Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

ase change "  . . . dyadic communications cannot lead to any communication." in my previous post to  ". . .dyadic interactions cannot lead to any communication."   Thanks.   Sung           -- Forwarded message -- From: Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu>

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

23:04 To: g...@gnusystems.ca Cc: Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object? On Oct 26, 2015, at 5:02 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: The Deely work I had in mind specifically is Purely Objecti

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

in >> types (universals)... >> >> 26. Oktober 2015 um 01:52 Uhr >> "Sungchul Ji" <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote: >> >> Hi, >> >> Correction: >> >> Please change " . . . dyadic communications cannot lead to any

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

> On Oct 27, 2015, at 10:16 AM, Stephen C. Rose wrote: > > Randomness can hardly be meaningless if it also implies chance which for > Peirce mean First. I suppose I am missing something. Usually do. > > "... chance ... a mathematical term to express with accuracy the >

Aw: Re: Fwd: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

Sung           ------ Forwarded message ------ From: Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> Date: Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 8:18 PM Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object? To: Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> Cc: frances.ke...@sympatico.ca, Gary &

Re: Re: Fwd: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

elief in names, but disbelief in > types (universals)... > > 26. Oktober 2015 um 01:52 Uhr > "Sungchul Ji" <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote: > > Hi, > > Correction: > > Please change " . . . dyadic communications cannot lead to any > communic

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

o any communication." in my previous post to  ". . .dyadic interactions cannot lead to any communication."   Thanks.   Sung           -- Forwarded message -- From: Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> Date: Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 8:18 PM Subject: Re: RE: [

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

ein be called representants and referentants and interpretants. Furthermore, all semiosic forms as vehicles and mediums and objects and subjects are in fact phenomenal representamen and existent objects, and all such objects in fact are mostly and usually signs of objects.)   From: g...

Re: Aw: Fwd: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

nications cannot lead to any communication." in my previous post to ". . .dyadic interactions cannot lead to any communication." Thanks. Sung ---------- Forwarded message ------ From: Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> Date: Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 8:18 PM Subjec

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

t;g...@gnusystems.ca>; Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object? On Oct 26, 2015, at 12:26 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: There was indeed a “reversal” of usage of the terms “subjectiv

Re: Embodiment (Was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?)

List: Gary writes, > Your original question, “How is a sign embodied in two different objects?”, > does not make sense in that context. Sense making? My original question stands; the additional text does not clarify the meaning for me. I understand that you (Gary) can not make sense of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

> On Oct 26, 2015, at 12:26 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > There was indeed a “reversal” of usage of the terms “subjective” and > “objective” starting in the 17th century, but no such reversal with “subject” > and “object.” This is explained in the Turning Signs chapter at >

Aw: Fwd: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

o any communication." in my previous post to  ". . .dyadic interactions cannot lead to any communication."   Thanks.   Sung           -- Forwarded message ------ From: Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> Date: Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 8:18 PM Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L]

Aw: Fwd: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

ehicles and mediums and objects and subjects are in fact phenomenal representamen and existent objects, and all such objects in fact are mostly and usually signs of objects.)   From: g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca] Sent: Sunday, 25 October, 2015 8:42 AM To: 'Peirce List' <p

RE: Embodiment (Was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?)

Jerry, you were ostensibly asking a question about Peirce’s text. Peirce’s text does not say, nor does it imply, that a sign is “embodied in two different objects.” Therefore your original question, as it stands, does not pertain to Peirce’s text, which is the context I referred to. Gary

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

> On Oct 25, 2015, at 8:36 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote: > > There is reason to think that the sense of the word ''object'' that means > objective, purpose, target, intention, goal, end, aim, and so on is more > fundamental than the more restrictive sense of a compact physical

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

rce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object? On Oct 25, 2015, at 8:36 PM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net <mailto:jawb...@att.net> > wrote: There is reason to think that the sense of the word ''object'' that means objective, purpos

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

Helmut, Peirce’s solution to your problem is the distinction between immediate and dynamic(al) object. [[ I use the word “Sign” in the widest sense for any medium for the communication or extension of a Form (or feature). Being medium, it is determined by something, called its Object,

Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

s and objects and subjects are in fact phenomenal > representamen > and existent objects, and all such objects in fact are mostly and usually > signs > of objects.) > > > > *From:* g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca > <http://g...@gnusystems.ca>] >

Fwd: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

ers.edu> Date: Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 8:18 PM Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object? To: Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> Cc: frances.ke...@sympatico.ca, Gary <g...@gnusystems.ca>, Peirce List < peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Helmut. lists, "

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

Helmut, The dynamic object, according to Peirce, does not have to be a real thing; it can be “altogether fictive”. One example he gives is “Hamlet’s madness.” Although it is imaginary, it still determines the embodiment in a subject (such as the reader of Shakespeare or a member of a

Re: Embodiment (Was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?)

List: In a separate post, it is stated: > Jerry, the sign is not embodied in two different objects, it is embodied in > two differentsubjects. Communication always involves at least two subjects; > even thought, according to Peirce, is dialogic. Any given thought is > “embodied” when it

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

: g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca] Sent: Sunday, 25 October, 2015 8:42 AM To: 'Peirce List' <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object? Helmut, Peirce’s solution to your problem is the distinction between immediate and dynamic(al)

Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

Gary F., Thank you! Now I understand it like: The triad representamen / immediate object / interpretant is irreducible, and the interpretant is possibly a representamen again, in the next sign, that relates to the same dynamical object. But this only accounts for cases, in which a dynamical

Embodiment Was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

List: On Oct 25, 2015, at 7:41 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > it is necessary that it should have been really embodied in a Subject > independently of the communication; and it is necessary that there should be > another subject in which the same form is embodied only in consequence of the >

RE: Embodiment (Was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?)

Jerry, EP2:477 is from a 1906 letter from Peirce to Lady Welby, and the EP2 editors chose to omit part of it, including the paragraph preceding the one that I quoted. Restoring this context may help to clear up your confusion about Peirce’s usage of “embodied,” which is compatible with the