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On 22 Sep, 15:10, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > On 22 Sep 2009, at 10:50, Flammarion wrote: > > > No he doesn't. His arguments have to assume Platonism as > > well as CTM. > > CTM needs Church thesis (to define the C of CTM). This requires > Arithmetical Realism, that is the belief that classical logic can be > applied in the number realm. (and there is an intuitionist variant > which works as well). Classical logic doesn't give you an immaterial UD > I make clear Arithmetical realism to avoid lengthy discussion with > exotic philososophies of mathematics, like utltrafinitism, abusive > formalism, etc. A justification of the assimption that numbers exist immaterially is just what is needed. > I prefer to reserve Platonism for the deeper (neo)platonist idea that > what we see and measure is the border, shadow or projection of > something else. And that is part of the *consequences* of UDA1-8. "Platonism" is often used just to mean that numbers exist immaterially., e.g by Penrose. > I have never met any defenders of CTM who is not an arithmetical > realist, which is not so astonishing, given that the mere acquaintance > with the idea of programming a computer, and reasoning on computers > relies on this very usual and common notion, more or less taught in > school. If realism means bivalence, that is probably true. The problem is using bivalence to smuggle in Platonism. > Then the seven first step of UDA relies on CTM. Actually only the > seventh requires Church Thesis. > > And it is at the eigth steps, the ancien preamble which can be read > independently, which 'reminds us' that linking consciousness to > physical activity (physical supervenience thesis) is just > epistemologically incompatible with the CTM idea, unless you > (re)define the physical as the border of the universal machine first > person (plural) indeterminacies. That CTM and phsycialism are incopatible is a philsophical arguemnt, not a mathematical proof, and it has counter-arguments, eg. Colin Klein's response to Maudlin's Olympia. > This is mathematically definable, and its makes the comp theory > testable. Comp is just a weaker and preciser version than Putnam > functionalism. The existence of the level is itself a non constructive > existence, which necessitates the realism. > > You did not answer my question: can you doubt about the existence of > primary matter? Yes. Can you doubt the actual existence of numbers? > Would you be so astonished if the physicists themselves would resume > the unification of forces by a relation among natural numbers? > > I could have use the combinators. I made a try on the list. No need to > be sanguine on the positive integers. I could have use real numbers + > a trigonometric function. To be realist about them consists in > believing that their digital computations stop or does not stop > independently of any consideration. > You introduce confusion by using the term "Platonism" here. I know > that mathematicians use sometimes Platonism in that sense (of > accepting classical logic, and the truth of mathematical statements, > including the non constructive one), but in the present context it > hides the main facts which is that MGA makes it necessary to redefine > the notion of matter. Observable Matter becomes an invariant for a > digital notion of universal machine's observation. > > After the seventh thread, we will come back on the eight step. I > suggest you follow that, and tell us where you object. > > You have said nothing about the seventh first steps, which does not > invoke the materiality issue. Any problem there? "Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a machine state] at space-time (x,t), we are obliged to associate [the pain I feel at space-time (x,t)] to a type or a sheaf of computations (existing forever in the arithmetical Platonia which is accepted as existing independently of our selves with arithmetical realism). " --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---