On 02 Jan 2011, at 13:09, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
on 02.01.2011 12:54 Brian Tenneson said the following:
Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
on 02.01.2011 12:07 Brian Tenneson said the following:
Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
...
Thank you for your answers. We could say that the Universe is made
of superstrings or we could say that the Universe is made of
numbers. Chalmers shows that for a human being this basically makes
no difference.
Would that be because superstrings are made of numbers?
This could serve as an explanation as well. Yet, I guess Chalmers
wanted to show this in the general case.
Well, that is what I explained to Chalmers in my (public, poster)
presentation (on UDA) at the second meeting of the ASSC (association
for the scientific study of consciousness) in 2000 (I think).
But this is true only locally. I cannot distinguish a virtual body,
from a brain in a vat or from my "real" body, but with enough time I
can find the difference, in principle. The deep point is that it does
make a global difference. If the computationalist hypothesis is true,
the laws of physics are non computational and have to be derived from
the laws of numbers, and we can make a comparison. Chalmers, like
most, still misses the first person indeterminacy, which make the
"matrix-and-only-matrix" consequence of comp testable.
Chalmers told me that after a WM duplication the first person is in
both cities, which is correct *from a third person point of view on
the first persons", but not from the first person points of view
themselves, and that is the crucial point to understand that the laws
of physics have to be secondary with respect to the laws of mind
(computer science/mathematical logic/machine's theology).
Also, the expression "superstring are made of numbers" is unclear. If
computationalism is correct the expression "made of" has no sense.
Things are not made of something, they are dreamed by (infinities) of
computation. The physical worlds becomes the border of the "matrix",
that is a first person plural reality, a partially sharable dream.
Those points are not simple, and that is why I propose a step by step
reasoning. If computationalism is correct, then the laws of physics
are generated in a very specific way, which makes the computationalist
hypothesis testable, and already retrospectively tested.
And by taking Gödel into account (and thus Löb, Solovay) not only the
quanta get a purely mathematical origin, but the qualia too. Quanta
appears indeed to be the sharable part of the qualia. Quanta are
special qualia.
Superstrings are turing universal, so we can use it as a theory of
everything-physical, if we want, but it is a treachery with respect to
comp, and it makes you miss the theory of qualia, and the whole
theology.
Remember that with comp, we can never know that we are awake. But we
can always know that we are dreaming or sharing a dream. The
experimental evidences (the quantum) are that we are indeed sharing a
dream.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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