On 22 Sep 2009, at 17:46, Flammarion wrote:
> On 22 Sep, 16:29, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>> On 22 Sep 2009, at 15:51, Flammarion wrote:
>>> He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial
>>> UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities.
>> You are in a third person way.
> That is still not possible if there are no immaterial entities.
I agree. But as far as I look to what is sharable among us I see only
All papers in physics relies on theories relating measurable numbers
through mathematical relation. the e-rest is already instinctive bets
and qualia. But I see immaterial entities all the time: people,
images, games, nations, programs, melodies, planets, galaxies, plants,
and the famous bosons and fermions, which are famous for taking
formalism so seriously .... :)
>> If you are a program relatively to any
>> "real world", you are 'executed' infinitely often by the material UD,
>> and by the arithmetical UD too in the corresponding third person
> Not if there is no immaterial (or as you call it, arithmetic) UD.
But it is a theorem of arithmetic that the UD exists. (accepting
Church thesis, I mean CT is not a theorem of arithmetic, and probably
false from an (arithmetical) first person point of view like Bp & p).
>> And MGA makes the need of a material UD non sensical, for anything
> A material UD cannot be redundant unless there is an immaterial
> one to take its place.
It exists like PI, gamma, and some constructive real, but it is
probably richer in the internal information.
It does not mean that we have to believe in some immaterial realm, but
only that we have to trust classical logic on arithmetical proposition.
>> Some people can argue that MGA is not needed. They believe that it is
>> obvious that consciousness is not something material at all, and that
>> it is a waste of time of both trying to attach consciousness to
>> matter, or to argue with those who believes that is possible (with or
>> without comp).
>> Do you see the different 'big' picture (as opposed to believe it
>> follows from comp)?
> There is no problem attaching consc to PM. There is a problem
> attachign consc. to mathematical structures, whether phsycially
> or not.
To attach mind on Matter? there is a sort of consensus that with or
without comp, the mind body problem is unsolved. the closer to the
comp consequence, on the consciousness issue (not on matter) is Colin
McGuin (the mysterianist).
Then you seem to forget that computer science provide a very clean
theory of self-reference, and (immaterial) machine themselves proves
interesting things about what they can prove (know, observe, bet
on...). Everett made QM intelligible by a use of comp. With Matter,
except for quantum computation, the notion of computation is still not
clearly defined (as we can expect from UDA/MGA).
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