Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
> > > > I think Bruno already remarked that it may well be more probable
> > > a continuation of your consciousness arises in some other branch of
> > > multiverse "by chance", rather than as a state of "your" erstwhile
> > > This would seem particularly more probable as your consciousness
> > > simplifies due to deterioration of your brain - how hard can it be to
> > > find a continuation of a near coma. Perhaps this continuation is the
> > > consciousness of a fish - and it's the Hindus rather than the
> > > who are right.
> > >
> > > Then we come up against the question of what we can expect to
> > > in the case of duplication with partial memory loss. For example,
> if you
> > > are duplicated 101 times such that one copy has 100% of your memories
> > > while the other 100 copies each have 1% of your memories, does this
> > > that you have an even chance of ending up as either the 100% or the 1%
> > > version of yourself? We need not invoke duplication experiments or the
> > > MWI to ask this question either. Suppose there are a billion people in
> > > the world each with 1/billion of my memories: does this mean I will
> > > myself becoming one of these people either now or after I have died?
> > As I understand it, Bruno's theory is that you are all the
> "consistent continuations" of your consciousness. I'm not exactly sure
> what constitutes a consistent continuation, but it must be something
> other than just sharing memories. At any given time my consciousness is
> accessing only a tiny fraction of my memories. Further I'm continually
> forming and forgetting short-term memories as well as forgetting some
> long-term memories.
> > Basing identity on memory seems inconsistent with supposing that
> identity is some property of consciousness alone. A digital computation
> doesn't depend on memory/data that isn't accessed.
> Identity from moment to moment is not just memory, it is the entire
> content of conscious experience, perhaps accessing at any one time only
> a small portion of memory. It may be just a sense that I am the same
> person continuing the same thought as I was a moment ago, or even less
> than this when I am waking up from sleep, for example. At such
> sufficiently vague moments, my consciousness may even be
> indistinguishable with that of many other people in the world, such that
> if I ceased to exist momentarily I would still experience continuity of
> consciousness as if nothing had happened, piggy-backing on someone
> else's thoughts: all equivalent observer moments are internally
> indistinguishable, by definition. However, such a thing could only
> happen momentarily, because very quickly I might reflect on my
> situation, and it is here that having a store of memories, motivations,
> personality style etc. instantly accessible (even if not continuously
> accessed) makes me, me.
Yes I understand that you would eventually, say when waking from anesthesia,
have some memories unique to Stathis Papaioannou. But in the meantime I think
you are still you - and not all those other people who shared those vague
thoughts in the recovery room. And it can't be because your memories are
"instantly accessible"; that's a mere potentiality not a state. If we start to
reify potentialities in a multi-verse where we already have a white rabbit
problem, we'll really be in trouble.
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