On 22 Sep 2009, at 10:50, Flammarion wrote:
> No he doesn't. His arguments have to assume Platonism as > well as CTM. CTM needs Church thesis (to define the C of CTM). This requires Arithmetical Realism, that is the belief that classical logic can be applied in the number realm. (and there is an intuitionist variant which works as well). I make clear Arithmetical realism to avoid lengthy discussion with exotic philososophies of mathematics, like utltrafinitism, abusive formalism, etc. I prefer to reserve Platonism for the deeper (neo)platonist idea that what we see and measure is the border, shadow or projection of something else. And that is part of the *consequences* of UDA1-8. I have never met any defenders of CTM who is not an arithmetical realist, which is not so astonishing, given that the mere acquaintance with the idea of programming a computer, and reasoning on computers relies on this very usual and common notion, more or less taught in school. Then the seven first step of UDA relies on CTM. Actually only the seventh requires Church Thesis. And it is at the eigth steps, the ancien preamble which can be read independently, which 'reminds us' that linking consciousness to physical activity (physical supervenience thesis) is just epistemologically incompatible with the CTM idea, unless you (re)define the physical as the border of the universal machine first person (plural) indeterminacies. This is mathematically definable, and its makes the comp theory testable. Comp is just a weaker and preciser version than Putnam functionalism. The existence of the level is itself a non constructive existence, which necessitates the realism. You did not answer my question: can you doubt about the existence of primary matter? Would you be so astonished if the physicists themselves would resume the unification of forces by a relation among natural numbers? I could have use the combinators. I made a try on the list. No need to be sanguine on the positive integers. I could have use real numbers + a trigonometric function. To be realist about them consists in believing that their digital computations stop or does not stop independently of any consideration. You introduce confusion by using the term "Platonism" here. I know that mathematicians use sometimes Platonism in that sense (of accepting classical logic, and the truth of mathematical statements, including the non constructive one), but in the present context it hides the main facts which is that MGA makes it necessary to redefine the notion of matter. Observable Matter becomes an invariant for a digital notion of universal machine's observation. After the seventh thread, we will come back on the eight step. I suggest you follow that, and tell us where you object. You have said nothing about the seventh first steps, which does not invoke the materiality issue. Any problem there? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
