I believe consciousness is just an ascription made to a first party, by a second party. There is an experience that the second party has, lets call it "the grasp of consciousness", but how can the second party know that the firstparty also has it. It's like seeing colors, or eating chocolate. How doesthe second party know that the first party's experience of "red" or "thetaste of chocolate" is the same as her own? The second party assumes it is the same and ascribes that experience to the first party. But we know that people, particularly men and women perceive colors differently, and that colors do not really exist, they are a phenomenon of how we perceive liight. And I'll never know what chocolate tastes like to you, only how I perceive the taste of chocolate. Suppose the first party is a robot and the second party is a human.If the experience does not occur by the same means can it be called the same thing? Or is defining things as conscious or not simply a matter of re-definition? Finally, is consciousness a prerequisite for anything important? Is it anythingmore than an ascription? Is consciousness useful for anything? Kindly enlighten... (my apologies since I'm late to this conversation). ~PM Date: Tue, 13 Jan 2015 08:49:56 -0800 Subject: Re: [agi] How to create an uploader From: [email protected] To: [email protected]
If we like to make the AGI project real science we need to build a conscious (intelligent) machine. That's the path http://dx.doi.org/10.13140/2.1.2286.5608 or or http://arxiv.org/abs/1411.5224 It's far beyond digital computation and we need to collaborate with biologists, cognitive scientists,.... Dorian On Tue, Jan 13, 2015 at 5:09 AM, John Rose via AGI <[email protected]> wrote: > -----Original Message----- > From: Steve Richfield via AGI [mailto:[email protected]] > > Again, everything I have seen shows "consciousness" to be a post-hoc emergent > property of a process that is VERY different that it appears to be. Think > hundreds of threads that can NOT be done one-at-a-time, except maybe in a > time sharing sort of way, because some threads may never finish, some might > cancel others, etc. Further, there is plenty of biological evidence supporting > bidirectional computations, which are incredibly inefficient to simulate on > present-day computers (except analog computers). There are many ways to look at it. It could be a finite state machine model where consciousness is the cumulative "moving average" of the contexts of the FSM with many threads running many FSM's where the contexts are interlinked. This would imply in your chess example where the FSM's are solving many chess moves simultaneously in the background and the post-hoc emergent consciousness is notified asynchronously of threaded results as they bubble up. That's not my preferred model just an impromptu example. Why is bidirectional more efficient on analog computers? Which type of bidirectional computation are you referring to. John ------------------------------------------- AGI Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/17795807-366cfa2a Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com AGI | Archives | Modify Your Subscription ------------------------------------------- AGI Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/21088071-f452e424 Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=21088071&id_secret=21088071-58d57657 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
