Le 07-mars-07, à 18:50, Danny Mayes a écrit :


 

If you assume an ensemble theory, whether it be an infinite MWI or Bruno’s
UD in the plenitude, is it POSSIBLE to avoid God?  For the purposes of this
question I’ll define “God” as an entity capable of creating everything that
would be observed to exist in a (all possible) quantum mechanical universe.





God has to choose only among QM universes? Does that God obey QM Eself?

>>> Bruno, as a starting point, I concede that discussion of things
occurring outside the quantum-mechanical multiverse is metaphysical.
Certainly other realities can be discussed (Tegmark, and for that matter the
UD in the plenitude), but for the purposes of the question I was
specifically limiting the subject to the creation of the type of universe we
observe, because we are having to work off the laws of physics we know to
attempt and answer the question, and the issue is the creation of what we
observe, not other realities.  So it’s not that “God” has to choose QM
universes, it’s that I’m only interested in whether an entity capable of
creating QM universes (whatever you call it) is an inevitable result of an
assumed ensemble theory.  Of course, as I described in the original post,
the entity does not have to actually create QM universes necessarily.  It
would achieve the same effect as to observers if it simply understood how to
emulate brain states of observers that existed in QM universes.    

 

To avoid God are we back to some kind of “primitive physical” idea that
there is something about the nature of reality that will forever prohibit
intelligence from emulating it?  





We cannot, knowingly, emulate a first person in any third person way. For
example we can emulate perfectly both the comp and the quantum indeterminacy
.. up to the measurement procedure, which can still be emulate but only by
emulating the observer himself. But this can be done with any classical or
quantum universal machine, but then only serendipitously.
I prefer translate the "primitive physical idea" as the idea that there is a
primitive physical world which is responsible for appearances. But this
already contradict the comp hypothesis (for example by the UDA argument, but
you can also look at Plotinus or Proclus).



 





That it is impossible even in theory to build a kind of “universal quantum
constructor”?  




It is impossible to build a universal *prover* or knower. But we can build
universal classical or quantum constructor or computer.




 

 

Or is the idea one that physics will forever prohibit intelligence from
acquiring the resources necessary to achieve such a feat? 


Neither math nor physics prohibit this. Math only prohibit universal machine
prover or knower.





How can you have everything, but not have something capable of creating
everything?  If you assume for instance the UD in the plenitude (no
intelligent action required), doesn’t it eventually describe intelligence
with access to infinite or near infinite resources capable of creating an
“artificial” UD?  




Sure. But why? The UD is needed in an argument. Real platonic UDs are enough
for the rest. Note that this can and should be tested.



If the answer is yes the whole debate over God seems to become a silly
argument over semantics.  




You are quite fuzzy about God, and your basic assumptions. Do you assume a
*primitive* physical universe? 




 I’ll be happy to hear where I’m wrong on all this.  Please be kind, I’ve
been away from these sorts of discussions for quite a while!



No problem, but you could be clearer about your assumption, or I am perhaps
missing something.

>>>  Thanks for your responses Bruno, I’ll respond as to my assumptions when
I have more time.

Danny


Bruno



Danny Mayes

 

 

On 3/7/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Tom Caylor wrote:

> I agree with the Russell quote as it stands.  Unendingness is not what
> gives meaning.  The source of meaning is not "living forever" in time
> (contrary to the trans-humanists) but is timeless.  However, the quote 
> makes a bad assumption when it talks about losing value.  The real
> problem is how there can be any true objective value to love in the
> first place (other than the so-called "irrefutable" first person: 
> "It's all about me").

Why should there be?  Values are relative to people.  Love is our word.  We
invented it to describe what we feel.  Having some Platonic form of LOVE out
there is superfluous.  You're just making up a requirement for "the really
real ding-an-sich" so that you can say God provides it.


You could replace "love" with "chocolate" and "God" with "the chocolate
fairy". You can claim that while the reason people like chocolate can be
explained in terms of chemistry, physiology, evolutionary biology etc., only
the chocolate fairy can give ultimate meaning to the chocolate eating
experience.

Stathis Papaioannou






http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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