Hi Brent, As you can guess, I am searching an old post of view which I intended to answer, and then I take opportunity to comment some other one, on some point which are perhaps somehow important ...
Le 17-mars-07, à 21:19, Brent Meeker a écrit : > > Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> Le 17-mars-07, à 00:11, Brent Meeker a écrit : >> >>> But what is Platonia - Tegmarks all mathematically consistent >>> universe? or Bruno's Peano arithmetic - or maybe Torny's finite >>> arithmetic (which would be a much smaller "everything"). >>> >>> And how do things "run" in Platonia? Do we need temporal modes in >>> logic, as well as epistemic ones? >> >> >> Brent, for what I understand, you seem to believe in both a material >> primitive universe, and in the computationalist hypothesis. > > I don't believe either one - I just contemplate them. ;-) > > Since it is not at all clear to me that Peano arithmetic, or any > mathematics, exists I'm uncertain as to whether there is greater > explanatory power in your UDA as compared to Peter's "some things > exist and others don't". The goal of the UDA is not to explain anything. The goal of the UD Argument is to show that the physicalist notion of Matter does not explain neither appearance of matter nor mind. UDA is negative. It only illustrate that with comp the mind body problem is two times more difficult than it is usually thought. You have to explain BOTH Mind and Matter (and actually you have to explain matter from mind, cf the reversal). Only when UDA is translated in the language of a Lobian machine, did it begin to give positive and verifiable informations on matter/appearances. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
