On 11/23/08, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > On 20 Nov 2008, at 21:40, Gordon Tsai wrote: > >> Bruno: >> I think you and John touched the fundamental issues of human >> rational. It's a dilemma encountered by phenomenology. Now I have a >> question: In theory we can't distinguish ourselves from a Lobian >> Machine. > (JM): Dear Gordon, thanks for your consent. My reply is shorter than Bruno's (Indeed professional - long - one): "If we say so": 'We' created a "machine" as we wish and if we created it 'that way', we cannot distinguish ourselves from it. > >(Bruno): > Note that in the math part (Arithmetical UDA), I consider only > "*Sound* Lobian machine". Sound means hat they are never wrong > (talking about numbers). Now no sound Lobian machine can know that she > is sound, and I am not yet sure I will find an interesting notion of > lobianity for unsound machines, and sound Lobian Machine can easily > get unsound, especially when they begin to confuse deductive inference > and inductive inference. We just cannot know if we are (sound) Lobian > Machine. > It is more something we should hope for ... > >> But can lobian machines truly have sufficient rich experiences like >> human? > > You know, Mechanism is a bit like the half bottle of wine. The > optimist thinks that the bottle is "yet half full", and the pessimist > thinks that the bottles is "already half-empty". > About mechanism, the optimist reasons like that. I love myself because > I have a so interesting life with so many rich experiences. Now you > tell me I am a machine. So I love machine because machine *can* have > rich experiences, indeed, myself is an example. > The pessimist reasons like that. I hate myself because my life is > boringly uninteresting without any rich experiences. Now you tell me I > am a machine. I knew it! My own life confirms that rumor according to > which machine are stupid automata. No meaning no future.
(JM): thanks Bruno, for the nice metaphor of 'machine' - In my vocabulary a machine is a model exercising a mechanism, but chacquun a son gout. With a mechanism I am differently: I like to expand it onto something like 'anything (process) that gets something entailed' without restrictions. But again, I do not propose this to universal acceptance. > >> For example, is it possible for a lobian machine to "still its mind' >> or "cease the computational logic" like some eastern philosophy >> suggested? Maybe any of the out-of-loop experience is still part of >> the computation/logic, just as our out-of-body experiences are >> actually the trick of brain chemicals? > > The bad news is that the singular point is, imo, behind us. The > universal machine you bought has been clever, but this has been > shadowed by your downloadling on so many particular purposes software. > And then she need to be "in a body" so that you can use it, as a if it > was a sort of slave, to send me a mail. It will take time for them > too. And once a universal machine has a body or a relative > representation, the first person and the third person get rich and > complex, but possibly confused. Its soul falls, would say Plotin. She > can get hallucinated and all that. > > With comp, to be very short and bit provocative, the notion of "out-of- > body" experience makes no sense at all because we don't have a body to > go out of it, at the start. Your body is in your head, if I can say. > > This is at least a *consequence* of the assumption of mechanism, and > I'm afraid you have to understand that by yourself, a bit like a > theorem in math. But it is third person sharable, for example by UDA, > I think. it leads I guess to a different view on Reality (different > from the usual Theology of Aristotle, but not different from Plato > Theology, roughly speaking). (JM): Bruno, in my opinion NOTHING is 'third person sharable' - only a 'thing' (from every- or no-) can give rise to develop a FIRST personal variant of the sharing, more or less (maybe) resembling the original 'to be shared' one. In its (1st) 'personal' variation. (Cf: perceived reality). > > You can ask any question, but my favorite one are the naive question :) > > Bruno Marchal > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > (JM): John Mikes > > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
