Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Brent Meeker writes: > > > > > I think Bruno already remarked that it may well be more probable > that > > > a continuation of your consciousness arises in some other branch of > the > > > multiverse "by chance", rather than as a state of "your" erstwhile > body. > > > This would seem particularly more probable as your consciousness > > > simplifies due to deterioration of your brain - how hard can it be to > > > find a continuation of a near coma. Perhaps this continuation is the > > > consciousness of a fish - and it's the Hindus rather than the > Bhuddists > > > who are right. > > > > > > Then we come up against the question of what we can expect to > experience > > > in the case of duplication with partial memory loss. For example, > if you > > > are duplicated 101 times such that one copy has 100% of your memories > > > while the other 100 copies each have 1% of your memories, does this > mean > > > that you have an even chance of ending up as either the 100% or the 1% > > > version of yourself? We need not invoke duplication experiments or the > > > MWI to ask this question either. Suppose there are a billion people in > > > the world each with 1/billion of my memories: does this mean I will > find > > > myself becoming one of these people either now or after I have died? > > > > As I understand it, Bruno's theory is that you are all the > "consistent continuations" of your consciousness. I'm not exactly sure > what constitutes a consistent continuation, but it must be something > other than just sharing memories. At any given time my consciousness is > accessing only a tiny fraction of my memories. Further I'm continually > forming and forgetting short-term memories as well as forgetting some > long-term memories. > > > > Basing identity on memory seems inconsistent with supposing that > identity is some property of consciousness alone. A digital computation > doesn't depend on memory/data that isn't accessed. > > Identity from moment to moment is not just memory, it is the entire > content of conscious experience, perhaps accessing at any one time only > a small portion of memory. It may be just a sense that I am the same > person continuing the same thought as I was a moment ago, or even less > than this when I am waking up from sleep, for example. At such > sufficiently vague moments, my consciousness may even be > indistinguishable with that of many other people in the world, such that > if I ceased to exist momentarily I would still experience continuity of > consciousness as if nothing had happened, piggy-backing on someone > else's thoughts: all equivalent observer moments are internally > indistinguishable, by definition. However, such a thing could only > happen momentarily, because very quickly I might reflect on my > situation, and it is here that having a store of memories, motivations, > personality style etc. instantly accessible (even if not continuously > accessed) makes me, me.
Yes I understand that you would eventually, say when waking from anesthesia, have some memories unique to Stathis Papaioannou. But in the meantime I think you are still you - and not all those other people who shared those vague thoughts in the recovery room. And it can't be because your memories are "instantly accessible"; that's a mere potentiality not a state. If we start to reify potentialities in a multi-verse where we already have a white rabbit problem, we'll really be in trouble. Brent Meeker --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
