On 03 Jan 2011, at 18:50, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 1/3/2011 4:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 03 Jan 2011, at 12:31, David Nyman wrote:

On 3 January 2011 09:09, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:


But nonetheless I can't see
any particular reason, for example, why "right now" I should find
myself to be situated as this particular human at a particular moment in my life history on Planet Earth in the 21st century, rather than an
alien from the Planet Zog a billion years ago, or hence.  What has
"relative proportion" got to do with it?  Or is the question just

The question "why am I living this current OM" is as meaningless as the question "Why am I the one in Washington" after the duplication experiment. But if I go in Washington by plane, the question "why am I in washington right now (after the travel)" admits the usual explanation: I am in Washington because the majority of computation leading to the state of BM in Brussels with the goal of going to Washington are continued by computation leading him to Washington. Empirically, this is enough lawful so that I can make planning and decisions, but of course we have to justify that lawfulness (from arithmetic, computer science).

That is why we have to recover the laws of physics (including the laws of flying plane) from the relative proportion (or plausibility measure) of computational histories (computations + first person perspective constraints).

It is, and has to be, counter-intuitive. Somehow, "me here and now" is an illusion. But my consciousness of being me, here and now, is not an illusion, but is not here and now. My consciousness of being me, here and now is intemporal and aspatial, but it cannot appears so from the 1-perspective. It is corroborated by the abandon of the physical supervenience, and the adoption of the comp supervenience. Consciousness (of a moment) is not related to a moment, but to a cloudy abstract infinite set of numbers in relation with each others. I am not saying that *this* is true, but arguing that this follows from D mechanism.



Correct me if I'm wrong, but isn't this assuming that time is digitized too so that OM's are discrete states? I think this is explicit in the Church-Turing concept of computation. I see problems with this. Certainly it seems possible that the world is a digital computation - but at a level much lower than conscious thoughts (perhaps the Planck level). But in that case OM's would just be fuzzy collections of many computational states and not themselves discrete.

3-OM are discrete (assuming mechanism)
1-OM does not need to be. The measure bears on the 1-OM, and is related to the measure on all infinite computational histories (including oracles), and this is a set of cardinality 2^aleph_0, and the topology is unknown, but it is more plausible that the set of 1-OM is a non discrete structure, like most possible notion of subjective and physical time. The ultimate discrete is countable, and not really a topological space. The continuum and the physical are internal constructs eventually depending on the "relevant" semantics of the Bp & p, Bp & Dt & p, ... logics. Remember that the inside view of arithmetic (countable) is highly not countable ... by the 'creatures' inside. It is similar to the use of complex analysis (non discrete) to figure out the prime distribution structure (discrete). Mechanism makes plausibly the physical world into a continuum *because* the ultimate non physical reality is discrete. This follows already from UDA-7. Some results by Blok and Esakia on the provability logics make possible that the physical reality is a sort of Cantor dust.



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