Colin,

This is the first I have read of your book. I am impressed. We have very
similar perspectives regarding subjectivity/objectivity, but you have taken
the time to put it into very clear language that elucidates the inherently
subjective nature of so-called objectivity in a way I am not sure I could
have done.

At the risk of overlooking things you may have already covered in the
chapters of your book that I have not yet read, I would suggest that you
consider looking deeper at the attentional aspects of P-consciousness
(section 3.4.2) and their relationship with novelty (section 3.4.1) for
clues as to some of the underlying mechanisms of consciousness. Consider
our internal experiential model of reality, which is constructed by the
brain from sensory data, and the fact that conscious awareness seems to be
called into effect by the presence of novelty in that model. I would posit
that conscious awareness consists of the application of some specific
mental module, whose purpose is to deal with novel situations (most likely
through simulation and combinatoric analysis), to the internal model of
reality.

A feeling of conscious awareness could be induced by the ability of this
mental module to call up components of the model as needed. So while we may
feel that we are simultaneously consciously aware of everything we see,
hear, feel, think, etc., this could in fact be an inherent self-deception
-- a trick of the mind -- because we lack the ability to effectively
monitor our access to that internal model, and so lacking this
introspective capability, we cannot be aware of limitations placed upon our
own consciousness that prevent us from immediate conscious awareness of
multiple simultaneous sensory streams. In other words, our feeling of
simultaneous awareness may come from the fact that the only test we have
available to us internally for awareness of a piece of information is the
attempt to access that information, and this test fails to distinguish
between actual access and the mere ability to do so. This effect could also
introduce temporal effects such as latent experience of simultaneity; for
example, while it may take several seconds to process a rapid succession of
events, we may nonetheless be able to consciously analyze those events in
their precise timing and feel as though we had consciously experienced them
in real time, provided their temporal relationships are recorded in the
model.

If all that the mental module which produces the experience of
P-consciousness can do is access and modify a mental model, then the only
things we can be aware of are things that we can store and access in that
model, which prevents us from being directly aware of the internal
mechanisms at work in the interaction between the consciousness module and
the model it utilizes. Differences in the "size" or "degree" of phenomenal
consciousness across species, which seems to be a somewhat universal
intuition among those who take the time to analyze the nature of conscious
experience, can be explained in terms of the model's complexity level
and/or the consciousness module's effectiveness at organizing and
interacting with that model. This proposed mechanism still leaves open the
fundamental nature of first person experience, but its attempt to gain
explanatory traction may nonetheless be a valuable step forward and may
yield some experimentally falsifiable hypotheses regarding the nature of
experiential consciousness.

On Tue, Jan 13, 2015 at 3:07 PM, Colin Geoffrey Hales via AGI <
[email protected]> wrote:

>  Hi,
>
> Please read my Chapter 3 to see what consciousness is. Attached.
>
>
>
> There is a mountain of information traceable in the references. It takes a
> while for the idea of it to become solid. “First person” is the key. You
> have to think of it as the physics of ‘being’ matter. Not ‘looking at’
> matter or making any abstraction whatever. A completely dumb inert piece of
> matter could have a 1st person perspective (e.g. a complex and vivid
> visual scene) and it would be conscious. Just unable to behave in any way.
> When you dream you are conscious (have a 1st person perspective). You are
> just not awake.
>
>
>
> Regards
>
> Colin
>
>
>
> *From:* Piaget Modeler via AGI [mailto:[email protected]]
> *Sent:* Wednesday, 14 January 2015 4:19 AM
> *To:* AGI
> *Subject:* [agi] Consciousness 101
>
>
>
> I believe consciousness is just an ascription made to a  first party, by a
> second party.
>
>
>
> There is an experience that the second party has, lets call it "the grasp
>
> of consciousness", but how can the second party know that the first
>
> party also has it.  It's like seeing colors, or eating chocolate. How does
>
> the second party know that the first party's experience of "red" or "the
>
> taste of chocolate" is the same as her own? The second party assumes
>
> it is the same and ascribes that experience to the first party.  But we
> know
>
> that people, particularly men and women perceive colors differently, and
>
> that colors do not really exist, they are a phenomenon of how we perceive
>
> liight. And I'll never know what chocolate tastes like to you, only how I
>
> perceive the taste of chocolate.
>
>
>
> Suppose the first party is a robot and the second party is a human.
>
> If the experience does not occur by the same means can it be called
>
> the same thing?
>
>
>
> Or is defining things as conscious or not simply a matter of
> re-definition?
>
>
>
> Finally, is consciousness a prerequisite for anything important? Is it
> anything
>
> more than an ascription? Is consciousness useful for anything?
>
>
>
> Kindly enlighten...  (my apologies since I'm late to this conversation).
>
>
>
> ~PM
>
>
>
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