[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy, friends of wisdom, nanomanagement
Dear Wilfred:
Sorry I forgot to mention you on my last message.
I'm also glad my english is understadable...
I'll take a look at your projects with due interest and time after the semester is finished here in Brasil in July...
I think maybe one good philosopher to look up about entelecheia is
Heidegger, in his interpretations of Aristotle; as far as I can see,
Heidegger, of course, as almost every other philosopher, uses and
abuses of Aristotle's opinions to corroborate and make up his own; but
if I'm not mistaken, it seems that Heidegger is quite near to Peirce,
in that he seems to understand the processes of formal and material
causation as reducible to final and efficient causation respectively.
As I'm not very experienced in Heidegger, I may be totally wrong (and I
don't have the book here with me right now, but I can go for the
references later on) in my guess.
I don't really know of many philosophers that have dealt with
entelechia besides the ones mentioned, but it seems to me that the
subject is in one way or another present very oftenly in the texts - I
think specially on Schelling, the way he describes the the ground of
darkness (how is it in English? "dunkle Grund"?) as the principle of
possibility without any rule ("Regellose"), from which nature springs
forth (the Absolute as positing itself - God revealing himself into
existence), tending to complete revelation, to light - the Real as "dem
Dunkel".
Just to remember, Peirce was a reader of both Aristotle and
Schelling, so, I think there are some links in this subject of
entelechia which could be searched out - explored.
Well, I'm not very precise right now, and I'm just suggesting things
from memory, since it's been a while I1ve read both Heidegger's
interpretation of Aristotle and Schelling's On the Essence of Human
Freedom.
So, if I'm commiting any mistake, please correct me.
thanks for your attention
cass.
2006/6/5, Drs.W.T.M. Berendsen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
Dear Cassiano, list,
I regard the below message as very interesting. Cassiano,
your English is definitely not poor. And for me it adds for sure to the
understanding of the very interesting notion of Entelechy. Which I also regard
a very interesting subject. But, till now I only know the sources of Peirce and
Aristotle for this notion. Maybe some people here now some other sources where
interesting statements about entelechy are made?
Besides this I would like to mention some initiative
I take part in now and that might be worthwhile to subscribe to for some
members of this list. It is the initiative called "friends of wisdom".
The official website being http://www.knowledgetowisdom.org/
.
The most interesting thing is, we currently have 2 mailing lists there. One for
the initiative itself, and one for discussions. The discussions there are very
interesting to me. And I think there will be enough people here who would also
be interested.
Besides this initiative, I once again would like to
mention my own initiative on www.nanomanagement.info
.
Would like to request people from here again to enlist on that website. But
actually it is just there but not very active yet. Also because of the small
group of members yet, unfortunately. But I will surely add more means for
communication and, more interesting, more useful info and insights there. Much
more. In some months or so (first have to complete my PhD research which is
taking most of my time now). In some months my initiative on
www.nanomanagement.info will be much
more interesting for sure. But to enable this, I need more people taking part. As
soon as possible. So once again, I would request people to view and enlist.
Kind regards,
Wilfred
Van:
Cassiano Terra Rodrigues [mailto:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Verzonden: maandag 5 juni 2006
3:51
Aan: Peirce
Discussion Forum
Onderwerp: [peirce-l] Re:
Entelechy
Hello list:
It's been a long while I don't write, but the subject interests me.
I run the risk of repeating everything that was said here about entelechy, but
a look up at the form of the word seems appropriate:
entelechy in ancient greek is a form of saying (as literally as I can see) en
telos echein, that is, something like "to have the end [aim?] in",
"the obtaining of the end" (since the verb "echein" has a
wide semantic range).
In this sense, it is possible to think of it as a process rather than the final
result of the process itself - if we think in analogy to the ultimate
interpretant, it's perfectly fit: although the interpretant is called
"ultimate", it's nonetheless still an interpretant, sign-process in
sum.
Now, the substantive "entelechia" seems to indicate exactly this, as
I can see, in Aristotle: a process of attaining the end (telos), which should
not as I see be defined as a defin
[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy
Dear Benjamin: thanks for your enlightening quotes from Aquinas and for your clarifying your entelecheian logou. Always a pleasant and learningfull note from you. Dears Victoria and Gary: I'm glad I'm not completely out of the subject. List: I'll try to get back to the subject in a more decent way soon. all the best cass. 2006/6/6, Gary Richmond <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: Victoria & Cassiano,I agree that Cassiano's is a sane, sound, and evenevolutionary way of looking at entelechy. Peirce too sawthat Kant and Bergson were on the right metaphysical track,process and vitalism, not mechanism and predetermination. The resultant 'emergent principle' is thus the seekingof a final and not an efficient cause. Tracing out thehistory of the principle further would seem a most valuableintellectual enterprise.Gary Victoria N. Alexander wrote:> Dear Cassino,>> I think that your characterization of Aristotle's (and Pierce's)> entelechy as a process is correct. I think an argument can be made > that this is true of genuine teleology in general. Teleology seeks,> in additional to material causes, evidence for an emergent vital> force immanent in the process itself. It seeks internal final causes > not external efficient causes. As vitalist Bergson writes in 1907,> predetermined teleology, based on a definite end, "implies that> things and beings merely realize a programme previously arranged … As > in the mechanistic hypothesis, here again it is supposed that all is> given. Finalism thus understood is only inverted mechanism.">> Kant imagined that limiting principles, inherent in ongoing natural > processes themselves, guided events. According to Alicia Juarrero,> "Kant's emphasis on recursive causality, wherein the parts are both> cause and effect, precludes the existence of a preexisting whole" > (113). And as Ernst Cassirer explains, the Kantian whole is> "contained in them [the parts] as a guiding principle." In Kant telos> is emergent, given in the interactions between parts and the whole. >> Victoria>> Victoria N. Alexander, Ph.D.> Dactyl Foundation for the Arts & Humanities> 64 Grand Street> New York, NY 10013> 212 219 2344> www.dactyl.org>> Support the arts! Copy and paste the link below to donate to Dactyl> Foundation using PayPal.>> https://www.paypal.com/xclick/ > business=art%40dactyl.org&item_name=Member+%2420+Friend+%24100+Patron+%2> 4500+Benefactor+%241000&item_number=Various+Levels&no_note=1&tax=0&curre> ncy_code=USD> On Jun 4, 2006, at 9:50 PM, Cassiano Terra Rodrigues wrote: >>> Hello list: It's been a long while I don't write, but the subject interests me.>> I run the risk of repeating everything that was said here about>> entelechy, but a look up at the form of the word seems appropriate: >> entelechy in ancient greek is a form of saying (as literally as I>> can see) en telos echein, that is, something like "to have the end>> [aim?] in", "the obtaining of the end" (since the verb "echein" has >> a wide semantic range).>> In this sense, it is possible to think of it as a process rather>> than the final result of the process itself - if we think in analogy>> to the ultimate interpretant, it's perfectly fit: although the >> interpretant is called "ultimate", it's nonetheless still an>> interpretant, sign-process in sum.>> Now, the substantive "entelechia" seems to indicate exactly this, >> as I can see, in Aristotle: a process of attaining the end (telos),>> which should not as I see be defined as a definite outcome, final>> and not capable of being fowarded furthermore - because the idea of >> telos carries the notion of possible aim to be reached - the final>> cause is of the nature of a general desire, in Peirce's>> interpretation (which seems a very plausible way to read Aristotle's >> theory of the four causes - the formal cause being in the end the>> same as the final cause, the material cause the same as the>> efficient cause). So, entelechy would be a process of causation, the >> finalization of the process of attainment a telos, or of>> fulfillment of the end, if I can say this in English. So, it>> continues to be a process, as I tend to read it; not the same as >> before, but still a process.>> I hope I'm understandable in this poor English of mine, and I also>> hope I'm not completely out of the discussion.>> All the best to all,>> Cassiano >> (from the Center for Studies on Pragmatism, Catholic University of>> São Paulo (PUC), Brasil). --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED]>>> ---> Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED]>---Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy
Victoria & Cassiano, I agree that Cassiano's is a sane, sound, and even evolutionary way of looking at entelechy. Peirce too saw that Kant and Bergson were on the right metaphysical track, process and vitalism, not mechanism and predetermination. The resultant 'emergent principle' is thus the seeking of a final and not an efficient cause. Tracing out the history of the principle further would seem a most valuable intellectual enterprise. Gary Victoria N. Alexander wrote: Dear Cassino, I think that your characterization of Aristotle's (and Pierce's) entelechy as a process is correct. I think an argument can be made that this is true of genuine teleology in general. Teleology seeks, in additional to material causes, evidence for an emergent vital force immanent in the process itself. It seeks internal final causes not external efficient causes. As vitalist Bergson writes in 1907, predetermined teleology, based on a definite end, "implies that things and beings merely realize a programme previously arranged … As in the mechanistic hypothesis, here again it is supposed that all is given. Finalism thus understood is only inverted mechanism." Kant imagined that limiting principles, inherent in ongoing natural processes themselves, guided events. According to Alicia Juarrero, "Kant's emphasis on recursive causality, wherein the parts are both cause and effect, precludes the existence of a preexisting whole" (113). And as Ernst Cassirer explains, the Kantian whole is "contained in them [the parts] as a guiding principle." In Kant telos is emergent, given in the interactions between parts and the whole. Victoria Victoria N. Alexander, Ph.D. Dactyl Foundation for the Arts & Humanities 64 Grand Street New York, NY 10013 212 219 2344 www.dactyl.org Support the arts! Copy and paste the link below to donate to Dactyl Foundation using PayPal. https://www.paypal.com/xclick/ business=art%40dactyl.org&item_name=Member+%2420+Friend+%24100+Patron+%2 4500+Benefactor+%241000&item_number=Various+Levels&no_note=1&tax=0&curre ncy_code=USD On Jun 4, 2006, at 9:50 PM, Cassiano Terra Rodrigues wrote: Hello list: It's been a long while I don't write, but the subject interests me. I run the risk of repeating everything that was said here about entelechy, but a look up at the form of the word seems appropriate: entelechy in ancient greek is a form of saying (as literally as I can see) en telos echein, that is, something like "to have the end [aim?] in", "the obtaining of the end" (since the verb "echein" has a wide semantic range). In this sense, it is possible to think of it as a process rather than the final result of the process itself - if we think in analogy to the ultimate interpretant, it's perfectly fit: although the interpretant is called "ultimate", it's nonetheless still an interpretant, sign-process in sum. Now, the substantive "entelechia" seems to indicate exactly this, as I can see, in Aristotle: a process of attaining the end (telos), which should not as I see be defined as a definite outcome, final and not capable of being fowarded furthermore - because the idea of telos carries the notion of possible aim to be reached - the final cause is of the nature of a general desire, in Peirce's interpretation (which seems a very plausible way to read Aristotle's theory of the four causes - the formal cause being in the end the same as the final cause, the material cause the same as the efficient cause). So, entelechy would be a process of causation, the finalization of the process of attainment a telos, or of fulfillment of the end, if I can say this in English. So, it continues to be a process, as I tend to read it; not the same as before, but still a process. I hope I'm understandable in this poor English of mine, and I also hope I'm not completely out of the discussion. All the best to all, Cassiano (from the Center for Studies on Pragmatism, Catholic University of São Paulo (PUC), Brasil). --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy
Dear Cassino, I think that your characterization of Aristotle's (and Pierce's) entelechy as a process is correct. I think an argument can be made that this is true of genuine teleology in general. Teleology seeks, in additional to material causes, evidence for an emergent vital force immanent in the process itself. It seeks internal final causes not external efficient causes. As vitalist Bergson writes in 1907, predetermined teleology, based on a definite end, "implies that things and beings merely realize a programme previously arranged … As in the mechanistic hypothesis, here again it is supposed that all is given. Finalism thus understood is only inverted mechanism." Kant imagined that limiting principles, inherent in ongoing natural processes themselves, guided events. According to Alicia Juarrero, "Kant's emphasis on recursive causality, wherein the parts are both cause and effect, precludes the existence of a preexisting whole" (113). And as Ernst Cassirer explains, the Kantian whole is "contained in them [the parts] as a guiding principle." In Kant telos is emergent, given in the interactions between parts and the whole. Victoria Victoria N. Alexander, Ph.D. Dactyl Foundation for the Arts & Humanities 64 Grand Street New York, NY 10013 212 219 2344 www.dactyl.org Support the arts! Copy and paste the link below to donate to Dactyl Foundation using PayPal. https://www.paypal.com/xclick/ business=art%40dactyl.org&item_name=Member+%2420+Friend+%24100+Patron+%2 4500+Benefactor+%241000&item_number=Various+Levels&no_note=1&tax=0&curre ncy_code=USD On Jun 4, 2006, at 9:50 PM, Cassiano Terra Rodrigues wrote: Hello list: It's been a long while I don't write, but the subject interests me. I run the risk of repeating everything that was said here about entelechy, but a look up at the form of the word seems appropriate: entelechy in ancient greek is a form of saying (as literally as I can see) en telos echein, that is, something like "to have the end [aim?] in", "the obtaining of the end" (since the verb "echein" has a wide semantic range). In this sense, it is possible to think of it as a process rather than the final result of the process itself - if we think in analogy to the ultimate interpretant, it's perfectly fit: although the interpretant is called "ultimate", it's nonetheless still an interpretant, sign-process in sum. Now, the substantive "entelechia" seems to indicate exactly this, as I can see, in Aristotle: a process of attaining the end (telos), which should not as I see be defined as a definite outcome, final and not capable of being fowarded furthermore - because the idea of telos carries the notion of possible aim to be reached - the final cause is of the nature of a general desire, in Peirce's interpretation (which seems a very plausible way to read Aristotle's theory of the four causes - the formal cause being in the end the same as the final cause, the material cause the same as the efficient cause). So, entelechy would be a process of causation, the finalization of the process of attainment a telos, or of fulfillment of the end, if I can say this in English. So, it continues to be a process, as I tend to read it; not the same as before, but still a process. I hope I'm understandable in this poor English of mine, and I also hope I'm not completely out of the discussion. All the best to all, Cassiano (from the Center for Studies on Pragmatism, Catholic University of São Paulo (PUC), Brasil). --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy
Cassiano wrote, >It's been a long while I don't write, but the subject interests me.>I run the risk of repeating everything that was said here about entelechy, but a look up at the form of the word seems appropriate: >entelechy in ancient greek is a form of saying (as literally as I can see) en telos echein, that is, something like "to have the end [aim?] in", "the obtaining of the end" (since the verb "echein" has a wide semantic range).>In this sense, it is possible to think of it as a process rather than the final result of the process itself - if we think in analogy to the ultimate interpretant, it's perfectly fit: although the interpretant is called "ultimate", it's nonetheless still an interpretant, sign-process in sum. >Now, the substantive "entelechia" seems to indicate exactly this, as I can see, in Aristotle: a process of attaining the end (telos), which should not as I see be defined as a definite outcome, final and not capable of being fowarded furthermore - because the idea of telos carries the notion of possible aim to be reached - the final cause is of the nature of a general desire, in Peirce's interpretation (which seems a very plausible way to read Aristotle's theory of the four causes - the formal cause being in the end the same as the final cause, the material cause the same as the efficient cause). So, entelechy would be a process of causation, the finalization of the process of attainment a telos, or of fulfillment of the end, if I can say this in English. So, it continues to be a process, as I tend to read it; not the same as before, but still a process.>I hope I'm understandable in this poor English of mine, and I also hope I'm not completely out of the discussion. >All the best to all,>Cassiano>(from the Center for Studies on Pragmatism, Catholic University of São Paulo (PUC), Brasil).I tend to see an entelechy as something which is stable but not merely exhausted, but instead "in working order" to do more. In its stability, it's not just a form but a structure, and it can serve as a foundation and basis for more, as for instance we say that knowledge is a basis and a grounding. So it's a settledness yet it contributes to a process, helps ground it more securely, sometimes precisely in order for the process not just to repeat but to evolve (through learning). It supports us, is our human supportedness by reality. So I tend to see entelechy as the confirmation, the solidification, of that action or culmination which is an end or is supposed to be an end -- but which may or may not hold up. If it holds up, stands stably, then it is, in that sense, confirmed. It's the difference between coming to an end, and being ended, being settled, settled in a constructive sense, ready for more. In a broader sense, I regard intelligent experience, formed as collateral to sign & interpretant in respect of the object, as the entelechy of semiosis as such. And they all keep on going, and cannot culminate except as "energy" or solidify except as basis -- energy and basis, for _more_ of themselves. Charles Olson once said that Edward Dahlberg pounded it into his head as a poet that "every perception leads DIRECTLY and IMMEDIATELY to another perception." Culmination & entelechy. It's also the difference between the Thomistic "necessaries for the beautiful" -- "claritas" (which Joyce well translated as "radiance," as of a culmination, a bloom, the bright colors of flowers, the shiny colors of fish, etc.,) and "integritas sive perfectio" (which Joyce sonorously translated as "wholeness" but misunderstood as simple unity as provided by a bounding line drawn around an object. Aquinas instead meant structural integrity, as of something not "diminuta" (dashed to pieces or destructively violated) and thereby "turpia" (base, disgusting, "gross"). Diminuta http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0059%3Aentry%3D%2314023 turpia http://lysy2.archives.nd.edu/cgi-bin/words.exe?turpis But in my emphasis on entelechy as something cognitive and even epistemic, as confirmation, confirmed value, etc., (as opposed to a telos or teleiosis as more affective, a culmination, a value), I part with Aristotle, Aquinas, Peirce, and everybody but myself. I also think of entelechy as a causal principle like telos, in a sense like the formal cause, but deepened, just as a vital telos is something deeper than mere thermodynamic decay. With entelechy, there is dependence, often complex dependence, on sign and evidentiary conditions. E.g., knowledge & expectations are causes in markets. This is not "instead" of telic influence, nor does it leave teleology behind -- but it does take things to a new level, a level of ongoing evolution (mental, social), which distinguishes a human from, say, a vegetable organism which, in its way, is quite telically governed, but certainly does not evolve in its own lifetime. So those are just my o
[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy
Hello list: It's been a long while I don't write, but the subject interests me. I run the risk of repeating everything that was said here about entelechy, but a look up at the form of the word seems appropriate: entelechy in ancient greek is a form of saying (as literally as I can see) en telos echein, that is, something like "to have the end [aim?] in", "the obtaining of the end" (since the verb "echein" has a wide semantic range). In this sense, it is possible to think of it as a process rather than the final result of the process itself - if we think in analogy to the ultimate interpretant, it's perfectly fit: although the interpretant is called "ultimate", it's nonetheless still an interpretant, sign-process in sum. Now, the substantive "entelechia" seems to indicate exactly this, as I can see, in Aristotle: a process of attaining the end (telos), which should not as I see be defined as a definite outcome, final and not capable of being fowarded furthermore - because the idea of telos carries the notion of possible aim to be reached - the final cause is of the nature of a general desire, in Peirce's interpretation (which seems a very plausible way to read Aristotle's theory of the four causes - the formal cause being in the end the same as the final cause, the material cause the same as the efficient cause). So, entelechy would be a process of causation, the finalization of the process of attainment a telos, or of fulfillment of the end, if I can say this in English. So, it continues to be a process, as I tend to read it; not the same as before, but still a process. I hope I'm understandable in this poor English of mine, and I also hope I'm not completely out of the discussion. All the best to all, Cassiano (from the Center for Studies on Pragmatism, Catholic University of São Paulo (PUC), Brasil). --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy
May 13, 2005 Dear Kirsti, Thanks. Glad to hear you enjoyed those early articles. Re truth giving to beauty, see below. Dear Jeff, You ask how a poem can be an argument in Peirces sense, related to the context of him describing the universe as an argument that is necessarily a great poem. Perhaps Peirce means this in the same way as when he distinguished between an argument and argumentation in his A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God essay. Remember there, as Nathan Houser points out in his introduction to EP2, that Peirce distinguished an argument as, any process of thought reasonably tending to produce a definite belief from argumentation as an argument proceeding upon definitely formulated premisses. An argument, as Houser points out, does not have to be self-controlled, as argumentation is. Hence The universe as an argument is necessarily a great work of art, a great poem as Peirce put it in the quotation I cited, is allowing the universe to be cosmic poeisis, self-creating perfection of being, whose ultimate entelechy, as I imagine it, is the intrinsically admirable being we call Beauty. Truth gives itself to Beauty in this sense, where the end of inquiry coalesces into the intrinsically admirable. Gene --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy
On May 10, 2006, at 1:06 AM, Peirce Discussion Forum digest wrote: Sorry I incorrectly attributed the Ehresmann reference to you -- it will take a while to get oriented to the list. Janet Janet / List: You asked, in an earlier post, about the relations between Rosen and Ehresmann. They were longtime friends and exchanged correspondence for decades. I would not attempt to go beyond a few sentences in describing the relation of their works. Ehresmann believes that a physical basis for biology / consciousness exists. Rosen attempted to show via his personal view of "modeling relation" (not model theory!), that the mathematics of physics was not the mathematics of life. Both of them use the mathematics of category theory to construct their philosophical positions. From the perspective of chemical logic (for example, DNA - motivated processes), neither of them seek to invoke the law of mass action or other chemical principles in introducing time into their equations. Thus, while I , personally, have benefited greatly from exchanges with them, I long ago decided to construct a new path that is consistent with chemical logic. Cheers Jerry --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy
Vinicius, Thank you. I'd very much appreciate knowing when and where the translation is available. Just skimming over your sources and their juxtapositions intrigued me. Bill Vin¨cius Romanini wrote: Bill, Interestingly, this is my main concern too - and I agree the quotes given by Joe go straight to Peirce¨s late definition of Sign as a medium for communication. I have explored a bit these ideas in an article (in Portuguese) in which Peirce¨s definiton of Perfect Sign in terms of Entelechy is related to the dispute between Poincar¨ and Boltzmann (and how all this relates to Prigogine¨s ideas) http://www.eca.usp.br/caligrama/n_2/1%20ViniciusRomanini.pdf I might have it translated into English in some weeks, if you are interested. Best, Vinicius -- No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.392 / Virus Database: 268.5.6/338 - Release Date: 5/12/2006 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy
Bill, Interestingly, this is my main concern too - and I agree the quotes given by Joe go straight to Peirce¨s late definition of Sign as a medium for communication. I have explored a bit these ideas in an article (in Portuguese) in which Peirce¨s definiton of Perfect Sign in terms of Entelechy is related to the dispute between Poincar¨ and Boltzmann (and how all this relates to Prigogine¨s ideas) http://www.eca.usp.br/caligrama/n_2/1%20ViniciusRomanini.pdf I might have it translated into English in some weeks, if you are interested. Best, Vinicius Bill Bailey <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Joe,Thank you for the below post--which I've cut away all but it's identification. I don't find entelechy of particular interest, but I'm in awe of Peirce's conception of communication and mediation. It's ready to bottle and label.Bill Bailey> For the benefit of those who don't have a copy of Essential Peirce 2, here > is the passage referred to by Vinicius Romanini in which Peirce appears to > be defining "perfect sign" in such a way as to make it synonymous with > "entelechy" (Peirce's emphasis shown here by use of capital letters):-- No virus found in this outgoing message.Checked by AVG Free Edition.Version: 7.1.392 / Virus Database: 268.5.6/337 - Release Date: 5/11/2006---Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] Yahoo! Mail goes everywhere you do. Get it on your phone. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy
Joe, Thank you for the below post--which I've cut away all but it's identification. I don't find entelechy of particular interest, but I'm in awe of Peirce's conception of communication and mediation. It's ready to bottle and label. Bill Bailey For the benefit of those who don't have a copy of Essential Peirce 2, here is the passage referred to by Vinicius Romanini in which Peirce appears to be defining "perfect sign" in such a way as to make it synonymous with "entelechy" (Peirce's emphasis shown here by use of capital letters): -- No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.392 / Virus Database: 268.5.6/337 - Release Date: 5/11/2006 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy
Dear Folks-- I came across this definition of Entelechy among the words Peirce is reputed to have defined for the Century Dictionay in 1886 (page 404 of Writings of Charles S Peirce A Chronological Edition Volume 5 1884-1886) -- I was looking for a definition of form. BEGIN QUOTE ENTGELECHY, n. CGr entelecheia, word invented by Aristotle, from en telei echon, having atained the end.) Literally, attainment, realization; opposed to power, potentiality, and nearly the same as energy or act (actuality). The idea of entelechy is connected with that of FORM (caps from piat), the idea of power with that of matter. Iron is potentially in its ore, which to be made from must be worked. When this is done, the iron exists in entelechy. The passage from power to entelechy takes place by means of change (kinesis). This is the imperfect energy, the perfected energy is the entelechy. Tirst entelechy is being in working order, second entelechy is being in action. The soul is said to be first entelechy, that is, a thing precisely like a mani in every respect, except that it would not feel, would b e body without a sould; but a soul once infused is not lost whenever the man is asleep. This is the Aristotelian sense, but Cudworth and others have used entelechy and firt entelechy somewhat diferently. Cudworth calls his plastic nature or vital principle the first entelechy, and leibniz terms a monad an entelechy. END OUOTE My apologies if I'm repeating previously posted material. Cheers, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy
Gene, I wonder if you can comment a bit more on the end of your note--how exactly does it make sense from a Peircean point of view to claim that poems are arguments? More specifically, if poems qua aesthetic objects partake most of firstness, how can they also be arguments? Jeff -Original Message- >From: Eugene Halton <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >Sent: May 9, 2006 7:45 AM >To: Peirce Discussion Forum >Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Entelechy > >Kirsti M: ��The entelechy or perfection of being Peirce here refers to is >something never attained to full, but strived at, again and again. Just as >with science and scientific knowledge. It's about striving to approach, >better and better, The Truth. If there ever would be an end, the absolute >perfection of knowledge, that would mean an end, which would be in >contradiction with life and living. Life and living IS striving - with >some kind of an end. Never the last possible�� > > I have to disagree, Kirsti. Life is more than �science and >scientific knowledge,� and more than �striving to approach, better and >better, The Truth.� And I mean this in a Peircean sense. Stated >differently, science is part of life, not the determinant of it. > > By my lights life is participant in the entelechy of being, not a >spectator looking at a scoreboard it can never reach. The perfection of >being manifests all the time in realized aesthetic moments. Entelechy has >Firstness, here and now, does it not? > > Perhaps something like this aesthetic perspective is what William >Blake had in mind when he wrote: �If the doors of perception were cleansed >every thing would appear to man as it is, infinite. For man has closed >himself up, till he sees all things thro' narrow chinks of his cavern.� > > ��[T]he living intelligence which is the creator of all >intelligible reality��, as Peirce put it in the earlier quotation you >comment on, means that ongoing creation involves more than chaos or chance, >it involves a �reasonableness energizing in the world,� as Peirce put it >elsewhere. If logic, as self-controlled thought, is a species of ethics, as >self-controlled conduct, and ethics is itself a species of aesthetics, as >the intrinsically admirable, then �The Truth� ultimately gives itself to >Beauty, as the ultimate of entelechy, as I understand Peirce. > > And if so, as I see it, the perfection of being involves genesis, >as well as development. Perfecting habits of conduct and even the laws of >the universe itself, means the perfection of ongoing creation, not the >�overcoming� of it in some Hegelian straitjacket. From this perspective >the >final entelechy of all being is itself such a moment, poem, painting, >banquet, music, or better, mousike, rhythm-rhyme-dance-musicking, at least >in the sense in which Peirce claimed that: > > �The Universe as an argument is necessarily a great work of art, a >great poem -- for every fine argument is a poem and a symphony -- just as >every true poem is a sound argument. But let us compare it rather with a >painting -- with an impressionist seashore piece -- then every Quality in a >Premiss is one of the elementary colored particles of the Painting; they >are all meant to go together to make up the intended Quality that belongs >to the whole as whole. That total effect is beyond our ken; but we can >appreciate in some measure the resultant Quality of parts of the whole -- >which Qualities result from the combinations of elementary Qualities that >belong to the premisses.� CP 5.119 > > > Gene > > > >--- >Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] > --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy
e of an analogous phenomenon will do good service. Metaphysics has been said contemptuously to be a fabric of metaphors. But not only metaphysics, but logical and phaneroscopical concepts need to be clothed in such garments. For a pure idea without metaphor or other significant clothing is an onion without a peel. ===END QUOTE=== And to this passage the editors have footnoted yet another passage from another manuscript (MS 793) which is apparently just an alternative draft of the same provenance as MS 283, which reads as follows: =QUOTE PEIRCE=== For the purpose of this inquiry a Sign may be defined as a Medium for the communication of a Form. It is not logically necessary that anything possessing consciousness, that is, feeling of the peculiar common quality of all our feeling, should be concerned. But it is necessary that there should be two, if not three, QUASI-MINDS, meaning things capable of varied determination as to forms of the kind communicated. As a MEDIUM, the Sign is essentially in a triadic relation, to its Object which determines it, and to its Interpretant which it determines. In its relation to the Object, the Sign is PASSIVE; that is to say, its correspondence to the Object is brought about by an effect upon the Sign, the Object remaining unaffected. On the other hand, in its relation to the Interpretant the Sign is ACTIVE, determining the Interpretant without being itself thereby affected. But at this point certain distinctions are called for. That which is communicated from the Object through the Sign to the Interpretant is a Form. It is not a singular thing; for if a singular thing were first in the Object and afterward in the interpretant outside the Object, it must thereby cease to be in the Object. The Form that is communicated does not necessarily cease to be in one thing when it comes to be in a different thing, because its being is a being of the predicate. The Being of a Form consists in the truth of a conditional proposition. Under given circumstances, something would be true. The Form is in the Object, entitatively we may say, meaning that that conditional relation, or following of consequent upon reason, which constitutes the Form, is literally true of the Object. In the Sign the Form may or may not be embodied entitatively, but it must be embodied representatively, that is, in respect to the Form communicated, the Sign produces upon the Interpretant an effect similar to that which the Object itself would under favorable circumstances. =END QUOTE= The above is from MS 793 (1906), which is apparently an alternative draft to MS 283. It is quoted in editorial footnote 22 to "The Basis for Pragmaticism in the Normative Sciences," in EP2, p. 544. The reason for quoting all of this is not to make any particular point of interpretation but rather because of the connections of the idea of entelechy with so many different conceptions of special interest in Peirce that can be found in these passages. My copy of "The Basis for Pragmaticism in the Normative Sciences" in EP2 is too badly marked up to be readable by the OCR program of my scanner or I would scan it and put it up at Arisbe, too, since there seem to be important connections with the New Elements paper. Joe Ransdell - Original Message - From: "gnusystems" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Tuesday, May 09, 2006 8:49 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Entelechy Vinicius, [[ I think the best definition of Entelechy given by Peirce, done in terms of Semeiosis, can be found in his definition of "Perfect Sign" (EP2: 545, n.25). ]] I see what you mean -- although Peirce doesn't mention the word "entelechy" there, "perfect sign" seems synonymous with it. Janet, I'm relatively new around here myself, so i know it takes awhile to get oriented. Welcome to the list! (I don't recall whether that's been said to you already, but if so, another welcome won't hurt.) [[ I am surprised, however, to see the entrants under "Models and simulations of mind." Aren't the views of Hofstadter, Dennet and Minsky generally at odds with the spirit of rest of your list -- and explicitly at odds with Damasio, Lakoff, Maturana and Varela, Rosen, and Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations? ]] No more at odds than the latter group are among themselves, if you allow for some major differences in focus and idiom. But i have to admit that i don't find much of interest in Dennett or Minsky nowadays. They were central to my reading and thinking 25 years ago (before the others that you mention appeared on my horizon), but much more peripheral now. I put them on the list because i think much of what i learned from them is still valid; and in Hofstadter's case, bec
[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy
Gene, I enjoyed reading your message. - My own expressions must have been inadequate, and misleading, because, as it happens, I fully agree with all you say in the following: Life is more than “science and scientific knowledge,” and more than “striving to approach, better and better, The Truth.” And I mean this in a Peircean sense. Stated differently, science is part of life, not the determinant of it. By my lights life is participant in the entelechy of being, not a spectator looking at a scoreboard it can never reach. The perfection of being manifests all the time in realized aesthetic moments. Entelechy has Firstness, here and now, does it not? Perhaps something like this aesthetic perspective is what William Blake had in mind when he wrote: “If the doors of perception were cleansed every thing would appear to man as it is, infinite. For man has closed himself up, till he sees all things thro' narrow chinks of his cavern.” “…[T]he living intelligence which is the creator of all intelligible reality…”, as Peirce put it in the earlier quotation you comment on, means that ongoing creation involves more than chaos or chance, it involves a “reasonableness energizing in the world,” as Peirce put it elsewhere. Although I'm not sure whether I fully understand your meaning here: If logic, as self-controlled thought, is a species of ethics, as self-controlled conduct, and ethics is itself a species of aesthetics, as the intrinsically admirable, then “The Truth” ultimately gives itself to Beauty, as the ultimate of entelechy, as I understand Peirce. To my mind Truth and Beauty become One, a unity. But perhaps my English just fails me. "giving itself to Beauty" sounds to my nonnative ear as something like surrending to something superior. And if so, as I see it, the perfection of being involves genesis, as well as development. Perfecting habits of conduct and even the laws of the universe itself, means the perfection of ongoing creation, not the “overcoming” of it in some Hegelian straitjacket. I fully agree, again, From this perspective the final entelechy of all being is itself such a moment, poem, painting, banquet, music, or better, mousike, rhythm-rhyme-dance-musicking, at least in the sense in which Peirce claimed that: “The Universe as an argument is necessarily a great work of art, a great poem -- for every fine argument is a poem and a symphony -- just as every true poem is a sound argument. But let us compare it rather with a painting -- with an impressionist seashore piece -- then every Quality in a Premiss is one of the elementary colored particles of the Painting; they are all meant to go together to make up the intended Quality that belongs to the whole as whole. That total effect is beyond our ken; but we can appreciate in some measure the resultant Quality of parts of the whole -- which Qualities result from the combinations of elementary Qualities that belong to the premisses.” CP 5.119 My favorite quote! - That "the total effect is beyond our ken" was what I was striving to express. And that we only "can appreciate in some measure the resultant Quality of parts of the whole". Thank you for your response! Back in the 1980's I read two articles of yours. They were the first ones on Peirce I had met, which I agreed with. Used to go around recommending them to everyone. With best regards, Kirsti --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy
Gary,
Your concluding comment:
We are worlds in conversation, turning still.
Sometimes we spin in synchrony and sometimes we don't. When we do, we
have structural coupling, as Maturana and Varela called it. And when we
don't, we may have a chance to learn something new.
for some reason brought to mind this famous one.
"I do not think much of a man who is
not wiser today than he was yesterday."
Abraham Lincoln
Gary
gnusystems wrote:
Vinicius,
[[ I think the best definition of Entelechy given by Peirce, done in
terms of Semeiosis, can be found in his definition of "Perfect Sign"
(EP2: 545, n.25). ]]
I see what you mean -- although Peirce doesn't mention the word
"entelechy" there, "perfect sign" seems synonymous with it.
Janet,
I'm relatively new around here myself, so i know it takes awhile to get
oriented. Welcome to the list! (I don't recall whether that's been said
to you already, but if so, another welcome won't hurt.)
[[ I am surprised, however, to see the entrants under "Models and
simulations of mind." Aren't the views of Hofstadter, Dennet and Minsky
generally at odds with the spirit of rest of your list -- and explicitly
at odds with Damasio, Lakoff, Maturana and Varela, Rosen, and
Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations? ]]
No more at odds than the latter group are among themselves, if you allow
for some major differences in focus and idiom. But i have to admit that
i don't find much of interest in Dennett or Minsky nowadays. They were
central to my reading and thinking 25 years ago (before the others that
you mention appeared on my horizon), but much more peripheral now. I put
them on the list because i think much of what i learned from them is
still valid; and in Hofstadter's case, because my work in progress still
draws upon his concepts of "tangled hierarchy" and "strange loops" and
(especially) his modeling of the creative process. Besides, Hofstadter
was quick to pick up on the emerging concepts of chaos and complexity.
Actually, if i had to list those who are most out of step with the rest
of the list, i'd name Pinker, Dawkins, Koch and Crick. But they still
have a place there, if only because i think that any point on which they
agree with the others can be assumed to have very broad support, simply
because the supporters are so diverse.
But really i'd rather not speak as glibly of these folks as i have here,
as if i could fit each one neatly into some mental pigeonhole. Each one
of us is a whole world. We are worlds in conversation, turning still.
Sometimes we spin in synchrony and sometimes we don't. When we do, we
have structural coupling, as Maturana and Varela called it. And when we
don't, we may have a chance to learn something new.
gary F.
}The simple fact is that no measurement, no experiment or observation is
possible without a relevant theoretical framework. [D.S. Kothari]{
gnusystems }{ Pam Jackson & Gary Fuhrman }{ Manitoulin University
}{ [EMAIL PROTECTED] }{ http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/ }{
---
Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED]
---
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[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy
Kirsti M: The entelechy or perfection of being Peirce here refers to is something never attained to full, but strived at, again and again. Just as with science and scientific knowledge. It's about striving to approach, better and better, The Truth. If there ever would be an end, the absolute perfection of knowledge, that would mean an end, which would be in contradiction with life and living. Life and living IS striving - with some kind of an end. Never the last possible I have to disagree, Kirsti. Life is more than science and scientific knowledge, and more than striving to approach, better and better, The Truth. And I mean this in a Peircean sense. Stated differently, science is part of life, not the determinant of it. By my lights life is participant in the entelechy of being, not a spectator looking at a scoreboard it can never reach. The perfection of being manifests all the time in realized aesthetic moments. Entelechy has Firstness, here and now, does it not? Perhaps something like this aesthetic perspective is what William Blake had in mind when he wrote: If the doors of perception were cleansed every thing would appear to man as it is, infinite. For man has closed himself up, till he sees all things thro' narrow chinks of his cavern. [T]he living intelligence which is the creator of all intelligible reality , as Peirce put it in the earlier quotation you comment on, means that ongoing creation involves more than chaos or chance, it involves a reasonableness energizing in the world, as Peirce put it elsewhere. If logic, as self-controlled thought, is a species of ethics, as self-controlled conduct, and ethics is itself a species of aesthetics, as the intrinsically admirable, then The Truth ultimately gives itself to Beauty, as the ultimate of entelechy, as I understand Peirce. And if so, as I see it, the perfection of being involves genesis, as well as development. Perfecting habits of conduct and even the laws of the universe itself, means the perfection of ongoing creation, not the overcoming of it in some Hegelian straitjacket. From this perspective the final entelechy of all being is itself such a moment, poem, painting, banquet, music, or better, mousike, rhythm-rhyme-dance-musicking, at least in the sense in which Peirce claimed that: The Universe as an argument is necessarily a great work of art, a great poem -- for every fine argument is a poem and a symphony -- just as every true poem is a sound argument. But let us compare it rather with a painting -- with an impressionist seashore piece -- then every Quality in a Premiss is one of the elementary colored particles of the Painting; they are all meant to go together to make up the intended Quality that belongs to the whole as whole. That total effect is beyond our ken; but we can appreciate in some measure the resultant Quality of parts of the whole -- which Qualities result from the combinations of elementary Qualities that belong to the premisses. CP 5.119 Gene --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy
Vinicius,
[[ I think the best definition of Entelechy given by Peirce, done in
terms of Semeiosis, can be found in his definition of "Perfect Sign"
(EP2: 545, n.25). ]]
I see what you mean -- although Peirce doesn't mention the word
"entelechy" there, "perfect sign" seems synonymous with it.
Janet,
I'm relatively new around here myself, so i know it takes awhile to get
oriented. Welcome to the list! (I don't recall whether that's been said
to you already, but if so, another welcome won't hurt.)
[[ I am surprised, however, to see the entrants under "Models and
simulations of mind." Aren't the views of Hofstadter, Dennet and Minsky
generally at odds with the spirit of rest of your list -- and explicitly
at odds with Damasio, Lakoff, Maturana and Varela, Rosen, and
Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations? ]]
No more at odds than the latter group are among themselves, if you allow
for some major differences in focus and idiom. But i have to admit that
i don't find much of interest in Dennett or Minsky nowadays. They were
central to my reading and thinking 25 years ago (before the others that
you mention appeared on my horizon), but much more peripheral now. I put
them on the list because i think much of what i learned from them is
still valid; and in Hofstadter's case, because my work in progress still
draws upon his concepts of "tangled hierarchy" and "strange loops" and
(especially) his modeling of the creative process. Besides, Hofstadter
was quick to pick up on the emerging concepts of chaos and complexity.
Actually, if i had to list those who are most out of step with the rest
of the list, i'd name Pinker, Dawkins, Koch and Crick. But they still
have a place there, if only because i think that any point on which they
agree with the others can be assumed to have very broad support, simply
because the supporters are so diverse.
But really i'd rather not speak as glibly of these folks as i have here,
as if i could fit each one neatly into some mental pigeonhole. Each one
of us is a whole world. We are worlds in conversation, turning still.
Sometimes we spin in synchrony and sometimes we don't. When we do, we
have structural coupling, as Maturana and Varela called it. And when we
don't, we may have a chance to learn something new.
gary F.
}The simple fact is that no measurement, no experiment or observation is
possible without a relevant theoretical framework. [D.S. Kothari]{
gnusystems }{ Pam Jackson & Gary Fuhrman }{ Manitoulin University
}{ [EMAIL PROTECTED] }{ http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/ }{
---
Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy
Title: [peirce-l] Re: Entelechy Gary -- I see now that Merrell is mentioned in the "Life of Meaning" resources on your site. Nice collection! I am surprised, however, to see the entrants under "Models and simulations of mind." Aren't the views of Hofstadter, Dennet and Minsky generally at odds with the spirit of rest of your list -- and explicitly at odds with Damasio, Lakoff, Maturana and Varela, Rosen, and Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations? Janet Gary -- Are you familiar with the work of Floyd Merrell? Your characterization of your own work brings his to mind. To quote from a review of three of Merrell's books by Robert E. Innis (review available in the archives of the Semiotic Review of Books at http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/epc/srb/srb/signtrek.html ) "Merrell's account of the physical contexts of semiosis culminates in the notion of the physical conditions of possibility of open systems, exemplified in the revolutionary work of Prigogine (perhaps, after Peirce, Merrell's intellectual hero), which make possible on the ontological level emergence of higher-order structures, including the higher-order structure that doubles back on itself, the field of consciousness itself. On this view, consciousness is an emergent property of cosmic processes and condition of the possibility of our knowledge of these very properties." Sorry I incorrectly attributed the Ehresmann reference to you -- it will take a while to get oriented to the list. Janet --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy
Title: [peirce-l] Re: Entelechy Gary -- Are you familiar with the work of Floyd Merrell? Your characterization of your own work brings his to mind. To quote from a review of three of Merrell's books by Robert E. Innis (review available in the archives of the Semiotic Review of Books at http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/epc/srb/srb/signtrek.html ) "Merrell's account of the physical contexts of semiosis culminates in the notion of the physical conditions of possibility of open systems, exemplified in the revolutionary work of Prigogine (perhaps, after Peirce, Merrell's intellectual hero), which make possible on the ontological level emergence of higher-order structures, including the higher-order structure that doubles back on itself, the field of consciousness itself. On this view, consciousness is an emergent property of cosmic processes and condition of the possibility of our knowledge of these very properties." Sorry I incorrectly attributed the Ehresmann reference to you -- it will take a while to get oriented to the list. Janet --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] RE: Entelechy
Kirsti, There wasn't an attachment--what you must have seen is how one of my browsers (Safari or Firefox, whichever I used) represents a reply to a previous e-mail. Sorry. NB -Original Message- From: Kirsti Määttänen [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Mon 5/8/2006 1:51 PM To: Peirce Discussion Forum Cc: Subject:[peirce-l] RE: Entelechy Neal, I didn't succeed in opening your attachment. Could you possibly copy it and send it as a mail? Kirsti 7.5.2006 kello 23:09, Neal Bruss kirjoitti: . . . and notice how the first two clauses of the passage link "entelechy" with the Peirce's freuqent turn to grammar in his logic, and, of course, to his semiotic. ["The mode of being of the composition of thought, which is always of the nature of the attribution of a predicate to a subject . . . ]. > > > > --- > Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] > --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] <>--- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] RE: Entelechy
Kirsti, it's good that you couldn't open the attachment -- according to my software it contained a virus (the worm Mydoom.O). Neal doesn't mention it in the message itself, so i'd bet he didn't even know it was attached when he sent it. Neal, better check your system -- gary - Original Message - Sent: Monday, May 08, 2006 1:51 PM Neal, I didn't succeed in opening your attachment. Could you possibly copy it and send it as a mail? Kirsti 7.5.2006 kello 23:09, Neal Bruss kirjoitti: . . . and notice how the first two clauses of the passage link "entelechy" with the Peirce's freuqent turn to grammar in his logic, and, of course, to his semiotic. ["The mode of being of the composition of thought, which is always of the nature of the attribution of a predicate to a subject . . . ]. > > > > --- --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] RE: Entelechy
Neal, I didn't succeed in opening your attachment. Could you possibly copy it and send it as a mail? Kirsti 7.5.2006 kello 23:09, Neal Bruss kirjoitti: . . . and notice how the first two clauses of the passage link "entelechy" with the Peirce's freuqent turn to grammar in his logic, and, of course, to his semiotic. ["The mode of being of the composition of thought, which is always of the nature of the attribution of a predicate to a subject . . . ]. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy
List, I think the best definition of Entelechy given by Peirce, done in terms of Semeiosis, can be found in his definition of "Perfect Sign" (EP2: 545, n.25). Best, ViniciusKirsti M¨¨tt¨nen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Gary, Wilfred et al.Gary wrote:> I'm still trying to get a firmer grip on the concept of "entelechy"> myself, but the best definition i can offer at the moment is "the end> product of a completed process."Yes, that's a good definition. Keeping in mind Peircean idea of meaning as something having it's being in futuro. So, the process in question will never actually be completed. Which is tied with Peirce's idea of continuity (which goes beyond those of Aristotle and Kant).The Greek word comes from: en-telos-ekhein. With en (preposition)= inside, telos =end, and ekhein = to have. So, it comes to something like: Having it's (or a ?) being within an end.> G.F.: So the problem with the translation "actuality" is that the > reality of> the entelechy does not depend on its actuality -- not in the Peircean> senses of those words.Agreed. I don't think it does in the Aristotelian sense either.>> Personally i find it almost impossible to apply these "-tel-" concepts> (such as entelechy and final cause) to a linear process. It seems to me> that they are only really meaningful in the nonlinear or cyclical> domain.So do I, so do I. This is exactly where Peirce's notion of continuity is crucial. It's not a linear notion.> And yet this is not evident from Peirce's discussion in "New> Elements", which for me is the central text in the discussion of> "entelechy". There he applies the term to the universal process -- the> process of the universe evolving toward complete being -- and he > doesn't> appear to say that this universal process is nonlinear. (Though i don't> think he rules it out either.)I assume Peirce takes it in New Elements as something he had already made clear in earlier writings, and consequently did not feel the need to make it explicit there. (Thus highly overestimating the capacities his audience:).)Well, I do hope I'll have time in the future to discuss the New Elements in the list. Now I've just jotted down these few thoughts in a hurry. Noticing that there are twenty unread messages. So, someone else might have written something I should have taken notice.BestKirsti M¨¨tt¨nen<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>7.5.2006 kello 18:25, gnusystems kirjoitti:Kirsti, Wilfred et al.,>> Kirsti writes,> [[ I was quite perplexed to read that>>> J.A. Smith's translation of De>>> Anima renders [entelechy] as "actuality." ]]>> Yes, that perplexed me too when i compared the Smith translation with> the Greek original. Peirce would never translate it that way -- he > would> no doubt write "realization". And yet Smith's choice does make some> sense in the context (though it might make more sense if rendered> "actualization").>> I'm still trying to get a firmer grip on the concept of "entelechy"> myself, but the best definition i can offer at the moment is "the end> product of a completed process." (The "end" part represents the> connection with /telos/ cited in the Century Dictionary.) In that> sense, the complete actualization of an idea would be an entelechy; > it's> what you'd have when the material, efficient, formal and final causes > of> the fact had all completed their work. The problem is that we can (and > i> think Peirce does) talk about the entelechy of a process which may > never> *actually* be completed. As you say, Kirsti,> [[ Perfection of being, which you take up from Peirce, is something> never attained to the full. Still, something which is effective, and in> that sense real, even if never actual, to the full. ]]>> So the problem with the translation "actuality" is that the reality of> the entelechy does not depend on its actuality -- not in the Peircean> senses of those words.>> Personally i find it almost impossible to apply these "-tel-" concepts> (such as entelechy and final cause) to a linear process. It seems to me> that they are only really meaningful in the nonlinear or cyclical> domain. And yet this is not evident from Peirce's discussion in "New> Elements", which for me is the central text in the discussion of> "entelechy". There he applies the term to the universal process -- the> process of the universe evolving toward complete being -- and he > doesn't> appear to say that this universal process is nonlinear. (Though i don't> think he rules it out either.)>> That's the crux of the problem, to me -- and this problem is the main> reason i wanted to start (or rather revive) the discussion of "New> Elements" on this list when i first joined. (It's also the main reason> that i first looked into Aristotle's book On the Psyche.)>> By the way: Looking again at the Century Dictionary entry on> "entelechy", we can see that the final part of it is attributed to E.> Wallace. But where in the entry does Peirce's contribution end and> Wallace's begin? Where the fine print starts, or at the par
[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy
Gary, Wilfred et al. Gary wrote: I'm still trying to get a firmer grip on the concept of "entelechy" myself, but the best definition i can offer at the moment is "the end product of a completed process." Yes, that's a good definition. Keeping in mind Peircean idea of meaning as something having it's being in futuro. So, the process in question will never actually be completed. Which is tied with Peirce's idea of continuity (which goes beyond those of Aristotle and Kant). The Greek word comes from: en-telos-ekhein. With en (preposition)= inside, telos =end, and ekhein = to have. So, it comes to something like: Having it's (or a ?) being within an end. G.F.: So the problem with the translation "actuality" is that the reality of the entelechy does not depend on its actuality -- not in the Peircean senses of those words. Agreed. I don't think it does in the Aristotelian sense either. Personally i find it almost impossible to apply these "-tel-" concepts (such as entelechy and final cause) to a linear process. It seems to me that they are only really meaningful in the nonlinear or cyclical domain. So do I, so do I. This is exactly where Peirce's notion of continuity is crucial. It's not a linear notion. And yet this is not evident from Peirce's discussion in "New Elements", which for me is the central text in the discussion of "entelechy". There he applies the term to the universal process -- the process of the universe evolving toward complete being -- and he doesn't appear to say that this universal process is nonlinear. (Though i don't think he rules it out either.) I assume Peirce takes it in New Elements as something he had already made clear in earlier writings, and consequently did not feel the need to make it explicit there. (Thus highly overestimating the capacities his audience:).) Well, I do hope I'll have time in the future to discuss the New Elements in the list. Now I've just jotted down these few thoughts in a hurry. Noticing that there are twenty unread messages. So, someone else might have written something I should have taken notice. Best Kirsti Määttänen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> 7.5.2006 kello 18:25, gnusystems kirjoitti: Kirsti, Wilfred et al., Kirsti writes, [[ I was quite perplexed to read that J.A. Smith's translation of De Anima renders [entelechy] as "actuality." ]] Yes, that perplexed me too when i compared the Smith translation with the Greek original. Peirce would never translate it that way -- he would no doubt write "realization". And yet Smith's choice does make some sense in the context (though it might make more sense if rendered "actualization"). I'm still trying to get a firmer grip on the concept of "entelechy" myself, but the best definition i can offer at the moment is "the end product of a completed process." (The "end" part represents the connection with /telos/ cited in the Century Dictionary.) In that sense, the complete actualization of an idea would be an entelechy; it's what you'd have when the material, efficient, formal and final causes of the fact had all completed their work. The problem is that we can (and i think Peirce does) talk about the entelechy of a process which may never *actually* be completed. As you say, Kirsti, [[ Perfection of being, which you take up from Peirce, is something never attained to the full. Still, something which is effective, and in that sense real, even if never actual, to the full. ]] So the problem with the translation "actuality" is that the reality of the entelechy does not depend on its actuality -- not in the Peircean senses of those words. Personally i find it almost impossible to apply these "-tel-" concepts (such as entelechy and final cause) to a linear process. It seems to me that they are only really meaningful in the nonlinear or cyclical domain. And yet this is not evident from Peirce's discussion in "New Elements", which for me is the central text in the discussion of "entelechy". There he applies the term to the universal process -- the process of the universe evolving toward complete being -- and he doesn't appear to say that this universal process is nonlinear. (Though i don't think he rules it out either.) That's the crux of the problem, to me -- and this problem is the main reason i wanted to start (or rather revive) the discussion of "New Elements" on this list when i first joined. (It's also the main reason that i first looked into Aristotle's book On the Psyche.) By the way: Looking again at the Century Dictionary entry on "entelechy", we can see that the final part of it is attributed to E. Wallace. But where in the entry does Peirce's contribution end and Wallace's begin? Where the fine print starts, or at the paragraph break? Does anyone know? gary F.
[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy
Janet,
[[ Is entelechy the same as final cause to Aristotle or are they just
related concepts? ]]
My understanding is that the entelechy is an entity, while the final
cause is not. If we could map a process onto a sentence, the entelechy
would correspond to a noun while the final cause would be more like a
verb. Or maybe a better analogy is the "attractor" in physical state
space: final cause would be its *attracting* function, while the
entelechy is the final state that would be achieved if the attractor
could complete its work. As long as the attractor is still working, the
entelechy has only "such identity as a sign may have" (Peirce) -- so
it's an odd sort of entity.
I'm not using Aristotelian language here, because his usage of the term
is not very clear to me, and i'm trying to carry forward Peirce's
attempt to clarify the concept more than Aristotle himself did (while
also trying to preserve Aristotle's meaning). Here's what Peirce said in
"New Elements":
[[[ Aristotle gropes for a conception of perfection, or entelechy, which
he never succeeds in making clear. We may adopt the word to mean the
very fact, that is, the ideal sign which should be quite perfect, and so
identical, -- in such identity as a sign may have, -- with the very
matter denoted united with the very form signified by it. The entelechy
of the Universe of being, then, the Universe qua fact, will be that
Universe in its aspect as a sign, the "Truth" of being. The "Truth," the
fact that is not abstracted but complete, is the ultimate interpretant
of every sign. ]]]
[[ I believe your point about "-tel-" concepts and non-linearity agrees
with Robert Rosen's treatment of final cause and complexity. ]]
I'm glad you think so too! Rosen did not use the idiom of semiotics but
i have no doubt that his "modeling relation" is a semiotic one; and his
idea of the modeling process is virtually identical with what Walter
Freeman (the neuroscientist) calls "circular causality". But this is the
central concept of my work in progress, so i'd better drop the subject
here lest i get carried away ...
I too would be curious about what people find in Professor Ehresmann's
work on Memory Evolutive Systems -- i still haven't found time yet to
tackle it myself. (Jerry Chandler, who provided us with the link to it,
finds it "radically different" from Rosen's view, but i don't know why.)
I guess it's questionable how appropriate this topic is to Peirce-L, but
in my view it's close enough. I subscribe to a complexity list which
hosted a lengthy discussion on Peirce last year, so i don't see why we
shouldn't discuss complexity on the Peirce list! But Joe and others
might disagree about that, and perhaps rightly so.
gary F.
}Into deep darkness fall those who follow the immanent. Into deeper
darkness fall those who follow the transcendent. He who knows both, with
the immanent overcomes death and with the transcendent reaches
immortality. [Mascaro, Isa Upanishad]{
gnusystems }{ Pam Jackson & Gary Fuhrman }{ Manitoulin University
}{ [EMAIL PROTECTED] }{ http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/ }{
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[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy
Gary, On 5/7/06 Gary F. wrote: ... Personally i find it almost impossible to apply these "-tel-" concepts (such as entelechy and final cause) to a linear process. ... Is entelechy the same as final cause to Aristotle or are they just related concepts? I believe your point about "-tel-" concepts and non-linearity agrees with Robert Rosen's treatment of final cause and complexity. I've just downloaded some material from Professor Ehresmann's site on Memory Evolutive Systems -- thanks for that reference. I'm curious what anyone has to say about her model of living systems in contrast with that of Rosen, if that's an appropriate topic for this list. Thanks (to whole list) for the enlightening discussions, Janet Singer --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] RE: Entelechy
. . . and notice how the first two clauses of the passage link "entelechy" with the Peirce's freuqent turn to grammar in his logic, and, of course, to his semiotic. ["The mode of being of the composition of thought, which is always of the nature of the attribution of a predicate to a subject . . . ]. -Original Message- From: Kirsti Määttänen [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Sun 5/7/2006 12:59 PM To: Peirce Discussion Forum Cc: Subject: [peirce-l] RE: Entelechy Neal, A good quote you brought up. The entelechy or perfection of being Peirce here refers to is something never attained to full, but astrived at, again and again. Just as with science and scientific knowledge. It's about striving to approach, better and better, The Truth. If there ever would be an end, the absolute perfection of knowledge, that would mean an end, which would be in contradiction with life and living. Life and living IS striving - with some kind of an end. Never the last possible. Welcome to the list! Best, Kirsti Määttänen 6.5.2006 kello 18:01, Neal Bruss kirjoitti: Dear Wilfred: > > Do you have 6.341, noted as from "Some Amazing Mazes, Fourth > Curiosity," (c. 1909)? > > 341 The mode of being of the composition of thought, which is always > of the nature of the attribution of a predicate to a subject, is the > living intelligence which is the creator of all intelligible reality, > as well as the knowledge of such reality. It is the /entelechy/, or > perfection of being. > > Neal Bruss > (new to the list > English department > University of Massachusetts Boston) > > > -Original Message- > From: Drs.W.T.M. Berendsen [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > Sent: Sat 5/6/2006 4:23 AM > To: Peirce Discussion Forum > Cc: > Subject: [peirce-l] Entelechy > > Dear list, > > I am currently writing my PhD thesis and want to use the concept of > "entelechy" in it. But, for doing so, I would be interested whether > Peirce > might have defined this term in other sources than the Century > Dictionary > (where I got it from). If so, I would be very interested in sources. > > Besides this, I would like to know the exact translation of the greek > (?)word entelechia like it was used by Aristotle. > > Is there anyone here on the list who knows this ancient greek > (?)language ? > > Kind regards, > > Wilfred > > -- > Internal Virus Database is out-of-date. > Checked by AVG Free Edition. > Version: 7.1.385 / Virus Database: 268.5.1/327 - Release Date: > 28-4-2006 > > > > --- > Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > > > > > --- > Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] > --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] <>--- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] RE: Entelechy
Neal, A good quote you brought up. The entelechy or perfection of being Peirce here refers to is something never attained to full, but astrived at, again and again. Just as with science and scientific knowledge. It's about striving to approach, better and better, The Truth. If there ever would be an end, the absolute perfection of knowledge, that would mean an end, which would be in contradiction with life and living. Life and living IS striving - with some kind of an end. Never the last possible. Welcome to the list! Best, Kirsti Määttänen 6.5.2006 kello 18:01, Neal Bruss kirjoitti: Dear Wilfred: Do you have 6.341, noted as from "Some Amazing Mazes, Fourth Curiosity," (c. 1909)? 341 The mode of being of the composition of thought, which is always of the nature of the attribution of a predicate to a subject, is the living intelligence which is the creator of all intelligible reality, as well as the knowledge of such reality. It is the /entelechy/, or perfection of being. Neal Bruss (new to the list English department University of Massachusetts Boston) -Original Message- From: Drs.W.T.M. Berendsen [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Sat 5/6/2006 4:23 AM To: Peirce Discussion Forum Cc: Subject:[peirce-l] Entelechy Dear list, I am currently writing my PhD thesis and want to use the concept of "entelechy" in it. But, for doing so, I would be interested whether Peirce might have defined this term in other sources than the Century Dictionary (where I got it from). If so, I would be very interested in sources. Besides this, I would like to know the exact translation of the greek (?)word entelechia like it was used by Aristotle. Is there anyone here on the list who knows this ancient greek (?)language ? Kind regards, Wilfred -- Internal Virus Database is out-of-date. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.385 / Virus Database: 268.5.1/327 - Release Date: 28-4-2006 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy
Dear Folks-- I looked up escatology (which I though is at least a remotely related notion) and entelechy in the Oxford Companion to Philosophy. I found the entry below for Entelechy. I think it adds a fun slant that is consistent with the picture you folks are painting. I especially like the "religious" teleological (from the Greek word for goal task completion or erfection -- also according to the Oxford Companion) movtives that I think are implicit in this notion. BEGIN QUOTE: entelechy. Hans Driesch (1867-1941) this century's leading neovitalist, was much impressed with his discovery that, despite extreme interferene in the early stages of embrological development, some organisms nevertheless develop into perfectly formed adults. In a thoroughly Aristotelian fashion, therefore, he became convinced that there is some life-element, transcending the purely material, controlling and promoting such development. Denying that this 'entelechy' is a force in the ususal sense, Driesch openly argued that it is end-directed. In his later writing, Driesch moved beyond his Greek influences, starting to sound more Hegelian, as he argued that ll life culminates ultimately in a 'supra personal whole'. END QUOTE the artical ends with a cross reference to vitalism which reminds me that Peirce was himself an investigator of spritualism. Cheers, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy
Kirsti, Wilfred et al.,
Kirsti writes,
[[ I was quite perplexed to read that
>> J.A. Smith's translation of De
>> Anima renders [entelechy] as "actuality." ]]
Yes, that perplexed me too when i compared the Smith translation with
the Greek original. Peirce would never translate it that way -- he would
no doubt write "realization". And yet Smith's choice does make some
sense in the context (though it might make more sense if rendered
"actualization").
I'm still trying to get a firmer grip on the concept of "entelechy"
myself, but the best definition i can offer at the moment is "the end
product of a completed process." (The "end" part represents the
connection with /telos/ cited in the Century Dictionary.) In that
sense, the complete actualization of an idea would be an entelechy; it's
what you'd have when the material, efficient, formal and final causes of
the fact had all completed their work. The problem is that we can (and i
think Peirce does) talk about the entelechy of a process which may never
*actually* be completed. As you say, Kirsti,
[[ Perfection of being, which you take up from Peirce, is something
never attained to the full. Still, something which is effective, and in
that sense real, even if never actual, to the full. ]]
So the problem with the translation "actuality" is that the reality of
the entelechy does not depend on its actuality -- not in the Peircean
senses of those words.
Personally i find it almost impossible to apply these "-tel-" concepts
(such as entelechy and final cause) to a linear process. It seems to me
that they are only really meaningful in the nonlinear or cyclical
domain. And yet this is not evident from Peirce's discussion in "New
Elements", which for me is the central text in the discussion of
"entelechy". There he applies the term to the universal process -- the
process of the universe evolving toward complete being -- and he doesn't
appear to say that this universal process is nonlinear. (Though i don't
think he rules it out either.)
That's the crux of the problem, to me -- and this problem is the main
reason i wanted to start (or rather revive) the discussion of "New
Elements" on this list when i first joined. (It's also the main reason
that i first looked into Aristotle's book On the Psyche.)
By the way: Looking again at the Century Dictionary entry on
"entelechy", we can see that the final part of it is attributed to E.
Wallace. But where in the entry does Peirce's contribution end and
Wallace's begin? Where the fine print starts, or at the paragraph break?
Does anyone know?
gary F.
}The meaning of a word is its use in the language. [Wittgenstein]{
gnusystems }{ Pam Jackson & Gary Fuhrman }{ Manitoulin University
}{ [EMAIL PROTECTED] }{ http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/ }{
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[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy
Gary, Wilfred & list.
Well, I was quite perplexed to read that
J.A. Smith's translation of De
Anima renders [entelechy] as "actuality."
That must simply be a grave mistake. My Liddell & Scott does not, either, give the exact word 'entelechy, but it does give "enteinoo" (with omega last), with noting that it's a verb denoting future. Amongst the synonyms listed is Latin intendere.
I'm absolutely an amateur with classical Greek, but what Liddell & Scott gives here accords with how Aristotle, and Peirce, for that matter, use the term.
Perfection of being, which you take up from Peirce, is something never attained to the full. Still, something which is effective, and in that sense real, even if never actual, to the full.
Best,
Kirsti
6.5.2006 kello 15:07, gnusystems kirjoitti:
Wilfred,
I have a smattering of classical Greek, maybe enough to provide you with
a little information.
Aristotle apparently coined the term, and didn't define it, so one has
to figure out its meaning from context. (There is no listing for it in
Liddell and Scott's Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon, which is the
only Greek dictionary i have at hand.) J.A. Smith's translation of De
Anima renders it as "actuality."
It is sometimes transliterated "entelechia" and sometimes "entelecheia"
(the latter is closer to the actual Greek), so an Internet search on
either of those spellings will bring up some useful items.
As for Peirce, the term plays a prominent role in his "New Elements"
essay, which you'll find in EP2 and online at Arisbe. Another
illuminating passage is CP 6.356: [[[ It must not be forgotten that
Aristotle was an Asclepiad, that is, that he belonged to a family which
for generation after generation, from prehistoric times, had had their
attention turned to vital phenomena; and he is almost as remarkable for
his capacity as a naturalist as he is for his incapacity in physics and
mathematics. He must have had prominently before his mind the fact that
all eggs are very much alike, and all seeds are very much alike, while
the animals that grow out of the one, the plants that grow out of the
other, are as different as possible. Accordingly, his dunamis is
germinal being, not amounting to existence; while his entelechy is the
perfect thing that ought to grow out of that germ. ]]]
Another term he gives as equivalent to it is "perfection of being" (CP
6.341).
I hope this is of some help, though the more accomplished Peircean and
Aristotelian scholars can probably provide more.
gary F.
}The revelation of the Divine Reality hath everlastingly been identical
with its concealment and its concealment identical with its revelation.
[The Bab]{
gnusystems }{ Pam Jackson & Gary Fuhrman }{ Manitoulin Island, Canada
}{ [EMAIL PROTECTED] }{ http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/ }{
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Kirsti Määttänen
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy
Joe, Gary, Neal, Thanx a lot for this info. It is for now very sufficient also because I myself also thought that perfection of being belongs to the notion of entelechy according to Peirce. The passages stated also really help me because they prove that. Would be interested however in more insights in entelechy. So if other people could contribute I would be very interested to hear! Kind regards, Wilfred -Oorspronkelijk bericht- Van: Joseph Ransdell [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Verzonden: zaterdag 6 mei 2006 16:44 Aan: Peirce Discussion Forum Onderwerp: [peirce-l] Re: Entelechy Just one point to add to what Gary says, namely, that the word "perfection", as used by Peirce in this context (and wherever the concept of a process is pertinent) should be understood as implying completion. Joe Ransdell -- Internal Virus Database is out-of-date. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.385 / Virus Database: 268.5.1/327 - Release Date: 28-4-2006 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] RE: Entelechy
Dear Wilfred: Do you have 6.341, noted as from "Some Amazing Mazes, Fourth Curiosity," (c. 1909)? 341 The mode of being of the composition of thought, which is always of the nature of the attribution of a predicate to a subject, is the living intelligence which is the creator of all intelligible reality, as well as the knowledge of such reality. It is the /entelechy/, or perfection of being. Neal Bruss (new to the list English department University of Massachusetts Boston) -Original Message- From: Drs.W.T.M. Berendsen [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Sat 5/6/2006 4:23 AM To: Peirce Discussion Forum Cc: Subject:[peirce-l] Entelechy Dear list, I am currently writing my PhD thesis and want to use the concept of "entelechy" in it. But, for doing so, I would be interested whether Peirce might have defined this term in other sources than the Century Dictionary (where I got it from). If so, I would be very interested in sources. Besides this, I would like to know the exact translation of the greek (?)word entelechia like it was used by Aristotle. Is there anyone here on the list who knows this ancient greek (?)language ? Kind regards, Wilfred -- Internal Virus Database is out-of-date. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.385 / Virus Database: 268.5.1/327 - Release Date: 28-4-2006 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy
Just one point to add to what Gary says, namely, that the word "perfection",
as used by Peirce in this context (and wherever the concept of a process is
pertinent) should be understood as implying completion.
Joe Ransdell
- Original Message -
From: "gnusystems" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Peirce Discussion Forum"
Sent: Saturday, May 06, 2006 7:07 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Entelechy
Wilfred,
I have a smattering of classical Greek, maybe enough to provide you with
a little information.
Aristotle apparently coined the term, and didn't define it, so one has
to figure out its meaning from context. (There is no listing for it in
Liddell and Scott's Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon, which is the
only Greek dictionary i have at hand.) J.A. Smith's translation of De
Anima renders it as "actuality."
It is sometimes transliterated "entelechia" and sometimes "entelecheia"
(the latter is closer to the actual Greek), so an Internet search on
either of those spellings will bring up some useful items.
As for Peirce, the term plays a prominent role in his "New Elements"
essay, which you'll find in EP2 and online at Arisbe. Another
illuminating passage is CP 6.356: [[[ It must not be forgotten that
Aristotle was an Asclepiad, that is, that he belonged to a family which
for generation after generation, from prehistoric times, had had their
attention turned to vital phenomena; and he is almost as remarkable for
his capacity as a naturalist as he is for his incapacity in physics and
mathematics. He must have had prominently before his mind the fact that
all eggs are very much alike, and all seeds are very much alike, while
the animals that grow out of the one, the plants that grow out of the
other, are as different as possible. Accordingly, his dunamis is
germinal being, not amounting to existence; while his entelechy is the
perfect thing that ought to grow out of that germ. ]]]
Another term he gives as equivalent to it is "perfection of being" (CP
6.341).
I hope this is of some help, though the more accomplished Peircean and
Aristotelian scholars can probably provide more.
gary F.
}The revelation of the Divine Reality hath everlastingly been identical
with its concealment and its concealment identical with its revelation.
[The Bab]{
gnusystems }{ Pam Jackson & Gary Fuhrman }{ Manitoulin Island, Canada
}{ [EMAIL PROTECTED] }{ http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/ }{
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Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy
Wilfred,
I have a smattering of classical Greek, maybe enough to provide you with
a little information.
Aristotle apparently coined the term, and didn't define it, so one has
to figure out its meaning from context. (There is no listing for it in
Liddell and Scott's Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon, which is the
only Greek dictionary i have at hand.) J.A. Smith's translation of De
Anima renders it as "actuality."
It is sometimes transliterated "entelechia" and sometimes "entelecheia"
(the latter is closer to the actual Greek), so an Internet search on
either of those spellings will bring up some useful items.
As for Peirce, the term plays a prominent role in his "New Elements"
essay, which you'll find in EP2 and online at Arisbe. Another
illuminating passage is CP 6.356: [[[ It must not be forgotten that
Aristotle was an Asclepiad, that is, that he belonged to a family which
for generation after generation, from prehistoric times, had had their
attention turned to vital phenomena; and he is almost as remarkable for
his capacity as a naturalist as he is for his incapacity in physics and
mathematics. He must have had prominently before his mind the fact that
all eggs are very much alike, and all seeds are very much alike, while
the animals that grow out of the one, the plants that grow out of the
other, are as different as possible. Accordingly, his dunamis is
germinal being, not amounting to existence; while his entelechy is the
perfect thing that ought to grow out of that germ. ]]]
Another term he gives as equivalent to it is "perfection of being" (CP
6.341).
I hope this is of some help, though the more accomplished Peircean and
Aristotelian scholars can probably provide more.
gary F.
}The revelation of the Divine Reality hath everlastingly been identical
with its concealment and its concealment identical with its revelation.
[The Bab]{
gnusystems }{ Pam Jackson & Gary Fuhrman }{ Manitoulin Island, Canada
}{ [EMAIL PROTECTED] }{ http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/ }{
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Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
