Hi David, All comments appreciated.

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In

`"Rather, he is saying that IF computational science is assumed (e.g. by`

`proponents of CTM) to be the correct mind-body theory, THEN the`

`appearance of the body (and consequently the rest of matter/energy) must`

`emerge as part of the same theory"`

`It's possible that we have fallen foul of our implicit projections onto`

`the words 'correct mind-body theory'. If one was in possession of such a`

`thing, what exactly has one got? Options:`

`(1) appearing things (scientific rule-abidedness of appearances, to an`

`observer/scientist)`

(2) actual things prior to being observed. (3) The T-computation of rules of appearances (1) (4) The rule-abidedness of actual things (2) _regarded as_ 'computation' (5) The T-computation of (4) rules where

`(a) T-computation means abstract symbol manipulation of the kind in a`

`standard computer.`

`(b) observation is observational qualia in the scientist, not mere`

`measurement.`

NOTE: Standard empirical laws of nature are rules in (1).

`The COMP I and others refute is hypothesis that a (3) is`

`indistinguishable from a (1).`

`The existence and behaviour of scientists and their consciousness proves`

`(1) rules are not the same as (4) rules`

`Is a 'correct mind-body theory' (1) or (4) rules running/not running as`

`per (3) or (5) or ..what? I can't tell.`

`Pick any two and then confuse them with each other, and you can see how`

`many ways there are to be talking at cross purposes. I choose not to`

`conflate any of these things. The words 'assuming comp' sometimes appear`

`to be (1)/(3) confusion and other times seems to be (1)/(5) confusion`

`and other times seems to be T-computation confused with (4) natural`

`rule-abidedness as 'computation'. Any of these conflations lead to an`

`impoverished view based on undiscussed presupposition. If comp is true`

`or false, which of these is being addressed? Not very clear to me. The`

`words 'assuming comp' sound, to me, like 'implicitly confusing THIS with`

`THAT then it follows that ...etc etc ..'.`

`Then, when I try to sort out the confusion, I get told I am confused`

`because I cannot force myself to conflate 2 justifiably different`

`things? Yikes.`

`I am here to finally nut out a design decision before I start to build.`

`That design decision is ultimately what this discussion is about:`

`balancing doubts and then choosing. So here it is....Based on typical`

`scientific principles, I'll build my AGI based on the best available`

`well founded analysis (multiple well placed arrows of doubt, zero cases`

`supporting it in any other way other than faith) that indicate my design`

`preference should be not to use (3) or (5) to create an AGI. Emulate,`

`not simulate. BE the thing, don't merely pretend to be the thing to an`

`observer. I have that level of certainty at least. I guess a word of`

`thanks is in order.`

Thanks! :-) Colin David Nyman wrote:

On 1 February 2011 22:53, Colin Hales <c.ha...@pgrad.unimelb.edu.au> wrote: Colin Do forgive me for butting in on an exchange I sometimes only dimly follow, but I think I may possibly see a misunderstanding on your part about what Bruno actually claims about "comp" (forgive me, both of you, if I'm wrong). As I've understood Bruno over the years, he has never asserted that comp(utational science) necessarily is the fundamental science of body and mind. Rather, he is saying that IF computational science is assumed (e.g. by proponents of CTM) to be the correct mind-body theory, THEN the appearance of the body (and consequently the rest of matter/energy) must emerge as part of the same theory. In other words, EITHER the correctness of comp as a mind-body theory directly implies the "emptiness" of any fundamental theory of matter; OR alternatively (i.e. accepting a "fundamental" theory of matter) comp can't be the correct mind-body theory. The establishment of this disjunction depends on a number of logical steps, culminating in a class of "reductio" thought experiments including Maudlin's Olympia/Klara and Bruno's MGA, the burden of which is to reveal contradictions inherent in any such conjunction of computationalism and materialism. As it happens, Maudlin uses this result to reject CTM, and Bruno follows the opposite tack of rejecting materialism. There is some controversy over these results from supporters of CTM who continue to find ways to dispute them with auxiliary assumptions. Personally, these auxiliaries strike me as being rather in the nature of epicycles, but then I'm hardly an authority. Anyway, forgive me if this was already obvious, but I suppose the conclusion might be that, if you reject fundamental computational science as your basic theory of "matter", Bruno would expect you to take the same tack with respect to mind. I'm sure both he and you will put me right on this. DavidBruno Marchal wrote:On 01 Feb 2011, at 07:51, Colin Hales wrote:Hi Bruno, I have been pondering this issue a bit and I am intrigued about how you regard the problem space we inhabit. When you say things like ... "Are you aware that If comp is true, that is if I am a machine ..." I cannot fathom how you ever get to this point.By looking at amoeabs, then reading book on molecular genetics, smelling Turing universality, then by reading Gödel's proof and the discovery of how to handle self-duplication and self-reference in representational machine, ... I did not take this too much seriously until my understanding of Church thesis deepens. The closure of computerland for diagonalization makes universal machine extremely universal, if I can say.This is a presupposition that arises somehow in the lexicon you have established within your overall framework of thinking.It has lead me to some interest with that hypothesis.Let me have a stab at how my view and yours correlate. In my view ======================================================== A) There is a natural world. We, Turing machines dogs, computers are all being 'computed' by it. This is a set of unknown naturally occurring symbols The natural 'symbols' interact naturally. This is 'natural computation'. NOT like desktop computing. Universe U ensues. Scientist S is being computed within U Scientist S can observe U from within. U makes use of fundamental properties of the symbols to enable .... observation, from within. Call this principle P-OIf by natural world you mean the world of the natural numbers with addition and multiplication, I am OK. I can picture your "A)".No. Here's where we part company. This presupposition about the relation between the abstractions for quantity we call numbers, and the natural world is one I do not make. All you can logically claim is that it is made of a large set of 'something', these 'somethings' interact simultaneously, on mass. The 'numbers' do not relate to each other like natural numbers, but they do relate in a way that can be MODELLED using natural numbers.If by natural world you mean the physical worlds as seen by 'numbers', what you say might be locally correct, but that remains to be proved (assuming comp).No. You have it all backwards. You can assume _nothing_ about the natural world and abstract number systems.B) This is a symbolic description of U created by S from within U S can concoct a description of the natural symbols in (A) It need not be unique, many (B) correspond to one (A) S can never know if it's completely done. S can never know the real nature of the sybols in (A) Descriptions (B), with P-O, explains observation and the observer S C) There is a _second_ description It is also concocted by S These are the normal empirical laws we all know so well?It describes how the U appears to S from inside It need not be unique, many (C) correspond to one (A) No (C) ever explains observation. In this framework (i) a computer running description/rules (B) is not the natural world.OK. With the two sense of natural world I accept above.(ii) a computer running description/rules (C) is not the natural world.OK.(iii) a computer running descriptions (B) or (C) is 'artificially computing'Yes. it is an isolated malin génie.(iv) (C) is physics that present day scientists constructI don't get "C".So you don't understand what basic empirical scientists do. Boy have I failed to connect or what!(v) (B) is physics of a natural world prior to an observer.This exist for Löbian machine (although they can find it "looking inward").Who's 'they'?(vi) (A) is 'NATURALLY computing' in the sense that it is literally 'computing' scientist S. ===================================================== OK. These options are the logically justifiable position we can take when we are, as we are, inside U trying to work U out from within, using an observation faculty provided by U as part of (A). Empirical evidence justifying (C) is normal overvation (contents of one or more observer-agreed conscious experisnces). Empirical evidence justifying (B) is implicit in the existence of an observer concocting a set (C). You can't be confused about an bservation unless there is an observer to be confused. ===================================================== All that said.....now .... You mention "digital physics". You say "Are you aware that If COMP is true, that is if I am a machine ..." In terms of my framework....you are speaking of ...what?I postulate, eventually, only natural numbers and addition and multiplication. Then from this (it is not obvious but standard in good logic textbook) you can show that the arithmetical relation (defined with "+" and "*", and classical logic) emulate all computations. Physics or the natural world is never emulated (but often simulated by malin génie program). Physics is what appear from inside taking the first person indeterminacy inyto account. A priori the natural world is not a computational object."Physics is what appear from inside taking the first person indeterminacy inyto account. " This is (C). Standard empirical physics. "A priori the natural world is not a computational object" This is (A). the universe U is not a computational object. Not computed. OK. Clarity of a sort. Where does (B) fit in? I think you assume it as a com,puter program on a magical non-existent computer running something. I hold that descriptions (B) are accessible. I also hold that these descriptions are not the same as the (C) descriptions. Both constructed by the same observer/scientist. No I think maybe you merge (A) and (B) and then replace them both with your lower-case comp machine. OK.(1) A 'Turing machine (digital computer)' inside U running (B) descriptions? (2) The natural computation itself, of kind (A)? I suspect (3) Some kind of magical 'computer' in idea-space computing us as (A)? i.e. A 'virtual machine' that 'acts as if' it generates an arbitrary number of different U? The COMP I talk about having refuted is in (i) or (ii) above. I suspect this is not the COMP you are speaking of...The comp I talk about is the assumption that my (generailzed) brain can be emulated by a digital computer. The rest should follow.The 'comp' you talk about is actually an abstract machine in a non-existent abstract space that manipulates abstractions. It's got nothing to do with the COMP I talk about, which is a computer, made of the real world (not integers), in the real natural world, running a description (made by humans) of the natural world. This applies to 'quasi-digital' (desktop style), analogue and quantum computers. You have a deep seated conviction that this abstract computer that 'is' a reality and a real computer that runs descriptions of a reality are indistinguishable. This is unjustifiable. The simpler, parsimonious solution is to assume that is not the case, and work out what options exist for a describer and the possible relations between a describer and the described. The reason your propositions have trouble getting accepted is because they make this step into a faith-based presupposition that is indistinguishable from a statement like "the natural world is erected in real time by the little purple regularity fairies". It has exactly the same level of faith and assumption. So the comp you speak of, I conclude, at last, is not the COMP I refute, nor is it the one of the many other refutations. Which is kind of good from your perspective. From my perspective it means I have to battle no more with your comp. In relation to Stathis' request: If you model a natural environment presenting some problem to a human within that environment, the simulated human will arrive at the same solution as the real human would have. If intelligence is problem-solving behaviour, there is therefore no difference between the natural world and the model provided that the model is in fact a good one. Your claim that computers cannot replicate human intelligence is thus equivalent to a claim that there is some process in the human brain which is not Turing emulable. What process do you No. This is just plain wrong. You cannot model an observation of something that you have no idea of the evidence of .i.e. You cannot model the unknown. If you could then you'd already know it (the observer and the relationship of the observer to everything else. If you want to get at unknowns, then you have to model a modeller of the unknown ... and then _assume_ that everything in a model captures the reality you are modelling, during the process. The non-Turing emulable part of the natural world is the relationship between every little bit X and every other bit of it that is NOT directly related to X. A product of massive parallelism created by a massive collection of the entities of which we are actually made, which is best assumed not to be abstract numbers if you want to understand it. This is something we inherit by 'being' in the world. Something that cannot be simulated. Something that a Turing Machine (computer), totally different to us physically, does not get in its program. By way of example, I have attached a video of a simulated neuron firing. It's from a paper I have in review at the moment. The video depicts the currents originating the biologically realistic EM fields around a neuron due to the ion channels involed in an action potential. It was produce by the package NEURON. In it you will see a pair of red/blue interfaces travelling away from the soma. These interfaces are virtual evanescent current-dipoles. They are mathematically describable, but form no part of the mathematical description that generated them. THAT is what is missing. These are the virtual relationships not accessed by the mathematics of a Turing machine. No matter what is going on in a Turing machine, NONE of this kind of phenomenon are accessed by it. The question is 'what is it like to BE those fields'. It cannot be claimed to be like the mathematical description that represents them, nor can it be claimed to be 'like' being the computer running the simulation. A final demo that tells you what can't be emulated...using, yes, actual natural numbers. Here's a 1. Here another 1. If I 'be' the first 1, you 'be' the second 1. what 'law' captures the relationship between the two instances of 1? That 'law' is not any law that you and I concoct sitting up here, staring down at them like a god. No amount of abstraction of 'one-ness' capture that relationship. I am glad I don't have to battle lower case comp any more. So I guess I'll leave it there for now. Progress has been made. Cheers colin -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

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