On 3 January 2011 12:40, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > It is, and has to be, counter-intuitive. Somehow, "me here and now" is an > illusion. But my consciousness of being me, here and now, is not an > illusion, but is not here and now. My consciousness of being me, here and > now is intemporal and aspatial, but it cannot appears so from the > 1-perspective. It is corroborated by the abandon of the physical > supervenience, and the adoption of the comp supervenience. Consciousness (of > a moment) is not related to a moment, but to a cloudy abstract infinite set > of numbers in relation with each others. I am not saying that *this* is > true, but arguing that this follows from D mechanism. > > OK?
Well, the more I think about 1-person indeterminacy, the odder it becomes. For example, let's say that instead of my being "cut and pasted" to W and M, I'm "copied and pasted". Now we have a situation where, from the 3-person viewpoint, I'm in both W and M, but also still back where I started as if nothing had happened! And, from the 1-person pov, after the operation, "I" could "find myself" in any one of these three situations. Another thing. Let's say one were to adopt, rather than DM, some sort of position whereby consciousness is tied to matter. The "copy and paste" process now works by "beaming" enough information to W and M to assemble local copies atom-by-atom (well, it works in Star Trek!). The weird thing is, none of this makes any difference. After the operation, there are still three versions of me, one of which claims to have gone nowhere, one who claims to have been transported to W, and the other to M. And I can still only bet on which "I" will be "me" (or should I say "me" will be "I"!). All this makes me realise that ultimately (as you have said) the association of 1-person experiences with particular 3-person states is indeed mysterious. It is not, as you say, "here and now", even though it appears that one can make predictions, depending on one's theory, about the distribution of 1-person "heres and nows" amongst continuations of any given 3-person mental state. As we've remarked before, it's as if there were one big consciousness that somehow resolves, materialises, individuates and links all these states, and in so doing makes sense of them. David >, > On 03 Jan 2011, at 12:31, David Nyman wrote: > >> On 3 January 2011 09:09, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >> >>> Indeed. Even without the movie graph, but with any of Tegmark multiverse >>> levels, that 1-indeterminacy comes to play. With the movie graph, our >>> relative proportion depends on all computational histories, and this >>> makes >>> ourself multiplied by infinity at each instant, and that is confirmed for >>> anyone willing to accept the quantum wave/matrix and to reject the >>> collapse >>> of the waves. >> >> When you say "relative proportion", do you intend the reference class >> to be the observer moments relating to "my" history, or the entire >> class of all possible OMs? In other words, what principle determines >> why a specific moment seems to be picked out as "here" and "now" from >> a particular first-person perspective, from all other possibilities? > > I assume mechanism throughout. > There is no mechanism picking up my current first person moment, except my > personal memory. > Consider the WM duplication. After that duplication, there is no explanation > at all why I find myself in Washington (resp. Moscow). But there is an > explanation why I find myself in either W or M. Just my will or planning to > be reconstituted there, and my memory of being in Brussels (say) just before > the duplication experiment. > So the question "why am I me" as no answer. But the question why will be me > in this or that situation can be explained by proportion of computational > histories. > The "real" situation is more complex, given that any precise enough > prediction relies on all computations going through my states. The measure, > and the topology and geometry put on those > computation/continuation/consistent extensions depends on the > self-referential correctness constraints. This is always relative to an > infinity of universal numbers. They compete below my substitution level. > > > > > >> I see that all OMs can be considered to be eternally "here" and "now", >> and the question of location within a particular personal history is >> then resolved in the context of each OM. > > Yes. That is correct for each OM. But we have to explain why OMs follows > laws such that the physical structure and experience can be explained? Why > actually there are laws. > > > >> But nonetheless I can't see >> any particular reason, for example, why "right now" I should find >> myself to be situated as this particular human at a particular moment >> in my life history on Planet Earth in the 21st century, rather than an >> alien from the Planet Zog a billion years ago, or hence. What has >> "relative proportion" got to do with it? Or is the question just >> meaningless? > > The question "why am I living this current OM" is as meaningless as the > question "Why am I the one in Washington" after the duplication experiment. > But if I go in Washington by plane, the question "why am I in washington > right now (after the travel)" admits the usual explanation: I am in > Washington because the majority of computation leading to the state of BM in > Brussels with the goal of going to Washington are continued by computation > leading him to Washington. Empirically, this is enough lawful so that I can > make planning and decisions, but of course we have to justify that > lawfulness (from arithmetic, computer science). > > That is why we have to recover the laws of physics (including the laws of > flying plane) from the relative proportion (or plausibility measure) of > computational histories (computations + first person perspective > constraints). > > It is, and has to be, counter-intuitive. Somehow, "me here and now" is an > illusion. But my consciousness of being me, here and now, is not an > illusion, but is not here and now. My consciousness of being me, here and > now is intemporal and aspatial, but it cannot appears so from the > 1-perspective. It is corroborated by the abandon of the physical > supervenience, and the adoption of the comp supervenience. Consciousness (of > a moment) is not related to a moment, but to a cloudy abstract infinite set > of numbers in relation with each others. I am not saying that *this* is > true, but arguing that this follows from D mechanism. > > OK? > > Bruno > > > > >> >> David >> >>> >>> On 03 Jan 2011, at 06:29, Kim Jones wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> On 03/01/2011, at 11:39 AM, David Nyman wrote: >>>> >>>>> The whole issue of "where will I find myself" after duplication is in >>>>> any case very curious. Deciding "who I am" and "where I am" can only >>>>> be post-hoc on the basis of present experience in the context of >>>>> memory. >>>> >>>> It's even worse (better?) than that. If I read Bruno correctly, he is >>>> saying that the mere fact that every morning when you wake up you >>>> believe >>>> you are the same "I" you were before you went to sleep is a contingent >>>> observation. It may be that one does not have to step into a >>>> teleportation >>>> device to be duplicated. >>> >>> >>> Indeed. Even without the movie graph, but with any of Tegmark multiverse >>> levels, that 1-indeterminacy comes to play. With the movie graph, our >>> relative proportion depends on all computational histories, and this >>> makes >>> ourself multiplied by infinity at each instant, and that is confirmed for >>> anyone willing to accept the quantum wave/matrix and to reject the >>> collapse >>> of the waves. >>> So with the DM theory, you get matter indeterminacy, non locality and non >>> clonability as a direct gift (even without the movie graph argument). >>> With >>> the movie graph argument you get immediately *immateriality*. This >>> reduces >>> the mind-body problem to a reduction of the body problem to number theory >>> (or combinators, etc.). >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Kim Jones >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups >>>> "Everything List" group. >>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>>> For more options, visit this group at >>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>> >>> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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