Le 07-mars-07, à 18:50, Danny Mayes a écrit :

> If you assume an ensemble theory, whether it be an infinite MWI or 
> Bruno’s UD in the plenitude, is it POSSIBLE to avoid God?  For the 
> purposes of this question I’ll define “God” as an entity capable of 
> creating everything that would be observed to exist in a (all 
> possible) quantum mechanical universe. 

God has to choose only among QM universes? Does that God obey QM Eself?

> To avoid God are we back to some kind of “primitive physical” idea 
> that there is something about the nature of reality that will forever 
> prohibit intelligence from emulating it? 

We cannot, knowingly, emulate a first person in any third person way. 
For example we can emulate perfectly both the comp and the quantum 
indeterminacy .. up to the measurement procedure, which can still be 
emulate but only by emulating the observer himself. But this can be 
done with any classical or quantum universal machine, but then only 
I prefer translate the "primitive physical idea" as the idea that there 
is a primitive physical world which is responsible for appearances. But 
this already contradict the comp hypothesis (for example by the UDA 
argument, but you can also look at Plotinus or Proclus).

> That it is impossible even in theory to build a kind of “universal 
> quantum constructor”? 

It is impossible to build a universal *prover* or knower. But we can 
build universal classical or quantum constructor or computer.

> Or is the idea one that physics will forever prohibit intelligence 
> from acquiring the resources necessary to achieve such a feat? 

Neither math nor physics prohibit this. Math only prohibit universal 
machine prover or knower.

> How can you have everything, but not have something capable of 
> creating everything?  If you assume for instance the UD in the 
> plenitude (no intelligent action required), doesn’t it eventually 
> describe intelligence with access to infinite or near infinite 
> resources capable of creating an “artificial” UD? 

Sure. But why? The UD is needed in an argument. Real platonic UDs are 
enough for the rest. Note that this can and should be tested.

> If the answer is yes the whole debate over God seems to become a silly 
> argument over semantics.  

You are quite fuzzy about God, and your basic assumptions. Do you 
assume a *primitive* physical universe?

>  I’ll be happy to hear where I’m wrong on all this.  Please be kind, 
> I’ve been away from these sorts of discussions for quite a while!

No problem, but you could be clearer about your assumption, or I am 
perhaps missing something.


> Danny Mayes
> On 3/7/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Tom Caylor wrote:
>  > I agree with the Russell quote as it stands.  Unendingness is not 
> what
>  > gives meaning.  The source of meaning is not "living forever" in 
> time
>  > (contrary to the trans-humanists) but is timeless.  However, the 
> quote
>  > makes a bad assumption when it talks about losing value.  The real
>  > problem is how there can be any true objective value to love in the
>  > first place (other than the so-called "irrefutable" first person:
>  > "It's all about me").
>  Why should there be?  Values are relative to people.  Love is our 
> word.  We invented it to describe what we feel.  Having some Platonic 
> form of LOVE out there is superfluous.  You're just making up a 
> requirement for "the really real ding-an-sich" so that you can say God 
> provides it.
>  You could replace "love" with "chocolate" and "God" with "the 
> chocolate fairy". You can claim that while the reason people like 
> chocolate can be explained in terms of chemistry, physiology, 
> evolutionary biology etc., only the chocolate fairy can give ultimate 
> meaning to the chocolate eating experience.
>  Stathis Papaioannou
>  >

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