On 22 Sep, 14:37, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 2009/9/22 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>:
> >> But surely what is 'literally' the case depends critically on one's
> >> starting assumptions.  If one starts with a theoretical commitment to
> >> the primacy of the physical, then the status of mathematics is
> >> obviously rendered formal or metaphorical with respect to this.  OTOH
> >> if one starts from the theoretical primacy of number - irrespective of
> >> whether one labels such primacy 'arithmetical' or 'platonic' - the
> >> opposite is the case,
> > That is pretty much what I have been saying. But note that
> > there is a difference between assuming something because you
> > think it is incontrovertible (deduction) and assuming it because
> > its consequences match observation (abduction)
> One might indeed adduce this distinction in preferring one approach
> over the other, but it isn't forced.  Indeed, in the case of the MGA,
> if one accepts the deduction and retains one's commitment to CTM, then
> the abduction is only to be expected.

I don;t follow that. The MGA is an attempted reductio -- ie it does
need premises of its own but negates the premises of its
that I accept it

> But if you agree with my
> formulation, I'm confused by what you go on to say below:
> >> and indeed Bruno argues precisely how and why,
> >> on the basis of the MGA, one cannot take the status of matter (as
> >> opposed to its appearances) 'literally' from the perspective of
> >> computational theory.
> > No he doesn't. His arguments have to assume Platonism as
> > well as CTM.
> Bruno argues that an experiential-computational type can't be
> plausibly associated with one of its valid physical tokens in at least
> one case.

He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial
UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities.

>If you can show where he goes wrong, you may consider
> CTM+PM has been defended.  OTOH if one agrees with him, this obscures
> the association of consciousness with physics 'qua computatio'.  In
> this case, one could choose to abandon either CTM or PM.  If the
> latter, the move from MGA to UDA requires the reversal of the
> theoretical primacy of matter and (at least a branch of) mathematics.

There is no UDA without a Platonic UD.

> When you respond "That is pretty much what I have been saying" you are
> agreeing, aren't you, that what you mean by Platonism - whether or not
> you accept the MGA as motivating its entailment by CTM - is just a
> theoretical commitment to the primacy of the mathematical, as opposed
> to the material?


>And this seems pretty much indistinguishable from
> Arithmetical Realism to me.

I think Bruno's use fo AR is ambiguous. Sometimes he uses
it to mean Platonism. sometimes he uses it to mean bivalence.

> >> In either case there may be what one considers defensible grounds for
> >> a commitment to a particular direction of inference, but ISTM that
> >> further insistence on the metaphysical 'primitiveness' of one's point
> >> of departure is entirely tangential to the distinctiveness of either
> >> explanatory scheme.
> > Who's been doing that?
> This seems an odd question at this stage.  I thought you were
> insisting that Bruno needs some metaphysically primitive sense of
> Platonism to justify the UDA

He needs to make it clear he is assuming it. He
may justify the assumption apriori or he may justify it abductively.

> >>  The opinions cited in the first posting assume
> >> the first of these theoretical commitments and hence choose to take
> >> the primacy of matter as their inferential fons et origo.  Comp takes
> >> the opposite position.  The rest is a research programme, isn't it?
> > Yes. For my money, metaphysics is a  subject-matter.
> > It is not an epistemological modus-operandi involving declarations of
> > irrefutable certainty.
> Well then, surely we can agree.  One finds grounds for preferring a
> theoretical point of departure, and then one gets down to work.  Comp
> is open to empirical refutation, so it's research.  Is your problem
> that MGA is a "declaration of irrefutable certainty"?

No. But is has assumptions of its own.

>If so, it
> shouldn't be.  Like any deductive argument, it is open to refutation
> if one can find an error.  Further, even if one can't, this doesn't
> force a commitment to Arithmetical Realism, it simply puts the
> coherency of CTM+PM into doubt.

Which could lead to PM-CTM as in Maudlin's argument.
Maudlin of course is *not* assuming Platonism.

>Either conclusion might motivate a
> preference for one research approach over another.
> David
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