the physical book a sign token.  The corresponding type would be
the entire text, considered as a string of chapters, paragraphs,
sentences, words -- independent of any method of presentation
or storage.

That type is an abstraction from the physical book.  But there is
an even more general abstraction:  the detailed plot of the book,
which is the same type for Tolstoy's original Russian and the
translation to English or any other language.

A very similar, but somewhat simplified plot type could be used
to classify a movie made from the book.  The plot type for the
movie and the plot type for the book would both be special cases
of a more general plot type.


Every system has a "Now". This is the signs, that happen every now,
and this "now" travels through time.


You could apply that description to the movie as it is projected
on a screen (in a theater or on a computer).

But you could also apply it to the process of a person sitting
in a chair and reading the book -- in any language.  That process
may be discontinuous, since people don't read _War and Peace_
in a single sitting.

John

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Aw: Re: CP2.230 (1910) ] Systems of Meaning was Re: [PEIRCE-L] 123, abc

[Helmut Raulien]

Jerry, List,

 

I think, that the main difference between a sytem and a sign is, that a system can sleep (in the sense of dreamless sleep). A system, I think, is defined by the part of it´s structure, that does not change. The system exists as long as this part of structure (set of relations) exists. Which part of the structure is used to define the system, can be arbitrary choice, but usually is something essential, whatever this means.

Every system has a "Now". This is the signs, that happen every now, and this "now" travels through time. The system´s now of a person, I think, is his/her "I", or ego. The self is something different: the set of memories (conscious and asleep), the body, etc., I guess. When one sleeps dreamlessly, for him/her there is no "now", she/he has no "I", but still a self.

 


I think in a system we have:

1.: Events

2.: Subjects or entities or things

3.: Structure (relations),

 

while in a "system´s now" or signs we have:

1.: Signs (events at work)

2.: Objects (subjects at work)

3.: Interpretants (relations at work).

 

In the sense of the first triad, a system is a subject, and a sign is an event (at work). A person´s self is a subject, a person´s "I" consists of signs.

This is how I temporarily think that it is like.

 

Best,

Helmut

 

 


10. August 2017 um 21:23 Uhr
 "Jerry LR Chandler" <jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com>
 


John, List. 
 

(I preface my remarks with several quotes from earlier posts in an attempt to establish the context of my post and John’s response, which I do not understand.  It is a bit confusing, but I think this is a critically important issue with respect to the scientific foundations of semiotics.  That is, are all signs emanations?) 

 


On Aug 5, 2017, at 2:09 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
 





I want to combine CSP with systems theory. I think, there might come out a triadic systems theory this way. Peirce did not write much about systems, I think, and existing systems theories are not based on CSP. Stanley N. Salthe wrote about systems hierarchies: "Salthe´12Axiomathes". In this paper he wrote, that there are two kinds of systems hierarchies: Composition and subsumption. The latter is, or includes, classification. Therefore I am interested in the ways both (composition and classification) play a role in CSP´s theory of signs.


 

Best,

Helmut










 06. August 2017 um 13:34 Uhr
 kirst...@saunalahti.fi
wrote:



Helmut,

Todays systems theories were not known by Peirce. Thus he dis not use
the TERM (which is just a name for a theoretical concept) in the sense
(meaning) it is used nowadays.

I have studied some early cybernetics, then Bertallanffy and Luhman in
more detail.

 

 

I wrote 


Jerry LR Chandler 

CP2.230 (1910) ] Systems of Meaning  was  Re: [PEIRCE-L] 123, abc

Armando, List:

 

Consider the meaning of the chromaticity  (spectra) of 

1,2,3…

A, B, C,…

H, He, Li, Be, B, C, N, O, F, Ne,…

A, B, C, D, E, F, G, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, A, B, C,…   (musical scales)

nad A, nad B, and nad C, etc, (genetic symbols with closure over a set of genetic symbols that represent the potential of inheritance of the genome)

 

 

Each of these five symbol systems is an accepted social symbol system that is used publicly in everyday communication and by different academic tribes.  The factual meaning of the latter three symbol systems are established by factual (reproducible) observations from objects.

 

Now, consider the CP 2.230 (1910) in relation to the systems of modern thought.

 

[[ The word Sign will be used to denote an Object perceptible, or only imaginable, or even unimaginable in one sense—for the word “fast,” which is a Sign, is not imaginable, since it is not this word itself that can be set down on paper or pronounced, but only an instance of it, and since it is the very same word when it is written as it is when it is pronounced, but is one word when it means “rapidly” and quite another when it means “immovable,” and a third when it refers to abstinence. But in order that anything should be a Sign, it must “represent,” as we say, something else, called its Object, although the condition that a Sign must be other than its Object is perhaps arbitrary, since, if we insist upon it we must at least make an exception in the case of a Sign that is a part of a Sign. Thus nothing prevents the actor who acts a character in an historical drama from carrying as a theatrical “property” the very relic that that article is supposed merely to represent, such as the crucifix that Bulwer's Richelieu holds up with such effect in his defiance. On a map of an island laid down upon the soil of that island there must, under all ordinary circumstances, be some position, some point, marked or not, that represents qua place on the map, the very same point qua place on the island. 

A sign may have more than one Object. Th

Re: CP2.230 (1910) ] Systems of Meaning was Re: [PEIRCE-L] 123, abc

[John F Sowa]

On 8/10/2017 3:23 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
Is Tarski’s approach to the formal logics of metalanguages essential 
to give coherence to communication with the broad array of modern 
synthetic symbol systems?


By itself, Tarski's version of model theory and metalanguage is not
sufficient.  But something like it is a necessary part of any theory
that relates any language or symbol system to the world.

The basic foundation is as old as Aristotle.  In fact, Tarski
quotes Aristotle in the introduction of his famous paper (1933):
"To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is,
is false, while to say of what is that it is, or of what is not
that it is not, is true."

Aristotle used that principle to determine which patterns of
syllogisms are or are not valid.  John Venn developed his famous
diagrams as a systematic way of testing the validity of syllogisms.
The Stoics used the same principle to test the validity of their
rules of inference for propositional logic.

A combination of the Aristotelian and Stoic logics was developed
in detail by the Scholastics.  Ockham developed a model-theoretic
foundation for that subset of Latin that expressed the Aristotelian-
Stoic combination.

Peirce lectured on Ockham at Harvard, he knew Venn's work, and he
developed his endoporeutic (outside-in evaluation) for determining
the truth values of existential graphs.

Nobody understood how endoporeutic worked until Risto Hilpinen (1982)
showed that it is equivalent to a version of Hintikka's game theoretic
semantics (GTS), which is an extension (improvement) of Tarski's method.
For a summary of GTS, see http://www.jfsowa.com/logic/math.htm#Model

As for metalanguage, the Scholastics called it second-intentional
language, and Peirce developed it further.  I discuss those issues in

   http://jfsowa.com/pubs/rolelog.pdf
   The role of logic and ontology in language

   http://jfsowa.com/pubs/eg2cg.pdf
   From existential graphs to conceptual graphs

   http://jfsowa.com/pubs/fuzzy.pdf
   What is the source of fuzziness?

Summary:  As I said, Tarski's methods (or the many equivalent
versions) are necessary.   But they're not sufficient.  Peirce,
as usual, went beyond the limitations of 20th-century philosophy.

John

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Re: CP2.230 (1910) ] Systems of Meaning was Re: [PEIRCE-L] 123, abc

[Jerry LR Chandler]

John, List. 

(I preface my remarks with several quotes from earlier posts in an attempt to 
establish the context of my post and John’s response, which I do not 
understand.  It is a bit confusing, but I think this is a critically important 
issue with respect to the scientific foundations of semiotics.  That is, are 
all signs emanations?) 

> On Aug 5, 2017, at 2:09 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
> 
> I want to combine CSP with systems theory. I think, there might come out a 
> triadic systems theory this way. Peirce did not write much about systems, I 
> think, and existing systems theories are not based on CSP. Stanley N. Salthe 
> wrote about systems hierarchies: "Salthe´12Axiomathes". In this paper he 
> wrote, that there are two kinds of systems hierarchies: Composition and 
> subsumption. The latter is, or includes, classification. Therefore I am 
> interested in the ways both (composition and classification) play a role in 
> CSP´s theory of signs.
>  
> Best,
> Helmut

 06. August 2017 um 13:34 Uhr
 kirst...@saunalahti.fi <mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi>
wrote:
Helmut,

Todays systems theories were not known by Peirce. Thus he dis not use
the TERM (which is just a name for a theoretical concept) in the sense
(meaning) it is used nowadays.

I have studied some early cybernetics, then Bertallanffy and Luhman in
more detail.


I wrote 
Jerry LR Chandler 
CP2.230 (1910) ] Systems of Meaning  was  Re: [PEIRCE-L] 123, abc
Armando, List:

Consider the meaning of the chromaticity  (spectra) of 
1,2,3…
A, B, C,…
H, He, Li, Be, B, C, N, O, F, Ne,…
A, B, C, D, E, F, G, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, A, B, C,…   (musical scales)
nad A, nad B, and nad C, etc, (genetic symbols with closure over a set of 
genetic symbols that represent the potential of inheritance of the genome)
 

Each of these five symbol systems is an accepted social symbol system that is 
used publicly in everyday communication and by different academic tribes.  The 
factual meaning of the latter three symbol systems are established by factual 
(reproducible) observations from objects.

Now, consider the CP 2.230 (1910) in relation to the systems of modern thought.

[[ The word Sign will be used to denote an Object perceptible, or only 
imaginable, or even unimaginable in one sense—for the word “fast,” which is a 
Sign, is not imaginable, since it is not this word itself that can be set down 
on paper or pronounced, but only an instance of it, and since it is the very 
same word when it is written as it is when it is pronounced, but is one word 
when it means “rapidly” and quite another when it means “immovable,” and a 
third when it refers to abstinence. But in order that anything should be a 
Sign, it must “represent,” as we say, something else, called its Object, 
although the condition that a Sign must be other than its Object is perhaps 
arbitrary, since, if we insist upon it we must at least make an exception in 
the case of a Sign that is a part of a Sign. Thus nothing prevents the actor 
who acts a character in an historical drama from carrying as a theatrical 
“property” the very relic that that article is supposed merely to represent, 
such as the crucifix that Bulwer's Richelieu holds up with such effect in his 
defiance. On a map of an island laid down upon the soil of that island there 
must, under all ordinary circumstances, be some position, some point, marked or 
not, that represents qua place on the map, the very same point qua place on the 
island. 
A sign may have more than one Object. Thus, the sentence “Cain killed Abel,” 
which is a Sign, refers at least as much to Abel as to Cain, even if it be not 
regarded as it should, as having “a killing” as a third Object. But the set of 
objects may be regarded as making up one complex Object. In what follows and 
often elsewhere Signs will be treated as having but one object each for the 
sake of dividing difficulties of the study. If a Sign is other than its Object, 
there must exist, either in thought or in expression, some explanation or 
argument or other context, showing how—upon what system or for what reason the 
Sign represents the Object or set of Objects that it does. Now the Sign and the 
Explanation together make up another Sign, and since the explanation will be a 
Sign, it will probably require an additional explanation, which taken together 
with the already enlarged Sign will make up a still larger Sign; and proceeding 
in the same way, we shall, or should, ultimately reach a Sign of itself, 
containing its own explanation and those of all its significant parts; and 
according to this explanation each such part has some other part as its Object. 
According to this every Sign has, actually or virtually, what we may call a 
Precept of explanation according to which it is to be understood as a sort of 
emanation, so to speak, of its Object. (If the Sign be an Icon, a scholastic 
might say that t

CP2.230 (1910) ] Systems of Meaning was Re: [PEIRCE-L] 123, abc

[Armando Sercovich]

(CORRECTION)

Jerry, List.

I know well CP2.230 because I translated it to spanish in 1974 and I gave
it to Kenneth Ketner at Harvard on 1989. But would need to meditate more
time to approach some answer to your queries.

Really I don't find correlation among the important peircean statement you
refer and the theory of Tarski's metalenguajes. I don't think that Peircean
Semiotic has a lot of relationship with the theory of that branch of the
Logic.

Anyway I will continue studying the topic.

Cheers,
Armando Sercovich

Coordinator
Interamerican Semiotic Center Charles Sanders Peirce (Cispeirce)


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CP2.230 (1910) ] Systems of Meaning was Re: [PEIRCE-L] 123, abc

[Armando Sercovich]

Jerry, List.

I know well CP2.230 because I translated it to spanish in 1974 and I took
it to Kenneth Ketner to Harvard on 1989. But would need to meditate more
time to approach some answer to your queries.

Really I don't find correlation among the important peircean statement you
refer and the theory of Tarski's metalenguajes. I don't think that Peircean
Semiotic has a lot of relationship with the theory of that branch of the
Logic.

Anyway I will continue studying the topic.

Cheers,
Armando Sercovich

Coordinator
Interamerican Semiotic Center Charles Sanders Peirce (Cispeirce)


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Re: CP2.230 (1910) ] Systems of Meaning was Re: [PEIRCE-L] 123, abc

[John F Sowa]

On 8/7/2017 12:07 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
How does the modern notion of a system compare with CSP’s 
late 19th / early 20 th Century rhetoric?


Very directly.  Peirce had provided the logical foundation for
describing all of them.  He didn't have the modern experience with the
latest computer systems, but his 1887 article on "Logical Machines"
was 63 years ahead of Turing in speculating about mechanisms for
automating some aspects of human reasoning.  In 1963, Marvin Minsky
included that article in his bibliography of artificial intelligence.

Peirce's work at the USC gave him the latest updates on the most
advanced engineering *systems* of the day.  He was also a pioneer
in designing some of them.  He was not only the first scientist or
engineer to propose a wavelength of light as an international standard
for length -- he also built the instruments to use a wavelength of
light to measure the pendulums he used for measuring gravity.

For evidence, I recommend the articles in the four volume NEM that
demonstrate his wide range of mathematical methods and applications.
In particular, browse through Vol. 2, which includes letters by CSP
to and about some of the most famous mathematicians of his day.  It
also includes some of his letter to William James, in which he tries
to explain some mathematical concepts to a notorious nonmathematician.

For evidence of his broad range of thought, I recommend the thousands
of words he defined for the _Century Dictionary_.  For some of them
and for pointers to others, see the ones I excerpted in
http://jfsowa.com/peirce/defs

He also contributed many definitions to Baldwin's dictionary after 1900.
Some of then are rather detailed essays.  For all of them up to the
letter O, see http://jfsowa.com/peirce/baldwin.htm

Note his essays on "Laws of Thought", "Logic", "Logic, exact",
"Logical", "Logical Diagram (or Graph)", "Matter and Form", and
"Modality".



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CP2.230 (1910) ] Systems of Meaning was Re: [PEIRCE-L] 123, abc

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Armando, List:

Consider the meaning of the chromaticity  (spectra) of 
1,2,3…
A, B, C,…
H, He, Li, Be, B, C, N, O, F, Ne,…
A, B, C, D, E, F, G, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, A, B, C,…   (musical scales)
nad A, nad B, and nad C, etc, (genetic symbols with closure over a set of 
genetic symbols that represent the potential of inheritance of the genome)
 

Each of these five symbol systems is an accepted social symbol system that is 
used publicly in everyday communication and by different academic tribes.  The 
factual meaning of the latter three symbol systems are established by factual 
(reproducible) observations from objects.

Now, consider the CP 2.230 (1910) in relation to the systems of modern thought.

[[ The word Sign will be used to denote an Object perceptible, or only 
imaginable, or even unimaginable in one sense—for the word “fast,” which is a 
Sign, is not imaginable, since it is not this word itself that can be set down 
on paper or pronounced, but only an instance of it, and since it is the very 
same word when it is written as it is when it is pronounced, but is one word 
when it means “rapidly” and quite another when it means “immovable,” and a 
third when it refers to abstinence. But in order that anything should be a 
Sign, it must “represent,” as we say, something else, called its Object, 
although the condition that a Sign must be other than its Object is perhaps 
arbitrary, since, if we insist upon it we must at least make an exception in 
the case of a Sign that is a part of a Sign. Thus nothing prevents the actor 
who acts a character in an historical drama from carrying as a theatrical 
“property” the very relic that that article is supposed merely to represent, 
such as the crucifix that Bulwer's Richelieu holds up with such effect in his 
defiance. On a map of an island laid down upon the soil of that island there 
must, under all ordinary circumstances, be some position, some point, marked or 
not, that represents qua place on the map, the very same point qua place on the 
island. 
A sign may have more than one Object. Thus, the sentence “Cain killed Abel,” 
which is a Sign, refers at least as much to Abel as to Cain, even if it be not 
regarded as it should, as having “a killing” as a third Object. But the set of 
objects may be regarded as making up one complex Object. In what follows and 
often elsewhere Signs will be treated as having but one object each for the 
sake of dividing difficulties of the study. If a Sign is other than its Object, 
there must exist, either in thought or in expression, some explanation or 
argument or other context, showing how—upon what system or for what reason the 
Sign represents the Object or set of Objects that it does. Now the Sign and the 
Explanation together make up another Sign, and since the explanation will be a 
Sign, it will probably require an additional explanation, which taken together 
with the already enlarged Sign will make up a still larger Sign; and proceeding 
in the same way, we shall, or should, ultimately reach a Sign of itself, 
containing its own explanation and those of all its significant parts; and 
according to this explanation each such part has some other part as its Object. 
According to this every Sign has, actually or virtually, what we may call a 
Precept of explanation according to which it is to be understood as a sort of 
emanation, so to speak, of its Object. (If the Sign be an Icon, a scholastic 
might say that the “species” of the Object emanating from it found its matter 
in the Icon. If the Sign be an Index, we may think of it as a fragment torn 
away from the Object, the two in their Existence being one whole or a part of 
such whole. If the Sign is a Symbol, we may think of it as embodying the 
“ratio,” or reason, of the Object that has emanated from it. These, of course, 
are mere figures of speech; but that does not render them useless.) ] CP2.230 
(1910) ] 

How can we find a meaningful interpretation of this CSP text today?

My questions:

How does the modern notion of a system compare with CSP’s late 19th / early 20 
th Century rhetoric?

How can we think of a symbol as "as embodying the “ratio,” or reason, of the 
Object that has emanated from it.”  

WHAT IS THE SYSTEM that generates the sign the “emanated from it”? 

(In my published works, Perplexity lies in the origin of the emanation from an 
integer number (index) with finite chromaticity.)

Is Tarski’s approach to the formal logics of metalanguages essential to give 
coherence to communication with the broad array of modern synthetic symbol 
systems?


Cheers

Jerry



> On Aug 5, 2017, at 9:57 AM, Armando Sercovich  
> wrote:
> 
> You are right, Jerry.
> 
> Greetings,
> Armando
> --
> 
> -
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