On 03 Jan 2011, at 18:50, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 1/3/2011 4:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Jan 2011, at 12:31, David Nyman wrote:
On 3 January 2011 09:09, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
But nonetheless I can't see
any particular reason, for example, why "right now" I should find
myself to be situated as this particular human at a particular
in my life history on Planet Earth in the 21st century, rather
alien from the Planet Zog a billion years ago, or hence. What has
"relative proportion" got to do with it? Or is the question just
The question "why am I living this current OM" is as meaningless as
the question "Why am I the one in Washington" after the duplication
experiment. But if I go in Washington by plane, the question "why
am I in washington right now (after the travel)" admits the usual
explanation: I am in Washington because the majority of computation
leading to the state of BM in Brussels with the goal of going to
Washington are continued by computation leading him to Washington.
Empirically, this is enough lawful so that I can make planning and
decisions, but of course we have to justify that lawfulness (from
arithmetic, computer science).
That is why we have to recover the laws of physics (including the
laws of flying plane) from the relative proportion (or plausibility
measure) of computational histories (computations + first person
It is, and has to be, counter-intuitive. Somehow, "me here and now"
is an illusion. But my consciousness of being me, here and now, is
not an illusion, but is not here and now. My consciousness of being
me, here and now is intemporal and aspatial, but it cannot appears
so from the 1-perspective. It is corroborated by the abandon of the
physical supervenience, and the adoption of the comp supervenience.
Consciousness (of a moment) is not related to a moment, but to a
cloudy abstract infinite set of numbers in relation with each
others. I am not saying that *this* is true, but arguing that this
follows from D mechanism.
Correct me if I'm wrong, but isn't this assuming that time is
digitized too so that OM's are discrete states? I think this is
explicit in the Church-Turing concept of computation. I see
problems with this. Certainly it seems possible that the world is a
digital computation - but at a level much lower than conscious
thoughts (perhaps the Planck level). But in that case OM's would
just be fuzzy collections of many computational states and not
3-OM are discrete (assuming mechanism)
1-OM does not need to be. The measure bears on the 1-OM, and is
related to the measure on all infinite computational histories
(including oracles), and this is a set of cardinality 2^aleph_0, and
the topology is unknown, but it is more plausible that the set of 1-OM
is a non discrete structure, like most possible notion of subjective
and physical time.
The ultimate discrete is countable, and not really a topological
space. The continuum and the physical are internal constructs
eventually depending on the "relevant" semantics of the Bp & p, Bp &
Dt & p, ... logics. Remember that the inside view of arithmetic
(countable) is highly not countable ... by the 'creatures' inside. It
is similar to the use of complex analysis (non discrete) to figure out
the prime distribution structure (discrete). Mechanism makes plausibly
the physical world into a continuum *because* the ultimate non
physical reality is discrete. This follows already from UDA-7.
Some results by Blok and Esakia on the provability logics make
possible that the physical reality is a sort of Cantor dust.
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