On 03 Jan 2011, at 12:31, David Nyman wrote:
On 3 January 2011 09:09, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
Indeed. Even without the movie graph, but with any of Tegmark
multiverse
levels, that 1-indeterminacy comes to play. With the movie graph, our
relative proportion depends on all computational histories, and
this makes
ourself multiplied by infinity at each instant, and that is
confirmed for
anyone willing to accept the quantum wave/matrix and to reject the
collapse
of the waves.
When you say "relative proportion", do you intend the reference class
to be the observer moments relating to "my" history, or the entire
class of all possible OMs? In other words, what principle determines
why a specific moment seems to be picked out as "here" and "now" from
a particular first-person perspective, from all other possibilities?
I assume mechanism throughout.
There is no mechanism picking up my current first person moment,
except my personal memory.
Consider the WM duplication. After that duplication, there is no
explanation at all why I find myself in Washington (resp. Moscow). But
there is an explanation why I find myself in either W or M. Just my
will or planning to be reconstituted there, and my memory of being in
Brussels (say) just before the duplication experiment.
So the question "why am I me" as no answer. But the question why will
be me in this or that situation can be explained by proportion of
computational histories.
The "real" situation is more complex, given that any precise enough
prediction relies on all computations going through my states. The
measure, and the topology and geometry put on those computation/
continuation/consistent extensions depends on the self-referential
correctness constraints. This is always relative to an infinity of
universal numbers. They compete below my substitution level.
I see that all OMs can be considered to be eternally "here" and "now",
and the question of location within a particular personal history is
then resolved in the context of each OM.
Yes. That is correct for each OM. But we have to explain why OMs
follows laws such that the physical structure and experience can be
explained? Why actually there are laws.
But nonetheless I can't see
any particular reason, for example, why "right now" I should find
myself to be situated as this particular human at a particular moment
in my life history on Planet Earth in the 21st century, rather than an
alien from the Planet Zog a billion years ago, or hence. What has
"relative proportion" got to do with it? Or is the question just
meaningless?
The question "why am I living this current OM" is as meaningless as
the question "Why am I the one in Washington" after the duplication
experiment. But if I go in Washington by plane, the question "why am I
in washington right now (after the travel)" admits the usual
explanation: I am in Washington because the majority of computation
leading to the state of BM in Brussels with the goal of going to
Washington are continued by computation leading him to Washington.
Empirically, this is enough lawful so that I can make planning and
decisions, but of course we have to justify that lawfulness (from
arithmetic, computer science).
That is why we have to recover the laws of physics (including the laws
of flying plane) from the relative proportion (or plausibility
measure) of computational histories (computations + first person
perspective constraints).
It is, and has to be, counter-intuitive. Somehow, "me here and now" is
an illusion. But my consciousness of being me, here and now, is not an
illusion, but is not here and now. My consciousness of being me, here
and now is intemporal and aspatial, but it cannot appears so from the
1-perspective. It is corroborated by the abandon of the physical
supervenience, and the adoption of the comp supervenience.
Consciousness (of a moment) is not related to a moment, but to a
cloudy abstract infinite set of numbers in relation with each others.
I am not saying that *this* is true, but arguing that this follows
from D mechanism.
OK?
Bruno
David
On 03 Jan 2011, at 06:29, Kim Jones wrote:
On 03/01/2011, at 11:39 AM, David Nyman wrote:
The whole issue of "where will I find myself" after duplication
is in
any case very curious. Deciding "who I am" and "where I am" can
only
be post-hoc on the basis of present experience in the context of
memory.
It's even worse (better?) than that. If I read Bruno correctly, he
is
saying that the mere fact that every morning when you wake up you
believe
you are the same "I" you were before you went to sleep is a
contingent
observation. It may be that one does not have to step into a
teleportation
device to be duplicated.
Indeed. Even without the movie graph, but with any of Tegmark
multiverse
levels, that 1-indeterminacy comes to play. With the movie graph, our
relative proportion depends on all computational histories, and
this makes
ourself multiplied by infinity at each instant, and that is
confirmed for
anyone willing to accept the quantum wave/matrix and to reject the
collapse
of the waves.
So with the DM theory, you get matter indeterminacy, non locality
and non
clonability as a direct gift (even without the movie graph
argument). With
the movie graph argument you get immediately *immateriality*. This
reduces
the mind-body problem to a reduction of the body problem to number
theory
(or combinators, etc.).
Bruno
Kim Jones
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