Brent Meeker writes:> >  > I think Bruno already remarked that it may well be 
more probable that > > a continuation of your consciousness arises in some 
other branch of the > > multiverse "by chance", rather than as a state of 
"your" erstwhile body. > > This would seem particularly more probable as your 
consciousness > > simplifies due to deterioration of your brain - how hard can 
it be to > > find a continuation of a near coma. Perhaps this continuation is 
the > > consciousness of a fish - and it's the Hindus rather than the Bhuddists 
> > who are right.> > > > Then we come up against the question of what we can 
expect to experience > > in the case of duplication with partial memory loss. 
For example, if you > > are duplicated 101 times such that one copy has 100% of 
your memories > > while the other 100 copies each have 1% of your memories, 
does this mean > > that you have an even chance of ending up as either the 100% 
or the 1% > > version of yourself? We need not invoke duplication experiments 
or the > > MWI to ask this question either. Suppose there are a billion people 
in > > the world each with 1/billion of my memories: does this mean I will find 
> > myself becoming one of these people either now or after I have died?> > As 
I understand it, Bruno's theory is that you are all the "consistent 
continuations" of your consciousness.  I'm not exactly sure what constitutes a 
consistent continuation, but it must be something other than just sharing 
memories.  At any given time my consciousness is accessing only a tiny fraction 
of my memories.  Further I'm continually  forming and forgetting short-term 
memories as well as forgetting some long-term memories.  > > Basing identity on 
memory seems inconsistent with supposing that identity is some property of 
consciousness alone.  A digital computation doesn't depend on memory/data that 
isn't accessed.    Identity from moment to moment is not just memory, it is the 
entire content of conscious experience, perhaps accessing at any one time only 
a small portion of memory. It may be just a sense that I am the same person 
continuing the same thought as I was a moment ago, or even less than this when 
I am waking up from sleep, for example. At such sufficiently vague moments, my 
consciousness may even be indistinguishable with that of many other people in 
the world, such that if I ceased to exist momentarily I would still experience 
continuity of consciousness as if nothing had happened, piggy-backing on 
someone else's thoughts: all equivalent observer moments are internally 
indistinguishable, by definition. However, such a thing could only happen 
momentarily, because very quickly I might reflect on my situation, and it is 
here that having a store of memories, motivations, personality style etc. 
instantly accessible (even if not continuously accessed) makes me, me.Stathis 
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