On 03 Jan 2011, at 06:29, Kim Jones wrote:


On 03/01/2011, at 11:39 AM, David Nyman wrote:

The whole issue of "where will I find myself" after duplication is in
any case very curious.  Deciding "who I am" and "where I am" can only
be post-hoc on the basis of present experience in the context of
memory.

It's even worse (better?) than that. If I read Bruno correctly, he is saying that the mere fact that every morning when you wake up you believe you are the same "I" you were before you went to sleep is a contingent observation. It may be that one does not have to step into a teleportation device to be duplicated.


Indeed. Even without the movie graph, but with any of Tegmark multiverse levels, that 1-indeterminacy comes to play. With the movie graph, our relative proportion depends on all computational histories, and this makes ourself multiplied by infinity at each instant, and that is confirmed for anyone willing to accept the quantum wave/matrix and to reject the collapse of the waves. So with the DM theory, you get matter indeterminacy, non locality and non clonability as a direct gift (even without the movie graph argument). With the movie graph argument you get immediately *immateriality*. This reduces the mind-body problem to a reduction of the body problem to number theory (or combinators, etc.).

Bruno





Kim Jones

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