On 20 Nov 2008, at 21:40, Gordon Tsai wrote:
> I think you and John touched the fundamental issues of human
> rational. It's a dilemma encountered by phenomenology. Now I have a
> question: In theory we can't distinguish ourselves from a Lobian
Note that in the math part (Arithmetical UDA), I consider only
"*Sound* Lobian machine". Sound means hat they are never wrong
(talking about numbers). Now no sound Lobian machine can know that she
is sound, and I am not yet sure I will find an interesting notion of
lobianity for unsound machines, and sound Lobian Machine can easily
get unsound, especially when they begin to confuse deductive inference
and inductive inference. We just cannot know if we are (sound) Lobian
It is more something we should hope for ...
> But can lobian machines truly have sufficient rich experiences like
You know, Mechanism is a bit like the half bottle of wine. The
optimist thinks that the bottle is "yet half full", and the pessimist
thinks that the bottles is "already half-empty".
About mechanism, the optimist reasons like that. I love myself because
I have a so interesting life with so many rich experiences. Now you
tell me I am a machine. So I love machine because machine *can* have
rich experiences, indeed, myself is an example.
The pessimist reasons like that. I hate myself because my life is
boringly uninteresting without any rich experiences. Now you tell me I
am a machine. I knew it! My own life confirms that rumor according to
which machine are stupid automata. No meaning no future.
> For example, is it possible for a lobian machine to "still its mind'
> or "cease the computational logic" like some eastern philosophy
> suggested? Maybe any of the out-of-loop experience is still part of
> the computation/logic, just as our out-of-body experiences are
> actually the trick of brain chemicals?
The bad news is that the singular point is, imo, behind us. The
universal machine you bought has been clever, but this has been
shadowed by your downloadling on so many particular purposes software.
And then she need to be "in a body" so that you can use it, as a if it
was a sort of slave, to send me a mail. It will take time for them
too. And once a universal machine has a body or a relative
representation, the first person and the third person get rich and
complex, but possibly confused. Its soul falls, would say Plotin. She
can get hallucinated and all that.
With comp, to be very short and bit provocative, the notion of "out-of-
body" experience makes no sense at all because we don't have a body to
go out of it, at the start. Your body is in your head, if I can say.
This is at least a *consequence* of the assumption of mechanism, and
I'm afraid you have to understand that by yourself, a bit like a
theorem in math. But it is third person sharable, for example by UDA,
I think. it leads I guess to a different view on Reality (different
from the usual Theology of Aristotle, but not different from Plato
Theology, roughly speaking).
You can ask any question, but my favorite one are the naive question :)
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at