Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Dear Jason,

I think the basic point is that "materialist science," as Fish calls it, is not 
science at all. It both assumes the essential things of the world are 
discovered and forbids new discovery in foundations: we are limited to 
"strings" or "particles" or "probability," none of which can lead to an 
explanation of sense and how it is characterized, or "the mind." Thus 
contemporary science is plainly a dualism that leaves any right thinker with 
only one of two options when it comes to "the mind," identity theory or 
emergence theory; of which both are as good as the other since you cannot 
distinguished one from the other, and both fail to provide explanation, they 
amount to appeals to "magic." 

The absolutist view of materialist science violates the principles of good 
science, science is a "liberal physicalism," in that it is certainly founded 
upon empiricism, the observable and that which may be inferred from it, but it 
must always allow for new discovery in these observations and the suggestions 
that such observations are possible in theory.

The irony is that the discipline of physics makes such suggestions all the 
time, consider string theory for example, but this kind of scientific 
adventurism is not currently allowed in biophysics (of course, I am referring 
to the challenges presented by my own work). In fact, I'd say that metaphysical 
adventurism in contemporary physics has only served to allow contemporary 
science generally to tolerate the irrational nature of identity theory and 
emergentism, and to neglect the inquiry of great thinkers like Peirce.

With respect,
Steven


--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info







On Mar 29, 2012, at 10:44 AM, Khadimir wrote:

> Steven,
> 
> This seems to be a plausible judgment of contemporary scene, if a sparse one. 
>  If I continue with this, then might I ask exactly what constitutes being a 
> scientific dualist on your view?  I would agree that many contemporary 
> positions are prima facie crypto-dualist, if that is what you mean, a 
> hypothesis that would be verified or not in individual cases (thinkers).  
> However, when I claim that of a view and indicate why, they always reject the 
> view, and about the only widespread commonality that I've seen is a rejection 
> of scholastic realism (realism about universals) and of continuity 
> (synechism).
> 
> Best,
>Jason
> 
> 
> 
> On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 at 12:01 PM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith  
> wrote:
> Dear Cathy,
> 
> "Non-Peirceans," if you will forgive the over simplification, are in two 
> camps:
> 
>1. the religious dualist,
>2. the scientific dualist.
> 
> Often they are in both.
> 
> One does not know how to ground what Peirce calls "Thirdness" (more 
> generally, "the mind") in their conception of "God," the other does not know 
> how to ground Thirdness in their conception of Physics. In-other-words, there 
> are two dogmas working against the Peircean.
> 
> It produces precisely the problem that Stanley Fish alludes to, and that I 
> respond to (see my comment at the bottom of the page), here:
> 
>Citing Chapter and Verse: Which Scripture Is the Right One?
>
> http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/citing-chapter-and-verse-which-scripture-is-the-right-one/?comments#permid=72
> 
> This is a reference to an article that Stephen Rose gave a few days ago.
> 
> Peirce's objection to the "Russelization" of logic is relevant here, because 
> the eradication of "psychologism" placed "the mind" (esp. "Thirdness") beyond 
> the reach of 20th Century science and logic.
> 
> It has become clear to me that Charles Peirce, and his father Benjamin, did 
> indeed conceive of the mind, and in particular what Charles called 
> "Thirdness," as grounded in both a conception of "God" and a conception of 
> Physics. Now I rush to add that, despite the language of the time, this "God" 
> conception is not the usual one but one that is really "non-theistic" in the 
> modern sense, in that it is without personification and clearly not the god 
> of popular western conception.
> 
> This, in my view, is the proper way to interpret the apparent contradiction 
> in this matter when it is naively read into Benjamin Peirce's "Ideality in 
> the physical sciences" and in the writings of Charles Peirce. Their view is 
> more like that of Taoism than Judeao-Christianity (although it maintains the 
> passion of the later).
> 
> So, in presenting Peirce's view in relation to contemporary arguments it is 
> important, I think, to highlight these points and challenge the dogma. If you 
> do, then Peircean concerns and questions may become more clear to the 
> audience unfamiliar with them.
> 
> With respect,
> Steven
> 
> 
> --
>Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
>Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
>http://iase.info
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On Mar 29, 2012, at 2:08 AM, 

Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos

[Khadimir]

Ben and list,

In part it is a reflection of what I like to talk about, but they tend to
reject a variant of your fourth bullet point, especially either the direct
or indirect implications of "Four Incapacities," "Consequences of Four
Incapacities," and the continuity of inference and semiotic.  However, the
discussion never reaches that level of detail.

Instead, I ask such questions as--as I did at a conference last weekend to
a superbly inviting, mostly analytic audience--"why do you think that
conscious intentionality must begin as a conscious (noetic/attentive)
phenomenon rather than in bodily intentionality?"  In this case, the
interlocutor was treating conscious intentionality as if it were ex nihilo
and was insouciant on the point, though one does not need Peircean
continuity to answer that question.  This is the kind of "Cartesian
dualism" that I see in the wild, i.e., a species of "discontinuity."

Jason

On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 at 2:17 PM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:

> **
> I said this wrong. Changed below between pairs of asterisks. Sorry! -
> Best, Ben
>
> - Original Message -
>
> Jason, list,
>
> That's interesting. What aspects of synechism do they reject?
>
>- Continuity of space and time? Lorentz symmetries seem to make such
>continuity pretty credible.
>- Idea of espousing continuity of space and time for philosophical
>reasons instead of physics reasons?
>- Real infinitesimals?
>- Continuity of semiosis and of inference process? **Idea that
>incapacities such as that of a cognition devoid of determination by
>inference help** prove the reality of the continuous and therefore of the
>general? (Some Consequences of Four Incapacities)
>
> Or if discussions of synechism don't get into such detail, still what do
> they say is wrong with synechism?
>
> Best, Ben
>
> ----- Original Message -
> *From:* Khadimir
> *To:* PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
> *Sent:* Thursday, March 29, 2012 1:44 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos
>
> Steven,
>
> This seems to be a plausible judgment of contemporary scene, if a sparse
> one.  If I continue with this, then might I ask exactly what constitutes
> being a scientific dualist on your view?  I would agree that many
> contemporary positions are prima facie crypto-dualist, if that is what you
> mean, a hypothesis that would be verified or not in individual cases
> (thinkers).  However, when I claim that of a view and indicate why, they
> always reject the view, and about the only widespread commonality that I've
> seen is a rejection of scholastic realism (realism about universals) and of
> continuity (synechism).
>
> Best,
>Jason
>
>
>
> On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 at 12:01 PM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:
>
> Dear Cathy,
>
> "Non-Peirceans," if you will forgive the over simplification, are in two
> camps:
>
>1. the religious dualist,
>2. the scientific dualist.
>
> Often they are in both.
>
> One does not know how to ground what Peirce calls "Thirdness" (more
> generally, "the mind") in their conception of "God," the other does not
> know how to ground Thirdness in their conception of Physics.
> In-other-words, there are two dogmas working against the Peircean.
>
> It produces precisely the problem that Stanley Fish alludes to, and that I
> respond to (see my comment at the bottom of the page), here:
>
>Citing Chapter and Verse: Which Scripture Is the Right One?
>
> http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/citing-chapter-and-verse-which-scripture-is-the-right-one/?comments#permid=72
>
> This is a reference to an article that Stephen Rose gave a few days ago.
>
> Peirce's objection to the "Russelization" of logic is relevant here,
> because the eradication of "psychologism" placed "the mind" (esp.
> "Thirdness") beyond the reach of 20th Century science and logic.
>
> It has become clear to me that Charles Peirce, and his father Benjamin,
> did indeed conceive of the mind, and in particular what Charles called
> "Thirdness," as grounded in both a conception of "God" and a conception of
> Physics. Now I rush to add that, despite the language of the time, this
> "God" conception is not the usual one but one that is really "non-theistic"
> in the modern sense, in that it is without personification and clearly not
> the god of popular western conception.
>
> This, in my view, is the proper way to interpret the apparent
> contradiction in this matter when it is naively read into Benjamin Peirce's
> "Ideality in the 

Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos

[Benjamin Udell]

I said this wrong. Changed below between pairs of asterisks. Sorry! - Best, Ben

- Original Message - 

Jason, list,

That's interesting. What aspects of synechism do they reject?
  a.. Continuity of space and time? Lorentz symmetries seem to make such 
continuity pretty credible. 
  b.. Idea of espousing continuity of space and time for philosophical reasons 
instead of physics reasons? 
  c.. Real infinitesimals? 
  d.. Continuity of semiosis and of inference process? **Idea that incapacities 
such as that of a cognition devoid of determination by inference help** prove 
the reality of the continuous and therefore of the general? (Some Consequences 
of Four Incapacities)
Or if discussions of synechism don't get into such detail, still what do they 
say is wrong with synechism?

Best, Ben

- Original Message - 
From: Khadimir
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU 
Sent: Thursday, March 29, 2012 1:44 PM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos


Steven,


This seems to be a plausible judgment of contemporary scene, if a sparse one.  
If I continue with this, then might I ask exactly what constitutes being a 
scientific dualist on your view?  I would agree that many contemporary 
positions are prima facie crypto-dualist, if that is what you mean, a 
hypothesis that would be verified or not in individual cases (thinkers).  
However, when I claim that of a view and indicate why, they always reject the 
view, and about the only widespread commonality that I've seen is a rejection 
of scholastic realism (realism about universals) and of continuity (synechism). 


Best,
   Jason




On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 at 12:01 PM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:

  Dear Cathy,

  "Non-Peirceans," if you will forgive the over simplification, are in two 
camps:

 1. the religious dualist,
 2. the scientific dualist.

  Often they are in both.

  One does not know how to ground what Peirce calls "Thirdness" (more 
generally, "the mind") in their conception of "God," the other does not know 
how to ground Thirdness in their conception of Physics. In-other-words, there 
are two dogmas working against the Peircean.

  It produces precisely the problem that Stanley Fish alludes to, and that I 
respond to (see my comment at the bottom of the page), here:

 Citing Chapter and Verse: Which Scripture Is the Right One?
 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/citing-chapter-and-verse-which-scripture-is-the-right-one/?comments#permid=72

  This is a reference to an article that Stephen Rose gave a few days ago.

  Peirce's objection to the "Russelization" of logic is relevant here, because 
the eradication of "psychologism" placed "the mind" (esp. "Thirdness") beyond 
the reach of 20th Century science and logic.

  It has become clear to me that Charles Peirce, and his father Benjamin, did 
indeed conceive of the mind, and in particular what Charles called "Thirdness," 
as grounded in both a conception of "God" and a conception of Physics. Now I 
rush to add that, despite the language of the time, this "God" conception is 
not the usual one but one that is really "non-theistic" in the modern sense, in 
that it is without personification and clearly not the god of popular western 
conception.

  This, in my view, is the proper way to interpret the apparent contradiction 
in this matter when it is naively read into Benjamin Peirce's "Ideality in the 
physical sciences" and in the writings of Charles Peirce. Their view is more 
like that of Taoism than Judeao-Christianity (although it maintains the passion 
of the later).

  So, in presenting Peirce's view in relation to contemporary arguments it is 
important, I think, to highlight these points and challenge the dogma. If you 
do, then Peircean concerns and questions may become more clear to the audience 
unfamiliar with them.

  With respect,
  Steven


  --
 Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
 Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
 http://iase.info



  On Mar 29, 2012, at 2:08 AM, Catherine Legg wrote:

  > Gary R wrote:
  > *
  >>> For my own part, I tend--as perhaps Jon does as well--to see 
esthetic/ethics/logic as semeiotic as being in genuine tricategorial relation 
so that they *inform* each other in interesting ways. Trichotomic vector 
theory, then, does not demand that one necessarily always follow the order: 1ns 
(esthetic), then 2ns (ethics), then 3ns (logic). One may also look at the three 
involutionally (logic involves ethics which, in turn, involves esthetic) or, 
even, according to the vector of representation (logic shows esthetic to be in 
that particular relation to ethics which Peirce holds them to be in). But only 
a very few scholars have taken up tricategorial vector relations. Indeed, R. J. 
Parmentier and I a

Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos

[Khadimir]

Steven,

This seems to be a plausible judgment of contemporary scene, if a sparse
one.  If I continue with this, then might I ask exactly what constitutes
being a scientific dualist on your view?  I would agree that many
contemporary positions are prima facie crypto-dualist, if that is what you
mean, a hypothesis that would be verified or not in individual cases
(thinkers).  However, when I claim that of a view and indicate why, they
always reject the view, and about the only widespread commonality that I've
seen is a rejection of scholastic realism (realism about universals) and of
continuity (synechism).

Best,
   Jason



On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 at 12:01 PM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:

> Dear Cathy,
>
> "Non-Peirceans," if you will forgive the over simplification, are in two
> camps:
>
>1. the religious dualist,
>2. the scientific dualist.
>
> Often they are in both.
>
> One does not know how to ground what Peirce calls "Thirdness" (more
> generally, "the mind") in their conception of "God," the other does not
> know how to ground Thirdness in their conception of Physics.
> In-other-words, there are two dogmas working against the Peircean.
>
> It produces precisely the problem that Stanley Fish alludes to, and that I
> respond to (see my comment at the bottom of the page), here:
>
>Citing Chapter and Verse: Which Scripture Is the Right One?
>
> http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/citing-chapter-and-verse-which-scripture-is-the-right-one/?comments#permid=72
>
> This is a reference to an article that Stephen Rose gave a few days ago.
>
> Peirce's objection to the "Russelization" of logic is relevant here,
> because the eradication of "psychologism" placed "the mind" (esp.
> "Thirdness") beyond the reach of 20th Century science and logic.
>
> It has become clear to me that Charles Peirce, and his father Benjamin,
> did indeed conceive of the mind, and in particular what Charles called
> "Thirdness," as grounded in both a conception of "God" and a conception of
> Physics. Now I rush to add that, despite the language of the time, this
> "God" conception is not the usual one but one that is really "non-theistic"
> in the modern sense, in that it is without personification and clearly not
> the god of popular western conception.
>
> This, in my view, is the proper way to interpret the apparent
> contradiction in this matter when it is naively read into Benjamin Peirce's
> "Ideality in the physical sciences" and in the writings of Charles Peirce.
> Their view is more like that of Taoism than Judeao-Christianity (although
> it maintains the passion of the later).
>
> So, in presenting Peirce's view in relation to contemporary arguments it
> is important, I think, to highlight these points and challenge the dogma.
> If you do, then Peircean concerns and questions may become more clear to
> the audience unfamiliar with them.
>
> With respect,
> Steven
>
>
> --
>Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
>Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
>http://iase.info
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Mar 29, 2012, at 2:08 AM, Catherine Legg wrote:
>
> > Gary R wrote:
> > *
> >>> For my own part, I tend--as perhaps Jon does as well--to see
> > esthetic/ethics/logic as semeiotic as being in genuine tricategorial
> > relation so that they *inform* each other in interesting ways.
> Trichotomic
> > vector theory, then, does not demand that one necessarily always follow
> > the order: 1ns (esthetic), then 2ns (ethics), then 3ns (logic). One may
> > also look at the three involutionally (logic involves ethics which, in
> > turn, involves esthetic) or, even, according to the vector of
> > representation (logic shows esthetic to be in that particular relation to
> > ethics which Peirce holds them to be in). But only a very few scholars
> > have taken up tricategorial vector relations. Indeed, R. J. Parmentier
> and
> > I are the only folk I know of who have published work on possible paths
> of
> > movement (vectors) through a genuine trichotomic relation which does
> *not*
> > follow the Hegelian order: 1ns then 2ns then 3ns.
> >
> > This is very interesting, thanks Gary :-)
> >
> >>> Indeed, with a  few exceptions, there appears at present to be
> > relatively little interest in Peirce's categories generally speaking.
> > Given the way they pervade his scientific and philosophical work, and
> > considering how highly he valued their discovery, this has always struck
> > me as quite odd.
> > *
> >
> > I have found that presenting on these concepts to non-Peirceans in
> > seminars and conference papers can be very hard work. It doesn't make
> much
> > sense to people who aren't already thinking within Peirce's system.
> >
> > Cathy
> >
> >
> -
> > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the
> PEIRCE-L listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to
> lists...@listserv.iupui.edu wi

Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos

[Stephen C. Rose]

And here is the little commentary I did on the Stanley Fish piece Steven
mentions;

Fallibilism applies to both scientists and religionists
Citing Chapter and Verse: Which Scripture Is the Right One? -
NYTimes.com
:
'via Blog 
this'
When a link to a Stanley Fish column appears on the NYT home page
You take notice
Fish could have said this all a bit more economically
if he had evoked Charles Sanders Peirce
Pinker and Dawkins are exactly as Fish says
or as I say in four words -
half of a binary
Acknowledgement of fallibility all around
opens up the way to thinking in threes
*Charles Sanders Peirce - Thinking in
Threes
*
*ShortFormContent at Blogger* 



On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 at 1:01 PM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:

> Dear Cathy,
>
> "Non-Peirceans," if you will forgive the over simplification, are in two
> camps:
>
>1. the religious dualist,
>2. the scientific dualist.
>
> Often they are in both.
>
> One does not know how to ground what Peirce calls "Thirdness" (more
> generally, "the mind") in their conception of "God," the other does not
> know how to ground Thirdness in their conception of Physics.
> In-other-words, there are two dogmas working against the Peircean.
>
> It produces precisely the problem that Stanley Fish alludes to, and that I
> respond to (see my comment at the bottom of the page), here:
>
>Citing Chapter and Verse: Which Scripture Is the Right One?
>
> http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/citing-chapter-and-verse-which-scripture-is-the-right-one/?comments#permid=72
>
> This is a reference to an article that Stephen Rose gave a few days ago.
>
> Peirce's objection to the "Russelization" of logic is relevant here,
> because the eradication of "psychologism" placed "the mind" (esp.
> "Thirdness") beyond the reach of 20th Century science and logic.
>
> It has become clear to me that Charles Peirce, and his father Benjamin,
> did indeed conceive of the mind, and in particular what Charles called
> "Thirdness," as grounded in both a conception of "God" and a conception of
> Physics. Now I rush to add that, despite the language of the time, this
> "God" conception is not the usual one but one that is really "non-theistic"
> in the modern sense, in that it is without personification and clearly not
> the god of popular western conception.
>
> This, in my view, is the proper way to interpret the apparent
> contradiction in this matter when it is naively read into Benjamin Peirce's
> "Ideality in the physical sciences" and in the writings of Charles Peirce.
> Their view is more like that of Taoism than Judeao-Christianity (although
> it maintains the passion of the later).
>
> So, in presenting Peirce's view in relation to contemporary arguments it
> is important, I think, to highlight these points and challenge the dogma.
> If you do, then Peircean concerns and questions may become more clear to
> the audience unfamiliar with them.
>
> With respect,
> Steven
>
>
> --
>Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
>Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
>http://iase.info
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Mar 29, 2012, at 2:08 AM, Catherine Legg wrote:
>
> > Gary R wrote:
> > *
> >>> For my own part, I tend--as perhaps Jon does as well--to see
> > esthetic/ethics/logic as semeiotic as being in genuine tricategorial
> > relation so that they *inform* each other in interesting ways.
> Trichotomic
> > vector theory, then, does not demand that one necessarily always follow
> > the order: 1ns (esthetic), then 2ns (ethics), then 3ns (logic). One may
> > also look at the three involutionally (logic involves ethics which, in
> > turn, involves esthetic) or, even, according to the vector of
> > representation (logic shows esthetic to be in that particular relation to
> > ethics which Peirce holds them to be in). But only a very few scholars
> > have taken up tricategorial vector relations. Indeed, R. J. Parmentier
> and
> > I are the only folk I know of who have published work on possible paths
> of
> > movement (vectors) through a genuine trichotomic relation which does
> *not*
> > follow the Hegelian order: 1ns then 2ns then 3ns.
> >
> > This is very interesting, thanks Gary :-)
> >
> >>> Indeed, with a  few exceptions, there appears at present to be
> > relatively little interest in Peirce's categories generally speaking.
> > Given the way they pervade his scientific and philosophical work, and
> > considering how highly he valued their discovery, this has always struck
> > me as quite odd.
> > *
> >
> > I have found that presenting on these concepts to non-Peirceans in
> > seminars and conference papers can be very hard work. It doesn't make
> much
> > sense to p

Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Dear Cathy,

"Non-Peirceans," if you will forgive the over simplification, are in two camps: 

1. the religious dualist, 
2. the scientific dualist. 

Often they are in both. 

One does not know how to ground what Peirce calls "Thirdness" (more generally, 
"the mind") in their conception of "God," the other does not know how to ground 
Thirdness in their conception of Physics. In-other-words, there are two dogmas 
working against the Peircean. 

It produces precisely the problem that Stanley Fish alludes to, and that I 
respond to (see my comment at the bottom of the page), here: 

Citing Chapter and Verse: Which Scripture Is the Right One?

http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/citing-chapter-and-verse-which-scripture-is-the-right-one/?comments#permid=72

This is a reference to an article that Stephen Rose gave a few days ago.

Peirce's objection to the "Russelization" of logic is relevant here, because 
the eradication of "psychologism" placed "the mind" (esp. "Thirdness") beyond 
the reach of 20th Century science and logic.

It has become clear to me that Charles Peirce, and his father Benjamin, did 
indeed conceive of the mind, and in particular what Charles called "Thirdness," 
as grounded in both a conception of "God" and a conception of Physics. Now I 
rush to add that, despite the language of the time, this "God" conception is 
not the usual one but one that is really "non-theistic" in the modern sense, in 
that it is without personification and clearly not the god of popular western 
conception. 

This, in my view, is the proper way to interpret the apparent contradiction in 
this matter when it is naively read into Benjamin Peirce's "Ideality in the 
physical sciences" and in the writings of Charles Peirce. Their view is more 
like that of Taoism than Judeao-Christianity (although it maintains the passion 
of the later).

So, in presenting Peirce's view in relation to contemporary arguments it is 
important, I think, to highlight these points and challenge the dogma. If you 
do, then Peircean concerns and questions may become more clear to the audience 
unfamiliar with them.

With respect,
Steven


--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info







On Mar 29, 2012, at 2:08 AM, Catherine Legg wrote:

> Gary R wrote:
> *
>>> For my own part, I tend--as perhaps Jon does as well--to see
> esthetic/ethics/logic as semeiotic as being in genuine tricategorial
> relation so that they *inform* each other in interesting ways. Trichotomic
> vector theory, then, does not demand that one necessarily always follow
> the order: 1ns (esthetic), then 2ns (ethics), then 3ns (logic). One may
> also look at the three involutionally (logic involves ethics which, in
> turn, involves esthetic) or, even, according to the vector of
> representation (logic shows esthetic to be in that particular relation to
> ethics which Peirce holds them to be in). But only a very few scholars
> have taken up tricategorial vector relations. Indeed, R. J. Parmentier and
> I are the only folk I know of who have published work on possible paths of
> movement (vectors) through a genuine trichotomic relation which does *not*
> follow the Hegelian order: 1ns then 2ns then 3ns.
> 
> This is very interesting, thanks Gary :-)
> 
>>> Indeed, with a  few exceptions, there appears at present to be
> relatively little interest in Peirce's categories generally speaking.
> Given the way they pervade his scientific and philosophical work, and
> considering how highly he valued their discovery, this has always struck
> me as quite odd.
> *
> 
> I have found that presenting on these concepts to non-Peirceans in
> seminars and conference papers can be very hard work. It doesn't make much
> sense to people who aren't already thinking within Peirce's system.
> 
> Cathy
> 
> -
> You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
> listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
> lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of 
> the message.  To post a message to the list, send it to 
> PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU

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Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos

[Stephen C. Rose]

When I say I like Peirce I mean

1. I was drawn to him because of similarities between what I took to be his
life and mine.

2. I was led by him with some help from Feibleman to a massive
clarification in my own thinking - to Peirce as one who integrates
idealism, realism and pragmaticism.

3. I do not think categories are as primary as others might. I do think the
notion of threes as a way of thinking is not merely a reason for liking
Peirce but also a reason for articulating this as a means of countering the
binary meltdown of our culture, among other things.

*ShortFormContent at Blogger* 



On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 at 9:32 AM, Khadimir  wrote:

> I can confirm that last bit about the difficulty of explaining these
> concepts, though I do so as a Deweyan always wondering exactly how did he
> borrow and deviate from Peirce's concepts.  I do hear a number of people
> say that they "like Peirce," but it is never clear to what they are
> referring.  That might be due to my ignorance of the received view of
> Peirce.  Perhaps someone could enlighten me?
>
> Jason
>
>
> On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 at 4:08 AM, Catherine Legg wrote:
>
>> Gary R wrote:
>> *
>> >>For my own part, I tend--as perhaps Jon does as well--to see
>> esthetic/ethics/logic as semeiotic as being in genuine tricategorial
>> relation so that they *inform* each other in interesting ways. Trichotomic
>> vector theory, then, does not demand that one necessarily always follow
>> the order: 1ns (esthetic), then 2ns (ethics), then 3ns (logic). One may
>> also look at the three involutionally (logic involves ethics which, in
>> turn, involves esthetic) or, even, according to the vector of
>> representation (logic shows esthetic to be in that particular relation to
>> ethics which Peirce holds them to be in). But only a very few scholars
>> have taken up tricategorial vector relations. Indeed, R. J. Parmentier and
>> I are the only folk I know of who have published work on possible paths of
>> movement (vectors) through a genuine trichotomic relation which does *not*
>> follow the Hegelian order: 1ns then 2ns then 3ns.
>>
>> This is very interesting, thanks Gary :-)
>>
>> >>Indeed, with a  few exceptions, there appears at present to be
>> relatively little interest in Peirce's categories generally speaking.
>> Given the way they pervade his scientific and philosophical work, and
>> considering how highly he valued their discovery, this has always struck
>> me as quite odd.
>> *
>>
>> I have found that presenting on these concepts to non-Peirceans in
>> seminars and conference papers can be very hard work. It doesn't make much
>> sense to people who aren't already thinking within Peirce's system.
>>
>> Cathy
>>
>>
>> -
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>> listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to
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>>
>
>
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Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos

[Khadimir]

I can confirm that last bit about the difficulty of explaining these
concepts, though I do so as a Deweyan always wondering exactly how did he
borrow and deviate from Peirce's concepts.  I do hear a number of people
say that they "like Peirce," but it is never clear to what they are
referring.  That might be due to my ignorance of the received view of
Peirce.  Perhaps someone could enlighten me?

Jason

On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 at 4:08 AM, Catherine Legg  wrote:

> Gary R wrote:
> *
> >>For my own part, I tend--as perhaps Jon does as well--to see
> esthetic/ethics/logic as semeiotic as being in genuine tricategorial
> relation so that they *inform* each other in interesting ways. Trichotomic
> vector theory, then, does not demand that one necessarily always follow
> the order: 1ns (esthetic), then 2ns (ethics), then 3ns (logic). One may
> also look at the three involutionally (logic involves ethics which, in
> turn, involves esthetic) or, even, according to the vector of
> representation (logic shows esthetic to be in that particular relation to
> ethics which Peirce holds them to be in). But only a very few scholars
> have taken up tricategorial vector relations. Indeed, R. J. Parmentier and
> I are the only folk I know of who have published work on possible paths of
> movement (vectors) through a genuine trichotomic relation which does *not*
> follow the Hegelian order: 1ns then 2ns then 3ns.
>
> This is very interesting, thanks Gary :-)
>
> >>Indeed, with a  few exceptions, there appears at present to be
> relatively little interest in Peirce's categories generally speaking.
> Given the way they pervade his scientific and philosophical work, and
> considering how highly he valued their discovery, this has always struck
> me as quite odd.
> *
>
> I have found that presenting on these concepts to non-Peirceans in
> seminars and conference papers can be very hard work. It doesn't make much
> sense to people who aren't already thinking within Peirce's system.
>
> Cathy
>
>
> -
> You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L
> listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to
> lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body
> of the message.  To post a message to the list, send it to
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Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos

[Catherine Legg]

Gary R wrote:
*
>>For my own part, I tend--as perhaps Jon does as well--to see
esthetic/ethics/logic as semeiotic as being in genuine tricategorial
relation so that they *inform* each other in interesting ways. Trichotomic
vector theory, then, does not demand that one necessarily always follow
the order: 1ns (esthetic), then 2ns (ethics), then 3ns (logic). One may
also look at the three involutionally (logic involves ethics which, in
turn, involves esthetic) or, even, according to the vector of
representation (logic shows esthetic to be in that particular relation to
ethics which Peirce holds them to be in). But only a very few scholars
have taken up tricategorial vector relations. Indeed, R. J. Parmentier and
I are the only folk I know of who have published work on possible paths of
movement (vectors) through a genuine trichotomic relation which does *not*
follow the Hegelian order: 1ns then 2ns then 3ns.

This is very interesting, thanks Gary :-)

>>Indeed, with a  few exceptions, there appears at present to be
relatively little interest in Peirce's categories generally speaking.
Given the way they pervade his scientific and philosophical work, and
considering how highly he valued their discovery, this has always struck
me as quite odd.
*

I have found that presenting on these concepts to non-Peirceans in
seminars and conference papers can be very hard work. It doesn't make much
sense to people who aren't already thinking within Peirce's system.

Cathy

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Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos

[Gary Richmond]

Leo, Jon, List,
*

Although there's a great deal more to be said about the relations of ethics, 
esthetic (Peirce's spelling for the theoretical science), and logic as 
semeiotic, a quick and dirty response to your comment that "It's interesting 
that logic depends upon ethics and, in turn, aesthetics  when dependence is 
itself a logical relation" is that (as previously discussed on the list in a 
related context) all the sciences of discovery--that is, all the pure or 
theoretical sciences--preceding logic as semeiotic (logica docens) in Peirce's 
classification of the sciences, all these sciences quasi-necessary employ a 
logica utens (the ordinary logic of any normal thinking person). These sciences 
are, of course, theoretical mathematics, phenomenology, esthetics and ethics. 
Once a logica docens is developed, however, it may be employed 
*retrospectively*, as it were, in consideration of the sciences preceding it.
*
For my own part, I tend--as perhaps Jon does as well--to see 
esthetic/ethics/logic as semeiotic as being in genuine tricategorial relation 
so that they *inform* each other in interesting ways. Trichotomic vector 
theory, then, does not demand that one necessarily always follow the order: 1ns 
(esthetic), then 2ns (ethics), then 3ns (logic). One may also look at the three 
involutionally (logic involves ethics which, in turn, involves esthetic) or, 
even, according to the vector of representation (logic shows esthetic to be in 
that particular relation to ethics which Peirce holds them to be in). But only 
a very few scholars have taken up tricategorial vector relations. Indeed, R. J. 
Parmentier and I are the only folk I know of who have published work on 
possible paths of movement (vectors) through a genuine trichotomic relation 
which does *not* follow the Hegelian order: 1ns then 2ns then 3ns. Indeed, with 
a  few exceptions, there appears at present to be relatively little interest in 
Peirce's categories generally speaking. Given the way they pervade his 
scientific and philosophical work, and considering how highly he valued their 
discovery, this has always struck me as quite odd.
*
Best, Gary

Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
E202-O
718 482-5700

*** *** *** ***
>>> Leo  03/27/12 4:23 AM >>>
Nice.
It's interesting that logic depends upon ethics and, in turn, aesthetics 
when dependence is itself a logical relation.
Rather hard to get one's head around.




On 3/26/2012 9:48 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
> Peircers,
>
> I found the figure I used to draw to explain that
> "pragmatic ordering of the normative sciences" --
>
> Re: The Pragmatic Cosmos
> At: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000879.html
>
> o-o
> | |
> |o|
> |   / \   |
> |  /   \  |
> | / \ |
> |o---o|
> |   /| Logic |\   |
> |  / |   | \  |
> | /  |   |  \ |
> |o---o|
> |   /|   | Ethic |   |\   |
> |  / |   |   |   | \  |
> | /  |   |   |   |  \ |
> |o---o|
> |   /|   |   Aesthetic   |   |\   |
> |  / |   |   |   |   |   | \  |
> | /  |   |   |   |   |   |  \ |
> |o---o---o---o---o---o---o---o|
> | |
> o-o
> Figure 1.  The Pragmatic Cosmos
>
> Here is the Figure that goes with this description of the Pragmatic 
> Cosmos,
> or the pragmatically ordered normative sciences:  Aesthetics, Ethics, and
> Logic.  The arrangement is best viewed as a planar projection of a solid
> geometric configuration, as three cylinders on concentric circular bases,
> all subtending an overarching cone.  This way of viewing the situation
> brings into focus the two independent or orthogonal order relations
> that exist among the normative sciences.  In regard to their bases,
> logic is a special case of ethics and aesthetics, and ethics is
> a special case of aesthetics, understanding these concepts in
> their broadest senses.  In respect of their altitudes, logic
> exercises a critical perspective on ethics and aesthetics,
> and ethics exercises a critical perspective on aesthetics.
>

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Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos

[Jon Awbrey]

Peircers,

Here's another prospectus on normative inquiry that I wrote up in September 
1992.

Prospects For Inquiry Driven Systems

1.3.1. Logic, Ethics, Esthetics

The philosophy I find myself converging to more often lately is the pragmatism of C.S. Peirce and John Dewey. According 
to this account, logic, ethics, and esthetics form a concentric series of normative sciences, each a subdiscipline of 
the next. Logic tells how one ought to conduct one's reasoning in order to achieve the stated goals of reasoning in 
general. Thus logic is a special application of ethics. Ethics tells how one ought to conduct one's activities in 
general in order to achieve the good appropriate to each enterprise. What makes the difference between a normative 
science and a prescriptive dogma is whether this "telling" is based on actual inquiry into the relationship of conduct 
to result, or not.


In this view, logic and ethics do not set goals, they merely serve them. Of course, logic may examine the consistency of 
an arbitrary selection of goals in the light of what science tells about the likely repercussions in nature of trying to 
actualize them all. Logic and ethics may serve the criticism of certain goals by pointing out the deductive implications 
and probable effects of striving toward them, but it has to be some other science which finds and tells whether these 
effects are preferred and encouraged or detested and discouraged relative to a particular form of being.


The science which examines individual goods, species goods, and generic goods from an outside perspective must be an 
esthetic science. The capacity for inquiry into a subject must depend on the capacity for uncertainty about that 
subject. Esthetics is capable of inquiry into the nature of the good precisely because it is able to be in question 
about what is good. Whether conceived as empirical science or as experimental art, it is the job of esthetics to 
determine what might be good for us. Through the exploration of artistic media we find out what satisfies our own form 
of being. Through the expeditions of science we discover and further the goals of own species' evolution.


Outriggers to these excursions are given by the comparative study of biological species and the computational study of 
abstractly specified systems. These provide extra ways to find out what is the sensible goal of an individual system and 
what is the perceived good for a particular species of creature. It is especially interesting to learn about the 
relationships that can be represented internally to a system's development between the good of a system and the system's 
perception, knowledge, intuition, feeling, or whatever sense it may have of its goal. This amounts to asking the 
questions: What good can a system be able to sense for itself? How can a system discover its own best interests? How can 
a system achieve, from the evidence of experience, a cognizance, evidenced in behavior, of its own best interests?


http://mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey/Essays/Prospects_For_Inquiry_Driven_Systems#1.3.1._Logic.2C_Ethics.2C_Esthetics

Regards,

Jon

--

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word press blog 2: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/

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Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos

[Jon Awbrey]

Re: Frances Kelly
At: http://article.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8051

Frances,

I hadn't been expecting to untangle their complex inter-relationships and
mutual dependencies in a single fixed hierarchy -- something more like the
Vortices of Yeats comes to mind even at a first glance, except it would take
a trio of tornadoes in this case -- and things that are ordered one way under
one light may be ordered another way under another light.  The problem that
Peirce gives us is how to understand the way in which logic might be seen
as a special case of ethics and ethics might be seen as a special case of
aesthetics, all without denying the obvious applications of each form of
inquiry to all the others.

Here's another bunch of bits I emitted on this subject:

• 
http://mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey/Papers/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_:_Part_5#5.2.10._The_Pragmatic_Cosmos

I apologize for the style of writing in that material --
those are things I wrote 1 or 2 decades ago and it will
take 2 or 3 passes before I can extract the substance in
any tolerable form.

Regards,

Jon

--

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Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos

[Stephen C. Rose]

I am waiting for the day when values replaces ethics as a base term for
discussing morality and, if a hierarchy is pertinent, when ontological
values would be right up there wherever thought (musement) begins. I think
we have confused virtues and characteristics with values from the gitgo.
(See the Bard on honor.) And we have made ethics synonymous with morality
and managed to devalue the entire exercise. My cottoning to Peirce relates
somewhat to the probability that he might agree which is why I second the
sense that Peirce failed in this respect during his lifetime,  while
leaving a foundation for us to adapt and build on. Best, S

*ShortFormContent at Blogger* 



On Tue, Mar 27, 2012 at 8:14 AM, Frances Kelly
wrote:

> Jon and others...
> This overview of mine on your idea is merely a curiosity, yet it
> is also a thorn for me, and my overview may be off base, but let
> me thrash it out.
>
> There could be a difference to note in the giving or getting of
> the categories in regard to determinacy and dependency. (This
> topic was slightly dealt with in messages some months back.) The
> gist of the topic was that any lower category is determinant of
> its next higher category, and that any higher category is
> dependent on its next lower category. For example, objects as a
> second determine representamen as a first and interpretants as a
> third depend on their objects and representamen.
>
> The hierarchy of the normative sciences to be consistent with
> this take on the categories may therefore be more dependently
> regressive than determinately progressive as a matter of fact, in
> that ethics seems to be applied aesthetics and logics seems to be
> applied ethics.
>
> Incidentally, the sketch outlining the normative sciences built
> up in an architectonic way seems correct, but the higher logics
> would likely have the majority of inner compartments with
> aesthetics having only one whole compartment and ethics having
> just two main compartments. This approach of course implies that
> dependent higher categories are more say divided or detailed,
> although nonetheless with greater simplicity, if that is not a
> contradiction with the assumed complexity of determinant lower
> categories.
>
>
> -Original Message-
> From: C S Peirce discussion list
> [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On Behalf Of Jon Awbrey
> Sent: Tuesday, 27 March, 2012 12:48 AM
> To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
> Subject: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos
>
> Peircers,
>
> I found the figure I used to draw to explain that "pragmatic
> ordering of the normative sciences" --
>
> Re: The Pragmatic Cosmos
> At: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000879.html
>
> o-o
> | |
> |o|
> |   / \   |
> |  /   \  |
> | / \ |
> |o---o|
> |   /| Logic |\   |
> |  / |   | \  |
> | /  |   |  \ |
> |o---o|
> |   /|   | Ethic |   |\   |
> |  / |   |   |   | \  |
> | /  |   |   |   |  \ |
> |o---o|
> |   /|   |   Aesthetic   |   |\   |
> |  / |   |   |   |   |   | \  |
> | /  |   |   |   |   |   |  \ |
> |o---o---o---o---o---o---o---o|
> | |
> o-o
> Figure 1.  The Pragmatic Cosmos
>
> Here is the Figure that goes with this description of the
> Pragmatic Cosmos, or the pragmatically ordered normative
> sciences:  Aesthetics, Ethics, and Logic.  The arrangement is
> best viewed as a planar projection of a solid geometric
> configuration, as three cylinders on concentric circular bases,
> all subtending an overarching cone.  This way of viewing the
> situation brings into focus the two independent or orthogonal
> order relations that exist among the normative sciences.  In
> regard to their bases, logic is a special case of ethics and
> aesthetics, and ethics is a special case of aesthetics,
> understanding these concepts in their broadest senses.  In
> respect of their altitudes, logic exercises a critical
> perspective on ethics and aesthetics, and ethics exercises a
> critical perspective on aesthetics.
>
>
> -
> You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L
> listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to
> lists...@listserv.iup

Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos

[Frances Kelly]

Jon and others... 
This overview of mine on your idea is merely a curiosity, yet it
is also a thorn for me, and my overview may be off base, but let
me thrash it out. 

There could be a difference to note in the giving or getting of
the categories in regard to determinacy and dependency. (This
topic was slightly dealt with in messages some months back.) The
gist of the topic was that any lower category is determinant of
its next higher category, and that any higher category is
dependent on its next lower category. For example, objects as a
second determine representamen as a first and interpretants as a
third depend on their objects and representamen. 

The hierarchy of the normative sciences to be consistent with
this take on the categories may therefore be more dependently
regressive than determinately progressive as a matter of fact, in
that ethics seems to be applied aesthetics and logics seems to be
applied ethics. 

Incidentally, the sketch outlining the normative sciences built
up in an architectonic way seems correct, but the higher logics
would likely have the majority of inner compartments with
aesthetics having only one whole compartment and ethics having
just two main compartments. This approach of course implies that
dependent higher categories are more say divided or detailed,
although nonetheless with greater simplicity, if that is not a
contradiction with the assumed complexity of determinant lower
categories. 


-Original Message-
From: C S Peirce discussion list
[mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On Behalf Of Jon Awbrey
Sent: Tuesday, 27 March, 2012 12:48 AM
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Subject: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos

Peircers,

I found the figure I used to draw to explain that "pragmatic
ordering of the normative sciences" --

Re: The Pragmatic Cosmos
At: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000879.html

o-o
| |
|o|
|   / \   |
|  /   \  |
| / \ |
|o---o|
|   /| Logic |\   |
|  / |   | \  |
| /  |   |  \ |
|o---o|
|   /|   | Ethic |   |\   |
|  / |   |   |   | \  |
| /  |   |   |   |  \ |
|o---o|
|   /|   |   Aesthetic   |   |\   |
|  / |   |   |   |   |   | \  |
| /  |   |   |   |   |   |  \ |
|o---o---o---o---o---o---o---o|
| |
o-o
Figure 1.  The Pragmatic Cosmos

Here is the Figure that goes with this description of the
Pragmatic Cosmos, or the pragmatically ordered normative
sciences:  Aesthetics, Ethics, and Logic.  The arrangement is
best viewed as a planar projection of a solid geometric
configuration, as three cylinders on concentric circular bases,
all subtending an overarching cone.  This way of viewing the
situation brings into focus the two independent or orthogonal
order relations that exist among the normative sciences.  In
regard to their bases, logic is a special case of ethics and
aesthetics, and ethics is a special case of aesthetics,
understanding these concepts in their broadest senses.  In
respect of their altitudes, logic exercises a critical
perspective on ethics and aesthetics, and ethics exercises a
critical perspective on aesthetics.

-
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Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos

[Leo]

Nice.
It's interesting that logic depends upon ethics and, in turn, aesthetics 
when dependence is itself a logical relation.

Rather hard to get one's head around.




On 3/26/2012 9:48 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:

Peircers,

I found the figure I used to draw to explain that
"pragmatic ordering of the normative sciences" --

Re: The Pragmatic Cosmos
At: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000879.html

o-o
| |
|o|
|   / \   |
|  /   \  |
| / \ |
|o---o|
|   /| Logic |\   |
|  / |   | \  |
| /  |   |  \ |
|o---o|
|   /|   | Ethic |   |\   |
|  / |   |   |   | \  |
| /  |   |   |   |  \ |
|o---o|
|   /|   |   Aesthetic   |   |\   |
|  / |   |   |   |   |   | \  |
| /  |   |   |   |   |   |  \ |
|o---o---o---o---o---o---o---o|
| |
o-o
Figure 1.  The Pragmatic Cosmos

Here is the Figure that goes with this description of the Pragmatic 
Cosmos,

or the pragmatically ordered normative sciences:  Aesthetics, Ethics, and
Logic.  The arrangement is best viewed as a planar projection of a solid
geometric configuration, as three cylinders on concentric circular bases,
all subtending an overarching cone.  This way of viewing the situation
brings into focus the two independent or orthogonal order relations
that exist among the normative sciences.  In regard to their bases,
logic is a special case of ethics and aesthetics, and ethics is
a special case of aesthetics, understanding these concepts in
their broadest senses.  In respect of their altitudes, logic
exercises a critical perspective on ethics and aesthetics,
and ethics exercises a critical perspective on aesthetics.



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