On 22 Sep 2009, at 10:50, Flammarion wrote:
> No he doesn't. His arguments have to assume Platonism as
> well as CTM.
CTM needs Church thesis (to define the C of CTM). This requires
Arithmetical Realism, that is the belief that classical logic can be
applied in the number realm. (and there is an intuitionist variant
which works as well).
I make clear Arithmetical realism to avoid lengthy discussion with
exotic philososophies of mathematics, like utltrafinitism, abusive
I prefer to reserve Platonism for the deeper (neo)platonist idea that
what we see and measure is the border, shadow or projection of
something else. And that is part of the *consequences* of UDA1-8.
I have never met any defenders of CTM who is not an arithmetical
realist, which is not so astonishing, given that the mere acquaintance
with the idea of programming a computer, and reasoning on computers
relies on this very usual and common notion, more or less taught in
Then the seven first step of UDA relies on CTM. Actually only the
seventh requires Church Thesis.
And it is at the eigth steps, the ancien preamble which can be read
independently, which 'reminds us' that linking consciousness to
physical activity (physical supervenience thesis) is just
epistemologically incompatible with the CTM idea, unless you
(re)define the physical as the border of the universal machine first
person (plural) indeterminacies.
This is mathematically definable, and its makes the comp theory
testable. Comp is just a weaker and preciser version than Putnam
functionalism. The existence of the level is itself a non constructive
existence, which necessitates the realism.
You did not answer my question: can you doubt about the existence of
Would you be so astonished if the physicists themselves would resume
the unification of forces by a relation among natural numbers?
I could have use the combinators. I made a try on the list. No need to
be sanguine on the positive integers. I could have use real numbers +
a trigonometric function. To be realist about them consists in
believing that their digital computations stop or does not stop
independently of any consideration.
You introduce confusion by using the term "Platonism" here. I know
that mathematicians use sometimes Platonism in that sense (of
accepting classical logic, and the truth of mathematical statements,
including the non constructive one), but in the present context it
hides the main facts which is that MGA makes it necessary to redefine
the notion of matter. Observable Matter becomes an invariant for a
digital notion of universal machine's observation.
After the seventh thread, we will come back on the eight step. I
suggest you follow that, and tell us where you object.
You have said nothing about the seventh first steps, which does not
invoke the materiality issue. Any problem there?
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