Re: Daniel Yergin & pal on the grid

[Bill Burgess]

An article by Andrew Goetz in The Journal of Transport Geography, March
2002 does a pretty convincing job on US airline deregulation. Among other
things, he notes that because of the economics of hub and spoke
routing/scheduing, one airline has come to more or less monopolize  each
regional hub, creating a local monopoly, higher prices. Another issue is
perhaps more danger due to the congestion of waves of flights in and out
timed to enable tighter connections.
Journal of Transport Geography
Volume 10, Issue 1, March 2002, Pages 1-19
112ed3.jpg
Deregulation, competition, and antitrust implications in the US airline
industry
Andrew R. Goetz112f41.jpg, 112f55.jpg

Department of Geography and Intermodal Transportation Institute, University
of Denver, 2050 E. Iliff Ave., Denver, CO 80208, USA
Abstract:
Current problems in the US airline industry such as increasing industry
consolidation, fortress hub dominance, predatory behavior, and high fare
"pockets of pain" have their roots in the flaws of the theories that
supported airline deregulation in 1978. Contrary to pre-deregulation
expectations, the industry is characterized by large economies of scale,
large barriers to entry, and a lack of contestability in airline markets.
These inexorable economic forces are producing increased levels of monopoly
and oligopoly control over city-pair markets resulting in a larger share of
travelers paying higher fares. Additional mergers and acquisitions will
exacerbate the problem. As these trends continue, the US Congress and the
US Departments of Transportation and Justice will be under increasing
pressure to take serious corrective actions.
At 11:51 AM 19/08/2003 -0400, you wrote:
Speaking of which, anybody know of a good relatively recent article from a
progressive perspective about how airline deregulation fared?  I've seen a
couple of moderates in the last few days who have said, hey deregulation
isn't all that bad look at the airlines.  My impression is that in the
airline industry, prices are down for lucky people like myself who live in
DC but not for people who live in my hometown, Syracuse New York, and that
travel biplane is a lot more painful than it used to be -- nothing seems
to run on time, even when you take into account the new security.  But
that's only my impression, and I'd be curious what the data say.
Thanks,
Anders
> It's as with airline deregulation, when some airlines cut back on
maintenance (e.g.?, Alaska Airlines).
Jim
<><><>

Re: US Manufacturing

[Bill Burgess]

A point and some questions about the issue of US manufacturing:

Since productivity gains in manufacturing are greater than in most other
sectors, the relative dollar value of manufacturing output and its share of
GDP inevitably decline. To get a more balanced picture of the status of
manufacturing I think we should also look at the trends in _physical_
output (despite the difficulty in measuring this, given quality changes,
etc; think of computers). I was following this a couple of years ago and
was struck by the growing gap in the trends of dollar output and physical
output (the Federal Reserve published a series on physical output by sector
and somehow aggregated it into an index for all industrial sectors).
can anyone cite the most recent trends in physical production? I'm guessing
they provide a rather different image than that of
US-manufacturing-is-a-sunset-sector-and-now-its-the-new-economy-that-really-matters.
The other angle on this is to stay with dollar value data but look at
industrial output divided by _stage of production_, i.e., crude materials
vs. final products. Again, when I looked at this a couple of years ago I
was struck how the value of materials production within the US was rising
faster than the value of final products. Since I assume that the US is not
a big exporter of crude materials, it seemed to me this also indicated that
'real' output of final products was rising more than their dollar value
suggests (also, from another angle, how circulating constant capital is
probably rising faster than fixed constant capital). I just clicked on the
Federal Reserve series on output by stage of production
(see  http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/G17/ip_notes.htm ), and
without studying it too carefully it seemed this trend has continued into 2002.
Can anyone cite recent data on either trend (physical production and stage
of production), or do you have any thoughts on their significance for the
'future of manufacturing'? Although I realize that the comparative trends
with other countries are also important, is it not true that in 'real'
terms, US domestic manufacturing is bigger than ever (of course, not as big
as capacity, especially as the depression bites)? For example, if trade
barriers went up, doesn't the US still retain the capacity to be
_relatively_ self-sufficient in most manufactured goods (compared to other
advanced capitalist economies)? When the new economy bubble really bursts
and the relative prices of 'real' goods rise? won't there still be a very
large base for this increase in 'value'?
Bill Burgess



At 04:34 PM 15/08/2003 -0700, you wrote:
I have a question about the U.S. economy and a comment to make about
FDI to the third world.
We all know the U.S. is running a huge and growing trade deficit.
Moreover, the manufacturing sector has lost jobs for some thirty-five
consecutive months.  That is pretty amazing.  My question: are these
developments tied and can we confidently say that the U.S. industrial
sector has been hollowed out?  In other words has the job loss been
largely the result of the continually increasing import of manufactured
goods, many of which are produced by U.S. firms in other countries?
And has this development gone long enough that there has been
significant structural damage to U.S. manufacturing such that it is
unlikely that anything, including a falling dollar, will promote its
renewal?  Or is it just productivity that is causing this job loss or
is it ...?
I would really like to know what people think about this.

As to on FDI, I cannot remember who the person was, but in response to
someone I had mentioned that FDI is becoming more and more
concentrated.  That person had argued the opposite and asked for some
supporting information for my position.  I just came across something
relevant from the World Investment Report 2002.  On page 9 the report
says:
"In spite of the substantial liberalizing measures of the past decade,
developing countries still attract less than a third of world FDI
flows, and these flows remain highly concentrated.  In 2001, the five
largest host countries in the developing world received 62 percent of
total inflows and the 10 largest received three-quarters.  The level of
concentration of FDI in developing countries has in fact risen in
recent years."
On page 11 there is a chart that shows the share of the top 5, 10, and
30 host developing countries.  The increased share of FDI flows going
to each of these groups shows a marked gain beginning in 1996.
Marty Hart-Landsberg

Re: +

[Bill Burgess]

Apologies for mistakenly sending a message to Pen-L, but the result was 
making making contact with others doing courses on Marx, so I don't feel so 
bad.

Bill

[no subject]

[Bill Burgess]

Hey Tom

I'm teaching Mike Lebowitz's old Marxist economics course at SFU this 
semester. Any chance you would enjoy coming to talk to 40 economics 
students about the world-historic issue of shorter work time on a Tuesday 
or Thursday between 1.30 and 3.30? I can't really offer any benefit other 
than as much beer as you can drink in one sitting and vague notions of karma.

Bill

Havana conference CORRECTION

[Bill Burgess]

Apologies, important sections were somehow excluded from the text that was 
previously forwarded:


International Conference  The work of Karl Marx and challenges for the 
XXI Century - Second Call for Papers


The Institute of Philosophy of the Ministry of Science, Technology and 
Environment of Cuba is organizing the International Conference on “The 
work of Karl Marx and challenges for the XXI Century “ which will take 
place  in Havana,  Cuba, from May 5 to May 8, 2003 at the Conference 
Rooms of the Cuban Workers’ Labour Union (Central de Trabajadores de Cuba).

This important event has the auspices of:

Cuban Association to the United Nations
The National Association of Economists and Accountants of Cuba, ANEC
The Cuban Workers Labour Union/Central de Trabajadores de Cuba
Ministry of Economy and Planning  The Juan F. Noyal Centre for Economic 
Studies and Planning
The Council for Social Sciences of the Ministry of Science, Technology 
and Environment  CITMA
The Directorate for Marxism and Leninism  Ministry of Higher Education
Faculty of Philosophy and History  University of Havana
Higher Institute of Art ISA of the Ministry of Culture
Cuban Society for Philosophic Enquiry
Economic Society of Friends of the Country
Popular University of the Mothers of the Plaza of May, Argentina

Objectives of the Event:

Next year will mark 120 years since Karl Marx's death.  Marx's heritage, 
as Frederick Engels pointed out, has been an invaluable 'guide to 
action' for all those who share his goal of a society permitting the 
full development of human potential, a society that goes beyond 
capitalism. As we know, though, Marx's work was always rooted in the 
real movements of society. To be consistent with that work and to be 
faithful to its goals, we need to understand the experiences of those 
120 years both in relation to changes in capitalism and also in the 
attempts to create a humane alternative to capitalism, a socialist society
We think this is an important time to look at Marx's ideas and to see 
how they can help us not only to understand the world but also to change 
it. We see the need to develop progressive thought for the beginning of 
the XXI century and the necessary link to revolutionary practice without 
which there can be no change. In this way, we want to honour Marx, who 
dedicated his life (both in his theory and also his practice) to the 
development of a society of free and fully developed men and women, a 
socialist society.
Since socialism for Cuba has always been internationalist and has always 
been marked by international solidarity, we invite scholars and 
activists from around the world who share Marx's commitment to join us 
at this conference
We call for proposals around two main themes:

-The limits and contradictions within contemporary capitalism and the 
new forms of revolutionary struggle.
-The limits and contradictions within socialist experience at the end of 
the 20th Century: elements of improvements within the emmancipatory paradigm.


From these two main themes we hope that participants will develop their 
presentations along the following sub-themes:
·   Communist Revolution and Human Emancipation: the subject of 
revolution in the new world order



·   Workers and the trade union movement in the contemporary world
·   State and Economy in the current world
·   Under-development and Capitalism
·   Globalization and sustainable human development
·   Latin America: the FTAA and the USA
·   Property and social development

PROPOSALS ARE INVITED

Those wishing to participate in the conference should contact the 
Co-ordinator of the Scientific Committee, Dr. Jesus Pastor Garcia Brigos 
(see below  paper submission guidelines prior to the 31st of January 2003.

Our fee schedule is as follows: professional category US$80.00, 
companions of professionals US$60.00 and students US$50.00.

The goal of the organizers during the Dias of the conference is to 
achieve the closest and richest dialogue and discussions possible, and 
that resulting from these interchanges we can continue strengthening the 
necessary formative praxis   for human progress.

Paper submission guidelines:
·   : Papers should be sent to the Co-ordinator of the Scientific 
Committee: Dr. Jesus Pastor Garcia Brigos by e-mail: 
[EMAIL PROTECTED] or 3.5 disk



·   An abstract of the paper, maximum one page in length
·   Papers may be submitted in English or Spanish
·   Paper length maximum 30 pages (Windows 95 or later versions, New 
Times Roman font 12. double spaced, paper size 8-1/2 x 11, side margins 
2 centimetres, top and bottom margins 4 centimetres

Authors of papers that are selected for presentation will be notified by 
March 31st 2003.

It is expected that all papers that are presented will be circulated in 
advance via electronic mail among all participants to facilitate their 
study and thus have a better preparation prior to their debate and 
presentati

Havana Conference announcement

[Bill Burgess]

Forwarded on behalf of Mike Lebowitz [the attachment is reproduced
below]:
>Dear Friends and Comrades,
> Attached (this time it should open!) is an announcement of a 
> conference next May in Havana which I have been helping to organise.
The 
> theme, "Karl Marx and the Challenges of the 21st Century,"
is one that 
> should interest listmembers, and the hope is to have papers
distributed 
> in advance and a series of continuing panels ('commissions') which

> maximise discussion among participants.
> 
Among those who have already indicated their intention to present 
> papers are Greg Albo, Robert Albritton, Samir Amin, Patrick Bond,
Werner 
> Bonefeld, Paul Burkett, Alexander Buzgalin, Al Campbell, Paresh

> Chattopadhyay, Simon Clarke, Han Deqiang, Heinz Dieterich, Elizabeth

> Dore, Gerard Dumenil, Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, Helio Gallardo, Marta

> Harnecker, Martin Hart-Landsberg, Remy Herrara, John Holloway,
Francois 
> Houtard, David Kotz, Georges Labica, Michael Lebowitz, Hein Marais,

> Terrance McDonough, Istvan Meszaros, Dimitri Milonakis, Simon Mohun,
Fred 
> Moseley, Trevor Ngwane, Leo Panitch, James Petras, Robert Pollin,
Richard 
> Westra and Brigitte Young.
>
 If you are interested in presenting, unfortunately there is a 

> relatively short deadline that has been set (although there may be
some 
> flexibility-- in Cuba there generally is). Another possibility is to

> serve as a paper discussant; if you are interested in this (or have
any 
> other specific questions ), write to me with a copy to Nchamah
Miller 
>
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
indicating the subject area you would prefer.
> Also, could you please circulate this to any other lists where 

> you think this conference will be of interest. Thanks.
> in solidarity,
> mike
>
>---
>Michael A. Lebowitz
>Economics Department
>Simon Fraser University
>Burnaby, B.C., Canada V5A 1S6
>Office: Phone (604) 291-4669
> Fax (604) 291-5944
>Home: (604) 689-9510 [NOTE CHANGE]
>Lasqueti Island: (250) 333-8810
[Content of attachment referred to above]:
Havana conference: May 5 - 8, 2003
Karl Marx and the Challenges of the 21st Century
At the time of posting of this notice we already have the
confirmation of many internationally recognized scholars from all
continents and thus we are driven in our efforts to making this
conference as open as possible and maintaining our set
objectives.
Other Conference related activities
With a view to maintaining communications post the conference, the
Organizing Committee will be presenting a proposal to establish an
on-going Permanent International Workshop: Marx and the challenges of the
Century XXI which would publish, organize events and in general maintain
a continued interchange between participants to the conference and new
colleagues that may wish to join us.
Those who wish to participate in the activities that will be organized
for the International Workers Day on May 1st, and others that will be
co-ordinated by the Cuban Workers Labour Union together with the
Organizing Committee during the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th of May should advise
the Co-ordinator of the Scientific Committee prior to the 31st of January
2003.  The program for the activities for those days will be
published shortly and will include academic discussion and interchanges
with Cuban specialists and well as activities with the Cuban labour
movement among others.
We will be offering courses and events pre and post the conference as
well as co-lateral activities that will be published in other
notices.
All work will be done in commission-oriented sessions in panels grouped
by themes.
There will also be optional evening sessions at conference rooms nearby
the hotels that have been selected for the conference.  These
sessions will be dedicated to interchanges on themes that affect current
day Cuba, among other topics of relevance. Work sessions will be in
English and in Spanish.
CONFERENCE FORMAT
Presenters will be allotted a 15-minute presentation period for their
papers, and these will be the basis for discussions in working
commissions.
The Conference Schedule is as follows:
MONDAY: May 5
8:00 - 9:00 Registration of foreign participants Cuban participants
will register at the Instituto de Filosophia on April 28th to
30th.
9:30 - 11:30 Plenary Session Opening Speech Presentation of Scheduled
Work Program among others a proposal for the continuation of the work
commenced at this Conference on the basis of a Permanent International
Workshop:  Marx and the Challenges of the Century XXI.
11:00 - 11:30 Coffee Break
11:30 - 13:30 Work in Commissions
13:30 - 14:00 Lunch
14:00 - 16:00 Work in Commissions
16:00 Welcome cocktail.
Tour through Havana Tuesday May 6
Wed.  May 7
9:00 - 11:00 Work in oriented commissions
11:00 - 11:30 Coffee break
11:30 - 13:30 Work in oriented commissions
13:30 - 14:00 Lunch
14:00 - 16:00 Work in oriented commissions
21:00 - 23:00 Optional theme sessions
Thurs. May 8
9:00 - 11:00 Work in oriented commissions
11:00 - 1

Re: Maquiladoras not beneficial

[Bill Burgess]

At 01:04 PM 12/2/2002 -0500, Louis quoted:


Maquiladora workers receive wages considerably below those paid to 
non-maquiladora manufacturing workers.

What is it about the stats I've seen quoted by bourgeois economists that 
makes it possible for them to represent the opposite as true?

Bill

Re: Harvey

[Bill Burgess]

I think Harvey means something close to what you write below about the 
destruction of the planet.

I don't really know if his criticism of Foster as an exemplar was fair, but 
he complained about the lack of a ''class line' (my term) in Foster's 
suggestion that there is a "common interest" by humanity to stop despoiling 
the earth, or in Barry Commoner-like 'laws' of ecology ( 'nature knows 
best', etc). Harvey argues the eco-socialist program is still 
under-developed (my term). He has emphasize the environmental justice 
movement (e.g. against toxic sites in poor/Black/Latino neighbourhoods) as 
an under-rated site of eco/class struggle.  Louis P. describes such 
criticism as 'brown Marxism', but I think that is off the mark.

Bill Burgess

At 10:24 PM 8/27/2002 -0700, Ken wrote:
>Why is the distinction lost on you? Surely it is likely that the planet will
>survive. The idea of a vulnerable planet is a bit weird in itself except
>that a meteorite or MAD atomic blast might destroy it. What is vulnerable
>are some species and perhaps humans are one of them. I really dont know. But
>surely not all species are likely to be destroyed and even some members of
>the human species will probably survive a considerable amount of
>environmental degradation but not with a "standard of living" such as we now
>have. So what is it you mean when you claim not to understand Harvey's
>distinction? Or does he mean something different that what I described
>above?
>
>Cheers, Ken Hanly
> >
> >)
> >
> > Neither of these characters have anything to do with Marxism, but they
> > both figure in debates between Marxists over the ecological crisis. For
> > example, David Harvey argued that MR editor John Bellamy Foster was
> > veering in the same direction as people like Erlich because he titled
> > his book "The Vulnerable Planet." Harvey argued that we might despoil
> > the planet, but it will survive. This was a distinction lost on both
> > John and me.
> >

Re: Cuba

[Bill Burgess]

The quotes around real were to acknowledge the technical issues. But at 
root it comes down to the hours and skill of labour in sugar in Cuba vs. 
for oil in the USSR. Che Guevera wrote about this issue from Cuba's point 
of view when he was the Minister of Industry or head of the National Bank.

No doubt it is partly a political judgement. I maintain it is more accurate 
to say that the long term contracts and higher average prices that the USSR 
paid for sugar better reflected the "real" value and utility of sugar (they 
were arguably still too low), than to say that the USSR "subsidized" Cuba 
because it paid more than the incredibly underpriced rate imposed on 'third 
world' suppliers by the capitalist sugar monopolists who control the world 
sugar exchanges.

I don't have the earlier numbers for the period we are discussing, but 
according to the World Bank's _1998 World Development Indicators_, the 
index for the prices of manufactured good exports by the G-5 rose from 72 
in 1980 to 108 in 1997, while the index for the price of world sugar fell 
from 87.7 to 23.3! I understand that neoclassical economists argue this 
reflects their relative income elasticity of demand. Would you chose this 
criteria for valuation over mine?

Bill


>Bill Burgess wrote:
>
>>IMHO it is important to put the USSR-Cuba economic relations in the 
>>framework of the capitalist unequal exchange - Instead of subsidizing 
>>Cuba, the USSR paid something closer to 'real' value of sugar.
>
>The arrangement was generous, and far superior to capitalist convention, 
>but what's the "real" value of sugar? How do you know? How are you valuing 
>labor?
>
>Doug

Re: RE: Re:To Ulhas re definitions

[Bill Burgess]

IMHO it is important to put the USSR-Cuba economic relations in the
framework of the capitalist unequal exchange - Instead of subsidizing
Cuba, the USSR paid something closer to 'real' value of sugar. 
I haven't heard of evidence that oil was cut off around the 1968
invasion, but I do recall reading Castro's carefully worded speech on the
invasion a few year ago, and it seemed to me he had his own reasons to
genuinely support the invasion (not that I thought they were enough).

On the other hand, there is little doubt about Angola. Castro and other
Cuban leaders have directly said they disagreed with the USSR military
advice to the Angolans, and that they sent in their own troops against
the South Africans, e.g. the battle of Cuito Cunavale, without  the
advance agreement or support of the USSR.
Bill

My impression is that
the old USSR subsidized Cuba big time, by buying sugar at a (usually)
above-market rate and selling oil to them at a (usually) below-market
rate. Thus, when the USSR went south, Cuba's economy went into severe
crisis (which they have adapted to very well, considering). Cuba, and the
USSR's support for it, made the USSR look good. 

On the other hand, the Cuban foreign policy couldn't differ
too strongly from that of the USSR. For example, I've seen evidence that
the USSR cut oil supplies to Cuba in order to insure that Castro endorsed
the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, I don't know what
the Soviet Union's attitude was toward the Cuban role in Africa.

Question on US local government revenues

[Bill Burgess]

I've scanned the footnotes and definitions for data for US local government 
finances, but can't figure out:

Do state and the federal govt. pay property taxes to local governments in 
the US?  Or, do they pay a grant in lieu of property taxes (as in Canada), 
and if so, is it included under property tax revenues (as in Canada), or 
under intergovernmental transfer revenue?  (I'm aware that  District of 
Columbia is a special case.)

There is currently a big campaign underway in Canada to give municipal 
governments more fiscal (and even constitutional!) power. It is usually 
motivated as necessary for cities to become more 'competitive' locations in 
the world market, especially as federal and provincial governments withdraw 
or download service responsibilities to local governments. The US is being 
cited as a **positive example** of the ability of (some) local governments 
to tax local income, sales, payroll,  hotel rooms, etc., while in Canada 
local governments are (generally) restricted to taxing only real property. 
I'm trying the show that more fiscal power for individual local governments 
generally means more disparity in the public goods and services local 
governments provide.

Thanks in advance to anyone who can help.

Bill Burgess

Re: Re: rejecting a school

[Bill Burgess]

I'm skeptical of this achievement. Certainly the blind spot of liberal 
equality is exposed by post-prefixers'  focus on marginality, but how much, 
really, been added to the earlier Marxist, feminist, anti-imperialist etc. 
appreciations of social inequality/complexity (the better versions; I'm not 
thinking of the Stalinist types)?

My sense is that, politically, post-prefixism has been one step forward and 
two steps back. The emphasis on difference tends to result in abstention 
over what is common. What is a good example of post-prefixism yielding 
politically richer mixtures of difference and commonality than we knew of 
before?

Bill Burgess


> >Can someone name the main achievement of one author who has been dubbed
>"post-structuralist"? It is much better to talk about one specific thing than
>to go on and on about abstractions such as "post-structuralism."
>
>Achievement? Well, I think that the popularization of the value of
>"marginality" has something to do with post-structuralism. And, though I don't
>give litcritters credit for it, our awareness of the way that gender, ability,
>race, sexual orientation, etc. have been meaningfully, materially excluded
>from consideration of "rights" discourse has something to do with
>poststructuralism. Or were you thinking achievement like book titles?
>
>Christian

Re: RE: Re: rejecting a school

[Bill Burgess]

I don't understand the physics, but wasn't Newtonian physics transcended 
long before post-structuralism (by Einstein, a socialist, for one)? I'm not 
convinced by Irigarary that the _particular_ obstacle to better physics was 
masculinity, but in any case, I don't see how the _general_ point about the 
social construction of science and the rejection of pretensions to 
objectivity is a (new) achievement. Engels discussed flows in _Dialectics 
of Nature_, and Marx's _Capital_ is all about bourgeois objectivity.

Bill


> > Can someone name the main achievement of one author who has been
> > dubbed "post-structuralist"?
>
>the lads at http://www.adequacy.org had a go at claiming that Luce Irigaray
>anticipated Stephen Wolfram's "New Kind of Science": (I have added a couple
>of question marks to words which do not get through my firewall)

Re: Re: rejecting a school

[Bill Burgess]

>
>>I'm not
>>convinced by Irigarary that the _particular_ obstacle to better physics was
>>masculinity, but in any case, I don't see how the _general_ point about the
>>social construction of science and the rejection of pretensions to
>>objectivity is a (new) achievement.
>
>Well, maybe the development of an old insight in a new way is worth doing. 
>I don't say that Irigiray has done it. I rather doubt it.

Yes, it is certainly worthwhile when someone recovers (and especially 
improves on) an old or forgotten insight. That's all most worthwhile 
efforts ever amount to. It _is_ worth thinking about the link Irigarary is 
reported to draw between masculinity and Newtonian physics. But I'm asking, 
it is fair that the credits for this kind of challenge to positivism be 
placed in their (new?) column in the balance sheet of intellectual 
accomplishment? It is sometimes not even acknowledged that credits have 
already been earned in other columns.

Bill

Marxist economics courses

[Bill Burgess]

I'll taking advantage of Eric's request to pose my own:
I get to teach a 3rd year Introduction to Marxist Economics course next
January. I'm looking for ideas on what topics to cover and especially
how. Any thoughts/suggestions if you have done this, or if you know of
good and bad examples? What do you think about Charlie Andrew's
_Capitalism and Equality_ as a possible course text? 
Bill Burgess

At 02:26 PM 09/07/2002 -0700, you wrote:
All,
 
I'm looking for a short book about Marx's
_social_ theory appropriate for undergraduates. 
 
In the past I've used Berlin's biography, parts
of the Cambridge Companion to Marx, and Wood's KM in the past but want
something different this time. I've also used KM's original writings but
don't want to take this route this time and much of it is too hard for
many undergraduates.
 
Is anyone familiar with: 
(1) Marx: A Very Short Introduction by Peter
Singer (of animal rights fame)
(2) Marx: The Great Philos by Terry
Eagleton
 
I've not seen either but the price seems right
on both of these (<$10).
 
Thanks for any thoughts.
 
Eric
.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Re: Re: Re: Costly privatizing of firefighting

[Bill Burgess]

Among others, I think the folks at the Canadian Centre for Policy 
Alternatives have been producing stuff on this,  but I didn't find a 
specific title in my quick search at 
http://www.policyalternatives.ca/bc/index.html. The BC government has set 
up an agency to promote public-private partnerships in health delivery, 
e.g. they plan to open a new PPP hospital in Abbotsford, even though the 
accounting study commissioned projects "savings" of  less than 3% (and this 
does not include lots of costs, e.g., for government planning).

Bill


At 07:44 PM 13/06/2002 -0500, you wrote:
>According to this guy privatisation increases efficiency in Swedish health
>care. I have been looking for a critique of  these reforms but can't find
>any. Does anyone have URLs pointing to such a critique? I do know that the
>re-introduction of copays has increased usage of the system byt he better
>off compared to the less well off. Before copays there was little difference
> It is interesting that at least some unions support the changes. Also,
>the principle of universal coverage is not being challenged. What is
>happening is that more and more the system is opening up as an outlet for
>private capital and for profit health care and justified in terms of choice
>and efficiency. The state is able to serve private capital without
>challenging the principle of universal coverage.
>
>
>
>Cheers, Ken Hanly
>
>SWEDISH HEALTH-CARE REFORM:
>FROM PUBLIC MONOPOLIES TO MARKET SERVICES
>by Johan Hjertqvist*
>
>For 500 years Sweden has been a uniform and centralized country. Today it is
>on the road to pluralism and stronger regional governments. Often the leader
>of new trends in Europe, Swedes are making it clear to their politicians
>that they want public policies which cater better to individual needs and
>preferences.
>You can notice this change in the labour markets. Collective bargaining is
>in retreat, and Manpower, a temporary-help agency, is now the second-largest
>employer in Stockholm. In the education industry, privately operated schools
>are doubling their market share every year (though from a low base), and
>competitors who offer e-learning solutions for workplace education are
>booming. Signs of change are also apparent in the health-care industry:
>privatized hospitals, clinics and medical practices of all kinds; increasing
>numbers of private insurance companies; Internet-based patient information
>and a profusion of well documented opinions in favour of free choice,
>competition and diversity.
>
>Underlying this change of opinion is the success of public policy
>experiments that have embraced the principles of competition and choice. In
>1992-94, the Greater Council of Stockholm launched a number of competitive
>initiatives whose success is now apparent. Competition in public
>transportation in the metropolitan area has reduced taxpayer costs by 600
>million SEK, or roughly 25 percent. In one blow, with competitive
>contracting, the Greater Council reduced the yearly cost of ambulance
>service in the Stockholm region by 15 percent. In all areas service quality
>has increased noticeably.
>
>The results in health care have been just as startling. For example,
>privatized nursing homes have reduced costs by 20-30 percent. Or again, a
>recent evaluation has shown that private medical specialists are more
>efficient than their colleagues in public service. They focus on
>"with-patient time", which results in more patient value. Publicly employed
>doctors, in contrast, have more staff, spend more of their time on paperwork
>and ask for 10-15 percent higher budgets to provide the same treatment
>levels.
>
>By 1994, when the centre-right regional coalition lost the election, 100
>small and medium-size health-care contractors had been established, all of
>which had previously worked within the public system. All except one remain
>active. The change in government slowed, but did not stop, the process. In
>1998, the centre-right grouping returned to power, and they picked up new
>steam. They have wide public support in the urban areas, including that of
>the largest health-care unions, and plan to turn most of primary care into
>contracted services, an irreversible major step.
>
>Right now, about another 100 health-care units are in the process of leaving
>public ownership to become private companies. The Greater Council lends
>significant support in the form of free training and start-up consultants.
>In general, the new contractors run local health-care stations, GP group
>practices, treatment centers for mothers and infants, laboratories and
>psychiatric out-of-hospital clinics. When (and if) the Council completes
>this transformation, private GPs and other contractors will deliver around
>40 percent of all health-care services, and about 80 percent of all primary
>health-care in the metropolitan area.
>
>In 1999, a private company, Capio Ltd., bought one of Stockholm's largest
>hospitals, the St. George, from the Greate

Re: Re: Argentina, Australia and Canada

[Bill Burgess]

At 11:17 AM 21/04/2002 +0800, Grant wrote:

>That wasn't my contention, which is more accurately that except for actual
>formal/military imperialism, (e.g. Britain in India) "imperialist" and
>"imperialised" have always been poles on a notional axis, rather than being
>distinct and permanent things. I mean are you saying that there is little
>difference between the present positions (relative and absolute) of the
>economies and overseas political influence of Malaysia and Indonesia,
>compared now with what they were 50 years ago?

Nothing is pure or permanent, but yes, Malaysia and Indonesia are still 
imperialist-dominated countries (and also still in a different way than 
lesser imperialists Australia and New Zealand).

> > The best recent candidate for the 'imperial' club is probably s. Korea, 
> but, hello, this country is divided in half, occupied by US nukes...
>
>Forces which, some would argue, have assisted the South Korean national
>bourgeoisie in the same way that the capitalist economies of Japan, Taiwan
>and the old West Germany grew significantly as "armed camps".

>S Korea ...
> >could do
> > _nothing_ if Japan, Europe and the US stopped imports from s. Korea with a
> > stroke of a pen.
>
>Why would they do that? And there's always China...

For protectionist reasons, like the current US tariffs on s. Korean steel. 
Korean capitalists are impressive, but they are more vulnerable than 
capitalists in Japan or Germany. s. Korea and Taiwan were assisted to stop 
'communism', but I don't see either of them being let into the imperialist 
club. It is possible, but a lot of this kind of talk has been cooled by the 
'Asian' financial crisis.

>One point of the stats was that the highly "imperialised" Kenya is
>"imperialist" in regard to neighbouring countries, as shown (e.g.) by the
>restrictions on Kenyan investment. Nigeria is an even stronger case.

Yes, imperialized countries often dominate weaker neighbours, but I think 
the concept of imperialism should be reserved for geo-politics at a larger 
scale. And Kenya's outward FDI/GDP is only 1.5%; one-fifth of the inward 
rate. Nigeria's outward FDI/GDP is an impressive 31%, but still less than 
inward FDI/GDP at 51%. I mentioned South Africa before, but forgot to 
include the rates - inward FDI/GDP is 13.4% and outward FDI/GDP 24.8%. We 
need to look at other criteria, but the FDI numbers suggest that in Africa 
the only candidate for imperialist status is South Africa.

> > As you can see, Belgium and Switzerland show high rates of outward FDI, 
> and most FDI is to and from Europe - and almost nothing is _from_ the 
> likes of Argentina, Malaysia or Saudi Arabia.
>
>I note that the HK and Singaporean outward FDI figures cited are higher 
>than any of the European states you have cited, except Switzerland.

Fair enough, but, again, I think 'real' imperialist status requires a 
bigger real-estate base than these city-states. They are 
historical/geographical accidents/exceptions who lack the (more) 
independent economic base characteristic of  'real' imperialists. Bill R. 
also notes that it is important to consider the extent to which their FDI 
data reflects investors from other countries (this is probably also very 
relevant for the Swiss data).

>Substitute longer term declines in prices
>for wheat (which in the 1950s was worth more than three times what it is
>now), beef and other commodities and you have substantial structural
>problems for Argentina and Australia, both of which (unlike Indonesia or
>Malaysia) have also both experienced a withering of their manufacturing
>industries in the last 30 years.

The source I cited also reports a decline in the index for Australian coal 
from 55.9 in 1980 to 32.6 in 1997. However, in general terms the point is 
that the prices of goods produced by the rich imperialist countries have 
risen relative to those produced by poor imperialized countries. The 
Argentina-Australia comparison is very much on point. Have their 
manufacturing sectors really followed similar paths in recent decades? I 
don't have the data for Argentina on hand, but the OECD STAN database shows 
that per capita manufacturing output in Australia in 1997 was over US$8000, 
and total manufacturing output was over 5 times greater than in 1970, and 
about 25% greater than in 1989. (current US$). I think this suggests a 
different kind of 'withering' than in Argentina.

>There are obviously more "non-thieves" and fewer "thieves" in "imperialised"
>countries than in imperial ones; we will never stop "thievery" by
>encouraging the "smaller thieves".

It is my fault for having started this inelegant metaphor, so...

Bill

Re: Re: Argentina, Australia and Canada

[Bill Burgess]

Grant wrote:

> > country inward FDI stock/GDPoutward FDI stock/GDP
> > Canada   23.9% 26.9%
> > Australia   28.117.1
> > UK   23.335.9
> > France   11.715.9
> > Singapore  85.856.1
> > Malaysia67.022.7
> > Indonesia   73.32.4
> > Argentina   13.95.4
> > Brazil 17.11.4
>
>Interesting figures. I haven't had time to look at the comparable figures
>for other countries. In any case they don't prove a permanent/structural
>exclusion from "imperial" activity. For example, what about Hong Kong
>(pre-1997, not that it is yet a homogenous part of China)? The last I heard
>there was hardly any manufacturing left in Hong Kong because proprietors had
>shifted operations to the mainland. South Africa? Saudi Arabia?

Hong Kong   65.772
Saudi Arabia22.71.3
s. Korea6.1 6.5
Taiwan  7.8 14.7
New Zealand 66.211
Israel  11.16.8
Spain   21.512.5
Austria 11.38.2
Sweden  22.541.3
Belgium 61.750.2
Switzerland 26.569.1

I cited the FDI/GDP ratios against the suggestion that FDI from the likes 
of Malaysia and Indonesia is dissolving the cardinal difference between 
imperialist and imperialized countries. I don't see any real shift in the 
last 75 years or so in this division. Hong Kong has 'moved up' a couple of 
rungs on the product ladder, and a large part of the 'outward' FDI above is 
the labour-intensive factories that were opened nearby in the (rest of) PR 
China. But it lacks other characteristics, e.g. trade/GDP in Hong Kong is 
135% - as Bill R. noted, emphasized, HK and Singapore are entrepots, and 
they are city-economies, which indicates the need to qualify the 
significance of their numbers (Malaysia has the third highest trade/GDP; 
these three are the only countries with annual trade greater than GDP). The 
best recent candidate for the 'imperial' club is probably s. Korea, but, 
hello, this country is divided in half, occupied by US nukes, and could do 
_nothing_ if Japan, Europe and the US stopped imports from s. Korea with a 
stroke of a pen.

The balance of inward-outward FDI in Saudi Arabia tells the same story as 
we know about other realities of foreign-dominated oil producers.

I'd be interested in more rounded characterizations of South Africa, but 
the FDI data is consistent with the 'white'-settler state-now-lesser 
imperialist status of New Zealand, Israel, etc. Bill R. and I have 
discussed the NZ FDI stats before; I still have a hard time accepting the 
66.2% inward rate in NZ as one that provides a realistic comparison to that 
in other countries, but in any case, I think the difference between 
presenting a NZ passport and a Malaysian passport helps clarify the social 
relationships in world imperialism.

>Every bourgeoisie has to start somewhere. For example --- and I'm not going
>to revisit the complexities and vitriol of the "Kenya Debate" --- but I just
>came across this on the web:
Don't know what you mean with the Kenya stats, but there is _zero_  danger 
of Kenya going imperialist in any serious use of the term.

  >Singapore's inward and outward rates are both high, but note that inward 
FDI is still well above outward FDI in this city-state where annual trade 
is also 160%  !!! of GDP.
>That trend is not unusual for countries with small populations and highly 
>developed economies. What are the comparative figures for Belgium and 
>Switzerland?

As you can see, Belgium and Switzerland show high rates of outward FDI, and 
most FDI is to and from Europe - and almost nothing is _from_ the likes of 
Argentina, Malaysia or Saudi Arabia.

Trade/GDP in Austria is 44% and 38% in Switzerland, again, most trade is 
with fellow imperialist countries, not semi-colonial countries. They enjoy 
'free' trade, not the imperialist protectionism and unequal exchange faced 
by Malaysia or Indonesia. The price index for their manufactured goods 
_rose_ from 72 in 1980 to 108 in 1997, while logs from Malaysia dropped 
from 272 to 221, Indonesia's coffee producers faced a coffee index decline 
from  450.4 to 161.2  !!! The index for cotton fell from 284.3 to 162.2 
and for rubber from 197.9 to 94.5 (indexes from World Bank, World 
Development Indicators).

C. Jannuzi wrote:
 >I guess my point was that exploiter can easily become the exploited when 
the US involved. As any US citizen should know.

If we can't distinguish between a big thief taking from a smaller thief and 
theft from non-thieves we will never stop thievery.

Bill Burgess

Re: Argentina, Australia and Canada

[Bill Burgess]

In other words, a ruling class based in domestic finance capital emerged in 
Canada (and Australia), and these coutnries became imperialist economies; 
this did not occur in Argentina. In the case of Canada this is easier to 
see if Armstrong's overstress on staples relative to the development of 
modern farming and manufacturing is corrected, and the bank-railway axis of 
finance capital is made explicit.

Bill Burgess

  At 07:51 PM 11/04/02 -0400, Louis P. wrote:
>Warwick Armstrong, "The Social Origins of Industrial Growth: Canada,
>Argentina and Australia, 1870-1930", in "Argentina, Australia and
>Canada: Studies in Comparative Development, 1870-1965", edited by D.
>Platt & Guido di Tella:
>
>Yet, within the general pattern of similarity which gave them their
>distinctiveness, there were also important differences. The key to
>such differences can, again, be identified in the nature of the
>social structures and relationships within the three. This, in turn,
>affected the way in which the economy of each interacted with others
>in the international system of trade and investment. The most obvious
>variation is to be found between Argentina on the one hand, and
>Canada and Australia on the other. In the latter two, the urban
>elements in the ruling coalition were stronger, and earlier assumed a
>dominance over the staples producers. By the 1880s and 1890s, the
>Australian squatters had become, in many cases, subaltern members of
>the coalition, indebted to, and dependent upon, the banking sector
>for their continued viability. The power of Canadian capital, too,
>was concentrated in the financial institutions and commercial
>enterprises of Montreal and Toronto, which exercised a clear economic
>hegemony over the staples producers, and especially over the grain
>farmers of Ontario and the Prairies. This economic weight was
>reflected also in political influence at federal level. In Argentina,
>the dominance of the urban groups was less evident. The landed
>oligarchy continued to wield much greater economic and political
>influence, even after the Radical Party's triumph in 1916, and acted
>as the principal arbiter of social, economic, and political change in
>a way that its Australian equivalent had ceased to do after the late
>nineteenth century. And in any serious confrontations, they could
>call upon the ultimate weapon, the armed forces, which had retained a
>special position in the administrative order ever since the
>nineteenth century.
>
>One indicator of the relative capacities of the three ruling groups
>may be seen in RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION. The railway networks, central to
>the opening up of the staples-producing prairies of Canada, the
>pampas of Argentina, and the outback of Australia, could be
>considered economic elements of national importance to each country.
>In Canada, the major part of the construction was carried out first
>by private capital, heavily promoted and subsidised by the state.
>Australia's federal government constructed its own system in the
>separate colonies, and later, federal capital remained responsible
>for construction and operation, although, as in Canada, it drew
>heavily upon foreign loans and expertise. Argentina, however, the
>principal lines (and most profitable) were built and run by European
>companies, while the state was left with the task of undertaking the
>peripheral and less profitable sections.
>
>The manufacturing sectors of the three societies reflected also the
>distinct capacity of the ruling coalition to branch out into new and
>innovative activity. In the 1850s Canada was already establishing a
>range of small-scale, manufacturing activities associated with
>agricultural production; these competed successfully with the later
>influx of US branch plants. Similarly, the steel industry of Southern
>Ontario remained essentially a Canadian national enterprise. By the
>First World War, these groups had formed a modern corporate elite,
>part of a powerful managerial structure.
>
>Australia diversified and industrialized later, and possibly more
>slowly, but its manufacturing sector was, if anything, more firmly
>based upon indigenous capital and entrepreneurship. The processing
>industries and small-scale urban manufacturers were joined, after the
>turn of the century, by large-scale corporate enterprises, especially
>in the mining metals sector. As in Canada, enterprises such as BHP
>and Collins House were no longer family-controlled; they were modern,
>twentieth-century industrial conglomerates with vertical control from
>mining to blast furnaces to wire-rope factories to shipping lines -
>and with links to foreign capital through joint ventures. The
>Australian state, like its Canadian counterpart, was 

Re: social democracy

[Bill Burgess]

According to a 1998 NBER paper by Morck, the Wallenberg family controls 
corporate assets equal to 40% of the market value of all corporations on 
the Swedish stock exchange.

Statistics Canada tells us that 25 enterprises in Canada control 41% of all 
corporate assets in the country.

Ownership concentration is lower in the US, e.g., 85% of Standard and Poor 
corporations were widely held, while in Canada only 22% of TSE corporations 
were widely held (data from the late 1980s; widely held=ownership positions 
under 20%).

The Morck paper (cited by Michael P. on Pen-L a couple of years ago) does 
an absurd regression between inherited wealth and variables like the level 
of public debt and social assistance in various countries, but the data 
they collect is generally consistent with a connection between ownership 
concentration and social democracy.

Bill Burgess


At 07:06 PM 15/01/02 -0500, you wrote:
>Michael Perelman wrote:
>
>>Another Swedish question.  Doesn't Sweden have one of the most
>>concentrated industrial structures in the world?
>
>Yup, think it does. The Wallenberg family's Investor trust controls some 
>enormous portion of Swedish industry. Such structures are good for social 
>democracy; dispersed stockowner structures like the U.S.'s are its enemy.
>
>Doug

Re: health and inequality

[Bill Burgess]

Doug, on the inequality-health relation:

>Christopher Jencks told me that he's done some work in this area and found 
>that you could prove or disprove the thesis by tweaking your equations. 
>Something so susceptible to statistical manipulation isn't very robust, is it?

The relationship at the level of states and metro areas in the US is pretty 
strong - is this the scale at which Jencks makes his claim?

The BMJ editor raised the claim that the inequality 'effect' is a disguised 
form of absolute income (due the the curvelinear shape of the relation). 
However, I notice he did not mention the Wolfson study that specifically 
tested this hypothesis through a clever modeling process, and found it 
could *not* account for the inequality effect. The data methodology was 
above me, but it seemed convincing.

Lynch et al. had data for more countries than the original number on which 
Wilkinson based his study, and the additional countries undermined the 
goodness of fit of the inequality-health relation at the intern-national 
level. I havn't looked back at that study, but I have seen a similar 
regression for all countries with per capita income above $10,000, where 
inequality remains a significant variable. It seems reasonable to me to 
restrict the sample to 'rich' countries, and not confound the analysis with 
large differences in socio-economic systems, e.g. to consider only those 
countries those past the point where significant improvements in health 
status continue to accompany increases in per capita GDP.

It does seem as though the US is a bit of an exception to the general rule 
-- that it is hard to prove the relation between health and inequality 
through regression analysis.

Bill Burgess

Re: RE: Re: profit rate & recession

[Bill Burgess]

Me:
> >Isn't it worth getting some indication of the role of circulating (M) as
>well as fixed (K) capital, roughly, that (change in) ROP = (change in)
>K/Y+M/Y+S/Y?<
Jim:
>fine, do it. But I think that the rate of profit on fixed capital is more
>important in determining the ratio of net investment to fixed capital, which
>in turn is crucial to determining the fluctuations in aggregate demand. In
>other words, I accept Keynes' emphasis on fixed investment.
Fair enough. If I can figure out where/how to get numbers for M, I'll  try 
to answer my question.

Bill Burgess

Re: profit rate & recession

[Bill Burgess]

I wondered about Jim D. not including circulating constant capital 
(basically materials) in explaining the change in the ROP, especially since 
this is an area there have been productivity gains. Jim wrote

>shouldn't an improvement in inventory management techniques help labor
>productivity and profits (all else constant) and thus raise the rate of
>profit? So it wouldn't be ignored altogether.

It is partly included, and (probably) raised the ROP. But as I understand 
it, in 'explaining' the ROP, you are assuming that K/Y moves with the OCC 
(and that S/Y moves with the RSV?). Isn't it worth getting some indication 
of the role of circulating (M) as well as fixed (K) capital, roughly, that 
(change in) ROP = (change in) K/Y+M/Y+S/Y?

I cited a series that breaks down US industrial output into three 'stages' 
of production (materials, intermediate goods and final goods), noting that 
the first two make up half of total industrial output.

>I don't get how half of "value-added is accounted for by materials and
>intermediate goods" since the cost of materials and purchased intermediate
>goods is subtracted from total revenues when calculating a company's
>value-added (since they are part of another company's total revenues and we
>don't want to double-count). If you look at retail, intermediate goods would
>swamp value-added altogether.

I wasn't very clear.  I cited the breakdown by stage of production to note 
that, to the degree that the materials and intermediate goods are inputs to 
the final goods, M is large. It is typically? larger than one year's K, 
i.e., there is lots of quantitative room here for 'non-K, non-S' changes to 
affect the ROP.

> > Subcontracted inputs have become more important. While I suppose that in
>principle the accounting in separate business units should not affect the
>aggregate shares of fixed capital, profits, etc., I wonder if this is really
>is true. For example, is subcontracting an important vehicle for
>transferring profit from subcontracters to their oligopolistic customers.
>Even if the overal capital-output ratio does not change, who gets the
>profits does change, through unequal exchange. Also, is it prossible that
>more subconstractors means that more profit is taken in the  form of profits
>rather than big salaries for managers?<
>
>I interpret these changes in terms of changing relations of production --
>including intracapitalist relations -- which has an effect on the aggregate
>level.

Do you mean, *no* effect on the aggregate level?

I suggested a further reason to not focus on K alone is the problem of 
measuring K. Recent US manufacturing output and productivity gains are 
restricted to 2 sectors (industrial and electronic equipment), and may be 
exaggerated. Since a lot of these products become part of K in other 
sectors, this is another reason to question K values. As Jim notes, they 
are part of a recent speedup in rates of K depreciation.

>I don't think that the role of PCs is very large as part of the total K. It
>only has an effect as part of a welter of different forces affecting K/Y.

I accept this, but isn't it striking that in the output and producitivity 
data, a 2 industry tail has supposedly wagged the all-industry dog ?

Bill Burgess

Re: the profit rate & recession

[Bill Burgess]

Yes, I did find your talk interesting. Do you have any similar numbers for 
other countries, or when you compare your trends for the US with profit 
trends in other countries, what are the differences?

I generally agree with your focus on fixed capital and using 'conventional' 
profits rates, but I also wonder if something important is not being missed 
when circulating constant capital (raw materials and other 
non-fixed-capital inputs) is left out of the analysis of the reasons for 
the trends, especially about the role of the organic composition of 
capital. If  I remember correctly, Fred Mosely also leaves out circulating 
constant capital from his profit rate. Several questions come to mind.

My impression from the business press is that faster throughput and 
reducing waste in transforming materials have been a key element of 
productivity changes in recent years. This element of change in the organic 
composition of capital is ignored when the profit trends are expressed as 
yearly profits over the stock of fixed capital alone.

A useful series by the US  Federal Reserve (see 
www.federalreserve.gov/releases/G17/ip_notes.htm) shows that more than half 
of industry (roughly manufacturing and mining) value-added is accounted for 
by materials and intermediate goods, as opposed to final goods. The 
materials share of total industry value-added has been rising. This 
breakdown of industry by the stage of production underlines the 
*quantitative* significance of circulating constant capital. Or, am I 
misunderstanding something?

Subcontracted inputs have become more important. While I suppose that in 
principle the accounting in separate business units should not affect the 
aggregate shares of fixed capital, profits, etc., I wonder if this is 
really is true. For example, is subcontracting an important vehicle for 
transfering profit from subcontracters to their oligopolistic customers. 
Even if the overal capital-output ratio does not change, who gets the 
profits does change, through unequal exchange. Also, is it prossible that 
more subconstractors means that more profit is taken in the form of profits 
rather than big salaries for managers?

As we all know, measures of fixed capital are always a problem. In a 
comparison of productivity trends in US and Canadian manufacturing, Andrew 
Sharpe of the Centre for the Study of Living Standards 
(http://www.csls.ca/pdf/lanc.pdf) notes that all of the 1990-1997 increase 
in US manufacturing productivity (and almost all of the difference between 
Canada and the US) is concentrated in industrial machinery and electronic 
equipment sectors alone. He seems to question how accurate the US data is, 
but more to the point here, the boom in this sector suggests that a lot of 
machinery and computers has been scrapped and replaced with the latests and 
greatest, but probably before passing on its value. You note the decline in 
K/Y is related to the shake-out in manufacturing but, for example, while 
computer prices have declined massively, the fixed capital numbers may not 
reflect their service life. Another question - how much of computer-type 
purchases are counted as fixed capital?

Bill Burgess




  At 11:34 AM 27/12/01 -0800, you wrote:
>For those interested, I recently gave a talk at the Marxist School in
>Sacramento, California, suggesting that the recent recession is connected
>with the trend rise of the rate of profit. My notes are available at:
>http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/faculty/jdevine/FROP/sacramento.htm
>
>Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] &  http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~jdevine

Re: Help with Research

[Bill Burgess]

If you are not already familiar with them, try Myron Orfield's Metropolitan 
Area Research Organization at 
http://www.metroresearch.org/index.html.  They specialize in the problem of 
inter-municipal differences in both need for services and the capacity to 
provide them, and are very good at depicting these differences using maps. 
Orfield has a new book out, _American Metropolitics_. I take it you are 
looking at a rebalance in state-municipal financing while I think Orfield 
focuses more on fiscal capacity within metro areas. However, I think the 
general issues are similar,

Bill Burgess

At 03:29 PM 25/12/01 -0800, you wrote:
>Hi everyone,
>
>My name is Mitch Chanin, and I'm a community organizer in
>Philadelphia. I've been hoping to find someone who could help me
>with some research for an organizing effort
>
>I'm writing to ask whether or not you might be able to help with
>some research for an important community organizing effort that
>I've been participating in for the past few
>months.
>
>For several years, activists in Philadelphia and around the state
>have been working to change the way the Pennsylvania state
>government funds public education. PA has one of the most
>inequitable approaches to funding public schools of any state in
>the country -- it pays only about 35% of public school expenses,
>leaving local governments and school districts to depend on local
>property taxes for much of their funding. Districts with large
>tax bases are able to provide adequate funding for their schools,
>and other districts are not--some affluent suburbans districts
>near Philadelphia spend close to twice per pupil what the Philly
>school district is able to spend each year. Year after year,
>districts like Philadelphia's, including school districts in poor
>towns, suburbs, and rural areas throughout the state, are are
>desperately short of resources. Community groups and education
>advocates have been working through law suits and through
>legislative action to get the state to change its funding
>formula, and recently a new statewide, grassroots network called
>Good Schools Pennsylvania has come together to take on this
>campaign. I've been volunteering with Good Schools PA for several
>months, and I feel like there's real potential for a major change
>in policy over the next couple of years.
>
>The reform that's been discussed the most often involved
>increasing the state income tax, reducing local property taxes,
>and through a somewhat complicated formula, redistributing the
>increased state revenue to school districts around the state so
>as to insure that each school has an adequate amount of money to
>spend. A Republican state legislator from the Philly suburbs has
>recently introducted a proposal along these lines.
>
>In order to for us to advocate effectively for this kind of
>change, I think it would be extremely useful for us to have a
>clear picture of how the tax burden would be distributed, and I
>haven't so far been able to find that information. How would
>people in different income brackets and different kinds of
>households be affected? Who will pay more, and who will pay less?
>My sense is that the largest portion of the new revenue will come
>from the wealthiest people, and that at least some low-income and
>middle-income people will end up paying less in taxes. I'm not
>sure, though, how this kind of change would affect middle-income
>people overall, low-income renters, senior
>citizens living with their families or in institutions, etc.. As
>far as I know, no one has done a comprehensive analysis--I've
>talked with people from the Pennsylvania School Reform Network,
>which is one of the main proponents of this change, and also with
>a couple of local economic policy institutes. Conservative
>legislators are arguing against the proposal by saying that it
>would be "unfair to young workers," or that "middle class
>families" will suffer. The more we know about how the benefits
>and losses from this kind of bill would be distributed, the
>easier it will be for us to answer these claims or to come up
>with changes to the proposal to make it better.
>
>If anyone knows of a research institute, and individual reseacher
>or student, or a college class of some kind that might be able to
>do an analysis of this stuff, please let me know. I'm considering
>taking this on myself, and if I do, I'd be extremely grateful for
>an advice or help anyone could provide.
>
>I'm forwarding you a longer request for assistance that I wrote
>up a while ago, along with some background information. If you
>have any questions or need more information, please feel free to
>call me at 215-698-2422.
>
>Thanks very much, and I hope everyone is doing well. Have a great
>holiday,
>
>Mitch
>
>--
>
>Michael Perelman
>Economics Department
>California State University
>Chico, CA 95929
>
>Tel. 530-898-5321
>E-Mail [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>

Re: project for Pen-l

[Bill Burgess]

> > My list:

No 1. on my list, is, paraphrasing Marx, "Workers go to the wall under both 
free trade and protectionism." In some ways, this covers some of the same 
ground as one of Peter's points:

 >3. The case for free trade (and comparative advantage) is, in the end, 
the same as
 >the case for free markets in general.

I think this project is very worthwhile. Several months ago I benefited 
from the help of several Penners who replied with very useful advice and 
copies of papers when I asked for help on this topic. This list does have a 
'speciality' - it has top-notch professional and other economists, who have 
the ability to provide both internal and external critiques of 
neo-classical claims. Joan Robinson said something like, "The purpose of 
studying economics is...to avoid being deceived by economists."  Pen-L 
could lay out some of the examples. I appreciate most of the 'non-economic' 
topics discussed here, but why not take more advantages of the particular 
strengths of the list?

There was talk awhile ago about putting togeather some kind of intro 
textbook, but perhaps that was too ambitious. Is it too much to imagine 
that 'free' trade might be the first in series of informal collections of 
resources aimed at teachers of economics, teachers in other discipines, and 
for use in other spheres?

Bill Burgess

Re: Fed's actions

[Bill Burgess]

I don't think this is all for buying bonds, but Saturday's Globe and Mail 
reports a $US 82.5 billion "infusion of short term cash" into the US 
financial system by the Fed on Friday, for a total of $188 billion since 
Wednesday. An economist with J.P. Morgan Canada is quoted as estimating the 
addition of funds this week by the Fed was 20 times the normal amount.

Bill Burgess

At 12:51 AM 16/09/01 -0400, you wrote:

>A question for Doug Henwood (Hi Doug) and others:
>
>The New York Times reported on Friday that the Fed purchased government
>bonds of $70 billion on Thursday (after buying $38 billion on Wednesday),
>which it called "one of the biggest such operation in memory".  It also
>said that on a normal day the purchase would be "several billion dollars".
>
>Does anybody know:
>
>1. Other examples of such high purchases, and what the numbers were?
>
>2. How much the Fed purchased on Friday, which was not reported in
>Saturday's paper (at least I couldn't find it).
>
>
>Thanks in advance,
>Fred Moseley
>
>
>P.S.  The Monday opening of Wall St. should be very interesting.

Re: Re: Income Inequality and Health

[Bill Burgess]

Deaton's results show that including percent Black "knocks out" income
inequality as (partly) explaining mortality in US metropolitan areas. I
wonder if the the reverse is not also be true -- are they two not well
corellated?  So how can his results be taken as refuting the
Wilkinson-type argument that income inequality (in addition to the level
of income) significantly affects health? As Martin Brown wrote, percent
Black measures something, but what is it?

I like the (Reich-type?) political 'explanation' of these issues --
variables like income inequality roughly represent relative social power.
Mortality rates in the US are worse than in other countries because the
capitalist minority in the US has relatively more power to impose their
interests on the majority. There is less social solidarity. 'Free' markets
are unhealthy.   

However, I agree this 'explanation' needs to be made more compelling.
Martin also noted a practical problem in relating various Reich-type
factors (like the location of 'dirty' industries) to health is that a lot
of the data is not available on the basis of the SMSA (metropolitan)
scale. As it happens I am beavering away at drawing togeather SMSA data in
Canada and the US, including doing some aggregating of data to build up
SMSA-level data on local government finances. It's a nightmare, so if
anyone knows of similar efforts please contact me directly.

Bill Burgess


--------
Bill Burgess  ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Department of Geography, Tel: (604) 822-2663
University of British Columbia, B.C. Fax: (604) 822-6150

Re: Income Inequality and Health

[Bill Burgess]

Martin Brown wrote that ecological regressions (like average health against 
average income plus income inequality) are not worth the effort.  Could you 
expand a bit on why? I think regession assumptions like linearity, 
independendence of variables and unidirection of causality are big problems 
(on top of many issues regarding measuring health), but is this what you 
have in mind? If so, can you cite a non-econometric-technical summary of 
these problems, especially as they apply to health?

Bill Burgess


At 03:12 PM 24/08/01 -0400, you wrote:
>I'll try to respond to this when I have more time to do it right.  But there
>is something else I wanted to bring up from the International Health
>Economics Association meeting.
>
>There were several plenary and regular sessions focusing on the "Wilkinson
>Hypothesis".  That is to say the theory that there is a relationship between
>macroeconomic measures of income inequality and average health status.  This
>relationship is above and beyond that expected by the "Prescott Curve," that
>says there is a strong relationship between the level of individual income
>and individual health.  To make a long story short, the consensus at the
>meeting both from those who had been advocates and detractors of the W
>hypothesis in the past is that current data and/or sophisticated analysis
>does not support the hypothesis for most situations examined - e.g. OECD
>countries, within UK, within Canada, within Australia.  The remaining, very
>important case, is within the U.S.  Some cross-sectional analyses of SMSA
>data within the U.S. - notably by Michael Wolfson of Statistics Canada -
>strongly support the hypothesis.  The counter-argument, put forward by Angus
>Deaton - an econometrician/development economist - is that when one enters
>percent black population into the regression for the U.S. the coefficients
>on the inequality measures drop out.  This only happens if one looks
>separately at health status (e.g. mortality) for blacks and whites
>separately.  And, note, white mortality is inversely related to percent
>black population.
>
>There was some discussion to the effect that macro measures of social
>structure still matter but that things like Gini coefficients of measured
>income were never very good measures.  Some discussion about dysfunction
>urban structures in the U.S. being the real issue, etcbut apart from
>this what should we make of this debate??
>
>1]  All attempts a these kinds of ecological regression are not worth the
>effort.
>2]  There is rationale for Deaton to substitute percent black for income
>inequality.
>3]  Percent black is a proxy measure for something that really is important
>- but what is it??
>
>I will say this for health economics.  1] Would the questions of inequality
>ever dominate a meeting of AEA?   2] Would everybody at an AEA meeting, even
>those on the political right end of the debate, concede the importance of
>the Prescott curve, say that economists have ignored this for far too long
>and that we need to learn a lot more about the specific mechanisms behind
>this statistical relationship and intervene with social programs to address
>it?  3] Acknowledge that the Prescott Curve, alone, tells us that total
>social welfare would/should be improved by transfering social resources
>toward lower end of the income distribution (because 99% of health
>economists have pretty much accepted the proposition that a additional unit
>of health is/ought to be worth at least as much to a poor person as a rich
>person).
>
>On the down side, this debate has received the least visibility in the one
>country where the evidence suggests that both the Prescott Curve and
>(perhaps) the Wilkinson effects are the strongest - the US.

Re: Re: Lumber politics

[Bill Burgess]

Of course, the US position is the usual rotton, hypocritical protectionism.

But as Warnock suggests, it has put the spotlight on how corproations are 
'subsidized' in Canada by how public resources are handed over to 
capitalists for next to nothing. I'm waiting for the Council of Canadians 
to fight for our **sovereign right** to keep do this.

The reason the subsidy accusation is hard to make about the Atlantic 
forestry is that much (most?) forestry in the Atlantic region is on private 
land. However, wood  and fibre prices are still low because small woodlot 
owners have little bargaining power relative to the lumber and pulp mills 
they sell to.

In BC most forest land is publicly owned (in Canada provinces own most 
resources). The stumpage rate is basically derived as a residual in an 
estimation of the cost of (profitable) production -- take market price, 
deduct a profit margin, cost of building roads to cut blocks, cost of 
cutting and transportation to buyers,  and if there is anything left over 
the 'Crown' (government) claims it as the return to the owner of the 
resource. Well, they set a *minimum* rate, but basically it goes up and 
down depending on the market price. In some cases logging companies have, 
in effect, 'paid' **negative stumpage** on certain cut blocks,  e.g., when 
the cost of building roads ate up any stumpage change and then some.

The US industry argument has put a spotlight on this system, which in the 
past has been criticized by the labour movement and NDP (until the latter 
get into government, when they back down on any changes). Most recently it 
has been effectively critiqued by environmentalist groups like the Sierra Club.

But Warnock is off-base on the 'neo-colonial' argument. Despite large 
acquisitions by US companies of forestry operations in Canada in recent 
years, a substantial majority of the industry is controlled by Canadian 
corproations -- in 1998,  69 % of wood and paper industry corproate assets 
were Canadian controlled; 20% were controlled from the US (Stats Can 
figures). The system was and is set up to primarily benefit Canadian, not 
foreign capitalists. And, there is proportionately less high-tech, high 
value-added manufacturing in Canada than most rich countries (but slightly 
more than in fellow G7 member Italy), and the 'gap' between Canada and 
other rich countries has been declining , including since 'free' trade 
agreements took effect (OECD data).

This is a trade war between a bigger imperialist country and a smaller 
imperialist country. There's more to come. If we want an example of a 
neocolonial relation, try Canada's subsidy war against Brazil in the 
aircraft market -- Bombardier against Embraer. Canada even banned imports 
of Brazilian beef to pressure Brazil until Canadian government health dept 
scientists publicly denied the accusations there was any danger of mad cow 
disease in Brazil. Since then Canada has provided huge loan subsidies to 
two Bombardier customers (Air Wisconsin? and Northwest?), in violation of 
WTO rules, etc. etc. etc.

Since Canadian left-nationalists are so confused about these questions, it 
fell to the _Globe and Mail_  to run a story describing how in Brazil 
"Canada's stance...smacks of hypocritical first world imperialism, of a 
developed nation trying to deny Brazil the tools it needs to build up 
companies like [Canada's] BombardierThe message being sent is that 
Canada exports airplanes, Brazil exports coffee beans, and that is the say 
it should stay."

Bill Burgess


At 10:05 AM 12/08/01 -0500, Ken wrote:
>Sorry people but at least one Canadian source John Warnock in the
>July-August Canadian Dimension agrees with the US position.
>In fact if what he says is correct you are supporting US imperialist
>exploitation of Canadian forests. He argues that Canadian forestry
>development policy has been designed to attract foreign capital through
>subsidies, incentives, infrastructure development and so forth. For example,
>Canada has the lowest overall stumpage fees in the world according to a 1990
>UN study. Except for other provinces B.C.' s stumpage fees are lowest in the
>world. INn 1999 they were so low it was estimated that they were about half
>what US companies were paying for similar wood.
> As Warnock puts it: "The neo-colonial industrial model results in a
>heavy emphasis on exporting low-value-added wood products, lumber and pulp
>and paper." (p.41) Secondary  manufacturing is relatively weak. It is
>interesting that two large US forest corporations Weyerhauser and
>Louisiana-Pacific pulled out of the Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports. They
>claim that the Canadian government is correct in arguing that it does not
>unfairly subsidise the forest industry. Just coincidentally no doubt both
>companies have acquired cut

Re: Re: why colonialism?

[Bill Burgess]

J. Devine wrote:

>In general, colonialism arises from (1) competition within the ruling 
>class, often among nations; and (2) as a solution to class antagonisms and 
>other internal social stresses.
On the latter (does this inform "why South Africa?"):

"I was in the East End of London [a working class quarter] yesterday and 
attended a meeting of the unemployed. I listened to the wild speeches, 
which were just a cry for 'bread! bread!' and on my way home I pondered 
over the scene and I became more than ever convinced of the importance of 
imperialism...My cherished idea is a solution for the social problem, i.e., 
in order to save the 40,000,000 inhabitants of the United Kingdom from a 
bloody civil war, we colonial statesmen must acquire new lands to settle 
the surplus population, to provide new markets for the goods produced in 
the factories and mines. The Empire, as I have always said, is a bread and 
butter question. If you want to avoid civil war, you must become imperialists."

---Cecil Rhodes in 1895, quoted  by Lenin in Imperialism, the Highest Stage 
of Capitalism

Re: question on trade _theory_

[Bill Burgess]

My thanks to all who replied on and off list to my question about trade theory.

Bill Burgess

Re: question on trade _theory_

[Bill Burgess]

In _For the Common Good_ , Cobbs and  __ state that factor mobility 
(especially of capital) cannot be incorporated in the theory of comparative 
advantage. Is this correct? I seem to recall someone on this list stating 
otherwise.

Can you suggest a textbook or article that takes up this issue, and that 
quickly summarizes various other trade theories (e.g. 'new' trade theory)? 
I'm filling in for an absent colleague in a second year class discussion 
where these issues may come up.

Bill Burgess
([EMAIL PROTECTED])

Re: Re: Re: health & inequality

[Bill Burgess]

sorry, try
http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/319/7215/953/DC1 (BMJ 1999, 319)
If it doesn't work go to bmj.com (British Medical Journal) and look under 
income inequality

At 08:40 PM 01/03/2001 -0800, you wrote:
>This URL seems to be wrong.
>
> > The non-linear effect is examined by Wolfson et al. at
> > http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/319/7215/953/DC1AT. Their modeling
> > suggests it is not responsible for the observed relation between inequality
> > and health in the US.

Re: health & inequality

[Bill Burgess]

The non-linear effect is examined by Wolfson et al. at 
http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/319/7215/953/DC1At. Their modeling 
suggests it is not responsible for the observed relation between inequality 
and health in the US.

Bill

01:54 PM 01/03/01 -0500, you wrote:
>Doug,
>   I have not dug (sic) into this lit although I have seen
>some of it.  I think the argument that there is some
>kind of nonlinear effect at the personal level is very
>reasonable and certainly could be responsible for a
>lot of the apparently conflicting results.
>   In this regard, I think that one would be more likely
>to find stronger connections with the percent of people
>in poverty rather than with inequality per se, with all of
>this having to take into account the nature of the medical
>care system if one is doing cross-country studies.
>Barkley Rosser

Re: Re: death & income

[Bill Burgess]

For a quick review of research on inequality and health check out 
http://www.inequality.org/healthdcfr.html

Bill

Re: Re More privatisation

[Bill Burgess]

Michael asked what the problem was with the original Wilkinson study 
(showing that mortality is related to income inequality among developed 
countries.) I don't know that it is problem, but I think it was Lynch who 
added more developed countries to the list and found the relation was less 
clear than suggested by Wilkinson's original results (but it still exists). 
I attended a recent talk by Lynch where he made a convincing-sounding 
argument about how eating pasta and drinking red wine in Southern Europe 
are another part of why their populations are so much healthier than in 
Northern Europe (and the worst case of all, the United States).

A recent article by Lynch (with Ross et al.) in the British Medical 
Journal, on the relation between income inequality and mortality in 
Canadian and US cities, is available at 
http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/320/7239/898. They estimate that if the 
income share received by the poorer half of all working age households was 
increased by 1%, then mortality would hypothetically decline by 21 deaths 
per 100,000. How many other policy interventions would match this rate?

In an earlier paper Lynch showed that mortality in US states is more 
closely related to income inequality than to income. US cities with greater 
income inequality have significantly higher mortality independent of their 
average income.

In case this is where Doug's uncle comes in, the BMJ paper also cites 
evidence against the argument that the observed relation between health and 
income inequality is an artifact of the non-linear relation between income 
and mortality at the individual level.

One question I have about these results is how income and income inequality 
are treated as 'independent' variables (independent of each other). Is it 
really true this can be 'fixed' with fancy adjustments to the regression 
equation and results?

Bill Burgess

Re: Re:death & income

[Bill Burgess]

Wilkinson kicked a lot of this work off, using Luxemburg Income Study data 
to compare inequality and mortality in a dozen or so countries.The data 
points available then seemed to fit the income inequality increases 
mortality relation, but data for additional countires that has become 
available makes this relation less obvious.

Lynch shows there is a strong relation _within_ the US, i.e. mortality is 
higher in both states and cities that have more unequal incomes. If income 
inequality kills people, the US is the best example.

Bill




  At 06:22 PM 27/02/01 -0500, you wrote:
>J. Barkley Rosser, Jr. wrote:
>
>>   Well, my quick off-the-cuff international
>>regression suggests that this generalization
>>of Jencks's is not true, even if it might be true
>>within some countries.   Thus, the US has
>>a lower life expectancy than Japan and the
>>European social democracies that are at
>>similar levels of per capita income.  But, this
>>might not prove to be statistically significant,
>>even if Auntie Deirdre says not to worry.
>
>Whatever you think about Jencks, he's extremely careful with his numbers. 
>I'm told that he approaches every research question with no preconceptions 
>- he lets his regressions do the talking. Which is another way of saying 
>that he's rather apolitical, though his bias is quasi-Fabian aristo-liberal.
>
>Doug
>

Re: Re: Re: More privatisation

[Bill Burgess]

As it happens I am doing something very similar, as part of an effort to 
figure out why personal income _inequality_ is strongly (negatively) 
related to (age-adjusted) mortality rates in US cities, but not in Canadian 
cities. In other words, do more -- and more equal -- public goods in 
Canadian cities (schools, transit, libraries, sewers, etc.) mitigate some 
of the negative effects of personal income inequality that prevail in the 
US?  (Of course, personal income itself is also strongly negatively related 
to mortality, but an additional? inequality effect seems to apply over the 
range of income.)

BTW, some good recent work on the relation of income inequality and 
mortality is by Australian epidemiologist John Lynch. He offers a 
"neo-material" explanation for this relation in place of some of the 
'social capital' ideas (trust, cohesion, civic participation, etc.) 
recently discussed on Pen-L.

If anyone is working on similar points, please contact me to compare notes.

Bill Burgess

>On Tue, Feb 27, 2001 at 12:15:07AM +1100, Rob Schaap wrote:
> > G'day all,
> >
> > I see the best-cities-to-live-in poll for the year is out.  If memory 
> serves,
> > Vancouver came top and the likes of Vienna, Geneva and Sydney were 
> runners up
> > (my favourites, Melbourne and Amsterdam did well, too - and if these 
> gits had
> > bothered to visit Hobart' Oz would have had the winner, too).  Anyway, the
> > reason I bring this up is because the salient virtue of these places 
> (against
> > traditional faves like London and Paris) are apparently the quality of 
> *public
> > services* and the capacity of leading candidates to resist the inhuman 
> pace of
> > life of our age.  I'm not suggesting such poncy convocations constitute an
> > unimpeachable source (although the bottom-of-the-listers, Brazzaville and
> > Baghdad, are not destinations of mine right now, either), but I do suggest
> > there's a job for an idle economist out there in the collection of the 
> sort of
> > data economists don't count (you could add suicide rates, all those focus
> > group reports on quality-of-life priorities, Australian state election exit
> > polls, intra-city and inter-state migration trends, 
> letters-to-the-editor, and
> > a whole lot of the sort of stuff you often find buried in little columns on
> > page 6 of the Sunday papers).  My suspicion is that, taken together, such a
> > project would produce a monumental wall of evidence against 
> privatisation in
> > particular and the existence of homo economicus in general.
> >
> > Does anyone do this sort of thing?
> >
> > Cheers,
> > Rob.
> >
>
>--
>Michael Perelman
>Economics Department
>California State University
>Chico, CA 95929
>
>Tel. 530-898-5321
>E-Mail [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Canada-Brazil subsidy war

[Bill Burgess]

Brazil's jet dogfight

 By MARK
 MACKINNON
 From Saturday's Globe
 and Mail

 Sao Jose dos Campos, Brazil — A sleek collection of
 factories and office towers set against a background of
 multi-storey homes, Sao Jose dos Campos looks, from
 the highway heading into town, positively First World.

 The slums that dominate other Brazilian centres are
 almost nonexistent in this city of 500,000 nestled
 between the gentle green hills and scattered settlements
 of Sao Paulo state. Instead, corporate logos dot the
 landscape — defence contractors, information
 technology startups, multinational communications firms
 and a fledgling space program.

 Tens of thousands of Brazilians work in the city, in jobs
 that are high-paying by the developing country's
 standards. Tens of thousands more apply annually for
 jobs here.

 If Brazil had a Silicon Valley, a high-tech economic
 engine, it would be here, 100 kilometres northeast of
 Sao Paulo city. And at the economic heart of Sao Jose
 dos Campos is Embraer SA, the country's home-grown
 aerospace giant, with about 10,000 employees of its
 own.

 "Embraer is good for the city," said Carlos da Silva, a
 chauffeur in the area. "It is the centre of everything."

 Somewhere in this picture is the reason Brazil is more
 than willing to go toe-to-toe with Canada in what would
 surely be a mutually harmful trade war, one that revolves
 around an argument over who subsidizes their
 aerospace industry more. Sao Jose dos Campos is a
 model of industrial development the government wants
 to replicate across this impoverished country. It 
can't let
 the working models it has die off — at any cost.

 Since privatizing in 1994, Embraer has rapidly become
 the world's fourth-largest commercial airplane producer
 and the blood rival of Montreal-based Bombardier Inc.
 Two years ago, Embraer passed mining firm Vale do
 Rio Doce to become the country's largest exporter. In a
 country where horse-drawn carts compete for space on
 city roads with the latest Mercedes model, that's raised
 hopes of a high-tech revolution.

 "Embraer has become, in a sense, a symbol — just like
 Bombardier is in Canada — of success," said Jose
 Alfredo Graca Lima, Brazil's top trade negotiator. "As a
 country, we are concerned that we should produce
 more technologically sophisticated goods."

 Those outside Brazil, he said, do not understand the
 company's importance in helping modernize the
 country's economy. Its success is crucial, he argues, if
 Brazil is to change its image from that of a producer of
 bananas, coffee and shoes.

 Embraer is the byproduct of one of the few examples of
 long-term planning by the Brazilian government that
 worked out as planned. In the early 1950s, the
 government established the Aerospace Technological
 Institute, which created in subsequent decades a critical
 mass of well-trained aerospace engineers.

 The Brazilian government also created Embraer,
 originally to manufacture military planes, and ran it as a
 public company until 1994, losing millions of dollars in
 the process.

 After it was privatized, Mauricio Bothelo, the company's
 president and chief executive officer, launched what he
 called the "Redemption Project" — turning the
 company's focus from the military side toward a regional
 jet market still in its infancy.

 It was a prescient move. The company's
 assembly-line-like hangars here are full of dozens of
 37-, 44-, and 50-seat jets in various stages of
 construction. The multitude of logos painted on the sides
 — Air 

Capitalism & Freedom

[Bill Burgess]

At 12:55 AM 24/11/00 -0500, Yoshie wrote:

>If you want to give a little moral credit to some Europeans, why not 
>praise Canadians, the French Jacobins, & the Latin-American Jacobin 
>insurgents in the wars of independence?

Or _some_ Canadians. William Lyon Mackenzie, leader of the 1837-38 failed 
national-bourgeois-democratic revolution in Upper Canada (Ontario) was a 
leader of the Anti-Slavery Society (don't recall its exact name). On the 
other hand, Canada's first PM, Sir John A. MacDonald, was the legal agent 
of the Southern Slave States. The assasination of Abraham Lincoln was 
planned in Montreal.

Bill Burgess

Re: Re: Castro on US elections.

[Bill Burgess]

At 10:13 PM 14/11/00 -0800, Michael wrote:

>Let me ask a different type of question.  Suppose Castro were to hold an
>election.  Suppose he had every intention of making it free and 
>fair.  Wouldn't
>it be a disaster?  It would be open season for the CIA to try to do everything
>it could to muck things up.
There are regular elections in Cuba; there have been since the 1970s. 
Castro is directly elected as the representative of his neighbourhood. I 
believe the municipal representatives elect from themselves the members of 
the national parliament. The other big difference is that candidates 
_cannot_ run on political party affiliation (including CPC) -- candidates 
run on their _personal_ record of ability and public service. (I think I 
also recall that the law prohibits foreign financing of candidates, but I 
can't be sure of that.) The debates in the national parliament are not just 
for show -- they have changed things, e.g. a few years ago a proposal to 
impose income taxes on wage earners was rejected. Municipal governments are 
responsible for many important activities, including management of many 
local state-owned enterprises. It is a different type of electoral system 
but the Cuban government is still selected through elections.

Bill

Re: RE: Castro on US elections.

[Bill Burgess]

At 12:36 PM 09/11/00 -0500, Norm wrote:

>OK, health care is worse than in W.Europe and some don't have it at all in
>the US, but it's far better for most US citizens than just about anywhere
>else.

Far better for most US citizens? I doubt this.

But more to the point - why is _health_ in the US so bad relative to other 
countries? Infant mortality is terrible - one figure I've seen is that 
black infant mortality in Washington is higher than in Havana.

A recent study in the British Medical Journal found that all cause and 
age-adjusted mortality rates in almost every major US city are 
significantly higher than in Canadian cities. They suggest that part of the 
reason is greater income inequality in the US (average income is higher in 
the US,  but income inequality is higher, and signficantly correllated with 
mortality).

US capitalism is a very unhealthy system.

Bill

Re: Canada, Australia, Argentina

[Bill Burgess]

I agree with Paul and Nestor's point about the difference in class 
structure, and Paul's work on Canada's WW1 financing is an excellent 
illustration of the consolidation of an indigenous bourgeoisie.

>Nestor, I think, has put his finger on the critical difference -- neither
>Canada nor Australia had a landed elite such that the role of
>Canada and Australia vs GB was one of subsidiary (dependent?)
>capital vs imperial capital.  In Argentina, there was an intervening
>class, the landed aristocracy. (See, for instance, Baran on this)
>
>I have not done comparable work for Australia and Argentina, but
>for Canada the turning point, in my opinion, was the 1st World
>War.  In Canada's case, Britain ceased to be a creditor to Canada
>because of war created debts.  Canada financed the war from
>borrowing from capitalists made rich by war profiteering on
>government contracts to supply GB.  After the war, the state
>helped smash labour and tax the working and middle class to pay
>off capital debt incurred during the war, a classic case of (marxist)
>primitive accumulation. (By the way -- more shameless promotion --
>  I have written a paper on this.) The railways went bankrupt and
>reneged on their obligations to British bond holders. Though
borrowing shifted after the war from GB to the US, it was not until
>the "American boom in Canada" after the 2nd WW that American
>(direct) investment in Canada came to dominate the resourse and
>manufacturing industries.

However, by the mid 1980s the US-controlled share of all non-financial 
industres in Canada declined to levels below the post-WW2 buildup (the US 
share has risen slightly since then, as has foreign control in all countries).

I consider this 'repatriation' partial evidence that Canadian capital never 
lost _overal_ control of the domestic economy, which they originally 
gained, as I think Paul agrees, by around WW1. Just as a 'national 
bourgeoisie' was able to develop while formally still a British colony, it 
was able to survive and even gain relative strength despite extensive US 
ownership and control in _some_ industrial sectors. I don't think the 
Argentine bourgeoisie ever developed this kind of hegemony over the economy 
and state.

>As a well known member of Bill Burgess's detested left-nationalist
>cabal, I have also argued a form of Canadian dependency.

I winced here until I remembered how Paul has written far more and better 
than I have against some forms of Canadian dependency.

>All one has to do is look at the Cdn
>and Australian $s and see how they dropped in parallel as
>"commodity currencies" (also NZ) to realize the dependency of the
>Cdn/Oz/NZ economies on the imperial centre dominated by the US
>but, in Oz/NZ also the Japanese economies.  Canada has
>recovered somewhat better than Ozzieland in large part because
>the US economy has done much better than Japan.  Since I don't
>know where Argentina's markets are dominated by, I can't
>comment.  However, one common denominator is grain -- more
>particularly wheat.  We are all part of the Cairns group trying to get
>the US and the UE to stop subsidizing agriculture so we can sell
>our grain at a decent price.  Right now our agriculture is in the
>tank.  This demonstrates, I would think, a certain dependence over
>which neither Canada, Australia, nor Argentina have little control.

Where we differ is that Paul interprets this as Canadian and Australian 
dependence a la Frank. This would be appropriate for Argentina, but Canada 
and Australia are in the qualitatively different position of secondary 
imperialist countries. They get bullied by the US as do other secondary 
imperialist countries (e.g. in Europe, by the US and Japan, Germany, UK, 
etc.) but the politics of this relationship are very different than the 
politics of Frankian-like dependency.

Sorry to harp on this issue but I think the failure to distinguish between 
the two kinds of relations with bigger-power imperialism has long been a 
key failing of socialism in Canada (and I think the same applies to 
Australia and New Zealand).

Bill Burgess

Re: [Fwd: [sixties-l] more on 'Steal This Movie']

[Bill Burgess]

It is rank nationalism.

If the complaint was that film production is less unionized in Canada than 
in the US (I don't know if this is true) I could at least partly sympathize 
with the comment about skill levels, job loss, etc. Otherwise, it is a 
wonderful example of the arrogance that comes from living in the greatest 
imperialist country in the world, complete with the hypocritical argument 
about subsidies elsewhere.

Bill

At 11:10 AM 06/09/00 -0700, you wrote:
>what do pen-l's Canadian comrades think of this article?
>
>
>>"Steal this Movie" --
>>
>>From: Michael Everett <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>>
>>Even with its many flaws, which included terrible casting for the two
>>leads, I recommend this film as a sincere attempt at a biopic of Abbie
>>Hoffman -- an icon of the 60's and the embodiment of the American
>>revolutionary tradition.
>>
>>"Steal this Movie" is of course a play on words of Abbie's 60's
>>handbook of revolution, "Steal this Book", but for jobless
>>filmworkers, the title has yet another meaning, because "Steal this
>>Movie" is indeed a stolen movie.  It was stolen by NAFTA and is yet
>>another example of an American cultural product purporting to be made
>>in the US but in fact thrown together in the Canadian movie
>>maquiladoras where runaway productions are rewarded by fat subsidies.
>>
>>Alert filmworkers will notice from the credits that "Steal this Movie"
>>was in fact made in Ontario with just enough second unit work done in
>>NY and LA to make it appear to be an American film.
>>
>>And any film worker who's sat on the edge of their seat through
>>dailies to see whether their work was absolutely perfect will
>>recognize yet another telltale sign of the made in Canada stamp -- the
>>final shot of Abbie, as it moves into the key closeup of the film,
>>wanders totally out of focus.  Maybe it was the mischevious ghost of
>>Abbie himself who threw that shot out of focus, or maybe it was just a
>>Canadian film industry so jammed with subsidized NAFTA production that
>>it can't find camera assistants who care enough or are experienced
>>enough to meet the exacting demands of a difficult craft.
>>
>>No offense to our Canadian brothers and sisters who are just trying to
>>make a buck like the rest of us and who have no more control over the
>>corporate free trade agenda than do American workers, but shame on
>>Producer/Director Robert Greenwald who poses as a liberal, but makes
>>his living out of destroying the very industry that created him.
>>
>>Greenwald's Hollywood credits go back to the 1970's, but he's long
>>since abandoned the Hollywood workers who toiled on his earlier
>>projects for the greener subsidized pastures of Canada.  Of
>>Greenwald's last seven projects, six were fake made in USA films
>>actually produced in Canada.  In addition to 'Steal this Movie", they
>>include:
>>
>>"Deadlocked" (Vancouver), a TV movie about the American justice system
>>"Audrey Hepburn" (Montreal), biopic
>>"Outrage at Glen Ridge" (Toronto), a TV movie about a gang rape set in
>>Glen Ridge, New Jersey
>>"Secret Path" (Toronto), a TV movie about family abuse and race
>>relations set in the rural South
>>"Zelda" (Montreal), a TV biopic about Zelda Fitzgerald
>>
>>Isn't it time we call fake Hollywood liberals like Robert Greenwald to
>>account for their complicity in destroying an industry that took
>>eighty years of sweat and toil to build and for the suffering they've
>>caused to working families?
>>
>>Michael Everett
>>IATSE Local 728, Hollywood
>
>Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] &  http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~jdevine
>

Re: Re: Pomocanadianism

[Bill Burgess]

In reply to Doug's question, I think it was Kari Levitt who coined the term 
"rich dependency" to describe Canada; others have suggested terms like 
intermediate country, 'go-between' imperialist, advanced resource 
capitalism, etc.

No one disputes there is a big material difference between Canada and the 
Third World, but what is often suggested, particularly in terms of 
political strategy, is that Canada shares to a very significant extent the 
Third World's oppression and superexploitation by US imperialism. IMHO what 
this misses is what is the cardinal distinction -- between greater US and 
lesser Canadian imperialism on one side, and the greater and lesser 
imperialized or semi-colonial countries on the other, e.g., Mexico or 
Argentina to Haiti.

I've been reading about the CPC debate on this issue in the 1920s. At its 
founding in 1921 it was more or less assumed Canada was in the imperialist 
camp; in the mid-1920s the CPC began to claim that Canada was a dependent 
semi-colony; but by the end of the 1920s this was rejected and Canada was 
defined as an independent imperialist country. The CP still considers 
Canada imperialist _in purely formal terms_ but has dropped the independent 
adjective (because Canada is considered an adjunct of US imperialism). In 
practice the  CPC has long been more Canadian nationalist than the NDP.

Without being able to provide the details, I think one way of answering 
Brad's question of why Canada and Australia thrived and Argentina did not 
is that the latter was not able to make the transition to imperialist 
status.  Canada and Australia developed the economic base and class 
structure necessary for admission to the imperialist club despite their 
formal political status as colonies (later 'dominions'). Argentina did not, 
despite its formal political independence. Many apply to the club. Only a 
few are allowed in.

I think the (pomoCanadian?) attitude of being "at the margins" reflects 
_envy_ of major imperialist status.

Bill


>Bill Burgess wrote:
>
>>Actually, Canada has often been compared to Argentina by (some) Canadian 
>>political economists and leftists. While they would not deny the _degree_ 
>>of Canadian dependence is less,  they they often do suggest that Canada 
>>is dependent "in the same way" as Argentina - or to take a more recent 
>>example, Mexico in the context of NAFTA. The traditional dependency 
>>argument is rarely made any more, but its logic persists in the Canadian 
>>left-nationalist response to current events. While nationalism in nasty 
>>imperialist France or Germany is regarded with suspicion, Canada, you 
>>see, is in a different category...
>
>How do they deal with the fact that Canadian incomes are 3 times Mexico's 
>(according to the World Bank's PPP estimates) - and a hair higher than 
>France and Germany's even?
>
>Doug
>

Re: Pomocanadianism

[Bill Burgess]

>>Doug wrote:
>
>This seems a bit overstated - not from the point of view of Argentina, but 
>the parallel to Canada. Canada may be under the shadow of the U.S., but it 
>is a rich G7 country and the home to major multinational corps and banks. 
>It is, vis a vis the outside world except for the U.S., a mini-imperialist 
>power. Argentina is unambiguously in a dependent position. Surely even 
>Canadian nationalists don't deny that Canada is not dependent in the same 
>way that Argentina is.

Actually, Canada has often been compared to Argentina by (some) Canadian 
political economists and leftists. While they would not deny the _degree_ 
of Canadian dependence is less,  they they often do suggest that Canada is 
dependent "in the same way" as Argentina - or to take a more recent 
example, Mexico in the context of NAFTA. The traditional dependency 
argument is rarely made any more, but its logic persists in the Canadian 
left-nationalist response to current events. While nationalism in nasty 
imperialist France or Germany is regarded with suspicion, Canada, you see, 
is in a different category...

Bill

Fwd: WTO's next challenge? Unfair use of sushi - The Globe and Mail

[Bill Burgess]

This is too good to not pass on.

>X-Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Unverified)
>X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Light Version 3.0.5 (32)
>The Globe and Mail  Thursday, August 3, 2000
>
>WTO's next challenge? Unfair use of sushi
>
> By Jim Stanford
>
> This just in: A dispute-settlement panel of the World Trade
>Organization has ruled that Japan's traffic laws constitute a barrier to
>trade and must be changed.
> The judgment is considered a major victory for North American and
>European auto producers, who argued before the WTO that Japan's
>requirement that vehicles drive on the left side of the road established an
>unfair barrier to imports of cars and trucks.
> As one auto-industry lobbyist explained, "The Japanese government
>literally forces its citizens to drive on the wrong side of the road. It's
>the
>major reason why they don't buy our left-hand-drive vehicles."
> The WTO panel is similar to those that forced Canada to abolish the
>auto pact, its pharmaceutical patent laws, its domestic magazine policy,
>an aerospace technology program, and several agricultural marketing
>boards.
> The Japanese government must now enter into negotiations with
>other countries to determine a timetable for reforming its traffic laws.
>Sales of imported vehicles in Japan are expected to enjoy an immediate
>boost as a result of the WTO decision. Large North American sport-utility
>vehicles, such as the Dodge Durango and the tank-like General Motors
>Hummer, are likely to experience the greatest increases in market
>penetration thanks to their enhanced ability to withstand head-on
>collisions.
> International Trade Minister Pierre Pettigrew hailed the WTO's
>decision as a victory for free trade. "Sure, there will be short-run
>adjustment costs," he admitted, referring to the temporary increase in
>head-on crashes. "But, in the long run, the Japanese will start to focus
>their skills and resources in those industries where they are more
>efficient."
> Emboldened by the WTO decision, foreign automakers plan to
>launch other complaints against Japanese trade practices. Sources
>within the industry hint that the next challenge may target the unfair use
>of the Japanese language. "Japanese customers can hardly make sense
>of North American owner's manuals," said one Detroit-based auto
>analyst. "They're much less likely to buy a vehicle when they can't figure
>out how to make it work."
> It's widely expected that Japan would resist any WTO demands to
>abolish Japanese by claiming a cultural exemption to normal trade rules.
>But a WTO official scoffed. "There's even less genuine cultural value to
>a Japanese-language owner's manual than there is in the Canadian
>edition of Reader's Digest."
> China's trade ministry, meanwhile, expressed pleasure at the WTO
>decision, suggesting that it enhances the likelihood that Beijing will soon
>be admitted to the world trading club. "Sure, our country is still nominally
>run by Communists," said one official. "But we drive on the right side of
>the road. This clearly indicates our readiness to accept the discipline of
>world market forces."
> The implications of the WTO's ruling on traffic laws may extend to
>other industries. An association representing U.S. beef growers is
>already planning a trade challenge against the Japanese sushi industry.
>"Japanese consumers are indoctrinated to eat raw fish from the time
>they are toddlers," one beef lobbyist said. "No wonder they won't buy our
>meat. That's completely unacceptable."
> The beef challenge may be backed by powerful support from the
>pharmaceutical industry, which has long complained of a lack of
>Japanese demand for U.S.-made cholesterol-reduction drugs.
> The latest WTO decision represents another expansion in the scope
>and breadth of the trade body's dispute-settlement system. What was
>initially intended as a means of arbitrating relatively narrow and arcane
>questions of trade law has evolved into an authority with the mandate to
>challenge any law, policy or practice found to inhibit the pre-eminent goal
>of expanded world trade.
> The worldwide economic and cultural harmonization thus being
>encouraged by the dispute-settlement mechanism is a normal side-effect
>of globalization, said a top U.S. trade official assigned to the WTO.
>"Basically, it won't stop until foreigners think like Americans, act like
>Americans and shop like Americans."
>
>
>When not reporting on WTO decisions from Geneva, Jim Stanford is an
>economist with the Canadian Auto Workers union.

Re: FYI: Income shifts in Canada and US

[Bill Burgess]

Jim wrote:

>since much of the Canadian economy is owned by residents of the US, might 
>we think of the top 1/5 (or better, the top 1/100) of the US economy as 
>being the richest part of the Canadian distribution?

Not sure why we might think this way. There are more Canadian billionaires 
than US billionaires in the latest _Forbes_ billionaire rankings, per 
capita. Canadian residents still control 6 times as many corporate assets 
in Canada as do US residents. Canadians hold more FDI in other countries 
than foreigners own in Canada.

Bill Burgess

FYI: Income shifts in Canada and US

[Bill Burgess]

Statistics Canada

The Daily. Friday, July 28, 2000

Income inequality in Canada and the United States

1974-1997

Income distribution patterns in Canada and the United States have diverged 
during the
past 10 years despite free trade and increased economic integration between 
the two nations,
according to a new study.

Average real incomes are higher and have been growing considerably faster 
in the United States. At
the same time, Canada has not seen the substantial increase in income 
inequality that has occurred in
the United States.

Inequality (the gap between rich and poor) and polarization (decline in the 
middle class) of family
disposable incomes in Canada has remained roughly stable since the mid 
1970s, while it has
increased in the United States, more so since the mid 1980s.

The income gap between Canadian and American families has widened at the 
top of the income
spectrum. At the bottom of the income spectrum, Canadian families are 
better off in terms of
purchasing power than are their American counterparts.

The study, «Income inequality in North America: Does the 49th parallel 
still matter?,» explores
patterns of change between 1974 and 1997 in average earnings and income 
distribution in Canada
and the United States. It also investigated these patterns on the basis of 
broad geographic regions
within both countries.

The study rejected a theory that increasing economic integration has lead 
to greater similarity in
patterns of income distribution in the two countries. Rather, the results 
suggested a widespread
difference in overall income distribution in both Canada and the United 
States. If anything, the
differences appeared to be widening, at least up to 1997.

Income inequality in United States has risen more rapidly

While Canadian and American societies are similar in many respects, their 
levels and trends in
income inequality have been quite different during the past two decades.

Real incomes are higher and have been growing faster in the United States 
on average. However,
income inequality is higher in the United States, and it has been rising 
more rapidly.

In terms of comparative economic well-being, Canadian families in the 
bottom 25% of the income
distribution were better off in absolute terms in 1997 than were their 
counterparts in the United
States.

However, in the top one-fifth of the income distribution, American families 
had disposable incomes
more than 20% higher than their Canadian counterparts. In the top one-tenth 
of the income
distribution, disposable incomes among American families were about 25% higher.

In 1997, disposable incomes for American families in the top one-fifth of 
the income distribution
averaged $61,400 compared with $50,800 for Canadian families.

Government transfer programs have had a substantially equalizing impact on 
family income
distributions on both sides of the border. In fact, between 1974 and 1985, 
the American transfer
system appeared more redistributive than Canada's. However, between 1985 
and 1997,
government transfer programs in Canada generally had larger impacts.

Individual income and payroll taxes have also had an equalizing impact on 
the distribution of family
income on both sides of the border. This effect was somewhat larger in 
Canada than in the United
States. However, in both countries, income taxes had considerably weaker 
equalizing impacts than
did income transfers.

Average earnings higher in the United States

In 1997, American workers averaged about $36,500 in earnings (expressed in 
1995 Canadian
dollars using purchasing power parities), 29.2% more than the Canadian 
average of $28,300. These
workers included both men and women, employed both full-time and part-time, 
and employees as
well as the self-employed.

These 1997 averages followed increases of 14.6% in the United States
between 1985 and 1997 and 5.9% in Canada.

The differences in earnings between the two countries was largest for 
workers at the top of the
earnings distribution. The difference at the median - the middle point at 
which half the population has
higher earnings and half lower - was smaller (13.6%). The median earnings 
of American workers
were $27,500 in 1997, compared with $24,200 in Canada.

Also, the rate of increase in median earnings was much closer than those 
for mean earnings. In the
United States, median earnings increased 8.7% from 1985 to 1997, and in 
Canada 7.7%.

Between 1974 and 1985, earnings inequality and polarization increased in 
both countries. These
changes were more pronounced in Canada than in the United States.

However, between 1985 and 1997, these trends were completely reversed in 
Canada, where the
earnings gap narrowed and polarization declined. In the United States, 
earnings inequality continued
to increase, but polarization declined, signaling a reversal of the 
"disappearing middle-class jobs"
phenomenon first noted over a decade ago.

The feature article «Income inequality in North America: 

Re: query

[Bill Burgess]

At 09:59 AM 26/07/00 -0400, you wrote:
>Is anyone aware of any empirical studies on the tendency for the rate of
>profit to equalize across industries over time?
>
>Rudy

This may not be quite your topic but if I remember correctly, in a 1991 
_The Canadian Geographer_ D. Rigby showed that manufacturing profits in 
Canada did not equalize between places, and I think he and M. Webber have 
shown the same for the US in their _The Golden Age Illusion_ . But perhaps 
you are looking for equalization between (not within) sectors.

Bill Burgess

Re: "Houston, we have a problem."

[Bill Burgess]

 gets into political hot water.. The Canadian government 
passed
NAFTA with the support of oil producers Canadian and US owned, so how do I 
let them
off the hook? You fail to remark on the pricing aspects of NAFTA or the 
national
treatment requirement. Is that of no significance. Do you deny that we are 
unable
to charge a higher price for export than within Canada. Is that of no 
significance?
My understanding of NAFTA is that it allows other members the same claims 
on our
oil and gas resources as Canadians. Is that wrong? Maybe Paul Phillips has
something to say, or Rod Hay.I think I know your views on left nationalism:)
Cheers, Ken Hanly

And:

Come to think of it isn't the approved rise in prices in BC a direct result of
NAFTA? You say the government blames the rise on US prices. If the BC 
government
charges BC customers less than the US prices it would have to sell to the US at
those lower price under NAFTA. So are you saying that NAFTA has nothing to 
do with
it that BC could export gas at the higher US prices but charge less in BC? That
would not be allowed under NAFTA. Or are you suggesting that BC should export
natural gas at below market prices. This would surely increase demand and 
deplete
our reserves even quicker.
CHeers, Ken HanlyAt 07:44 PM 07/07/00 -0500, you wrote:
>Come to think of it isn't the approved rise in prices in BC a direct result of
>NAFTA? You say the government blames the rise on US prices. If the BC 
>government
>charges BC customers less than the US prices it would have to sell to the 
>US at
>those lower price under NAFTA. So are you saying that NAFTA has nothing to 
>do with
>it that BC could export gas at the higher US prices but charge less in BC? 
>That
>would not be allowed under NAFTA. Or are you suggesting that BC should export
>natural gas at below market prices. This would surely increase demand and 
>deplete
>our reserves even quicker.
>CHeers, Ken Hanly
>
>Bill Burgess wrote:
>
> > Ken H. asked about foreign ownership of oil in Canada.
> >
> > According to StatsCan, foreign control of 'energy'  industries (I assume
> > this covers oil, gas and hydro) in Canada was 19.8% by assets in 1997, down
> > from 23.2% in 1989 when 'free' trade came into effect. (When measured by
> > revenues foreign control is up slightly, from 32.4% to 33.7%.) The US
> > accounts for about 70% of the foreign share.
> >
> > The most recent figures I have for the petroleum sector (upstream and
> > downstream) are for 1988, when the foreign share of revenues was 59.6%; the
> > foreign share of assets would be lower. In the 1970s foreign control of
> > petroleum was over 90%.
> >
> > The government regulatory agency here in BC just approved an approximate
> > 25% increase in gas rates on top of another recent large increase,  blaming
> > the rise in US prices. But I disagree with Ken H. that the gas hikes should
> > be attributed to NAFTA as this lets Canadian corporations and governments
> > and capitalism in general off the hook. Also, it is not quite true that
> > 'Canada' can't say 'no' to the US - energy export volumes to the US can be
> > reduced each year by up to a certain percentage of the current year's
> > exports (I seem to remember 15%, but that may be wrong).
> >
> > Bill Burgess
> >
> > At 12:20 PM 07/07/00 -0500, you wrote:
> > >High prices are not beneficial to Canadian consumers. They benefit energy
> > >producers many of whom are US multinationals. There is an ongoing battle
> > >between ranchers and oil and gas producers. A recent bill in the ALberta
> > >legislature allows the government to end ranch leases of public land 
> and turn
> > >them over to oil and gas developers just like that. It also channels 
> royalties
> > >to the provincial governments rather than to the municipalities where 
> the gas
> > >and oil wells are located. These municipalities are often sparsely 
> populated
> > >with very low tax bases. However, representatives of rancher groups and
> > >gas and
> > >oil developers seem to be working out some compromise. The bill will 
> no doubt
> > >be amended and regulations will involve a compromise. The original terms
> > >though
> > >show the stripes (Stars an Stripes) of the Alberta government. Alberta 
> is one
> > >of the richest and most reactionary Canadian provinces. It is an 
> extension of
> > >Texas to the north.
> > > My main point is that it would make sense to have a national 
> policy as we
> > >did under Trudeau that developed energy resources in the first 
> instance so as
> > >t

Re: Re: "Houston, we have a problem."

[Bill Burgess]

Ken H. asked about foreign ownership of oil in Canada.

According to StatsCan, foreign control of 'energy'  industries (I assume 
this covers oil, gas and hydro) in Canada was 19.8% by assets in 1997, down 
from 23.2% in 1989 when 'free' trade came into effect. (When measured by 
revenues foreign control is up slightly, from 32.4% to 33.7%.) The US 
accounts for about 70% of the foreign share.

The most recent figures I have for the petroleum sector (upstream and 
downstream) are for 1988, when the foreign share of revenues was 59.6%; the 
foreign share of assets would be lower. In the 1970s foreign control of 
petroleum was over 90%.

The government regulatory agency here in BC just approved an approximate 
25% increase in gas rates on top of another recent large increase,  blaming 
the rise in US prices. But I disagree with Ken H. that the gas hikes should 
be attributed to NAFTA as this lets Canadian corporations and governments 
and capitalism in general off the hook. Also, it is not quite true that 
'Canada' can't say 'no' to the US - energy export volumes to the US can be 
reduced each year by up to a certain percentage of the current year's 
exports (I seem to remember 15%, but that may be wrong).

Bill Burgess


At 12:20 PM 07/07/00 -0500, you wrote:
>High prices are not beneficial to Canadian consumers. They benefit energy
>producers many of whom are US multinationals. There is an ongoing battle
>between ranchers and oil and gas producers. A recent bill in the ALberta
>legislature allows the government to end ranch leases of public land and turn
>them over to oil and gas developers just like that. It also channels royalties
>to the provincial governments rather than to the municipalities where the gas
>and oil wells are located. These municipalities are often sparsely populated
>with very low tax bases. However, representatives of rancher groups and 
>gas and
>oil developers seem to be working out some compromise. The bill will no doubt
>be amended and regulations will involve a compromise. The original terms 
>though
>show the stripes (Stars an Stripes) of the Alberta government. Alberta is one
>of the richest and most reactionary Canadian provinces. It is an extension of
>Texas to the north.
> My main point is that it would make sense to have a national policy as we
>did under Trudeau that developed energy resources in the first instance so as
>to benefit Canadians. Trudeau was hated by ALbertans. He nationalised a 
>big oil
>player Petro-Can. Of course now it is privatised again. Why should we sign an
>agreement that forces us to sell energy at the same price if we export it 
>as we
>charge internally?
> I tried to check out the percentage of foreign ownership of oil but
>couldn't find it. Perhaps Paul Phillips has the data at hand. I have no 
>idea of
>the environmental impact of the exploration. Ranchers have complained about
>messes oil companies have left etc. and about the meagre compensation they 
>get.
>But perhaps others know more about this. Alberta range land is not exactly as
>biodiverse as Amazon Rain forest. I am not sure how fragile it is.
> Cheers, Ken Hanly
>
>Jim Devine wrote:
>
> > Ken wrote:
> > >The posts show that Canada has a shortage of natural gas and higher prices
> > >because of NAFTA.
> >
> > At first blush, a high 'gas' price would be as beneficial to Canada as a
> > high oil price is to OPEC, but who is capturing the scarcity rents implied
> > by this higher gas price? is the higher gas price encouraging
> > environmentally-destructive seeking of new natural gas sources?
> >
> > BTW, could someone remind me of why deregulation of electrical power in the
> > US (or rather, the type of deregulation implemented) has led to rapid
> > increases in electricity prices in San Diego and "rolling brown-outs" in
> > San Francisco?
> >
> > Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] &  http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~jdevine

Re: Re: Malthus revisited (fwd)

[Bill Burgess]

At 08:07 AM 28/06/00 -0400, Louis wrote:

>Can the capitalist system resolve these  [ecological]  problems? This is a 
>theoretical
>question that has challenged a wide variety of thinkers. David Harvey's new
>book "Justice, Nature, and the Geography of Difference" argues that it can.

Harvey does NOT argue capitalism can resolve ecological problems. Did you 
read the book?

Bill Burgrss

Re: RE: energy crises

[Bill Burgess]

Just to be clear, I was not referring to the accumulated natural production 
over millions of years (see below), but to the 'proven reserves' that are a 
function of current technology and priceand world politics.

If Mark rejects the 'official' estimates of (rising) oil reserves I quoted, 
how do we guess if there is 10 years or 1,000 years worth left? How much is 
in the Alberta tar sands?

I wrote that technology and prices can (not _will_) increase reserves 
faster than consumption; I suppose I should have added under certain 
conditions, and for a time, but I didn't realize this was necessary.

The point is that capitalism has access to more oil now than when OPEC 
shook things up in the 1970s, and real oil prices can still rise a lot 
before they reach heights that capitalism was able to stumble over without 
falling flat on its back.

Sorry, it is not abundantly clear to me why dwindling oil is a sound 
political focus for anti-capitalists.

Bill:
> > I forget who Simon's bet was with (Paul Erlich?), but it is
> > undeniable that
> > better technology and higher relative prices can increase reserves of
> > non-renewable resources faster than they are depleted through the
> > outragious rate of consumption in rich countries.

Mark:
>This, too, is completely wrong and shows the futility of trying to debate
>these issues in fora where the most absurd statements which have absolutely
>no basis in fact or theory are uttered ad nauseam without respect for the
>evidence, which is contrary, abundant and clear.

and, that
 >What we are talking about here is the rate at which fossil fuels accumulate
 >under the earth and ocean-shelves. It is very slow indeed, and therefore of
 >no practical importance. For humankind, once the fossil carbon in the mantle
 >NOW is bnurnt, that's IT. It took 500m years to accumulate and we've used it
 >in 250 years.

Re: Re: energy crises

[Bill Burgess]

I forget who Simon's bet was with (Paul Erlich?), but it is undeniable that 
better technology and higher relative prices can increase reserves of 
non-renewable resources faster than they are depleted through the 
outragious rate of consumption in rich countries.

For example, according to a textbook by Agnew and Knox, in 1975 worldwide 
proven reserves of crude oil were 650 billion barrels. By 1985 they had 
risen to 765 billion barrels, and by 1995 they rose to 1 trillion barrels.

Of course, the geographical distribution of oil reserves is important: 
reserves in Europe and N. America were lower in 1995 than in 1975. And, as 
has been mentioned, there are lots of 'externalities' involved, including 
the nasty sunburn I got last week, apparently partly because there are now 
more UV rays caused by ozone-depletion.

I think Hegel and Marx's distinction between barrier and limit can be 
useful when thinking about nature and capitalism - very crudely, nature is 
a barrier; workers and allies are a (potential) limit.

Bill

Re: Re: stats (fwd)

[Bill Burgess]

Sorry, I sent the message below by mistake. I finally got my voice 
recognition software to run my email program,  dictated the phrase as a 
test, but forgot to delete it when I later told it to send my messages.

Bill

>What is the source? Who is Don, MD?
>
>Mine
>
>-- Forwarded message -- Date: Sat, 20 May 2000 11:48:06
>-0700 From: Bill Burgess <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Reply-To:
>[EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject:
>[PEN-L:19367] Re: stats
>
>if I thought that what you wrote was correct, I would have to kill myself.
>
>Bill
>
>At 05:08 PM 19/05/00 -0400, you wrote:
> >Statistics
> >
> >v Number of people in the world, (pop. 5.5 billion) that live in abject
> >poverty: 1.4 billion
> >
> >v Number of people currently expected to die from starvation: 900 million
> >
> >v Percentage of those that live in the undeveloped
> >
> >nations: 97
> >
> >v Number of children in world dying each year from controllable illness:
> >12 million
> >
> >v Number of people in world that died each of the five years of World War
> >II: 10 million
> >
> >v Number of people in world that die each year of preventable social
> >causes: 10 million
> >
> >v Cost of one new Osprey aircraft (50 planned):
> >
> >$84 million
> >
> >v Annual cost of treatment to eliminate world's malaria cases: $84 million
> >
> >v Money set aside annually for malaria control by organized world health:
> >$9 million
> >
> >v Money set aside for Viagra pills per annum by organized world health:
> >$40 million
> >
> >v Number of children in world blinded yearly from lack of Vitamin A: 500
> >million
> >
> >v Number of women who died during childbirth last year in world: 650,000
> >
> >v U.N. estimate of yearly expenditure on war: $800 billion
> >
> >v U.N. estimate of yearly expenditure on health services: $25 billion
> >
> >v Number of children in world that die by age 5 (yearly): 12 million
> >
> >v Percentage of those that succumb to routine preventable health causes: 90
> >
> >v Ratio of African-American to white new born deaths in U.S. last year: 2:1
> >
> >v Number of reported pediatric measles deaths in U.S. last year: 45
> >
> >v Amount of money not allocated by Congress for measles vaccines: $9 million
> >
> >v Average amount of 1999 year-end bonus paid to Oxford HMO execs: $6 million
> >
> >v Time it takes the Pentagon to spend annual federal allocation for
> >women's health: 15 minutes
> >
> >
> >- Figures compiled by Don Sloan, M.D.

Re: stats

[Bill Burgess]

if I thought that what you wrote was correct, I would have to kill myself.

Bill

At 05:08 PM 19/05/00 -0400, you wrote:
>Statistics
>
>v Number of people in the world, (pop. 5.5 billion) that live in abject 
>poverty: 1.4 billion
>
>v Number of people currently expected to die from starvation: 900 million
>
>v Percentage of those that live in the undeveloped
>
>nations: 97
>
>v Number of children in world dying each year from controllable illness: 
>12 million
>
>v Number of people in world that died each of the five years of World War 
>II: 10 million
>
>v Number of people in world that die each year of preventable social 
>causes: 10 million
>
>v Cost of one new Osprey aircraft (50 planned):
>
>$84 million
>
>v Annual cost of treatment to eliminate world's malaria cases: $84 million
>
>v Money set aside annually for malaria control by organized world health: 
>$9 million
>
>v Money set aside for Viagra pills per annum by organized world health: 
>$40 million
>
>v Number of children in world blinded yearly from lack of Vitamin A: 500 
>million
>
>v Number of women who died during childbirth last year in world: 650,000
>
>v U.N. estimate of yearly expenditure on war: $800 billion
>
>v U.N. estimate of yearly expenditure on health services: $25 billion
>
>v Number of children in world that die by age 5 (yearly): 12 million
>
>v Percentage of those that succumb to routine preventable health causes: 90
>
>v Ratio of African-American to white new born deaths in U.S. last year: 2:1
>
>v Number of reported pediatric measles deaths in U.S. last year: 45
>
>v Amount of money not allocated by Congress for measles vaccines: $9 million
>
>v Average amount of 1999 year-end bonus paid to Oxford HMO execs: $6 million
>
>v Time it takes the Pentagon to spend annual federal allocation for 
>women's health: 15 minutes
>
>
>- Figures compiled by Don Sloan, M.D.

Re: racism, eurocentrism

[Bill Burgess]

At 10:56 AM 14/04/00 -0700, Sam wrote:

>No, it wasn't euro-centric to expect a revolution there and then [Germany
1918-19], it was
>eurocentric to presume that such a revolution was a necessary and maybe
>even a sufficient condition to lead world socialism. This is the view I
>was arguing against. Right up until his death Trotsky maintained that
>the survival of the USSR and world socialism depended on revolution in
>the imperialist countries.

"Expect" was a poor word to use on my part. But are you saying it was wrong
in 1918-19 to have the *perspective* of revolution in Germany, that
Comintern stragegy should consider that this would be the next key step
forward in world socialism, and that the Comintern should instead have
counted on revolutions in the colonial countries as the next key step?
Otherwise, what is Eurocentric about Lenin and Trotsky's perspective (all
this before the Third Congress)?

If the idea that the survival of the USSR and world socialism (utlimately)
depends on revolution in the imperialist countries is Eurocentric, then I
guess I have to plead guilty. Perhaps we should change the name of this
list to Progressive Economists for Revolutions Somewhere Else.  

>Roy believed that since no revolution in Germany or
>elsewhere was forthcoming this surplus value would have to be cut off at
>the source i.e. through revolutions in the south and east in order to
>press the western working class into revolutionary agency. And maybe
>give them some confidence and an example (this was also Marx's argument
>that I cited previously). Lenin didn't go this far into proto Maoism.

I don't know much about Roy, but if this was his position and is an example
of non-Eurocentrism, it this idea of pressing into revolutionary agency
does not seem to be a gain over Eurocentrism. 

> The alliances [post-Lenin Comintern] were disastrous and it was partly
because of
>eurocentrism-- socialism wasn't possible in such backward places
>independent of European revolution.

Lenin and Trotsky were both champions of arguments against the Second
Interntional-Menshevic claim that socialism couldn't take root in
'backward' places. How does that make them Eurocentrist, even before Roy
and the Third Congress?

>Right, at the second congress, this [Roy's position] was later reversed at
the 3rd and
>subsequent congresses. Roy was given 5 minutes to speak at the third
>congress (!) I have the second congress resolution around here somewhere
>but can't find it right now. 

>Roy and other southern delegates to
>the 3rd congress did compare the Comintern's policy to the Second int'l.
>I can't find the documentation right now. Tomorrow.

I was not aware of an important change to the 2nd Congress position at the
Third or Fourth Congresses, so thanks in advance for finding the
references. But I seem to recall that Lenin and/or other Bolshevic leaders
also criticized (some) Communist Party leaders for hanging on to Second
International-type positions. Again, where is the Eurocentrism here?

>There were important theoretical differences between the Lenin and
>Stalin-Zinoviev comintern but these differences came to nothing in
>practice. The Comintern  blew it for many reasons, one of them being
>eurocentrism.

I don't want to reherse the issue of Stalinism (I think Stalin's Comintern
turned CPs into border guards of the interests of the Soviet bureaucracy,
and was the antithesis of the Lenin's Internationalist Comintern). I took
up your comments because of the claim that Eurocentrism was a key problem.
It seemed to me this was an example of what Carroll referred to, where a
reasonably sound analysis and terminology (imperialism, opportunism,
reformism, racism, etc.) already exists. Applying terms like Eurocentrism
mistakes the real issues (in this case, the problem of Stalinism).

Eurocentrism is real, but it should not be aimed at the 'Europeans' who
contributed most, theoretically, organizationally and politically to the
fight against this problem, e.g. Lenin. 

Bill Burgess

Re: Re:racism, eurocentrism

[Bill Burgess]

Sorry I was unclear. I was disagreeing with the positions quoted below
(which I attributed to Sam P), that Lenin and Trotsky were Eurocentrist in
politically important ways and that Stalinism = Eurocentrism. 

Mine wrote:

>Bill Burgess wrote:
>
>>it was Eurocentric
>>to expect a revolution in Germany in 1918-19

> >3) the Eurocentric policy of the Comintern led to disastrous
>alliances with the bourgeoisie in countries like China, Turkey and
>>Indonesia.

Thanks for the references on the Second Congress discussion, which is what
I was referring to in disagreeing with Sam's suggestion that Lenin and Roy
were in opposite corners on the importance of (or prospects for)
revolutions in the 'colonial' countries. 

(I do think it is half wrong to suggest that Lenin viewed the revolution in
Russia as a democratic revolution against feudalism,  but what we are
discussing here is the alledged role of Eurocentrism.) 

Bill Burgess
 

Re: racism, eurocentrism

[Bill Burgess]

If I understood Sam's comments correctly, he argues 1) it was Eurocentric
to expect a revolution in Germany in 1918-19, that 2) Lenin rejected Roy's
emphasis on the importance of the revolutions in colonial countries, and
that 3) the Eurocentric policy of the Comintern led to disasterous
alliances with the bourgeoisie in countries like China, Turkey and Indonesia.

1) Why was the perspective in 1918-19 on Germany wrong? The Comintern
blamed the failure on the Communist Party's poor leadership rather than
assuming the German working class were inherently reformist.  

2) In fact, at the Third Congress (or the Second?) Lenin changed his
original position and endorsed part of Roy's approach on the colonial
revolution. I think that part of the shift in the Lenin's position was to
accept Roy's sharper formulation of how unreliable allies the colonial
bourgeoise classes were, and to clarify that the class struggle in these
countries had a different strategic framework than in the imperialist
countries. How is it Eurocentric to programitically codify the rejection of
the Second International's 'socialist colonial policy'?

3) I'm sure Sam is well aware of it, so I wonder why he ignores the
cardinal differences between the Stalinist policy of the Comintern in
China, Turkey and Indonesia and the 'Lenin-Roy' approach adopted by the
Third Congress?

Bill Burgess 


At 11:42 PM 12/04/00 -0700, you wrote:
>
> Carrol wrote:
>> >
>> My objection to the label "eurocentrism" is not to its false application
>> -- all labels may be and are misused -- but to its redundancy. I claim
>> that there is no instance of its use in which it would not be more
>> accurate to speak of racism, of imperialism, or of racism & imperialism.
>
>No. Western Marxism has been full of Euro-centrism. Two of the greatest
>champions and fighters for socialist internationalism and against
>imperialism and racism--Lenin and Trotsky-- were Euro-centrists. After
>the events of 1918-19 in Germany, they moved away from this position
>realizing that the German working class had put its eggs in the soc-dem
>basket. If international socialism was to become an actuality, the
>impetus for it would have to come from the east and the south. Further,
>Marxists in the East and the South could not accept the fact that their
>liberation from colonialism would be achieved on the coat tails of the
>workers of Paris, London and Detroit.
>  This view was summed up by the Indian communist M.N. Roy in his report
>to the second congress of the Comintern (1920-- which can be called the
>'third worldist' congress):
>
>"[Comrade Roy] defends the idea that the fate of the revolutionary
>movement in Europe depends entirely on the course of the revolution in
>the East. Without victory of the revolution in the Eastern countries,
>the Communist movement in the West would come to nothing. This being so,
>it is essential that we divert our energies into developing and
>elevating the revolutionary movement in the East and accept as our 
>fundamental thesis that the fate of world communism depends on the
>victory of Communism in the East."
>
>This view can be found in Marx (and probably Engels) as early as 1853:
>
>"It may seem a very strange, and a very paradoxical assertion that the
>next uprising of the people of Europe, and their next movement for
>republican freedom may depend more probably on what is now passing in
>the Celestial Empire [China]...it may be safely augured that the Chinese
>revolution will throw the spark into the overloaded mine of the present
>industrial system and cause the explosion of the long prepared general
>crisis, which, spreading abroad will be closely followed by political
>revolutions on the Continent." *Revolution in China and Europe* New York
>tribune June 14, 1853.
>
>Lenin would have none of this:
>
>"Comrade Roy goes too far when he asserts that the fate of the West
>depends exclusively on the degree of development and the strength of the
>revolutionary movement in the eastern Countries. In spite of the fact
>that the proletariat in India numbers five million and there are 37
>million landless peasants, the Indian comrades have not succceeded in
>creating a Communist Party in their country. This fact alone shows that
>Comrade Roy's views are to a large extent unfounded."
>
>As if the balance of class forces depends on how many people have a card
>that says "member of the Communist Party"! And this after millions had
>taken part in anti-British actions--including general strikes-- in
>1920-1!
>
>Lenin's assistant Safarov commented:
>
>"...the Communist Parties of the imperialist countries have done
>extraord

[PEN-L:12625] Re: free labour in Canada

[Bill Burgess]

In reply to my suggestion that colonial policy restricted the availability
of land in 'Canada', and so retarded capitalism relative to that in the US,
Paul P. asked for any evidence that access to land was more restrictive in
Canada and retarded settlement. 

My evidence is pretty thin (I was hoping Paul would help here). Wakefield's
Appendix in Lord Durham's Report advocates higher land prices in Canada but
complains that lower land prices in the US limited how high 'Canadian'
prices could be set. While Wakefield's specific proposals were not
implemented, I think the Appendix indicates the US land system was
considerably freer. I don't think farmers in the US faced the burden they
did in Canada where at least 1/7 of all land aliented was granted to the
clergy. R. Gourlet's survey in the early part of the 19th century
documented that church lands were considered a major obstacle to settlement
because they were often left 'wild' (no roads through them, etc.) and did
not pay any taxes. Certainly the colonial land system was a central issue
in the 1837-38 rebellions (Canada's failed bourgeois-democratic
revolution), including the issue of feudal tenure in Lower Canada ('Quebec'). 

I suggested that the colonial land policy caused high out-migration, while
Paul wrote he instead connected this to Kondratief-wave depressed commodity
prices. I don't have the data for migration to the US before the 1850s, but
I understand that during much of the first half of the century migration
rates to the US from Canada were very high, especially from Lower Canada
(Quebec) to New England states. Certainly the data does show that in the
last 4 decades of the 19th century, out-migration from Canada (presumably
mostly to the US) exceeded in-migration. I assume Canadian farmers produced
similar commodities as in the northern states. So I wonder whether the
pattern of commodity prices explains very much here, and if the 'political'
explanation of land policy is better. 

Paul wrote: 

>I think I would disagree here.  Though the American west settled 
>before the Canadian, the "great American desert" which includes 
>the Palliasers triangle in Canada was not settled until the same 
>time as was the contiguous area of Canada.  Fowke, and others, 
>argue (I would say persuasively) that the settlement of this area 
>had to await the development of  "dry-land techniques" and the 
>development of crops that could mature within the frost cycle.  If I 
>am not mistaken, settlement of the western Canadian prairies did 
>not precede the settlement of the Dakotas, Montana and the 
>contiguous American prairies.

I think this is right, but my suggestion is that the western settlement was
unlike that in Eastern Canada, that is, it broke with the earlier
restrictive land policy and instead copied the 'American' pattern. It had
to, or Britain-Canada would have lost the west to the US. As I think Paul
wrote, it was the development of the west that spurred industrial
capitalism in Central Canada. My theory is that industrial capitalism in
Canada would not have been a generation or more behind that in the US if it
had a freer land system, e.g. been a democratic republic.

Paul wrote:

>Hold it, is this not one of my prime contentions in this thread -- that 
>exploitation of the aboriginal population is one of the most 
>important modes of primitive accumulation in Canada/UK in this 
>period?  If not, I have failed to communicate my main message.

My point is that the land system (seized from Natives, handed out to
colonial favourites and clergy for speculative profit) is rarely an
important part of the 'staples' explanation of Canadian political economy.
Instead of this political-national issue, it focuses on commodity markets
and the differences between commerical and industrial capital, etc. It
seems to me these are also the central issues in Paul's account. Again, my
question is whether the 'political economy of land' shouldn't occupy some
of the space usually given to the 'political economy of staples'.

Bill Burgess

[PEN-L:12394] free labour in Canada

[Bill Burgess]

Thanks, Paul, for your excellent synthesis of key issues about early
Canadian political economy. I have a couple of questions, though I
apologize that they are rather incoherent.

This thread began on the issue of free labour and land. What would you say
about the idea that one of the main reasons industrial capitalism in Canada
developed later and less robustly than in the US was because access to land
was more restrictive in Canada? (I'm referring here to social restrictions,
not issues of climate/soil etc., which are also important.) Very crudely,
I'm trying to relate this to the broader issue of the role of agriculture
in promoting capitalism. 

Wakefield's appendix to Lord Durham's Report, Pentland's work, etc. point
out that British colonial policy in Canada tried to ensure an adequate
supply of exploitable or free labour, expecially by keeping land prices
high. However, this was often thwarted by the easier access to land in the
more democratic republican US. For most of the 19th century, out-migration
to the US exceeded in-migration to Canada from Europe. 

You point out that settlement of the western plains was inhibited by the
absence of a continuous agricultural frontier. Would you agree the colonial
land system was also central? The west was rapidly settled (European
settlement) after Canada copied whole sections of the democratic post-Civil
War US Homestead Act. If further Metis settlement, or European settlement
(perhaps via the south of the lakes rather than north) had been encouraged
decades earlier through easy access to land, wouldn't there have been
takers, even before the railway? 

And, in earlier periods, if the British had not maintained feudal tenure in
Lower Canada for 70 years after the Conquest, and had made it easier for
poor settlers to get land in Upper Canada (rather than granting 1/7 to the
Church and much of the rest to wealthy speculators) would a more dynamic
('American') form of capitalism probably developed?  

In some ways, I suppose this is another way of looking at the balance of
power between commercial and industrial capital as the key to explaining
Canadian development, but in other ways it is a different approach. For
example, you mention commercial profits and public finance as two bases for
the primitive accumulation of capital in Canada. Why not land - seized from
Natives and granted to a colonial elite? This shifts attention somewhat
from the traditional focus on staples production. Yes, Canadian development
is different, but I wonder if the difference should be understood more in
terms of being a white-settler state than a resource-commodity exporter. 

BTW, your contribution about the role of WW1 public finance sounds too
important to have to wait for completion of your book. Can you give at
least a rough outline of the argument?

Bill Burgess

[PEN-L:12257] Re: US imperialism

[Bill Burgess]

#x27;sovereignty' to the WTO in
exchange for more secure profit opportunies in other countries, at least
for awhile. Why trade the free trade dirty shirt for the protectionist
dirty shirt?

>Five: Ten years after the original free trade agreement with the
>U.S., we are bound more tightly than ever to our neighbour.
>Last year, 84.7 per cent of Canadian exports were to the United
>States.
>
>``Under free trade, there has been another quantum leap in the
>level of cross-border trade and investment,'' says economist
>Mel Watkins, a nationalist guru now retired from the University
>of Toronto. ``Our economy is sliding into theirs'.''

So what? Europe is more tightly integrated. 95% of Canadians live within
300 kilometers of the U.S. border. Why would we expect not to integrate?

>Six: A new phenomenon has developed in the late 1990s.
>Canadian business is pouring its investment dollars into
>acquisitions in the United States. (This isn't a Canada-only
>phenomenon - Japan and Europe are investing heavily in
>America too).

As noted above. But actually, since free trade went into effect in 1989 the
US share of total Canadian FDI has gone down - Canadian capitalists are
investing elsewhere even more enthusiastically.   

``The huge thing that has happened since free
>trade is that Canadian business is running away from Canada . .
>. running away from unions, running away from higher taxes,''
>says political scientist James Laxer of York University. ``The
>Canadian business class is selling its birthright and opting for
>the American view of the world.''

Quite apart from the issue of there being a capitalist birthright, this is
a good example of blaming free trade (a policy) instead of capitalism (the
system). Have capitalists ever *not* blamed unions and taxes?

>Seven: Head offices migrating south (Alberta's Nova Chemicals,
>for example, is moving its executive team to Pittsburgh) and
>threats of more corporate headquarters to follow bring
>tremendous pressure on the federal government to buckle to
>business's calls for tax cuts.

Same as above. But why not see this as some Canadian imperialists
successfully penetrating the biggest market in the world? 

Bill Burgess

[PEN-L:11505] Re: Bairoch, etc.

[Bill Burgess]

I'd like to say that while I can't follow every twist and turn in the
argument about Europe and the periphery, I am appreciating this thread
(when it stays on track). 

But a question. For a different topic I am citing estimates of long-run
industrial output by Bairoch, as well as those by Angus Madison (OECD,
1995). Since some of you probably know this area well, any comments on how
good these estimates are, especially Bairoch's industrial output in
physical terms?

Bill Burgess

[PEN-L:11177] Re: RE: Re: Re: finanz kapital

[Bill Burgess]

R. Hilferding, 1981, _Finance Capital_, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul

At 07:56 PM 16/09/99 -0400, you wrote:
>Speaking of Hilferding, anyone know if Finanz Kapital has
>even been translated to English, and if so, how to get it
>(the book, not the finanz kapital)?
>
>max
>
>
>

[PEN-L:11062] Re: Social structure and hierarchy of capital

[Bill Burgess]

At 01:14 PM 15/09/99 -0500, Carroll wrote:
>
>Viewed *politically* is there any real difference within the capitalist
>class based on this real or alleged distinction between finance capital
>and industrial capital. (Definitions of fascism based on the distinction
>seem to me to be not only incorrect now but also wrong when they
>were first promulgated.)

*Politically*, yes, in Canada, because, as Mel Watkins recently wrote, in
Canada there is "not an alliance...between indigenous financial capital and
industrial capital (creating, in Marxist terminology, finance
capital)...Rather, there is an alliance between Canadian financial capital
and American industrial capital...with Canadian capital a junior partner." 

In other words, there is no united national bourgeoisie, the 'main enemy'
is foreign rather than domestic capital, and Canada is a dependent
semi-colony, not an independent imperialist power. While nationalist
politics are undoubtedly Bad in those nasty imperialist countries, Canada
is different - Canadian nationalism is Necessary and Good. I belive similar
left-nationalist perspectives are common in Australia and New Zealand.

*Politically* as well in U.S. history, since the imperialist policies
rooted in finance capital did not predominate until quite late in the 19th
century. Andrew Carnegie was a major financial backer of the
Anti-Imperialist League, up to about the time the U.S. seized the
Philippines, probably its first serious imperialist venture. As late as the
turn of the century I understand the U.S. still imported more capital than
it exported.

Bill Burgess 

[PEN-L:11048] Re: Re: Role of the Colonial Trade

[Bill Burgess]

Meyer's 1913 _History of Canadian Wealth_ discusses the role of the North
American fur trade in the primitive accumulation of capital. He cites an
1857 submission from the [British] Committee for the Aborigines Protection
Society, to the British Parliamentary Select Committee on the Hudsons' Bay
Company: 
"The Committee of the Society stated that the Indians were the real
producers of the huge wealth from the fur trade, estimated on competent
authority at £20,000,000, which had already gone to England." 

Bill Burgess

[PEN-L:11027] Re: Social structure and hierarchy of capital

[Bill Burgess]

At 12:03 PM 15/09/99 -0400, Doug wrote:

>The conglomerates in the classic sense - those put together in the 
>1960s and early 1970s - have largely been dismantled. I'm not sure 
>what you're talking about here.

Perhaps the classic conglomerates (companies with divisions in various
sectors), but hasn't conglomeration increased through various kinds of
holding companies (more vertical than horizontal integration)? My
understanding it has in most countries, though the United States is a bit
of an exception. 

One of the traditional arguments against Canada being an imperialist
country is the lack of significant ownership links between banks and
industrial firms. I'm working on an argument that finance capital here
takes the form of financial and industrial firms being commonly owned by
holding companies, often family-controlled. Or is 'finance capital' an
obsolete category?  

>
>It's a bit of an oversimplification to say that the "financial 
>oligarchy" lords it over the MNCs; the CEOs of the Fortune 500 are 
>themselves members of the ruling class with very substantial 
>stockholdings of their own.
>
>Actually they had a big struggle over that in the 1980s - just how 
>much direction major corps were going to take from Wall Street. Wall 
>Street won, but the very fact that there was a struggle suggests that 
>it's not quite so top-down as all that.
>

So, are there really different sectors involved in the circuit of capital?
_Wall Street_ suggests that industrial firms are essentially
self-financing, using aggregate data. But as noted above, 'Wall Street' has
been gaining power. Isn't this a contradiction?

Bill Burgess

[PEN-L:10984] Re: Re: imports

[Bill Burgess]

I wrote:
>>3% does not sound like much (assuming that figure is about right). But if
>>we assume that imports from non-industrial core countries are goods rather
>>than services, and that about 2/3 of GDP is services, a more relevant
>>figure for this discussion is 9%...
>>>>Bill Burgess

Brad replied:
>No it isn't. The relevant figure for this discussion is 3%--unless 
>you're some weird material-physiocrat who doesn't believe that 
>services really add value...
>>Brad DeLong

It't true, I have neo-physiocrat tendencies. Silly me, I still think there
is an important difference between goods and services, especially that they
are not substitutes for each other. If the U.S. and Canada lost our imports
of  nature and labour from other countries we couldn't make it up with more
lawsuits and cosmetic surgery. That is why I think that in this discussion
it is better to measure the impact of trade in terms of the goods economy
rather than the bubble called GDP.

On the other hand, after writing the above I remembered that when tourists
spend money elsewhere this is an import (of tourist services), which are
considerable, so it is probably not right to assume the 3% is all goods.

Bill Burgess

[PEN-L:10964] imports

[Bill Burgess]

At 01:17 PM 14/09/99 -0400, Brad wrote:

>>Imports from non-industrial-core countries equal to 3% of GDP--most
>>of which have potential domestic substitute producers who are not
>>*that* much more costly...
>>Brad DeLong

3% does not sound like much (assuming that figure is about right). But if
we assume that imports from non-industrial core countries are goods rather
than services, and that about 2/3 of GDP is services, a more relevant
figure for this discussion is 9%, without considering unequal exchange. 

Bill Burgess

[PEN-L:9217] Re: income by 'race'

[Bill Burgess]

At 03:14 PM 15/07/99 -0700, Michael P. wrote:
>Bill's numbers concerning the earnings gap seem to show a smaller earnings
gap
>for me in Canada than in the U.S.  I recently sent in a note about unions
being
>responsible for the lower Canadian women's earnings gap, compared to U.S.
>women.  Could unions be playing a similar role for men?

What is a ballpark figure for earning disparity by race in the U.S. before
and after 'correcting' for education etc. in a similar way as the study I
quoted?

I agree that higher unionization rate in Canada, especially in the public
sector, is probably why the male-female earning gap is lower than the U.S.
(assuming this is true). Unions have also undoubtedly reduced the gap
between British-origin and other white men and other men. I used to work in
the relatively high-wage forest industry here in B.C. and there is no doubt
that many of my fellow workers who were Punjabi and Chinese and women were
a) hired in the first place and b) promoted by seniority because our union,
however unevenly, opposed discrimination by race and sex. 

Bill Burgess

[PEN-L:9209] Re: income by 'race'

[Bill Burgess]

 economic discrimination may play an important role in
Canadian labour markets."

I'm pretty weak on regression analysis, but this does seem to be a thorough
study. They ran separate regressions for metropolitan and non-metro
residents.  The 'independent' variables included full/part time labour
status, weeks worked, province, household type, occupation, industry,
schooling, and knowledge of English and French. Labour market experience is
counted by years since completion of school or since immigration to Canada.
They test for the effect of educational qualifications being from outside
Canada and find this makes little difference. (An immigrant
visible-minority man who completed his education in Canada may expect to
earn 16.2% less than a Canadian-born white man, even though both have
Canadian education). One dissapointment is that it does not address workers
who are totally unemployed. 

I think this study reinforces my claim that race is a significant factor in
determining income in Canada, but I'd like to hear any opinions on its
validity, e.g. as compared to the Simpson and Hum study Paul reported on
(is it easily available?), or other studies. Are there comparable results
in the U.S. or elsewhere? 

I think Paul and Rod argue that affirmative action divides the working
class while I think it is necessary to unite workers, but in any case it is
important to establish the scale of earning differentials in Canada. Is
this really the "kinder and more gentle" country our ruling class likes to
talk about?

Bill Burgess  

[PEN-L:8834] Re: Re: racism

[Bill Burgess]

ffirmative action programmes is not that their are subject 
>to "racist objection." But because they introduce an obvious point of 
>division among the poor, when programmes that would achieve the same 
>objective, could be designed that are not defined in racial terms.

The divisions are not introduced, they already exist. Affirmative action is
to overcome the divisions which 'universalist' measures can't always do,
though I'm with Rod on the general idea of improving conditions from the
bottom up.  

>And for all Bill's rhetoric, there is not one solid proposal. I wrote my 
>piece because, Jim Devine challenged me to outline the policy conclusions of 
>my abstract claims. I would challenge Bill to do the same what is your 
>concrete proposal.

I've repeated my point on affirmative action (I think a good example of
this is the language laws in Quebec that require French to be the language
of work in large workplaces, and has (arguably) reduced the income gap
between francophone and anglophone workers). It is always important to
respond to cases of police racist brutality and similar instances. Here in
B.C. defence of Native self-determination is a key issue right now. Rod may
find this ironic but this includes defending the right to "separate".
Malcolm X said something about Blacks having to unite with each other
before Blacks can unite with whites and I think this sometimes applies. 

Without pre-judging the studies on race and income Rod has promised to
post, I think economists can help debunk the economic studies that show
racism is not a problem. As Joan Robinson said, the purpose of studying
economics is to avoid being deceived by economists. Most of us are in the
education system and have a wonderful opportunity in our classes to debunk
the concept of race, and I agree with Rod on that. Actually, I'd appreciate
more discussion on this issue of race as a category, so I can do a better
job on this than when I tried last semester.

Bill Burgess

[PEN-L:8824] Re:racism

[Bill Burgess]

I have to strongly disagree with Rod's claims about Canada. He wrote: 

>There is racism in Canada, but except for the native people there are is 
>little segregation. All the school districts receive comparable financing. 
>The private school system is very small. And believe it or not no economic 
>studies can find any significance for "self-identified race" in determining 
>income.

We can quibble about what "little segregation" is, but taking Vancouver as
an example, there certainly is residential segregation along the usual
race/class lines, and the less-'white'/more working class area schools have
inferior buildings, equipment, extra-curicular programs, etc. Partly  this
is because they have to provide more English language and special-education
programs per capita. 

>Canada's treatment of native people is scandalous but otherwise there 
>appears to be no widespread identifiable systematic racism, at present 
>(historically it is a different stories) Affirmative action programmes are 
>not needed here. If the federal government would simply live up to its 
>treaty obligations to the natives, that situation would be much better as 
>well.

No widespread, indentifiable, systemic racism in Canada at present? This is
whitewash. Affirmative action has not been as big an issue in Canada but
remains part of any serious program to overcome inequality.

It is incredible to imply that race is not a significant factor in
determining income in Canada. I'm with Rod on denying that race is a
scientific category but he seems to deny most of its social reality. I
don't have studies in hand on all groups, but I'm looking at a 1996
regression study by Shapiro and Stelcner that shows that  unilingual
francophone men in Quebec earned 20% less than unilingual anglophones  in
1971 and 9% less in 1991 (17% and 8% respectively when educational levels
are taken into account). Quebec is 82% francophone. The earning gap between
unilingual anglophones and allophones (neither French nor English is their
mother tongue) was even greater, and again, allophones who spoke only
French earned less than those who spoke only English. I wonder why? And, if
there is no widespread systemic racism in Canada why isn't Quebec's right
of national self-determination respected?

"Liv[ing] up to its treaty obligations to the natives" minimizes what is a
much bigger issue. There never have been treaties covering most of B.C. and
many other areas of Canada. The Indian Act, which treats Natives as wards
of the state, still governs all 'Status Indians'. 'Indians' are still
losing status if their mothers and grandmothers married whites (but not if
their father and grandfathers did). The income of Aboriginal people in
Canada was 40% lower than all Canadians in 1991, and the income of those on
reserves (which make up a much smaller area than those in the U.S.) would
be lower still. Aboriginals are incarcerated at 5-6 times the rate of the
rest of the population, 10 times as much for female aboriginals, 12 times
as much in the prairie provinces. The youth suicide rate is 6-8 times the
national average. 

The issue of racism in Canada is different in some ways than in the U.S.
but in other ways it is not. In one way it is bigger problem because it is
officially denied as being a problem. The (past) treatment of Natives? A
regretable error, mostly due to administrative oversight. The expulsion of
the Acadiens? Long ago. Internment of Japanese in WW2? An exception.
Torture-murder of Somali children by Canadian 'peacekeepers'? A totally
isolated incident; besides we expelled the Nazis in that unit. Racism
today? Its all in the past, except what come up from the U.S.
   
> And >I would insist that children from an earlier age be indoctrinated
with idea 
>that race is a stupid idea. The trick is to meet the needs of the kids 
>without anyone feeling left out. One of the problems with affirmative action 
>programmes is that poor "whites" see them and say "What about us? Nobody in 
>my family ever went to university, either." This makes them vulnerable to 
>right wing racist appeals against the 'special interests.' A 
>disproportionate number of "black" kids have extra needs that should be met. 
>Appeal to the need rather than the colour of the skin. This should provide 
>the basis for an alliance from common need of all the poor.

I am sceptical of placing much hope on the bourgeois school system's
ability to indoctrinate children from an early age that race is a stupid
idea. Rod seems to feel affirmative action is too vulnerable to racist
objections, so why would he think schools can do any better than some
watered-down version of liberal equality? Again, saying races do not exist
is true in one sense but race remains a central social fact and affirmative
action is a necessary part of overcoming the legacy of racism. 

Bill Burgess

[PEN-L:8823] Re: McDonalds union

[Bill Burgess]

Almost a year ago I wrote about the successful union organizing effort at
McDonalds in Squamish, B.C. The Canadian Auto Workers won a representation
vote, pursued negotiations for a contract, and the CAW members at McDonalds
voted to accept the $0.25 raise, grievance procedure and other basic points
recommended by a labour board-appointed mediator. 

However, McDonalds stalled, more than half the original workers are no
longer employed, and a majority just voted to de-certify the union. The
workers quoted in the paper said they believed that if they remained union
the franchise would be sold back to the parent corporation who would then
close it. They also said conditions had improved greatly since the the
organizing drive.

Bill Burgess

[PEN-L:8814] OECD data

[Bill Burgess]

Apologies to those who are not interested, but I am about to compare
industry structure in OECD countries using the OECD's Structural Analysis
Database (STAN), which takes national data and adjusts it for greater
consistency. If there are any opinions on the methods, accuracy, etc. of
this source I would greatly appreciate it if you would send them to me
directly.

Bill Burgess

[PEN-L:7486] Re: Re: Some Disquieting Info

[Bill Burgess]

At 05:34 PM 31/05/99 -0400, Barklay wrote:

>Paul,
>  I agree that this is disquieting information.  I must
>admit that I really do not know what Zimmerman's
>motives were in 1992.  I know that you are convinced
>of this effort to break up Yugoslavia for economic
>imperialism motives.  But by 1992, that had already
>happened.  Triggering a war in B-H served no purpose
>whatsoever to such an end, near as I can tell anyway.

Is this not where competition between the US and European countries has a
role? The US has sabotaged each 'peace' effort by the other leading
capitalist powers in order to choose the best time to impose its own and so
entrench its position within Europe. I know the idea of inter-imperialist
competition is not fashionable, but it seems to me it is a necessary part
of any explanation. 

Bill Burgess 

[PEN-L:7413] Re: Harvey

[Bill Burgess]

At 04:47 AM 28/05/99 -0400, Louis wrote:

>That and the
>charge that American Indians drove bison off cliffs, picked up by David
>Harvey,

I think they did, actually; it is an efficent hunting technique. My
grandparents homesteaded such a spot. I agree the accusation of wanton
waste is a projection by non-Indians. But where did Harvey do this?

Bill Burgess

[PEN-L:7412] Re: Re: RE: Harvey, Leibniz & Marx

[Bill Burgess]

At 08:54 AM 27/05/99 -0700, Jim D. wrote:

>If I
>remember correctly, Levins and Lewontin's discussion in THE DIALECTICAL
>BIOLOGIST does not employ the concept of contradictions to understand
>non-human nature. So we might say that there are _no_ contradictions
>(structurally-based conflicts) within non-human nature, a pretty large
>qualitative difference. 
>

If I read it correctly (I don't have it, so someone correct me if I'm
wrong) they are on the other side, i.e. with Engels, that nature, matter IS
dialectical, IS contradiction. 

Bill Burgess

[PEN-L:7327] Re: Re: Harvey

[Bill Burgess]

You are right; I took a shortcut here. The long lots in the new world were
not inherently feudal, but they did reproduce an old world feudal pattern
when dividing up the seignerial land grants. There was more to it than an
equal access to river routes. For example, once the land adjacent to the
river was all assigned, 4 or 5 more rows of similarly skinny lots were
sometimes created behind the first, river-edge row. The Red River
settlement in Manitoba also created long lots, and as far as I know the Red
River was not a central transportation route. Obviously tradition played a
role in choosing long lots. 

Some argue the small size and narrow shape of the long lots retarded the
mechanization of agriculture. The argument is that the square grid, with
larger lots, farmhouses set further apart and more compact towns (vs. the
long 'ribbon like' villages that develop along the roads between the rows
of long lots) are more suited to agriculture under capitalism, and a more
rapid emergence of capitalist industry. 

My point was that Harvey can talk about clashes about "notions" of property
without being the gross idealist Louis made him out to be. The first Métis
rebellion led by Riel was touched off when Canadian surveyers began to
drive square grid survey pegs into the Red River long lots.  

Bill Burgess

>Barkley wrote:
>  French long lots are "feudal" and square-grids are
>"capitalistic"?   Give me a break.
>   The French long lots simply guarantee that everybody
>has access to the main transportation route, which was
>rivers in French North America.  The idea is that people
>would be trading.  Pretty capitalistic.
>  The origin of the square grid was Roman urban
>planning (also seen independently in the layout of
>Beijing).  It was Thomas Jefferson who imposed the
>square grid in the Northwest Territories Ordinance drawing
>on the classical model.  Capitalistic?  Not any more
>particularly than the French long lots.
>Barkley Rosser
>-Original Message-
>From: Bill Burgess <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Date: Wednesday, May 26, 1999 5:09 PM
>Subject: [PEN-L:7260] Harvey
>
>
>>
>>First, I had a similar reaction to Louis P, that Harvey flirts with
>>idealism in his latest book, and this can be seen in his application of
>>Liebnitz and Whitehead and the distance he takes from Engel's "strong
>>version" of dialectics. (If I understand these issue at all, I think that
>>Richard Levins and Richard Lewontin's _The Dialectical Biologist_ provides
>>an excellent statement of the "strong" position, as against B. Ollman's and
>>(perhaps) Leibnitz's "internal relations" approach.)
>>
>>But on other points about Harvey I think Louis is simply off-base.
>>
>>On p. 189 of his book Harvey does not question the Sioux claim to the
>>plains, but rather that such a claim is based on ecological practice. What
>>he targets here is the "**uncritical acceptance** [i.e. by some
>>**non-Sioux** environmentalists] of of 'ecologically conscious' statements
>>[which] can, furthermore, be misleading."
>>
>>Hello, Louis, have you been following the Makah whaling story [The Makah
>>Nation in Washington state killed their first grey whale in 80 or so years
>>a couple of weeks ago]? I agree completely with what you and J. Craven have
>>written in defense of the Makah's right to whale. Harvey's point is exactly
>>that the uncritical application of 'ecologically conscious' positions (like
>>killing whales is a **Bad Thing**) leads to the reactionary rejection of
>>Makah rights unless they are 'real Indians' who are starving to death and
>>don't use outboard motors to tow their whales back to shore. Another
>>example here in BC is opposition to logging by Natives on the part of some
>>environmental groups, e.g. the Friends of Clayoquat Sound.
>>
>>Louis also reacts to Harvey's claim that New York is an ecosystem, as if
>>Harvey doesn't know how capitalism has fucked up cities, especially in the
>>U.S. Again, Harvey is simply challenging the mythical, romantic notion of
>>Nature and ecology as something separate from human society.
>>
>>Louis has Harvey's view on "militant particularisms" backward. Harvey is
>>not an opponent of militant particularism; he is a supporter, with Raymond
>>Williams's condition that they are "properly brought togeather", i.e.,
>>united by a univeralist notions like class. I think that Louis doesn't
>>appreciate that Harvey's book is **mainly directed** against
>>pos

[PEN-L:7325] Re: Re: Harvey and Jo'burg

[Bill Burgess]

At 06:12 AM 27/05/99 +, Patrick B. wrote:
>
>Bill is right on with his argument on Harvey's agenda and
>approach... except perhaps this last line which suggests we
>can't find a site of praxis in linking our worlds and
>thought processes with those of working-class and poor
>constituencies.

Pen-L is a possible resource here (and I think Michael P. often expresses
his desire for it to become more so).  

I wrote this because Louis P. is right that even the best stuff by Marxist
academics has little impact on socialists outside the academy (worse, the
same is probably more true vice versa). This is why I remind myself to not
*confuse* the two worlds. While I appreciate the general political
discussion on Pen-L, and I am probably contradicting myself, I'd prefer
that Pen-L was more specialist-economic-theoretical on the one hand and
more concrete-campaign-resource oriented on the other. 

Bill Burgess

>Right now, I am terribly behind schedule with lots of
>deadlines and the fuss associated with the SA election next
>Wednesday, so can't say anything original. But this debate
>is very inspiring. When it emerged last year and Louis was
>raving against "brown Marxists" I was moved to try to
>grapple with some city-country contradictions, to conclude
>a long chapter on a dam struggle my township comrades
>recruited me into (we lost... particularly against a World
>Bank that put a sleazy reformist face forward). The dam is
>in Lesotho, and as you may have heard, it justified the SA
>army's invasion of that wee country last September following
>a coup against an unpopular government. The Lesotho water
>(from the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, or LHWP)
>flows across a huge mountain range in order to satiate the
>gardening and swimming-pool thirst of the most hedonistic
>upper-class consumers on earth, my (white) neighbours in
>Johannesburg, a megalopolis (also known as Gauteng Province)
>without a river or other natural ground water source. I came
>to the conclusion that "there should be no geographical or
>locational grounds for Johannesburg to continue as South
>Africa's economic heartland over coming decades and
>centuries." Is this "urbicide"? Maybe. But look around this
>city and you'll agree there is very little compelling
>argument for its existence. This is the last bit of the
>chapter (it too does babble on a bit...):
>
>***
>
>Cronon (1991, 385) concluded his famous study of Chicago's
>ecological footprint:
>
> To do right by nature and people in the country, one
> has to do right by them in the city as well for the
> two seem always to find in each other their mirror
> image. In that sense, every city is nature's
> metropolis, and every piece of countryside is its
> rural hinterland. We fool ourselves if we think we
> can choose between them, for the green lake and the
> orange cloud are creatures of the same landscape.
> Each is our responsibility. We can only take them
> together and, in making the journey between them,
> find a way of life that does justice to them both.
>
>But the questionable and expensive extension of
>Johannesburg's footprint up the mountains of Lesotho, when
>Gauteng township residents still suffered from a lack of
>access to water, is not the end of the matter. Environmental
>politics, Harvey (1996, 400-401) insists, must also
>
> deal in the material and institutional issues of how
> to organise production and distribution in general,
> how to confront the realities of global power
> politics and how to displace the hegemonic powers of
> capitalism not simply with dispersed, autonomous,
> localised, and essentially communitarian solutions
> (apologists for which can be found on both right and
> left ends of the political spectrum), but with a
> rather more complex politics that recognises how
> environmental and social justice must be sought by
> a rational ordering of activities at different
> scales. The reinsertion of "rational ordering"
> indicates that such a movement will have no option,
> as it broadens out from its militant particularist
> base, but to reclaim for itself a noncoopted and
> nonperverted version of the theses of ecological
> modernisation. On the one hand that means subsuming
> the highly geographically differentiated desire for
> cultural autonomy and dispersion, for the
> proliferation of tradition and difference within a
> more global politics, but on the other hand making
> the quest for environmental and social justice
> central rather than peripheral concerns.
>  For that to h

[PEN-L:7260] Harvey

[Bill Burgess]

First, I had a similar reaction to Louis P, that Harvey flirts with
idealism in his latest book, and this can be seen in his application of
Liebnitz and Whitehead and the distance he takes from Engel's "strong
version" of dialectics. (If I understand these issue at all, I think that
Richard Levins and Richard Lewontin's _The Dialectical Biologist_ provides
an excellent statement of the "strong" position, as against B. Ollman's and
(perhaps) Leibnitz's "internal relations" approach.) 

But on other points about Harvey I think Louis is simply off-base. 

On p. 189 of his book Harvey does not question the Sioux claim to the
plains, but rather that such a claim is based on ecological practice. What
he targets here is the "**uncritical acceptance** [i.e. by some
**non-Sioux** environmentalists] of of 'ecologically conscious' statements
[which] can, furthermore, be misleading." 

Hello, Louis, have you been following the Makah whaling story [The Makah
Nation in Washington state killed their first grey whale in 80 or so years
a couple of weeks ago]? I agree completely with what you and J. Craven have
written in defense of the Makah's right to whale. Harvey's point is exactly
that the uncritical application of 'ecologically conscious' positions (like
killing whales is a **Bad Thing**) leads to the reactionary rejection of
Makah rights unless they are 'real Indians' who are starving to death and
don't use outboard motors to tow their whales back to shore. Another
example here in BC is opposition to logging by Natives on the part of some
environmental groups, e.g. the Friends of Clayoquat Sound.

Louis also reacts to Harvey's claim that New York is an ecosystem, as if
Harvey doesn't know how capitalism has fucked up cities, especially in the
U.S. Again, Harvey is simply challenging the mythical, romantic notion of
Nature and ecology as something separate from human society.  

Louis has Harvey's view on "militant particularisms" backward. Harvey is
not an opponent of militant particularism; he is a supporter, with Raymond
Williams's condition that they are "properly brought togeather", i.e.,
united by a univeralist notions like class. I think that Louis doesn't
appreciate that Harvey's book is **mainly directed** against
post-modernist-type rejection of univeralist and materialist positions. It
is a re-statement of his 'historical-materialist-geographical' Marxism
against the pomo accusations of 'totalizing meta-narative' and the like in
his earlier _The Condition of Post-Modernity_. As noted above, I have my
doubts too, but let's discuss them in their proper context.

One view is that the 'paleo-Indian' migration from Asia had a role in the
extinction of the giant beaver, camel etc. in the Americas after the last
ice age (10,000 or so years ago). This is speculation, but it is foolish to
deny and underestimate the impact of Native societies on the environment.
For example, I think it is environmenal historian William Cronan who
convincingly shows that the tree species dominating 'New England' forests
at the time of contact with Europeans [pine?] were the result of burning by
Natives. Native settlement and activity DID alter the environment,
including "destroying" previous ecosystems. How could it be otherwise? I
don't know if Harvey's criticism of Foster for using phrases like
"destroying" the world or the environment is fair, but it is an elementary
materialist point that does occasionally need to be made.

It is false that Harvey holds the idealist position that the clash between
Indians and European settlers was fundamentally between the **notions** of
time of space. Rather, he is making the basic materialist observation that
ideas are influenced by class society, i.e. settlers from capitalist
society viewed land as private property and capital, which has to be
measured and demarcated, and precisely represented on maps for the purpose
of legal documents, land title offices, etc. It is an an ABC point in
Harvey's discipline of human geography to show how different land survey
systems, i.e. different "ideas" affect how agriculture and towns develop.
(An example is the difference between the French feudal long lots in the
1600s along the St Lawrence River, and the 1800s capitalist square-grid
township system inscribed onto the prairies). 

Again, I'm for discussing whether or not Harvey goes too far down the
idealist road on some of these points, but Louis' version is a gross
exaggeration.

BTW, I thought the related thread on the contradiction of academic writing
and politics is worth discussing more in a forum like Pen-L. My take on
this is to try to remind myself every day to not confuse my academic
activities with advancing left-wing politics. How do others view this? 

Bill Burgess 

[PEN-L:6852] Re: Re: una preguntita

[Bill Burgess]

Tom L. replied to my objection to protectionism:

>Ok. Bill what's your plan?

Unions should focus on defending workers from *our* bosses, not delude
ourselves that we can fix international capitalism. I responded to your
suggestion that our task is to set the standards for the rest of the world
because this is another edition of the white mans' burden. 

My 'plan' is: Stop the imperialist war on Yugoslavia, '30 for 40',
affirmative action, and cancel the third world debt. 

Bill Burgess

[PEN-L:6825] una preguntita

[Bill Burgess]

At 04:04 PM 13/05/99 -0400, Tom L. wrote:

>What we do here sets the standard for the rest of the world!

This is partly true, but when linked to various protectionist-like schemes
it really means "we" come first, which is not a sound basis for
international solidarity.

Bill Burgess

>

[PEN-L:5517] Young Democratic Socialists position

[Bill Burgess]

The YDSA says they belive in acting through international institutions but
since the latter are not ready to do it socialists should support the
intervention of their own imperialist bourgeosie. 

The context is slightly different, but this brought to mind the explanation
given by a leader of German social democracy in 1914 for giving up their
traditional position on capitalist wars - "it is still to early to speak of
an international soidarity of the working class":
 
"Theoretically the solidarity of interests among the proletariat of the
great industrial countries did exist to be sure, but not yet
practically...It presupposes a certain equality of status among the powers
involved. As long as one nation is so superior to another as to be regarded
as a world dominion, this contrast, insofar as it is matter of other
nations standing in opposition to a single world domination, is transposed
upon their respective working classes as well. The war opened the eyes of
German social democrats to this fact, that historically considered, it is
still too early to speak of an international solidarity of the working class."

Bill Burgess

[PEN-L:5474] yes to Kosovo

[Bill Burgess]

Louis wrote:

>This analysis [snip] is utterly lacking in an analysis of Albanian
nationalism in the 1980s, which was racially and religiously exclusionist.

This is certainly what the bourgeoisie is saying, but is it true? Was and
is this true of the nationalist movement *as a whole*? I havn't seen any
convincing accounts of this (your previous reply to me didn't do it). 

But I have seen descriptions of a popular mass movement organizing its own
social services and education after autonomy was reversed and Belgrade
clamped down on the region's administration and reduced regional
equalization funds. This seems to me a healthy development, better than
passively waiting for the 'Communists' to do it *for* you, an example of
the popular organizing other working people in Eastern European countries
may need to do as the wanna-be capitalists run the old system into the
ground. 

I don't doubt that Kosova has it's own chauvinists who use nationalism the
way Milosovic and the Milosovics of Croatia and the other republics do. But
it seems to we also have been 'utterly lacking in an analysis' of, like,
why do the Serbs, long the dominant nationality in the old Yuglosavia, get
to 'trump' the national aspirations of the majority Albanian Kosovars, the
traditional 'poor cousins'? I don't want anything to do with Kosovars
calling for and urging NATO intervention, but this is different than taking
the moral and poltiical high ground on the principle of self-determination
of oppressed peoples. What would we say, for example, about a Kosovar
insurgency against a possible future alliance of Milosovic or someone like
him **WITH** NATO, or the US, or Germany, etc. individually? I don't think
that kind of alliance is excluded at all. 

Bill Burgess

 

[PEN-L:5071] self-determination

[Bill Burgess]

I wrote:

>>I don't know enough to cite detailed evidence, but I think your statement
>>that the Kosova nationalist movement "was inspired by the desire to have a
>>racially and religiously pure republic" is slander. What is your evidence
>>for this?

Louis posted this article: 
>
>The New York Times 
>>November 10, 1987, Tuesday, Late City Final Edition 
>>SECTION: Section A; Page 4, Column 3; Foreign Desk 
>>Pristina Journal;  Blood Will Have Blood; It's the Code of the Clans 
>>By DAVID BINDER, Special to the New York Times 
>
An anecdote about 'blood feuds' is evidence? The article doesn't even quote
anyone calling for racial (certainly not religious) purity. But if it is
correct about the extent to which Albanians used to run the show one can
certainly understand why they nearly all got pissed off about their lot in
Milosovic's Yugoslavia. 

I had written:

>There is no way the Kosovars and the other citizens
>of the old Yugoslavia will ever dump reactionary nationalist leaders and
>re-federate or cooperate in some other progressive form without
>crystal-clear assurances of national rights, which include the right to
>make the occasional 'wrong' decision.

Yoshie replied:

>What if the reactionary nationalist leaders made, in the name of
>'self-determination,' the wrong decision whose effect would be the negation
>of self-determination? Obviously, under the rule of the NATO ground troops
>(or other 'peace-keeping' forces from foreign nations), ethnic Albanians
>and other peoples in Kosovo will have no power of self-determination. What
>they can and cannot do will be determined by foreign military powers.

Yes, like the KLA is doing now. NATO/US is ultimately the greatest enemy of
of Kosavar self-determination there is. The Albanians will be be abandoned,
like the Kurds, or turned into a outright protectorate, as is being
discussed now. I'm still expecting a deal with Milosovic - the US has made
it clear the last thing they want is 'Kosovo for the Albanians'. 

But reactionary leaders and wrong decisions don't change the basic point,
that support for Yuglosavia against imperialism should not imply acceptance
of Milosovic's chauvinism and physical aggression towards Kosovars. This
stance writes off millions of potential allies against both imperialism and
the national chauvinism. Support for self-determination has to be
unconditional or it means nothing, but that doesn't mean it has to be
uncritical or imply political support for any current policy.

I responded here on the issue of self-determination, but I am also struck
at how much we all (myself included) get sucked into the line of both
chauvinists and imperialism that this is all about national or ethnic
tensions. It is ABC that social factors are the real underlying issue. 

Bill Burgess

[PEN-L:5062] Re: self-determination

[Bill Burgess]

Louis wrote:
>
>Yes, the same thing was true of Nicaragua. The Sandinistas acted in a
>racist manner toward the Miskitus, who they intended to "civilize". The
>problem is that the Miskitus then got used as pawns by US imperialism. As
>far as the Kosovars are concerned, I am afraid that the character of the
>movement in the 1980s had very few progressive possibilites. It was
>inspired by the desire to have a racially and religiously pure republic.
>The central government struggled to raise the Kosovars to the same level of
>the rest of the republic, but as often happens, the inability to
>immediately resolve inequality only led to more unrest. The same thing
>happened in the US among the black community in the 1960s, but with a more
>progressive dynamic. Here is an article that illustrates the good-faith
>intentions of the central government, but the obstacles that stood in the
way:

To their credit, the Sandinistas recognized their error and tried to
correct it, but the damage was largely done. The analogy here is the damage
in Kosovo was done by failing to carry through the early promise of the
Yugoslvian revolution, and now may be compounded by socialists elsewhere
who fail to support the *principle* of self-determination in Kosovo asnd
elsewhere.

I don't know enough to cite detailed evidence, but I think your statement
that the Kosova nationalist movement "was inspired by the desire to have a
racially and religiously pure republic" is slander. What is your evidence
for this? I think the implication they were fighting for an Islamic
republic is particularly dubvious, and perhaps an example of what I argued
against in an earlier post about how "Islamic fundamentalism" is often a
reactionary description. Even the CSM article you appended described
opposition to social service cutbacks, unemployment and the like - which
were part and parcel of the resort to market mechanisms, reliance on
imperialism and so on. As always, national and social demands are mixed up
togeather.  

Bill Burgess

[PEN-L:5052] self-determination

[Bill Burgess]

In his comment on the article about Kosova independence, Louis P. basically
argues that nationalism of the opressed against capitalist imperialism is
good, but isn't worth supporting when directed at post-capitalist
governments (my crude and selective summary, not Louis' words). 

Yes, many oppressed nationalists are reactionary, and are often used as
pawns by other reactionaries. So how do you ever hope to appeal to the
majority of these populations - tell them to drop their nationalism and
become no-name communists? Lenin argued the opposite (including against
Rosa Luxemburg and others). He said communists had to champion their
demands, practice 'affirmative action' and *prove* good faith by
guaranteeing their right to freely leave the socialist federation. 

Despite their gains within Yuglosvia, my understanding is that the Kosovars
still did not achieve nationalist equality, and individually were often
second-class citizens. Serb chavinists like Milosovic considered themselves
'first among equals'. There is no way the Kosovars and the other citizens
of the old Yugoslavia will ever dump reactionary nationalist leaders and
re-federate or cooperate in some other progressive form without
crystal-clear assurances of national rights, which include the right to
make the occasional 'wrong' decision. 

Bill Burgess

  

[PEN-L:4961] productivity

[Bill Burgess]

A question about U.S. productivity growth and statistics:

Statistics Canada and the Centre for the Study of Living Standards in
Canada have each recently released comparisons of productivity change in
Canada and the US. They claim that, contrary to previous reports and
widespread claims by the usual slash-and-burn-social-services crowd,
Canadian productivity growth has basically matched that in the US over the
last decade or so.

The Centre for the Study of Living Standards calculates that GDP/worker
between 1989 and 1997 grew by 0.9% in both Canada and the U.S., but that
GDP/hours worked actually increased more in Canada - 1.2% vs. 0.8% in the
US. (I forgot to check, but I assume this is per year.)

The big difference is in manufacturing, where US growth is greater. But the
CSLSC study says that if industrial machinery and equiptment and electric
and other electronic equiptment sectors are removed, US productivity growth
is greatly diminished but unchanged in Canada. They cast doubt on the
accuracy of US data (Dept. of Commerce) for these two sectors, noting that
their output doubled over the time period while the rest of manufacturing
output actually decreased in the 1990s.

Any thoughts on why the output and productivity growth in these sectors is
so great compared to others? How much of this is real? Was there some shift
in the data methods or industry definitions?

Bill Burgess 

[PEN-L:4820] Re: Stats on recent atrocities

[Bill Burgess]

>
>Estimated # of persons killed:
>
> In Iraq due to US-led
> sanctions: over
> 1,000,000
>
> In the Sudan over the
> past 15 years:
> 1,500,000
>
> In Rwanda over the
> last 5 years: 500,000
>
> In Chechnya: 80,000
>
> Around the world
> each day because of
> lack of water, clothing,
> shelter, food or
> medicine: 100,000
>
> Est # of people in the
> world who go to bed
> hungry: 800,000,000
>
> Est # of persons killed
> in Kosovo last year:
> 2,000
>
> ...from Sam Smith's "The
>  Progressive Review"
>
>
>

[PEN-L:4819] Re: Rightwing rumblings

[Bill Burgess]

At 12:25 PM 05/04/99 -0400, Louis wrote:

 mostly the discussion was around how
>the war was a promotion of New World Order/Globalization economic interests
>rather than humanitarianism. In fact the points being made were objectively
>anti-imperialist, compared to the awful crap being disseminated by NPR.

What's "objectively anti-imperialist" about this? 

Bill Burgess

[PEN-L:4736] the war

[Bill Burgess]

A few thoughts:

The "Red Ken" type of backsliding on the ABCs of anti-imperialist politics
is exhibited by Sven Robinson, NDP (social-democratic) MP in Canada. 

Robinson has been a long time opponent of Canada being in NATO and NORAD,
he often spoke out against US policy in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Grenada,
has defended Cuba, been arrested for joining Native blockades, and so on.
But there he is in Ottawa, cheering on Canada's bombing of Yugoslavia in
the name of human rights. 

So much for the Canadian nationalist line that we're not one of those nasty
imperialist robbers, just peacekeepers for the UN. Canadian jets in Iraq
mainly served as escorts for the US and UK, apparently because they didn't
have the best bombing weaponry available; now an officer quoted in the
paper a couple of days ago trumpeted that with new lazer bomb systems on
F-18s "Canada is in the big leagues", or something to that effect. 

The last time Canadian forces were involved in this kind of serious
offensive action was Korea; since then Canada has done its imperialist duty
well in places like the Congo and Vietnam, but this is a big step, just
like it is for Germany and others. And it's under the *Democrats* in the
US, *Labour* in the UK, *Social Democrats/Greens* in Germany, *Socialists*
in France, *Liberals* in Canada (supported by the *NDP*), and the list goes
on. Welcome to the 21st century.

In the middle of war hysteria I think we all have to be extra careful of
our own backsliding regarding "Islamic fundamentalism". This is often a
racist code word for ignoring/suppressing the national and social
grievances of a huge portion of the world's population. What was it Trotsky
said, religion is the envelope for the social discontent of the masses, or
something like that? If we can't clearly stand for self-determination for
oppressed peoples everywhere, regardless of who is currently leading them,
there is no hope for socialism. I think this issue is analogous to the
debate on colonialism in the Second International.

By most acounts Albanian Kosavars are second-class citizens, who had their
(limited) autonomy under Tito eliminated by Milosovic, and most support
greater national self-determination in one or other form. Yugoslavia's
socialist revolution made real gains, however limited, in overcoming uneven
development and national oppression, but Milsovic's Serb chauvinism is
reversing this gain of the Yugoslav workers state. It is always a messy
business, but on this point it seems the Kosovar nationalists, not the
Milosovic government, represent what was good about the old Yugoslavia. In
one sense, if they are a real popular movement it may be a step forward. In
the old Yugoslavia, national equality was very much a "top-down" process.  

I completely agree with the idea that we should push for our governments to
allow in Yugoslav and Kosovar victims of the war. 
  
Bill Burgess
  
   

  

[PEN-L:4604] trade and war

[Bill Burgess]

The current war is not about trade, but I can't help feeling it is time to
remind ourselves about the historic connections here. 

On March 17 a big majority of the House of Representatives voted to impose
curbs on steel imports into the United States. 

United Steelworkers of America (USWA) president George Becker said:
"Steelworkers and steel communities hold dear the notion that America's
trade policies should benefit Americans first. That may be a novel idea in
some quarters. But it was a winning idea today in Congress."

Ultra-rightist candidate for the Republican nomination for President,
Patrick Buchanan, said the vote was "a powerful message to the White House
that we must stand with American steelworkers against foreign regimes that
kill their jobs and destroy their towns by illegal steel dumping." He
added, "The day of economic patriotism has returned to America."

Occasionally we all find ourselves saying the same thing as reactionaries.
Usually easy to distinguish our positions by bringing in other aspects of
the question. Is Becker saying anything to make sure steelworkers and their
families distinguish between his "Americans first" line and Buchanan's
"economic patriotism"? 

What is the difference, really?

Bill Burgess

[PEN-L:4531] Why Kosovo

[Bill Burgess]

Left off this list is what would have been included a few years ago -
NATO/US encirclement of Russia, military backing for the restoration of
capitalism. I don't think we can assume this has already happened, and
reduce our political analysis of war!!! in Europe!!! to ratings and stupidity.

Bill Burgess

At 10:13 PM 24/03/99 -0800, you wrote:
>Is it that the Dems. ratings in foreign policy is slipping?
>Is it to prove that they are tough?  [A local reporter says that Clinton
>is bombing more countries than any previous president.  I suspect that
>more countries were involved in WWII bombing.]
>Is it that Kosovo is important for pipelines from the Caucacuses?
>Is it just to test new hardware?
>Is it just stupidity?
>--
>
>Michael Perelman
>Economics Department
>California State University
>[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Chico, CA 95929
>530-898-5321
>fax 530-898-5901
>
>
>

[PEN-L:3914] Re: Re: death penalty

[Bill Burgess]

At 11:53 AM 26/02/99 -0800, you wrote:
>Jim Devine asks:
>>is there anyone else out there who's feeling queasy because (1) if anyone
>>does, John William King (and his yet-to-be-tried sidekicks) deserve the
>>death penalty but (2) they have a principled opposition to the death
penalty?

I don't have much trouble with this one; the black to white ratio on death
row alone is a good argument for remaining principled. I know it is a
different situation, but what about queasiness on the Pinochet extradition
case? Is it paranoid to wonder who could be next? Is it blind to to see a
human-rights cover for bombing the hell out of Iraq and Yugoslavia instead
of justice for his victims?

Bill Burgess

[PEN-L:3604] David Harvey and Leibniz

[Bill Burgess]

Louis, can you elaborate on your post about Harvey and Leibniz and material
destruction of the earth? I don't understand the attention he gives
Leibniz; my eyes glazed over in these sections of the book.

Bill Burgess

[PEN-L:3530] Re: Re: racism

[Bill Burgess]

Hello angela, 

Thank your for elaborating your points. You wrote about the usual
'rational' arguments against racism:

>these ways of addressing racism only take for those who
>are relatively powerful, who do not attach themselves to racism as a
>way of recovering or explaining to themselves their own 'loss', their
>own lack of social power.

I don't accept this. I can't give you numbers, but my observation is that
'relatively powerful' people have a hard time giving up racist attitudes
because they only have liberal logic to rely on - meanwhile the bourgeoisie
directly benefits from racism. Working and oppressed people find often find
themselves side by side in struggle, and arguments about how racism weakens
and divides our struggles not only make sense in the abstract, they accord
with every-day experience. 

Your account of racism seems to assume that its real base is among working
people rather than the 'relatively powerful', and that it is rooted in
individual psychology rather than capitalist social relations. If so, I
don't see any way to overcome racism; perhaps I simply refuse to be that
pessimistic. Is there a ready-made psychoanalalytic explanation for
socialist optimism?   

You said, about my question about whether explaining the fear of castration
or discussing the phallus really helps combat racist attitudes by white
workers:

>i don't know if it works becuase it is not a prominent part of
>anti-racist practice.  i do know that to talk openly about racism as a
>form of enjoyment is to break with a moralising and enlightened
>approach which has consistently worked to deny the pertinence of
>desire within racism.  these ways of appproaching the issure here have
>been taken as simply another attempt (usually figured as an attempt by
>'the elites') to deny 'the ordinary bloke' their capacity for
>enjoyement - as another threat.  they merely seek to affirm 'the
>ordinary bloke's' social impotence; which i would think is not how a
>marxist politics would wish to proceed.

I appreciate that racism has not been erradicated, and we all have to ask
if our understanding of it, and our strategy against it, are adequate. But
I still see no evidence of any great "pertinence of desire". Sorry to be
blunt, but I think this is almost inevitably an elite approach. It is
stupid to assume that psychoanalytical issues have no importance, and we
certainly need abstract theories, specialized vocabularies, and so on. But
the reason the "desire" theory of racism is not a prominent part of
anti-racist practice is because it doesn't make any sense at either the
immediate level or in more theoretical terms. And it is not as if this is a
brand new idea - it has had the better part of this century to win support.

Someone wrote that Cuba has done more to erradicate racism than any other
country. I agree, and in a couple of trips to Cuba I have never heard
anyone  explain that they made little progress on fighting racism until
they adopted a psychoanalytical strategy. Instead, what I heard from Black
Cubans was how they volunteered to fight South Africa when it invaded
Angola, and their pride in having been part of the first black army to
defeat the white racist apartheid regime in a major battle, at Cuito
Cunavale (sp?), which opened the road to the liberation of Namibia and
South Africa. 

Another example that comes to mind is the Civil Rights movement in the
United States. Again, without denying there may be some merit to
psychoanalytical insights I don't think they played any role in defeating
Jim Crow segregation. In Canada, there is news coverage of Native struggles
every day; a couple of decades ago it was the silence of the grave. Racism
remains a central problem but let's not forget the progress that has been
made and how it happened. 

Bill Burgess

[PEN-L:3459] Re: Doug's question

[Bill Burgess]

At 04:19 PM 16/02/99 +1100, angela wrote:

>racism works because
>it echoes the structural logic of this 'fear of castration'... 

It seems to me there are very shaky grounds for accepting that this
"structural logic" really exists. Of course there may be something to it,
but I can't understand building a whole political approach around it, which
seems to me is what has been done. 

I thought Ken Hanley asked a series of very relevant questions about the
usefullness of the similar notion of the phallus, but they have not been
addressed. I have never tried to challenge and undermine racist attitudes
of fellow white workers by explaining it is because we fear castration.
Does this really work? Like, where? 

Bill Burgess