Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Brent Meeker writes: > > > Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2007 17:00:11 -0800 > > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > To: [email protected] > > Subject: Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds > > > > > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > > > Johnathan Corgan writes: > > > > > >> Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > >> > > >>> If some multiverse theory happens to be true then by your way of > argument we > > >>> should all be extremely anxious all the time, because every > moment terrible things > > >>> are definitely happening to some copy of us. For example, we > should be constantly > > >>> be worrying that we will be struck by lightning, because we > *will* be struck by lightning. > > >> If MWI is true, *and* there isn't a lowest quantum of > > >> probability/measure as Brent Meeker speculates, there is an > interesting > > >> corollary to the quantum theory of immortality. > > >> > > >> While one branch always exists which continues our consciousness > > >> forward, indeed we are constantly "shedding" branches where the most > > >> brutal and horrific things happen to us and result in our death. Their > > >> measure is extremely small, so from a subjectively probability > > >> perspective, we don't worry about them. > > >> > > >> I'd speculate that there are far more logically possible ways to > > >> experience an agonizing, lingering death than to live. Some have a > > >> relatively high measure, like getting hit by a car, or getting lung > > >> cancer (if you're a smoker), so we take steps to avoid these (though > > >> they still happen in some branch.) Others, like having all our > > >> particles spontaneously quantum tunnel into the heart of a burning > > >> furnace, are so low in measure, we can blissfully ignore the > > >> possibility. Yet if MWI is true, there is some branch where this has > > >> just happened to us. (modulo Brent's probability quantum.) > > >> > > >> If there are many more ways to die than to live, even of low > individual > > >> measure, I wonder how the "integral of the measure" across all of them > > >> comes out. > > > > > > It's not death that is the problem (you always get out of that), > it's suffering. Final death > > > would be better than a living hell, but QTI denies you final death. > I take comfort in the > > > speculation that if I'm still alive in a few hundred years, most > likely this will be as a result > > > of some advanced medical or cybernetic intervention, and if science > understands the brain > > > well enough to do that, it would be a relatively simple matter by > comparison to ensure that I > > > am content. I think the hellish routes to immortality would occur > mostly by chance and would > > > be of much lower total measure than the deliberate, happy routes. > > > > I think Bruno already remarked that it may well be more probable that > a continuation of your consciousness arises in some other branch of the > multiverse "by chance", rather than as a state of "your" erstwhile body. > This would seem particularly more probable as your consciousness > simplifies due to deterioration of your brain - how hard can it be to > find a continuation of a near coma. Perhaps this continuation is the > consciousness of a fish - and it's the Hindus rather than the Bhuddists > who are right. > > Then we come up against the question of what we can expect to experience > in the case of duplication with partial memory loss. For example, if you > are duplicated 101 times such that one copy has 100% of your memories > while the other 100 copies each have 1% of your memories, does this mean > that you have an even chance of ending up as either the 100% or the 1% > version of yourself? We need not invoke duplication experiments or the > MWI to ask this question either. Suppose there are a billion people in > the world each with 1/billion of my memories: does this mean I will find > myself becoming one of these people either now or after I have died?
As I understand it, Bruno's theory is that you are all the "consistent continuations" of your consciousness. I'm not exactly sure what constitutes a consistent continuation, but it must be something other than just sharing memories. At any given time my consciousness is accessing only a tiny fraction of my memories. Further I'm continually forming and forgetting short-term memories as well as forgetting some long-term memories. Basing identity on memory seems inconsistent with supposing that identity is some property of consciousness alone. A digital computation doesn't depend on memory/data that isn't accessed. Brent Meeker --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
