On 3 January 2011 09:09, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > Indeed. Even without the movie graph, but with any of Tegmark multiverse > levels, that 1-indeterminacy comes to play. With the movie graph, our > relative proportion depends on all computational histories, and this makes > ourself multiplied by infinity at each instant, and that is confirmed for > anyone willing to accept the quantum wave/matrix and to reject the collapse > of the waves.
When you say "relative proportion", do you intend the reference class to be the observer moments relating to "my" history, or the entire class of all possible OMs? In other words, what principle determines why a specific moment seems to be picked out as "here" and "now" from a particular first-person perspective, from all other possibilities? I see that all OMs can be considered to be eternally "here" and "now", and the question of location within a particular personal history is then resolved in the context of each OM. But nonetheless I can't see any particular reason, for example, why "right now" I should find myself to be situated as this particular human at a particular moment in my life history on Planet Earth in the 21st century, rather than an alien from the Planet Zog a billion years ago, or hence. What has "relative proportion" got to do with it? Or is the question just meaningless? David > > On 03 Jan 2011, at 06:29, Kim Jones wrote: > >> >> On 03/01/2011, at 11:39 AM, David Nyman wrote: >> >>> The whole issue of "where will I find myself" after duplication is in >>> any case very curious. Deciding "who I am" and "where I am" can only >>> be post-hoc on the basis of present experience in the context of >>> memory. >> >> It's even worse (better?) than that. If I read Bruno correctly, he is >> saying that the mere fact that every morning when you wake up you believe >> you are the same "I" you were before you went to sleep is a contingent >> observation. It may be that one does not have to step into a teleportation >> device to be duplicated. > > > Indeed. Even without the movie graph, but with any of Tegmark multiverse > levels, that 1-indeterminacy comes to play. With the movie graph, our > relative proportion depends on all computational histories, and this makes > ourself multiplied by infinity at each instant, and that is confirmed for > anyone willing to accept the quantum wave/matrix and to reject the collapse > of the waves. > So with the DM theory, you get matter indeterminacy, non locality and non > clonability as a direct gift (even without the movie graph argument). With > the movie graph argument you get immediately *immateriality*. This reduces > the mind-body problem to a reduction of the body problem to number theory > (or combinators, etc.). > > Bruno > > > > >> >> Kim Jones >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
