The petitioner's briefing at the cert stage of this case has been
profoundly discouraging.
Although the case does raise a genuinely interesting question that may be
worthy of Supreme Court review -- must a RFRA plaintiff show "an honest
belief that the practice is important to his free exercise
I'm confused about how the "deal" has changed.
The Title VII exemption allowing religious preferences by religious
organizations has remained the same since its expansion in 1972, and the
key cases rejecting its application to other types of discrimination were
decided in the 1980s -- the same
See, e.g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 340-41 (1979):
"Mr. Justice BRENNAN in his opinion concurring in the judgment argues that
our holding in *Edelman* that § 1983 does not abrogate the States' Eleventh
Amendment immunity is 'most likely incorrect.' To reach this conclusion he
relies on
the "honest belief" component of the CAAF's "important
to free exercise" reasoning, even though that component comes directly from
the Fifth Circuit's decision in *Sossamon*, which in turn relied on the
earlier *Adkins* case cited in Texas's *Sossamon *brief.
- Jim
O
Thanks to Marty for re-upping this thread. Two initial, related thoughts:
1. It would be very interesting to hear from Chip on this issue, as the
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) explicitly cited his excellent
article, "*Hobby Lobby* and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious
- Jim
On Thu, Feb 16, 2017 at 9:26 AM, Marty Lederman <
martin.leder...@law.georgetown.edu> wrote:
> No specific discussion of the "least restrictive means" requirement. Did
> Stutzman make any argument in that regard?
>
> On Thu, Feb 16, 2017 at 12:08 PM, James O
One initial observation: While much of the ground in the opinion has
previously been covered by courts in New Mexico and Colorado, this case
involved one issue not present in prior "wedding vendor" cases: an
exemption claim under a state constitutional provision that has been
interpreted to
Dear Colleagues,
I am pleased to announce the publication of "Law and Religion in an
Increasingly Polarized America," a symposium issue of the Lewis & Clark Law
Review. The nine papers in the symposium offer a variety of perspectives on
religious accommodation and church-state boundaries, and all
The first count of the complaint filed today in the Eastern District of
Virginia by CAIR lawyers challenging the EO is based on the Establishment
Clause (the complaint also raises free exercise, equal protection, and APA
arguments):
During the Holt v. Hobbs oral argument, in discussing the strict scrutiny
standard in RLUIPA, Justice Scalia said the following:
"We’re talking here about a compelling State interest. *Bear in mind
I would not have enacted this statute*, but there it is. It says there has
to be a compelling State
ct that Freed is the same sex as
> Ingersoll--if Ingersoll were a woman, she'd sell him flower arrangements
> for the marriage to Freed). But in that case, its coverage under the act
> would be even more self-evident, wouldn't it?
>
> On Wed, Oct 12, 2016 at 4:55 PM, James Oleske <jole..
In case it's of interest, I believe the most extensive judicial discussion
of this issue to date comes from the Colorado Court of Appeals in the
Masterpiece Caskeshop case:
https://www.courts.state.co.us/Courts/Court_of_Appeals/Opini
on/2015/14CA1351-PD.pdf (pages 12-23).
In concluding that a
;
> masin...@nova.edu
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:
> religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *James Oleske
> *Sent:* Wednesday, July 13, 2016 6:29 PM
> *To:* Law & Religion issues for Law Academics <religio
, and conflicting
messages from its supporters today (Heritage has invoked the "both sides"
aspect of the revised FADA to defend it, while that is precisely what has
led FRC to withdraw its support of the bill).
- Jim
On Wed, Jul 13, 2016 at 8:47 AM, James Oleske <jole...@lcla
In the wake of yesterday's hearing on the proposed First Amendment Defense
Act (FADA), which now has 171 co-sponsores in the House, there has been
some confusion about the text of the bill. I believe the source of this
confusion is the fact that the version discussed at the hearing was neither
(1)
research indicates that attorney's
fees for a prevailing party in a state constitutional law case might be
capped at $200 total. By contrast, after Stormans prevailed in the federal
district court on their section 1983 claim, that court approved an award of
over $2 million in attorney's fees.
- Jim
On Tu
DFlegal.org
> Not Licensed in DC
> Practice Limited to Federal Court
>
> *From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:
> religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *James Oleske
> *Sent:* Tuesday, June 28, 2016 9:48 PM
> *To:* Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
>
Like the plaintiff in Merced v. Kasson, 577 F.3d 578 (5th Cir. 2009), I
believe the owners of Stormans could have brought both (1) a federal free
exercise claim, which faced the challenge of getting past the Smith hurdle,
and (2) a state free exercise claim under a Sherbert/Yoder-like exemption
gt;> The Alito dissent is apparently why the case was held so long and
>>> relisted so many times. And of course I like the Alito dissent. But I have
>>> to say that his footnote 6 is utterly shameless in light of his dissent
>>> yesterday in *Woman’s Whole He
Dan -- I agree that Lukumi did not answer this question directly, but
didn't Yoder? Here's what the Court said about the issue there:
"A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed as a
barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if it is based on
purely secular
er "moral or ethical objections."
>
>
>
> On Tue, Jun 28, 2016 at 9:43 AM, Marty Lederman <lederman.ma...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> 15-page Alito dissent from denial, joined by Roberts and Thomas:
>>
>> http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders
is granted, this has the makings of a landmark free
exercise case.
- Jim
On Mon, Jan 4, 2016 at 11:34 PM, James Oleske <jole...@lclark.edu> wrote:
> On Monday, Stormans Inc. -- which operates a pharmacy in Washington State
> -- filed a cert. petition seeking review of the Ninth Circui
In the *Heffernan* decision issued earlier this week, the Court held a
public employer can violate the First Amendment when it acts with the
motive of punishing protected employee political activity, even if the
punished employee was not actually engaged in protected political activity.
In
My impression after oral argument was that things went better for the
petitioners and worse for the government than many expected, in large part
because the substantial-burden issue got so little play.
My impression after reading the two rounds of supplemental briefs, which
ended with the filing
in the prohibition on local acts would have
> precluded the legislature from passing a narrower bill limited to statewide
> restroom use, but that does not make HB2 necessarily unconstitutional. For
> the reasons Will explained, it seems a stretch to apply apply *Romer *
> here.
>
> Greg Wall
A few thoughts on some of the comments made in yesterday's discussion
between Greg Lipper and Greg Wallace.
Greg L. wrote: “Starting on a clean slate and defeating an amendment to add
a particular protected category [to a statewide antidiscrimination law]
doesn’t seem suspect by itself. But
; elimination of the YMCA carveout was meaningless and the YMCA and YWCA were
> still exempt from the sex discrimination provisions of the ordinance,
> particularly when one of the three exceptions was left in the statute.
>
> Will Esser
>
>
> --
&
Will expresses concern about "how truly radical the Charlotte City
ordinance was" and how it was "entirely over the top." It would appear,
however, that the changes made to the ordinance in February simply made it
consistent with the majority of other state and local laws prohibiting sex
ionally mandated in Hosanna-Tabor Lutheran Church v. EEOC. I
> wonder if Eugene, and others who question the Trinity Lutheran Church
> outcome, think that unanimous decision is incorrect.
>
>
> Sent from my iPhone
>
>
> On Jan 17, 2016, at 5:33 PM, James Oleske <jole
Another Minnesota for-profit case, which I don't think was mentioned in the
earlier chain, but which was cited in Justice Ginsburg's *Hobby Lobby*
dissent, is *Minnesota ex rel. McClure*, 370 N.W.2d 844, 847 (Minn.1985)
(upholding under *Sherbert*/*Yoder*-type scrutiny the application of a
state
Some years back, I wrote an article about whether Title VII's reasonable
accommodation provision is valid Section 5 enforcement legislation
abrogating state sovereign immunity (http://ssrn.com/abstract=476621).
Here's the conclusion:
"When Title VII's reasonable-accommodation provision was
To clarify, Eugene: Would this "maximalist equal treatment" theory prohibit
legislative exemptions available to religion but not non-religion, or just
legislative burdens placed on religion but not non-religion? If only the
latter, is it really a maximalist equal treatment theory? If both the
to dispensing particular drugs (whether
it be emergency contraception or drugs produced in countries with
objectionable human rights practices or drugs tested on particular animals)
and religious moral objections.
- Jim
On Thu, Jul 23, 2015 at 10:48 AM, James Oleske <jole...@lclark.edu> wrote:
&
er relevant and reflective treatments. See also
>> this valuable report of a task force on religion and U.S. foreign policy
>> sponsored by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs:
>> http://kroc.nd.edu/sites/default/files/engaging_religious_communities_abroad.pdf.
>> I think every
overnment taking a position on matters disputed within the faith itself.
>
> On Thu, Dec 10, 2015 at 5:23 PM, James Oleske <jole...@lclark.edu> wrote:
>
>> I agree with Marty that this whole discussion is unnerving, but given the
>> initial polls showing (1) substantial m
Although Rick and Chip agree that Trump's proposal violates the
Establishment Clause, they travel different paths to that conclusion, and
those different paths raise (I think) an interesting question:
Under the Court's precedents, is it clear that the "denominational
discrimination" rule Rick
In addition to Doug's piece, this March 2014 post from Eugene has a map and
comprehensive legend covering both RFRAs and state constitutional
provisions that have been interpreted as providing exemption rights:
he Capital:
> http://bjconline.org/state-RFRA-tracker-2015/ It is kept updated. It
> does not however cover the state constitutional part.
>
> Howard Friedman
>
> --
> *From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [
> religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucl
In addition to the anticipated re-introduction of the Georgia RFRA that
Chip mentions below, a state analog of the federal First Amendment Defense
Act (FADA) has been introduced in Illinois. In addition, a bill has been
introduced in Indiana that would combine statewide LGBT-rights protections
I've admittedly only skimmed the decision, but given that the court found
that the plaintiffs had pled a free exercise claim, it's not entirely clear
why (1) the majority had to decide the equal-protection/scrutiny-level
question and (2) Judge Roth's preference for intermediate scrutiny of
A doctrinal question concerning the full statement:
One of the "grave" consequences the statement says can be "predicted with
confidence" as a result of *Obergefell* is that individuals and
organizations who do not accept same-sex marriage will be "denied
constitutional rights in order to
Update:
Unlike the licenses previously issued by deputy clerk Brian Mason to
same-sex couples, which included "in the office of Rowan County," the
license he issued this morning has the words "in the office of" crossed out
and the language "Pursuant to the Federal Court Order" in the place where
Sorry -- "deposition" in the message below should be "preliminary
injunction hearing." - Jim
On Mon, Sep 14, 2015 at 9:14 AM, James Oleske <jole...@lclark.edu> wrote:
> Update:
>
> Unlike the licenses previously issued by deputy clerk Brian Mason to
Stepping back from the detailed discussion Kevin, Marty, and others have
been having today about the intricacies and proper interpretation of
Kentucky law, I wanted to address more broadly Kevin's suggested solution
to the Davis situation.
Here's the key testimony from Kim Davis that Kevin quotes
For what it's worth, in their filing to the Sixth Circuit yesterday,
Davis's attorneys insisted that she was *not* making a complicity claim
akin to that being made in the contraception cases, and they emphasized
that her concern was the appearance of her name on the forms (emphasis in
original):
substitute another official to carry out the
> state's duty so that nobody's right to marry is burdened.
>
> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [
> religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] on behalf of James Oleske [
> jole...@lcla
Thanks for the clarification, Eugene. I had assumed the clerk would be
seeking an accommodation specific to licenses for same-sex couples. But in
looking at the various alternatives the clerk has proposed in describing
her putative state RFRA claim, only one is explicitly limited to same-sex
I agree with Eugene that being elected doesn't disqualify one from getting
exemptions that lower-level officials might get, but I read Howard's email
to be raising a different distinction that might have an analog in the free
speech context.
Some speech by a government employee is the employee's
Eugene
>
>
>
> *From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:
> religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *James Oleske
> *Sent:* Wednesday, September 02, 2015 9:09 PM
> *To:* Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> *Subject:* Re: Questio
Link to decision:
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2015/07/23/12-35221.pdf
On Thu, Jul 23, 2015 at 10:48 AM, James Oleske jole...@lclark.edu wrote:
Today, the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion in *Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman*,
a long-running case involving a pharmacy's free-exercise
At least four list members (Doug, Rick, Chip, and Eugene) quoted in this
Times story:
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/25/us/schools-fear-impact-of-gay-marriage-ruling-on-tax-status.html
- Jim
___
To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
To
Quick Correction: the final letter referenced in my message below went to
legislators in Illinois, not Wisconsin. Sorry about that. - Jim
On Sat, May 9, 2015 at 2:28 PM, James Oleske jole...@lclark.edu wrote:
The text of the bill, which was announced on Thursday and formally
introduced
Hypothetical Statute (building off of Marty's, but designed to raise
Nelson's Hosanna-Tabor point more directly):
Michigan passes a statute that says schools can only be licensed if they
adhere to nondiscrimination conditions in their employment relations.
If Michigan attempted to enforce those
My apologies to Michael for the delay in answering the question he asked of
Chip and me earlier about Gordon College. I'll be honest, the Gordon
College situation was not on my radar, and now I think I know why.
Last October, the College issued a statement that [c]ontrary to recent
media reports,
Relevant to point #4 below, one Orthodox rabbi has weighed in very publicly
on the Louisiana controversy:
http://www.nola.com/opinions/index.ssf/2015/04/religious_freedom_louisiana.html
On Thu, Apr 30, 2015 at 6:20 AM, Kwall, Roberta rkw...@depaul.edu wrote:
I have been following this
over time. But it is a place to begin.
So if I may ask, Jim. Would you support or oppose the denial of a tax
exemption in such a case?
Alan
--
*From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu on behalf of James Oleske
jole
Luke,
Speaking only for myself, I would approach each case by asking how the law
or regulation would have treated similar discrimination issues before gay
people asked for equal access. My understanding of the New Jersey rule is
that it would have prohibited the denial of access for marriages
, Apr 29, 2015 at 7:18 PM, James Oleske jole...@lclark.edu wrote:
My quick take is that, at least in the short term, the prospect of such
schools losing their tax-exempt status is very low for the following
reasons:
1. Unlike most antidiscrimination statutes and regulations, which
typically
in 2022 under a democratic congress and
President, they won't put pressure on the same schools that have had their
accreditation threatened (Gordon and perhaps others) using the tax-exempt
status hammer?
On Wed, Apr 29, 2015 at 8:18 PM, James Oleske jole...@lclark.edu wrote:
My quick take
is that state legislation usually spells that out.
It's a very strange bill -- narrow in some ways and overbroad in others.
On Wed, 8 Apr 2015 19:27:06 -0700
James Oleske jole...@lclark.edu wrote:
Apologies to my fellow list members -- I dashed off the message below
quickly before heading to class
this bill is trying to solve (the interview was not illuminating on that
point)?
- Jim
On Mon, Apr 6, 2015 at 8:37 PM, James Oleske jole...@lclark.edu wrote:
Gov. Jindal's office announced today that he will support newly proposed
legislation in Louisiana that would give businesses the right
I think there is one very big cert-worthy issue on the horizon that could
still arise out of the wedding vendor cases in states that do not cover
sexual-orientation discrimination in their otherwise broad civil rights
laws: Do such omissions violate the Equal Protection Clause? I make the
fairly
(Louisiana has hosted 10 Super Bowls).
- Jim
On Sun, Apr 5, 2015 at 11:55 AM, James Oleske jole...@lclark.edu wrote:
When asked about the Indiana RFRA on Meet the Press today, Gov. Jindal said
the following:
Let's remember what this debate was originally all about. This is about
business owners
When asked about the Indiana RFRA on Meet the Press today, Gov. Jindal said
the following:
Let's remember what this debate was originally all about. This is about
business owners that don't wanna have to choose between their Christian
faith, their sincerely held religious beliefs, and being able
At the end of his post below, Chip writes: The hardest questions for me,
and I don't see a whole lot of discussion on the list about these, are the
exemptions for religiously affiliated non-profits.
As someone who has been guilty of focusing almost all my attention on the
for-profit disputes, I
--
*From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [
religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] on behalf of James Oleske [
jole...@lclark.edu]
*Sent:* Thursday, April 02, 2015 3:30 PM
*To:* Law Religion issues
or oppose the fix.
- Jim
On Thu, Apr 2, 2015 at 7:33 AM, James Oleske jole...@lclark.edu wrote:
The text of the fix is here:
http://t.co/58d1K81D1L
It provides that the RFRA does not:
(1) authorize a provider to refuse to offer or provide services,
facilities, use of public accommodations
The text of the fix is here:
http://t.co/58d1K81D1L
It provides that the RFRA does not:
(1) authorize a provider to refuse to offer or provide services,
facilities, use of public accommodations, goods, employment, or housing to
any member or members of the general public on the basis of race,
From the Indianapolis Star, which says it has obtained the language that is
being presented to the Governor today:
***
The clarification would say that the new religious freedom law does not
authorize a provider – including businesses or individuals -- to refuse to
offer or provide its services,
The Arkansas Senate passed a new bill tonight, and the House is expected to
take it up tomorrow. The text is here:
http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/2015/2015R/Amendments/sb975-S1.pdf
My guess is that the new version of the Arkansas RFRA bill -- which is
intended to more closely mirror the
Eugene has a new post up on Volokh Conspiracy entitled, Many liberals’
(sensible) retreat from the old Justice Brennan/ACLU position on religious
exemptions. The piece is lengthy, and I recommend folks read it in full,
but I want to take issue with the following assertion at the heart of
Eugene's
Of *James Oleske
*Sent:* Wednesday, April 01, 2015 2:25 PM
*To:* Law Religion issues for Law Academics
*Subject:* Eugene's Blog Post on Liberals and Exemption Rights
Eugene has a new post up on Volokh Conspiracy entitled, Many liberals’
(sensible) retreat from the old Justice Brennan/ACLU
law does not impose a substantial burden on religion because
the complainant is free to move to another state.”
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2010/06/23-kagan-rogers
*From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:
religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *James
Following up on Alan and Nelson's discussion of third-party burdens, I
think it might be helpful to identify two separate legal issues that are
impacted by such burdens:
1. The issue of whether a party has a right to a religious exemption in a
given case.
2. The issue of whether a discretionary
.
On Fri, 27 Mar 2015 23:58:40 -0700
James Oleske jole...@lclark.edu wrote:
no one is talking about discrimination against gay and lesbian people as
such
That assertion is simply incorrect.
In opposing ENDA, the Family Research Council complained that, under it,
[y]ou can’t decline to hire
Quick update from Indiana: Gov. Pence just did a press conference, and the
Indianapolis Star characterizes the bottom line as follows:
Pence said he had come to the conclusion that it will be helpful to move
legislation this week to amend the law to make it clear that it does not
give businesses
Dale Carpenter addresses this issue briefly at the end of a piece he just
posted on VC, which is primarily focused on responding to the claim that
there is nothing to see here because the Indiana law is modeled on 1990s
era RFRAs.
Here's the relevant passage concerning claims for state-law RFRA
no one is talking about discrimination against gay and lesbian people as
such
That assertion is simply incorrect.
In opposing ENDA, the Family Research Council complained that, under it,
[y]ou can’t decline to hire a homosexual for religious reasons.
Similarly, in opposing the recent Utah
I have to disagree with Doug and Ryan that the earlier controversy over the
Arizona bill casts any doubt on Marty's point about the consequences of the
Hobby Lobby decision. Recall, the Arizona bill wasn't an initial RFRA
enactment. Rather, it was a proposed amendment to the existing Arizona RFRA
http://le.utah.gov/~2015/bills/static/SB0296.html
On Wed, Mar 4, 2015 at 1:15 PM, Ira Lupu icl...@law.gwu.edu wrote:
Many stories on-line about the new proposal, e.g.,
http://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/mormon-church-backs-utah-anti-discrimination-bill/
Does anyone have a link to the
A quick follow-up:
The earlier housing/employment LGBT antidiscrimination bill to which Doug
linked (SB 100) was filed the same day as a public accommodations LGBT
antidiscrimination bill (SB 99). They were both filed January 29, 2015,
before the LDS Church's announcement that it would support a
http://www.atg.wa.gov/uploadedFiles/Home/News/Press_Releases/2015/Arlene%27s%20Flowers%20summary%20judgment.pdf
Earlier today, a state court judge in Washington granted summary judgment
on the merits against Arlene's Flowers and its owner Barronelle Stuzman. I
believe this is the first judicial
in question. In my
opinion, the reason why I think Employment Division v Smith ranks right up
with Dred Scott v Sandford among the worst decisions the Supreme Court has
ever issued.
*From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:
religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *James
, James Oleske jole...@lclark.edu wrote:
Brad writes of free speech doctrine:
[T]he court isn't determining if a person's words are mistaken . . . when
they say that free speech doesn't cover slander or libel.
we have long held that actual malice requires material falsity
*Air Wisconsin
is) dismissed with People supported
slavery and opposed interracial marriage the same way. That's not free
exercise under any definition that has any meaning.
*From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:
religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *James Oleske
*Sent:* Sunday
Brad writes:
[T]he fact that people have wrongly tried [to] make religious freedom
claims doesn't mean we disregard all religious freedom claims. We ought to
be able to distinguish between the two.
Although Brad thinks the law ought to be able to distinguish between
wrong and correct religious
One interesting question is whether situations like that in Coeur d'Alene
-- even assuming they are not adequately addressed by constitutional
protections for freedom of association and freedom of religion -- are best
addressed statutorily through (1) the definition of places of public
Given the overlap between Eugene's two most recent messages -- one on the
Oklahoma bill thread and the other offering the new racist prostitute
hypothetical -- I thought it might be helpful to put them both in one
thread.
Eugene's messages raise precisely the question I had been hoping to raise:
expediency. The shrewdest
way to buttress an argument *ad hominem* is to create an appearance of
engaging an opponent’s arguments while so distorting his view that a
caricature takes the place of the original.
Lewis and Clark University law professor James Oleske deploys the last
on the Bill
(if enacted) to discriminate. Likewise entrepreneurs, whose businesses are
not held in the corporate form.
Sent from my iPhone
On Jan 23, 2015, at 9:01 PM, James Oleske jole...@lclark.edu wrote:
Thanks for the links, Chip. Interestingly, the sponsor of the legislation
told
Thanks for the links, Chip. Interestingly, the sponsor of the legislation
told a reporter a couple of days ago that he was planning to change the
bill to address concerns like those laid out in your letter. Here's the
relevant passage from the news report:
***
Mark Goldfeder, a law professor at
I'm listening to the replay of the Holt v. Hobbs argument on CSPAN, and was
struck a moment ago by this comment from Justice Scalia while discussing
compelling state interest standard with the Assistant SG:
We’re talking here about a compelling State interest. *Bear in mind I
would not have
One caveat to the observations both Chip and Doug have made about the
situation in the 29 states that have not extended their public
accommodations laws to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. While one would not expect claims against wedding vendors to
arise under state law
, Jul 5, 2014 at 1:27 PM, James Oleske jole...@lclark.edu wrote:
Marty -- In your message below, and in your post over at Balkinization,
you posit that Wheaton College might still allege a RFRA violation if
employees do get the coverage under the Court's current solution of
written notification
forced to live by some other religion’s view of the matter and to
violate the rules of their own religion.
Douglas Laycock
Robert E. Scott Distinguished Professor of Law
University of Virginia Law School
580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
434-243-8546
*From:* James Oleske
Based on the briefs and oral argument in Hobby Lobby, one thing is already
clear: Professor Laycock's contention that the public meaning of RFRA can
be discerned by examining the congressional debates over RLPA has had a
notable impact. Not only did Paul Clement invoke the argument in Hobby
Robert E. Scott Distinguished Professor of Law
University of Virginia Law School
580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
434-243-8546
*From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:
religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *James Oleske
*Sent:* Friday, May 09
As Chip notes, there are profound difficulties in trying to use law as a
instrument to sort the sincere objectors from the bigots and phobes. And
until recently, our consistent approach to antidiscrimination laws and
religious accommodations implicitly recognized what Chip ultimately
concludes
In light of the recent discussions of this issue on the list, and in light
the various proposals percolating in the states, I've got a question for
the group and a shameless plug.
First, the shameless plug -- I've just posted a new piece on the issue to
SSRN (it won't be in print until next year,
a religious accommodation clause once
it is enacted, even if the majority comes to regret having enacted it.
On Wed, Feb 26, 2014 at 11:46 AM, James Oleske jole...@lclark.edu wrote:
In light of the recent discussions of this issue on the list, and in
light the various proposals percolating
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