On 04 Jan 2011, at 19:16, David Nyman wrote:
On 3 January 2011 12:40, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
It is, and has to be, counter-intuitive. Somehow, "me here and now"
is an
illusion. But my consciousness of being me, here and now, is not an
illusion, but is not here and now. My consciousness of being me,
here and
now is intemporal and aspatial, but it cannot appears so from the
1-perspective. It is corroborated by the abandon of the physical
supervenience, and the adoption of the comp supervenience.
Consciousness (of
a moment) is not related to a moment, but to a cloudy abstract
infinite set
of numbers in relation with each others. I am not saying that
*this* is
true, but arguing that this follows from D mechanism.
OK?
Well, the more I think about 1-person indeterminacy, the odder it
becomes. For example, let's say that instead of my being "cut and
pasted" to W and M, I'm "copied and pasted". Now we have a situation
where, from the 3-person viewpoint, I'm in both W and M, but also
still back where I started as if nothing had happened! And, from the
1-person pov, after the operation, "I" could "find myself" in any one
of these three situations.
Right. That's the correct answer to the question UDA-5. In a simple
classical teleportation without annihilation of the original is
equivalent with a duplication with a null delay in one branch.
Similarly a duplication without annihilation of the original is a tri-
plication. A n-plication without annihilation of the original is a n+1-
plication.
That's an important remark, because it explains why, in UDA step 7,
just the presence of the running-forever UD in our universe already
force to reduce the laws to computer science. We don't have to
annihilate you for that. An infinity UD-plication without annihilation
of the original is really an infinity+one-plication, to talk roughly.
Another thing. Let's say one were to adopt, rather than DM, some sort
of position whereby consciousness is tied to matter. The "copy and
paste" process now works by "beaming" enough information to W and M to
assemble local copies atom-by-atom (well, it works in Star Trek!).
The weird thing is, none of this makes any difference. After the
operation, there are still three versions of me, one of which claims
to have gone nowhere, one who claims to have been transported to W,
and the other to M. And I can still only bet on which "I" will be
"me" (or should I say "me" will be "I"!).
Yes.
All this makes me realise that ultimately (as you have said) the
association of 1-person experiences with particular 3-person states is
indeed mysterious. It is not, as you say, "here and now", even though
it appears that one can make predictions, depending on one's theory,
about the distribution of 1-person "heres and nows" amongst
continuations of any given 3-person mental state. As we've remarked
before, it's as if there were one big consciousness that somehow
resolves, materialises, individuates and links all these states, and
in so doing makes sense of them.
Indeed. And memorizing each alternative experience differentiates that
consciousness. Forgetting or amnesia fuse it. Then computer science
can explain how materialization occurs precisely, and we can see if we
recover, from the numbers, the rather peculiar quantum interferences
between the histories. But that is technical. That fits very well, up
to now---I want to say.
At first it seems improbable that we can have negative amplitude of
probability. This is what makes the bottom of matter so symmetrical,
both with QM (where the bottom is given by pure quantum mechanics),
and with DM, where the bottom is given by Bp & Dt (& p) restricted on
the dovetailing (the sigma_1 propositions in the AUDA 'modelization').
This does not just confirms comp, but also the classical theory of
knowledge (Plato-Theaetetus) and Plotinus matter theory (with
consistency, Dt, ~Bf) playing the role of the indeterminate. The G/G*
splitting can then differentiate between the first person plural
sharable quanta (our common history) from the non sharable but
undoubtable qualia (the personal private non 'scientifically-
communicable' content of our (common) consciousness. The common,
universal, consciousness is the consciousness of the Löbian machine.
She is born with an ineluctable tension between sharing 3-things and
living 1-things, between Bp and Bp & p. G* knows that, but the machine
cannot. That explains why the mind body problem seems, and even is,
insoluble by us (us = löbian machine). By assuming we are correct
machine (and thus Löbian given that we already know that we are
(Turing)-universal), computer science and mathematical logic meta-
solve the mind-body problem. The theory explains why there is a
mystery, which has to remain a mystery if we want to remain correct,
and this makes the saying "yes" to the doctor a big leap of faith, and
it forces us to respect all those saying "no" to the doctor (as far as
they respect those saying "yes").
Bruno
David
,
On 03 Jan 2011, at 12:31, David Nyman wrote:
On 3 January 2011 09:09, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
Indeed. Even without the movie graph, but with any of Tegmark
multiverse
levels, that 1-indeterminacy comes to play. With the movie graph,
our
relative proportion depends on all computational histories, and
this
makes
ourself multiplied by infinity at each instant, and that is
confirmed for
anyone willing to accept the quantum wave/matrix and to reject the
collapse
of the waves.
When you say "relative proportion", do you intend the reference
class
to be the observer moments relating to "my" history, or the entire
class of all possible OMs? In other words, what principle
determines
why a specific moment seems to be picked out as "here" and "now"
from
a particular first-person perspective, from all other possibilities?
I assume mechanism throughout.
There is no mechanism picking up my current first person moment,
except my
personal memory.
Consider the WM duplication. After that duplication, there is no
explanation
at all why I find myself in Washington (resp. Moscow). But there is
an
explanation why I find myself in either W or M. Just my will or
planning to
be reconstituted there, and my memory of being in Brussels (say)
just before
the duplication experiment.
So the question "why am I me" as no answer. But the question why
will be me
in this or that situation can be explained by proportion of
computational
histories.
The "real" situation is more complex, given that any precise enough
prediction relies on all computations going through my states. The
measure,
and the topology and geometry put on those
computation/continuation/consistent extensions depends on the
self-referential correctness constraints. This is always relative
to an
infinity of universal numbers. They compete below my substitution
level.
I see that all OMs can be considered to be eternally "here" and
"now",
and the question of location within a particular personal history is
then resolved in the context of each OM.
Yes. That is correct for each OM. But we have to explain why OMs
follows
laws such that the physical structure and experience can be
explained? Why
actually there are laws.
But nonetheless I can't see
any particular reason, for example, why "right now" I should find
myself to be situated as this particular human at a particular
moment
in my life history on Planet Earth in the 21st century, rather
than an
alien from the Planet Zog a billion years ago, or hence. What has
"relative proportion" got to do with it? Or is the question just
meaningless?
The question "why am I living this current OM" is as meaningless as
the
question "Why am I the one in Washington" after the duplication
experiment.
But if I go in Washington by plane, the question "why am I in
washington
right now (after the travel)" admits the usual explanation: I am in
Washington because the majority of computation leading to the state
of BM in
Brussels with the goal of going to Washington are continued by
computation
leading him to Washington. Empirically, this is enough lawful so
that I can
make planning and decisions, but of course we have to justify that
lawfulness (from arithmetic, computer science).
That is why we have to recover the laws of physics (including the
laws of
flying plane) from the relative proportion (or plausibility
measure) of
computational histories (computations + first person perspective
constraints).
It is, and has to be, counter-intuitive. Somehow, "me here and now"
is an
illusion. But my consciousness of being me, here and now, is not an
illusion, but is not here and now. My consciousness of being me,
here and
now is intemporal and aspatial, but it cannot appears so from the
1-perspective. It is corroborated by the abandon of the physical
supervenience, and the adoption of the comp supervenience.
Consciousness (of
a moment) is not related to a moment, but to a cloudy abstract
infinite set
of numbers in relation with each others. I am not saying that
*this* is
true, but arguing that this follows from D mechanism.
OK?
Bruno
David
On 03 Jan 2011, at 06:29, Kim Jones wrote:
On 03/01/2011, at 11:39 AM, David Nyman wrote:
The whole issue of "where will I find myself" after duplication
is in
any case very curious. Deciding "who I am" and "where I am"
can only
be post-hoc on the basis of present experience in the context of
memory.
It's even worse (better?) than that. If I read Bruno correctly,
he is
saying that the mere fact that every morning when you wake up you
believe
you are the same "I" you were before you went to sleep is a
contingent
observation. It may be that one does not have to step into a
teleportation
device to be duplicated.
Indeed. Even without the movie graph, but with any of Tegmark
multiverse
levels, that 1-indeterminacy comes to play. With the movie graph,
our
relative proportion depends on all computational histories, and
this
makes
ourself multiplied by infinity at each instant, and that is
confirmed for
anyone willing to accept the quantum wave/matrix and to reject the
collapse
of the waves.
So with the DM theory, you get matter indeterminacy, non locality
and non
clonability as a direct gift (even without the movie graph
argument).
With
the movie graph argument you get immediately *immateriality*. This
reduces
the mind-body problem to a reduction of the body problem to
number theory
(or combinators, etc.).
Bruno
Kim Jones
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