On Tue, Nov 10, 2009 at 1:29 PM, Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: > > That's why I say I take it as an ansatz - "Let's consider > all possible computations and see if we can pick out physics and the > brain and consciousness from them."
I would think that it's pretty much a given that out of all possible computations, we surely will be able to find some way of representing physics, the brain, and the contents of conscious experience. If we can't find some way to symbolically/logically represent these things...what would that mean? Wouldn't it mean that we ourselves aren't capable of grasping them? So, I don't think I see the significance of success in this project...I would think that success in finding some logico-mathematical representation of physics and the rest is the expected outcome, and that conclusive failure would be big news. So with computationalism, you can't see beneath the substitution level to the underlying "processor" substrate of what really exists. The conscious experience that results from the computation doesn't have to reveal anything about the nature of the computer...below the substitution level could be neurons, transistors, falling dominoes, dust clouds (a la Egan), numbers, platonic objects, alien matter existing in some alternate universe, Wang's Carpet (Egan again), ROCKS...basically anything capable of supporting computation...who knows? It would all look the same to us above the substitution level, right? If we were to go with Bruno's proposal, wouldn't it be because a substrate of platonically existing numbers seemed like a more plausible substrate than a contingently existing physical universe of matter and energy and laws which sprang from...nothing? Has existed eternally? What? --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
