On 07 Feb 2011, at 21:50, Andrew Soltau wrote:
All right, call it all quantum mechanical environments, meaning
simply the mathematical form of quantum mechanics, instantiated as
physical or arithmetical environments.
Many thanks you for your points 1) to 4) below. Now I am finding
it much easier to see what you are saying.
By 'first person indeterminacy' in 1 below, I am reading this as
the indeterminacy regarding the actual location and thus physical
context / instantiation of this observer. I would include this as
an automatic concomitant of the mind being a computation ( dynamic
structure of information) i.e. ALG.
By 2 below I understand you to be saying that just as the observer
can be, and in fact in some circumstances must be, existent
simultaneously at two different locations in space at the same
time, the observer is similarly existent simultaneously at two
different locations in time 'at the same time'. I would also
include this as an automatic concomitant with ALG.
Point 3 seems to be a direct implication of point 2, the mind is
non-local. The observer as mind (as structure of information /
algorithm) exists ubiquitously in all physical environments
If above you accept arithmetical, you make treachery to invoke the
It is the same error. You cannot use quantum mechanics at all. I mean
in this context.
I think you still miss something in the seven step.
It is a bit like some one defend the theory of evolution up to the
apes, and then say and God appears an creates man.
Nice one! LOL! [<god thinks> this evolution rubbish isn't getting
anywhere. Let's have some real people to watch / talk to / wind up /
be god to ...]
Once you accept that at some level you are Turing emulable, you
somehow disperse yourself in infinities of variants, and the
physical is some sum on all those variants.
Yes, no problem here. Exactly what I hold as 'universe superposition'.
Really? So you should understand why you cannot use QM (even just the
mathematical QM). If QM is correct, then QM has to be entirely
justified in term of machine's "dream", that is arithmetical relations
and internal measure. That is what the Bp & Dp does, with p
arithmetical and sigma_1 (DU-accessible).
So a physical body is, despite the appearance, a bad locus for
instantiating a mind.
Why 'bad'? The physical body is one of many possible instantiations,
*no more no less* in my view.
The problem is that we don't know what is a body. And the first clues
from comp is that a body is a projection of the mind, emulated by
infinitely many arithmetical relations. The picture is hard to figure
out, that is one reason why I eventually use formal tools.
The mind, even individual is more associated to a continuum of
I would not say 'more'. It is not only associate with a continuum of
possible bodies/projection, it is instantiated, given aritmetic and
algorithmic form, in continuum of possible bodies/projection. All
exist. All are aspects of the arithmetic totality.
It is instantiated, simultaneously, in all environments, simulated
or physical (simulated physical if you like), in which this mind is
The effective environment of this mind is the simultanetiy of all
such possible bodies/projection.
This does not mean that the whole thing is not instantiated in the
When you will get closer to the tilt, you will understand that we just
cannot take for granted any obvious interpretation of the word
It is true that it need not be instantiated in a physical reality,
but, in my opinion, we still have not made any particular progress
towards that point!
I think that tiny progresses have been done, but are ignored because
physicists have a problem with computer science and mathematical
logic, and logicians are not interested in physics or realities. And
very few scientist care about persons and consciousness. So in front
of hard works ...
In fine it depends on the math, the comp physical logic still lacks
(a bit laike quantum logic) a good tensor product.
That is all very well and good, but we know the physical explanation
works. Quantum mechanics *does* explain the observed results of
My strategy is top down, I work from hypothesis toward constrains.
Not completely. It explains by using comp, but comp reminds them, or
should remind them, that the first person qualia related to the
observation cannot be attached to the physical body of the
experimenter. Everett QM still use the identity thesis, and this is
refuted by comp. QM explains one halve of the picture.
If we are going to supersede it, we need a powerful logic which not
only does the same thing, fully and completely, without requiring an
underlying physical reality. I stay tuned.
The necessity of abandoning comp or of solving the comp body problem
has been proved. Conceptually it does not matter if comp will take a
billions years to prove the relative existence of waves, or to justify
rigorously that quantum computation wins the 'measure battle'.
These are two very different points, and, by your statement here, it
is clear that you conflate them. But I have as yet no rationale or
evidence for this conflation.
If ALG is correct, this simply means that the mind is an
instantiated algorithm. This directly implies that the physical
"cannot be used to singularize a conscious experience.". But this
*does not* mean that the physical has to be derived. It means that
the *effective physical environment of this observer* has to be
derived from the algorithm. It says nothing about anything else.
Aha. Now I see it. Now I see why you keep claiming that steps 1-7
show inversion of physical and arithmetic.
where it is instantiated. Again, I would include this as an
automatic concomitant with ALG.
You still miss the point that if ALG is correct then the physical
has to be derived and cannot be used to singularize a conscious
The logic you use in steps 1-7 are very much the same as I use in
establishing universe superposition, I think that they are the same
thing, or very similar. (What a surprise, addressing the same
specific aspect of reality we come to the same conclusion!)
Given that the mind is defined by a structure and or a process of
information, it is necessarily instantiated in a very large number
of physical situations.
Point 4 as you say is well known, and it obviously goes with ALG
in my view.
The first seven steps of UDA makes the following points:
1) that comp entails the existence of first person indeterminacy
in a deterministic context. Step 1-3. This is an original result
that I published in 1988 (although I made a dozen of conference
on this in the seventies). Many academics have criticize this,
but their argument have been debunked. Chalmers did criticize it
at the ASSC4.
2) that any measure of uncertainty of the comp first person
indeterminacy is independent of the reconstitution delays (step
3) that comp entails first person non locality (step this has
been more developed in my thesis, long and short version are in
my web page). This has been retrieved from sane04 (for reason of
place), but is developed in the original 1994 thesis (and in the
1998 short version, recently published).
4) That first person experience does not distinguish real from
virtual implementation (this is not original, it is in Galouye,
and it is a comp version of the old dream argument in the greek
chinese and indian antic literature). Step six. In particular
indeterminacy and non locality does not depend on the real or
virtual nature of the computation.
All good so far.
Nice. Not yet sure you really get the point. You still seems to
travel from radically new to thats what I say.
But if you are OK that any first order specification of any
universal system is enough for the ontology, and that we cannot use
the term "physical" before defining in a way respecting the first
person indeterminacy, then it is all right.
I'm OK that "any first order specification of any universal system
is enough for the ontology", in that it provides *what we need to
? I would have said the contrary. It provides what everybody agree on,
and what we will consider that we don't have to explain. I assume
only, in the classical (realist) context that
x + 0 = x
x + s(y) = s(x + y) laws of addition
x*0 = 0
x*s(y) = x*y + x laws of multiplication.
Nothing more, besides the idea that "I", whatever I am, is Turing
emulable. Here "I" is identified with some third person description,
usually manage by the doctor, or by the universal dovetailer.
So, first half of your sentence OK. Once again, I have a severe
problem with the conflation.
We cusotomarily use the term "physical" for the world 'out there'
giving rise to the ontologically obvious,
I would have said the phenomenologically obvious. UDA should help to
get the point if comp is true, then matter is no more obvious at all.
If only because of its lacks of enough white rabbits.
the existence of ourselves and our world for which we have immediate
and direct evidence.
The existence of our own consciousness. That is obvious and hard to
doubt. But we can doubt all content of that consciousness, and
especially notion of worlds, which are huge extrapolation.
We don't have any direct evidence on any material worlds. The old
dream argument already can be used for showing that.
The accustomed ontology is that 'physical' means both what is, and
what gives rise to first person frame of reference, of whatever
nature. If we hope to overturn this, surely, we have to quote
chapter and verse of why this should be a preferable, or even
My point is that you have to abandon comp if you want to prevent the
Physics is useful and excellent to predict things, but it misses the
main thing: consciousness. Comp (including consciousness) has already
I think you are still stuck in the seven step.
Could you explain to me how you predict what you will see (qualia)
when you abandon an apple free in the air, in a big universe with a
running UD in it? How do you predict your experience?
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