Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos
Gary R wrote: * For my own part, I tend--as perhaps Jon does as well--to see esthetic/ethics/logic as semeiotic as being in genuine tricategorial relation so that they *inform* each other in interesting ways. Trichotomic vector theory, then, does not demand that one necessarily always follow the order: 1ns (esthetic), then 2ns (ethics), then 3ns (logic). One may also look at the three involutionally (logic involves ethics which, in turn, involves esthetic) or, even, according to the vector of representation (logic shows esthetic to be in that particular relation to ethics which Peirce holds them to be in). But only a very few scholars have taken up tricategorial vector relations. Indeed, R. J. Parmentier and I are the only folk I know of who have published work on possible paths of movement (vectors) through a genuine trichotomic relation which does *not* follow the Hegelian order: 1ns then 2ns then 3ns. This is very interesting, thanks Gary :-) Indeed, with a few exceptions, there appears at present to be relatively little interest in Peirce's categories generally speaking. Given the way they pervade his scientific and philosophical work, and considering how highly he valued their discovery, this has always struck me as quite odd. * I have found that presenting on these concepts to non-Peirceans in seminars and conference papers can be very hard work. It doesn't make much sense to people who aren't already thinking within Peirce's system. Cathy - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos
I can confirm that last bit about the difficulty of explaining these concepts, though I do so as a Deweyan always wondering exactly how did he borrow and deviate from Peirce's concepts. I do hear a number of people say that they like Peirce, but it is never clear to what they are referring. That might be due to my ignorance of the received view of Peirce. Perhaps someone could enlighten me? Jason On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 at 4:08 AM, Catherine Legg cl...@waikato.ac.nz wrote: Gary R wrote: * For my own part, I tend--as perhaps Jon does as well--to see esthetic/ethics/logic as semeiotic as being in genuine tricategorial relation so that they *inform* each other in interesting ways. Trichotomic vector theory, then, does not demand that one necessarily always follow the order: 1ns (esthetic), then 2ns (ethics), then 3ns (logic). One may also look at the three involutionally (logic involves ethics which, in turn, involves esthetic) or, even, according to the vector of representation (logic shows esthetic to be in that particular relation to ethics which Peirce holds them to be in). But only a very few scholars have taken up tricategorial vector relations. Indeed, R. J. Parmentier and I are the only folk I know of who have published work on possible paths of movement (vectors) through a genuine trichotomic relation which does *not* follow the Hegelian order: 1ns then 2ns then 3ns. This is very interesting, thanks Gary :-) Indeed, with a few exceptions, there appears at present to be relatively little interest in Peirce's categories generally speaking. Given the way they pervade his scientific and philosophical work, and considering how highly he valued their discovery, this has always struck me as quite odd. * I have found that presenting on these concepts to non-Peirceans in seminars and conference papers can be very hard work. It doesn't make much sense to people who aren't already thinking within Peirce's system. Cathy - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos
I said this wrong. Changed below between pairs of asterisks. Sorry! - Best, Ben - Original Message - Jason, list, That's interesting. What aspects of synechism do they reject? a.. Continuity of space and time? Lorentz symmetries seem to make such continuity pretty credible. b.. Idea of espousing continuity of space and time for philosophical reasons instead of physics reasons? c.. Real infinitesimals? d.. Continuity of semiosis and of inference process? **Idea that incapacities such as that of a cognition devoid of determination by inference help** prove the reality of the continuous and therefore of the general? (Some Consequences of Four Incapacities) Or if discussions of synechism don't get into such detail, still what do they say is wrong with synechism? Best, Ben - Original Message - From: Khadimir To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU Sent: Thursday, March 29, 2012 1:44 PM Subject: Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos Steven, This seems to be a plausible judgment of contemporary scene, if a sparse one. If I continue with this, then might I ask exactly what constitutes being a scientific dualist on your view? I would agree that many contemporary positions are prima facie crypto-dualist, if that is what you mean, a hypothesis that would be verified or not in individual cases (thinkers). However, when I claim that of a view and indicate why, they always reject the view, and about the only widespread commonality that I've seen is a rejection of scholastic realism (realism about universals) and of continuity (synechism). Best, Jason On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 at 12:01 PM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote: Dear Cathy, Non-Peirceans, if you will forgive the over simplification, are in two camps: 1. the religious dualist, 2. the scientific dualist. Often they are in both. One does not know how to ground what Peirce calls Thirdness (more generally, the mind) in their conception of God, the other does not know how to ground Thirdness in their conception of Physics. In-other-words, there are two dogmas working against the Peircean. It produces precisely the problem that Stanley Fish alludes to, and that I respond to (see my comment at the bottom of the page), here: Citing Chapter and Verse: Which Scripture Is the Right One? http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/citing-chapter-and-verse-which-scripture-is-the-right-one/?comments#permid=72 This is a reference to an article that Stephen Rose gave a few days ago. Peirce's objection to the Russelization of logic is relevant here, because the eradication of psychologism placed the mind (esp. Thirdness) beyond the reach of 20th Century science and logic. It has become clear to me that Charles Peirce, and his father Benjamin, did indeed conceive of the mind, and in particular what Charles called Thirdness, as grounded in both a conception of God and a conception of Physics. Now I rush to add that, despite the language of the time, this God conception is not the usual one but one that is really non-theistic in the modern sense, in that it is without personification and clearly not the god of popular western conception. This, in my view, is the proper way to interpret the apparent contradiction in this matter when it is naively read into Benjamin Peirce's Ideality in the physical sciences and in the writings of Charles Peirce. Their view is more like that of Taoism than Judeao-Christianity (although it maintains the passion of the later). So, in presenting Peirce's view in relation to contemporary arguments it is important, I think, to highlight these points and challenge the dogma. If you do, then Peircean concerns and questions may become more clear to the audience unfamiliar with them. With respect, Steven -- Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith Institute for Advanced Science Engineering http://iase.info On Mar 29, 2012, at 2:08 AM, Catherine Legg wrote: Gary R wrote: * For my own part, I tend--as perhaps Jon does as well--to see esthetic/ethics/logic as semeiotic as being in genuine tricategorial relation so that they *inform* each other in interesting ways. Trichotomic vector theory, then, does not demand that one necessarily always follow the order: 1ns (esthetic), then 2ns (ethics), then 3ns (logic). One may also look at the three involutionally (logic involves ethics which, in turn, involves esthetic) or, even, according to the vector of representation (logic shows esthetic to be in that particular relation to ethics which Peirce holds them to be in). But only a very few scholars have taken up tricategorial vector relations. Indeed, R. J. Parmentier and I are the only folk I know of who have published work on possible paths of movement (vectors) through a genuine trichotomic relation which does *not* follow the Hegelian order: 1ns then 2ns then 3ns
Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos
Ben and list, In part it is a reflection of what I like to talk about, but they tend to reject a variant of your fourth bullet point, especially either the direct or indirect implications of Four Incapacities, Consequences of Four Incapacities, and the continuity of inference and semiotic. However, the discussion never reaches that level of detail. Instead, I ask such questions as--as I did at a conference last weekend to a superbly inviting, mostly analytic audience--why do you think that conscious intentionality must begin as a conscious (noetic/attentive) phenomenon rather than in bodily intentionality? In this case, the interlocutor was treating conscious intentionality as if it were ex nihilo and was insouciant on the point, though one does not need Peircean continuity to answer that question. This is the kind of Cartesian dualism that I see in the wild, i.e., a species of discontinuity. Jason On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 at 2:17 PM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote: ** I said this wrong. Changed below between pairs of asterisks. Sorry! - Best, Ben - Original Message - Jason, list, That's interesting. What aspects of synechism do they reject? - Continuity of space and time? Lorentz symmetries seem to make such continuity pretty credible. - Idea of espousing continuity of space and time for philosophical reasons instead of physics reasons? - Real infinitesimals? - Continuity of semiosis and of inference process? **Idea that incapacities such as that of a cognition devoid of determination by inference help** prove the reality of the continuous and therefore of the general? (Some Consequences of Four Incapacities) Or if discussions of synechism don't get into such detail, still what do they say is wrong with synechism? Best, Ben - Original Message - *From:* Khadimir *To:* PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU *Sent:* Thursday, March 29, 2012 1:44 PM *Subject:* Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos Steven, This seems to be a plausible judgment of contemporary scene, if a sparse one. If I continue with this, then might I ask exactly what constitutes being a scientific dualist on your view? I would agree that many contemporary positions are prima facie crypto-dualist, if that is what you mean, a hypothesis that would be verified or not in individual cases (thinkers). However, when I claim that of a view and indicate why, they always reject the view, and about the only widespread commonality that I've seen is a rejection of scholastic realism (realism about universals) and of continuity (synechism). Best, Jason On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 at 12:01 PM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote: Dear Cathy, Non-Peirceans, if you will forgive the over simplification, are in two camps: 1. the religious dualist, 2. the scientific dualist. Often they are in both. One does not know how to ground what Peirce calls Thirdness (more generally, the mind) in their conception of God, the other does not know how to ground Thirdness in their conception of Physics. In-other-words, there are two dogmas working against the Peircean. It produces precisely the problem that Stanley Fish alludes to, and that I respond to (see my comment at the bottom of the page), here: Citing Chapter and Verse: Which Scripture Is the Right One? http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/citing-chapter-and-verse-which-scripture-is-the-right-one/?comments#permid=72 This is a reference to an article that Stephen Rose gave a few days ago. Peirce's objection to the Russelization of logic is relevant here, because the eradication of psychologism placed the mind (esp. Thirdness) beyond the reach of 20th Century science and logic. It has become clear to me that Charles Peirce, and his father Benjamin, did indeed conceive of the mind, and in particular what Charles called Thirdness, as grounded in both a conception of God and a conception of Physics. Now I rush to add that, despite the language of the time, this God conception is not the usual one but one that is really non-theistic in the modern sense, in that it is without personification and clearly not the god of popular western conception. This, in my view, is the proper way to interpret the apparent contradiction in this matter when it is naively read into Benjamin Peirce's Ideality in the physical sciences and in the writings of Charles Peirce. Their view is more like that of Taoism than Judeao-Christianity (although it maintains the passion of the later). So, in presenting Peirce's view in relation to contemporary arguments it is important, I think, to highlight these points and challenge the dogma. If you do, then Peircean concerns and questions may become more clear to the audience unfamiliar with them. With respect, Steven -- Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith Institute for Advanced Science Engineering http://iase.info On Mar
Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos
Nice. It's interesting that logic depends upon ethics and, in turn, aesthetics when dependence is itself a logical relation. Rather hard to get one's head around. On 3/26/2012 9:48 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote: Peircers, I found the figure I used to draw to explain that pragmatic ordering of the normative sciences -- Re: The Pragmatic Cosmos At: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000879.html o-o | | |o| | / \ | | / \ | | / \ | |o---o| | /| Logic |\ | | / | | \ | | / | | \ | |o---o| | /| | Ethic | |\ | | / | | | | \ | | / | | | | \ | |o---o| | /| | Aesthetic | |\ | | / | | | | | | \ | | / | | | | | | \ | |o---o---o---o---o---o---o---o| | | o-o Figure 1. The Pragmatic Cosmos Here is the Figure that goes with this description of the Pragmatic Cosmos, or the pragmatically ordered normative sciences: Aesthetics, Ethics, and Logic. The arrangement is best viewed as a planar projection of a solid geometric configuration, as three cylinders on concentric circular bases, all subtending an overarching cone. This way of viewing the situation brings into focus the two independent or orthogonal order relations that exist among the normative sciences. In regard to their bases, logic is a special case of ethics and aesthetics, and ethics is a special case of aesthetics, understanding these concepts in their broadest senses. In respect of their altitudes, logic exercises a critical perspective on ethics and aesthetics, and ethics exercises a critical perspective on aesthetics. - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos
Jon and others... This overview of mine on your idea is merely a curiosity, yet it is also a thorn for me, and my overview may be off base, but let me thrash it out. There could be a difference to note in the giving or getting of the categories in regard to determinacy and dependency. (This topic was slightly dealt with in messages some months back.) The gist of the topic was that any lower category is determinant of its next higher category, and that any higher category is dependent on its next lower category. For example, objects as a second determine representamen as a first and interpretants as a third depend on their objects and representamen. The hierarchy of the normative sciences to be consistent with this take on the categories may therefore be more dependently regressive than determinately progressive as a matter of fact, in that ethics seems to be applied aesthetics and logics seems to be applied ethics. Incidentally, the sketch outlining the normative sciences built up in an architectonic way seems correct, but the higher logics would likely have the majority of inner compartments with aesthetics having only one whole compartment and ethics having just two main compartments. This approach of course implies that dependent higher categories are more say divided or detailed, although nonetheless with greater simplicity, if that is not a contradiction with the assumed complexity of determinant lower categories. -Original Message- From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On Behalf Of Jon Awbrey Sent: Tuesday, 27 March, 2012 12:48 AM To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU Subject: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos Peircers, I found the figure I used to draw to explain that pragmatic ordering of the normative sciences -- Re: The Pragmatic Cosmos At: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000879.html o-o | | |o| | / \ | | / \ | | / \ | |o---o| | /| Logic |\ | | / | | \ | | / | | \ | |o---o| | /| | Ethic | |\ | | / | | | | \ | | / | | | | \ | |o---o| | /| | Aesthetic | |\ | | / | | | | | | \ | | / | | | | | | \ | |o---o---o---o---o---o---o---o| | | o-o Figure 1. The Pragmatic Cosmos Here is the Figure that goes with this description of the Pragmatic Cosmos, or the pragmatically ordered normative sciences: Aesthetics, Ethics, and Logic. The arrangement is best viewed as a planar projection of a solid geometric configuration, as three cylinders on concentric circular bases, all subtending an overarching cone. This way of viewing the situation brings into focus the two independent or orthogonal order relations that exist among the normative sciences. In regard to their bases, logic is a special case of ethics and aesthetics, and ethics is a special case of aesthetics, understanding these concepts in their broadest senses. In respect of their altitudes, logic exercises a critical perspective on ethics and aesthetics, and ethics exercises a critical perspective on aesthetics. - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos
I am waiting for the day when values replaces ethics as a base term for discussing morality and, if a hierarchy is pertinent, when ontological values would be right up there wherever thought (musement) begins. I think we have confused virtues and characteristics with values from the gitgo. (See the Bard on honor.) And we have made ethics synonymous with morality and managed to devalue the entire exercise. My cottoning to Peirce relates somewhat to the probability that he might agree which is why I second the sense that Peirce failed in this respect during his lifetime, while leaving a foundation for us to adapt and build on. Best, S *ShortFormContent at Blogger* http://shortformcontent.blogspot.com/ On Tue, Mar 27, 2012 at 8:14 AM, Frances Kelly frances.ke...@sympatico.cawrote: Jon and others... This overview of mine on your idea is merely a curiosity, yet it is also a thorn for me, and my overview may be off base, but let me thrash it out. There could be a difference to note in the giving or getting of the categories in regard to determinacy and dependency. (This topic was slightly dealt with in messages some months back.) The gist of the topic was that any lower category is determinant of its next higher category, and that any higher category is dependent on its next lower category. For example, objects as a second determine representamen as a first and interpretants as a third depend on their objects and representamen. The hierarchy of the normative sciences to be consistent with this take on the categories may therefore be more dependently regressive than determinately progressive as a matter of fact, in that ethics seems to be applied aesthetics and logics seems to be applied ethics. Incidentally, the sketch outlining the normative sciences built up in an architectonic way seems correct, but the higher logics would likely have the majority of inner compartments with aesthetics having only one whole compartment and ethics having just two main compartments. This approach of course implies that dependent higher categories are more say divided or detailed, although nonetheless with greater simplicity, if that is not a contradiction with the assumed complexity of determinant lower categories. -Original Message- From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On Behalf Of Jon Awbrey Sent: Tuesday, 27 March, 2012 12:48 AM To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU Subject: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos Peircers, I found the figure I used to draw to explain that pragmatic ordering of the normative sciences -- Re: The Pragmatic Cosmos At: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000879.html o-o | | |o| | / \ | | / \ | | / \ | |o---o| | /| Logic |\ | | / | | \ | | / | | \ | |o---o| | /| | Ethic | |\ | | / | | | | \ | | / | | | | \ | |o---o| | /| | Aesthetic | |\ | | / | | | | | | \ | | / | | | | | | \ | |o---o---o---o---o---o---o---o| | | o-o Figure 1. The Pragmatic Cosmos Here is the Figure that goes with this description of the Pragmatic Cosmos, or the pragmatically ordered normative sciences: Aesthetics, Ethics, and Logic. The arrangement is best viewed as a planar projection of a solid geometric configuration, as three cylinders on concentric circular bases, all subtending an overarching cone. This way of viewing the situation brings into focus the two independent or orthogonal order relations that exist among the normative sciences. In regard to their bases, logic is a special case of ethics and aesthetics, and ethics is a special case of aesthetics, understanding these concepts in their broadest senses. In respect of their altitudes, logic exercises a critical perspective on ethics and aesthetics, and ethics exercises a critical perspective on aesthetics. - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message.
Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos
Peircers, Here's another prospectus on normative inquiry that I wrote up in September 1992. Prospects For Inquiry Driven Systems 1.3.1. Logic, Ethics, Esthetics The philosophy I find myself converging to more often lately is the pragmatism of C.S. Peirce and John Dewey. According to this account, logic, ethics, and esthetics form a concentric series of normative sciences, each a subdiscipline of the next. Logic tells how one ought to conduct one's reasoning in order to achieve the stated goals of reasoning in general. Thus logic is a special application of ethics. Ethics tells how one ought to conduct one's activities in general in order to achieve the good appropriate to each enterprise. What makes the difference between a normative science and a prescriptive dogma is whether this telling is based on actual inquiry into the relationship of conduct to result, or not. In this view, logic and ethics do not set goals, they merely serve them. Of course, logic may examine the consistency of an arbitrary selection of goals in the light of what science tells about the likely repercussions in nature of trying to actualize them all. Logic and ethics may serve the criticism of certain goals by pointing out the deductive implications and probable effects of striving toward them, but it has to be some other science which finds and tells whether these effects are preferred and encouraged or detested and discouraged relative to a particular form of being. The science which examines individual goods, species goods, and generic goods from an outside perspective must be an esthetic science. The capacity for inquiry into a subject must depend on the capacity for uncertainty about that subject. Esthetics is capable of inquiry into the nature of the good precisely because it is able to be in question about what is good. Whether conceived as empirical science or as experimental art, it is the job of esthetics to determine what might be good for us. Through the exploration of artistic media we find out what satisfies our own form of being. Through the expeditions of science we discover and further the goals of own species' evolution. Outriggers to these excursions are given by the comparative study of biological species and the computational study of abstractly specified systems. These provide extra ways to find out what is the sensible goal of an individual system and what is the perceived good for a particular species of creature. It is especially interesting to learn about the relationships that can be represented internally to a system's development between the good of a system and the system's perception, knowledge, intuition, feeling, or whatever sense it may have of its goal. This amounts to asking the questions: What good can a system be able to sense for itself? How can a system discover its own best interests? How can a system achieve, from the evidence of experience, a cognizance, evidenced in behavior, of its own best interests? http://mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey/Essays/Prospects_For_Inquiry_Driven_Systems#1.3.1._Logic.2C_Ethics.2C_Esthetics Regards, Jon -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ mwb: http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey word press blog 1: http://jonawbrey.wordpress.com/ word press blog 2: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos
Leo, Jon, List, * Although there's a great deal more to be said about the relations of ethics, esthetic (Peirce's spelling for the theoretical science), and logic as semeiotic, a quick and dirty response to your comment that It's interesting that logic depends upon ethics and, in turn, aesthetics when dependence is itself a logical relation is that (as previously discussed on the list in a related context) all the sciences of discovery--that is, all the pure or theoretical sciences--preceding logic as semeiotic (logica docens) in Peirce's classification of the sciences, all these sciences quasi-necessary employ a logica utens (the ordinary logic of any normal thinking person). These sciences are, of course, theoretical mathematics, phenomenology, esthetics and ethics. Once a logica docens is developed, however, it may be employed *retrospectively*, as it were, in consideration of the sciences preceding it. * For my own part, I tend--as perhaps Jon does as well--to see esthetic/ethics/logic as semeiotic as being in genuine tricategorial relation so that they *inform* each other in interesting ways. Trichotomic vector theory, then, does not demand that one necessarily always follow the order: 1ns (esthetic), then 2ns (ethics), then 3ns (logic). One may also look at the three involutionally (logic involves ethics which, in turn, involves esthetic) or, even, according to the vector of representation (logic shows esthetic to be in that particular relation to ethics which Peirce holds them to be in). But only a very few scholars have taken up tricategorial vector relations. Indeed, R. J. Parmentier and I are the only folk I know of who have published work on possible paths of movement (vectors) through a genuine trichotomic relation which does *not* follow the Hegelian order: 1ns then 2ns then 3ns. Indeed, with a few exceptions, there appears at present to be relatively little interest in Peirce's categories generally speaking. Given the way they pervade his scientific and philosophical work, and considering how highly he valued their discovery, this has always struck me as quite odd. * Best, Gary Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York E202-O 718 482-5700 *** *** *** *** Leo 03/27/12 4:23 AM Nice. It's interesting that logic depends upon ethics and, in turn, aesthetics when dependence is itself a logical relation. Rather hard to get one's head around. On 3/26/2012 9:48 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote: Peircers, I found the figure I used to draw to explain that pragmatic ordering of the normative sciences -- Re: The Pragmatic Cosmos At: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000879.html o-o | | |o| | / \ | | / \ | | / \ | |o---o| | /| Logic |\ | | / | | \ | | / | | \ | |o---o| | /| | Ethic | |\ | | / | | | | \ | | / | | | | \ | |o---o| | /| | Aesthetic | |\ | | / | | | | | | \ | | / | | | | | | \ | |o---o---o---o---o---o---o---o| | | o-o Figure 1. The Pragmatic Cosmos Here is the Figure that goes with this description of the Pragmatic Cosmos, or the pragmatically ordered normative sciences: Aesthetics, Ethics, and Logic. The arrangement is best viewed as a planar projection of a solid geometric configuration, as three cylinders on concentric circular bases, all subtending an overarching cone. This way of viewing the situation brings into focus the two independent or orthogonal order relations that exist among the normative sciences. In regard to their bases, logic is a special case of ethics and aesthetics, and ethics is a special case of aesthetics, understanding these concepts in their broadest senses. In respect of their altitudes, logic exercises a critical perspective on ethics and aesthetics, and ethics exercises a critical perspective on aesthetics. - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line
