On 07 Feb 2011, at 19:22, Andrew Soltau wrote:
The first seven steps of UDA makes the following points:
1) that comp entails the existence of first person indeterminacy in
a deterministic context. Step 1-3. This is an original result that
I published in 1988 (although I made a dozen of conference on this
in the seventies). Many academics have criticize this, but their
argument have been debunked. Chalmers did criticize it at the ASSC4.
2) that any measure of uncertainty of the comp first person
indeterminacy is independent of the reconstitution delays (step
3) that comp entails first person non locality (step this has been
more developed in my thesis, long and short version are in my web
page). This has been retrieved from sane04 (for reason of place),
but is developed in the original 1994 thesis (and in the 1998 short
version, recently published).
4) That first person experience does not distinguish real from
virtual implementation (this is not original, it is in Galouye, and
it is a comp version of the old dream argument in the greek chinese
and indian antic literature). Step six. In particular indeterminacy
and non locality does not depend on the real or virtual nature of
All good so far.
Step seven itself shows the reversal between physics and arithmetic
(or any first order theory of any universal system in post Church
Turing sense) in case the physical universe exists primitively and
is sufficiently big.
Because if you universe is as big as running a UD, and containing UD*,
if by luck you were here and now in a physical universe, at the next
instant you are in the UD* with any reasonable measure of first person
uncertainty. Even multiplied by 2^aleph_0.
You might think you can conceive a physical universe capable of
beating the UD in its redundancy, but even then, you will have to
attach your mind to some of its non turing emulable part for
preventing to be swallowed by the UD and its random oracle, and this
reduce physics (in case you are turing emulable), in the computer
science theoretical UD* white rabbit hunting. It might be that some
particular universal dovetailing win in the limit, like I think
quantum computation does, but that remains to be explained from
inside, without postulating this at the start.
And besides, step 8 prevent the use of primitive matter for
singularizing consciousness. In the paper and book preceding sane04, I
present the step 8, before the UD, it helps against physical
So UDA1-7 is the one of the main result of the thesis. A theory
which want to explain and unify quanta and qualia, and respect
comp, has to derive quanta and qualia without postulating them.
So you agree we cannot postulate the quanta? We cannot postulate the
physical ? That's the point.
You have also that comp + ~solipsisme entails first person plural
MW. Normally comp should imply ~solipsisme, but as I explain this
part is not yet solved in the concrete.
Now most people (among interested) understand UDA1-7, that is, that
comp + *very big* universe entails the reversal. If you have no
problem with the first person indeterminacy, with the invariance
for reconstitution delays, with the inability of first persons to
distinguish (in short time) real and virtual, I don't see what you
miss in the step seven. 7 is a direct consequence of 4,5,6.
Because if you agree that P = 1/2 for the WM duplication. If you agree
that an iteration of self-duplication is a Bernouilli experience
leading to a normal distribution, you see that in front of the UD you
are in front of an iterated self-duplication.
Come one, if the physical universe mulitplies more the normal words
than the UD, then you have to take into accoun that it will mulitply
more its own UD. That is wahy you can say that the proba is 1/2 (say)
for a WM duplication, because we duplicate relatively to the normal
worlds. You if you say yes to the doctor nin our normal worlds, you
already know that you are already driven by the normal UD worlds, so
that even the laws of your superuniverse have to be deduced by the UD
structure, that is arithmetic as seen from inside.
These simply show that the structure of information / algorithm /
computation defining the mind of the observer is simultaneously
present in a very large number of different physical instantiations.
"physical" has no usable meaning here. Eventually you have to define
it as a (hopefully plural) first person view.
I say that this means that the effective physical environment of
this observer is the simultaneity of all of those physical
environments. This is the concept I call 'universe superposition'.
Quantum vacuum will do, but why the quantum? What is an observer? What
do you mean by 'simultaneity'?
The result applies equally to a reality basically physical or
The arithmetical makes the physical a particular view on the
arithmetical, and the arithmetical reappear in the physical, but they
should not be identified. there are complex relations in between.
The result is personal parallel physical realities for each and
every observer, which I find very interesting and exciting.
This is because, in each such reality, the effective physical
environment (quantum mechanical, or arithmetically simulated quantum
mechanical) is determinate only where observed. Thus each observer
is in a very special position in their reality, in that all the
other observers are effectively icons in this reality, of other
So the difference between me and others in my reality suggests
solipsism - only I am real and fully defined in my reality. At the
same time, we are all in the same situation, which is why I call it
multisolipsism. Naturally, all this applies irrespective of whether
the basis of reality is physical or arithmetic.
But I don't see why any of that implies 'the reversal between
physics and arithmetic'. It does imply that the determinacy of the
effective physical environment of the observer is defined by, and
only by, the structure of information defining the observer, as held
in many-minds theories. This is all part of the universe
superposition concept. But we still require a physical reality for
all this to be instantiated in.
Still a bit suffering from Aristotelian brainwashing. I can suggest
many cures :)
The best one is logic and theoretical computer science.
To instantiate things is what universal numbers like to do the most
well, but below your level of substitution they all compete for doing
Not only we don't require a physical reality, but adding a physical
reality can only make the body problems artificially more difficult.
Your multisolipsism idea might have some sense (although I think the
many-mind theory does not, it adds a problem of probability where
there is none. Perhaps your misunderstanding, with my respect, could
be related to that.
Now, you can postulate that this physical reality itself is
simulated, or purely arithmetic. And I have no problem with that.
But I do not see how this is shown to be the case.
Because physical reality is given by the 1-indeterminacy measure on
all universal numbers working below your substitution level, in your
computational histories (as seen from your 'angle').
To do that, you would have to show that the appearance of all of
this going on is the natural result of arithmetical processes in the
absence of physical instantiation. This is what I am all agog to
have explained to me!
I don't have to show anything. I am just explaining that comp leads to
a body problem, expressible in a Platonist and even Pythagorean
machine's theology. And that such a problem cannot be used to easily
refute comp, because when you do the math, you see there is already a
quantum like notion of credibility/probability, and that nothing is
You should perhaps dig more on theoretical computer science and
mathematical logic if you want to invest in comp, CTM, ALG, whatever
universal machine can find the reason of quanta and qualia in their
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