On 11/23/08, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On 20 Nov 2008, at 21:40, Gordon Tsai wrote:
>> Bruno:
>>    I think you and John touched the fundamental issues of human
>> rational. It's a dilemma encountered by phenomenology. Now I have a
>> question: In theory we can't distinguish ourselves from a Lobian
>> Machine.
(JM): Dear Gordon, thanks for your consent. My reply is shorter than
Bruno's (Indeed professional - long - one): "If we say so":
 'We' created a "machine" as we wish and if we created it 'that way',
we cannot distinguish ourselves from it.
> Note that in the math part (Arithmetical UDA), I consider only
> "*Sound* Lobian machine". Sound means hat they are never wrong
> (talking about numbers). Now no sound Lobian machine can know that she
> is sound, and I am not yet sure I will find an interesting notion of
> lobianity for unsound machines, and sound Lobian Machine can easily
> get unsound, especially when they begin to confuse deductive inference
> and inductive inference. We just cannot know if we are (sound) Lobian
> Machine.
> It is more something we should hope for ...
>> But can lobian machines truly have sufficient rich experiences like
>> human?
> You know, Mechanism is a bit like the half bottle of wine. The
> optimist thinks that the bottle is "yet half full", and the pessimist
> thinks that the bottles is "already half-empty".
> About mechanism, the optimist reasons like that. I love myself because
> I have a so interesting life with so many rich experiences. Now you
> tell me I am a machine. So I love machine because machine *can* have
> rich experiences, indeed, myself is an example.
> The pessimist reasons like that. I hate myself because my life is
> boringly uninteresting without any rich experiences. Now you tell me I
> am a machine. I knew it! My own life confirms that rumor according to
> which machine are stupid automata. No meaning no future.

(JM): thanks Bruno, for the nice metaphor of 'machine' - In my vocabulary
a machine is a model exercising a mechanism, but chacquun a son gout.
With a mechanism I am differently: I like to expand it onto something like
'anything (process) that gets something entailed' without restrictions. But
again, I do not propose this to universal acceptance.
>> For example, is it possible for a lobian machine to "still its mind'
>> or "cease the computational logic" like some eastern philosophy
>> suggested? Maybe any of the out-of-loop experience is still part of
>> the computation/logic, just as our out-of-body experiences are
>> actually the trick of brain chemicals?
> The bad news is that the singular point is, imo, behind us. The
> universal machine you bought has been clever, but this has been
> shadowed by your downloadling on so many particular purposes software.
> And then she need to be "in a body" so that you can use it, as a if it
> was a sort of slave, to send me a mail. It will take time for them
> too. And once a universal machine has a body or a relative
> representation,  the first person and the third person get rich and
> complex, but possibly confused. Its soul falls, would say Plotin. She
> can get hallucinated and all that.
> With comp, to be very short and bit provocative, the notion of "out-of-
> body" experience makes no sense at all because we don't have a body to
> go out of it, at the start. Your body is in your head, if I can say.
> This is at least a *consequence* of the assumption of mechanism, and
> I'm afraid you have to understand that by yourself, a bit like a
> theorem in math. But it is third person sharable, for example by UDA,
> I think. it leads I guess to a different view on Reality (different
> from the usual Theology of Aristotle, but not different from Plato
> Theology, roughly speaking).
(JM): Bruno, in my opinion NOTHING is 'third person sharable' - only a
'thing' (from every- or no-) can give rise to develop a FIRST personal
variant of the sharing, more or less (maybe) resembling the original 'to
be shared' one. In its (1st) 'personal' variation. (Cf: perceived reality).

> You can ask any question, but my favorite one are the naive question :)
> Bruno Marchal
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
(JM): John Mikes
> >

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