On 1/3/2011 4:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 03 Jan 2011, at 12:31, David Nyman wrote:

On 3 January 2011 09:09, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

Indeed. Even without the movie graph, but with any of Tegmark multiverse
levels, that 1-indeterminacy comes to play. With the movie graph, our
relative proportion depends on all computational histories, and this makes ourself multiplied by infinity at each instant, and that is confirmed for anyone willing to accept the quantum wave/matrix and to reject the collapse
of the waves.

When you say "relative proportion", do you intend the reference class
to be the observer moments relating to "my" history, or the entire
class of all possible OMs?  In other words, what principle determines
why a specific moment seems to be picked out as "here" and "now" from
a particular first-person perspective, from all other possibilities?

I assume mechanism throughout.
There is no mechanism picking up my current first person moment, except my personal memory. Consider the WM duplication. After that duplication, there is no explanation at all why I find myself in Washington (resp. Moscow). But there is an explanation why I find myself in either W or M. Just my will or planning to be reconstituted there, and my memory of being in Brussels (say) just before the duplication experiment. So the question "why am I me" as no answer. But the question why will be me in this or that situation can be explained by proportion of computational histories. The "real" situation is more complex, given that any precise enough prediction relies on all computations going through my states. The measure, and the topology and geometry put on those computation/continuation/consistent extensions depends on the self-referential correctness constraints. This is always relative to an infinity of universal numbers. They compete below my substitution level.





I see that all OMs can be considered to be eternally "here" and "now",
and the question of location within a particular personal history is
then resolved in the context of each OM.

Yes. That is correct for each OM. But we have to explain why OMs follows laws such that the physical structure and experience can be explained? Why actually there are laws.



But nonetheless I can't see
any particular reason, for example, why "right now" I should find
myself to be situated as this particular human at a particular moment
in my life history on Planet Earth in the 21st century, rather than an
alien from the Planet Zog a billion years ago, or hence.  What has
"relative proportion" got to do with it?  Or is the question just
meaningless?

The question "why am I living this current OM" is as meaningless as the question "Why am I the one in Washington" after the duplication experiment. But if I go in Washington by plane, the question "why am I in washington right now (after the travel)" admits the usual explanation: I am in Washington because the majority of computation leading to the state of BM in Brussels with the goal of going to Washington are continued by computation leading him to Washington. Empirically, this is enough lawful so that I can make planning and decisions, but of course we have to justify that lawfulness (from arithmetic, computer science).

That is why we have to recover the laws of physics (including the laws of flying plane) from the relative proportion (or plausibility measure) of computational histories (computations + first person perspective constraints).

It is, and has to be, counter-intuitive. Somehow, "me here and now" is an illusion. But my consciousness of being me, here and now, is not an illusion, but is not here and now. My consciousness of being me, here and now is intemporal and aspatial, but it cannot appears so from the 1-perspective. It is corroborated by the abandon of the physical supervenience, and the adoption of the comp supervenience. Consciousness (of a moment) is not related to a moment, but to a cloudy abstract infinite set of numbers in relation with each others. I am not saying that *this* is true, but arguing that this follows from D mechanism.

OK?

Bruno

Correct me if I'm wrong, but isn't this assuming that time is digitized too so that OM's are discrete states? I think this is explicit in the Church-Turing concept of computation. I see problems with this. Certainly it seems possible that the world is a digital computation - but at a level much lower than conscious thoughts (perhaps the Planck level). But in that case OM's would just be fuzzy collections of many computational states and not themselves discrete.

Brent

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