# Multisolipsism

```Hi Bruno
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```The first seven steps of UDA makes the following points:

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1) that comp entails the existence of first person indeterminacy in a deterministic context. Step 1-3. This is an original result that I published in 1988 (although I made a dozen of conference on this in the seventies). Many academics have criticize this, but their argument have been debunked. Chalmers did criticize it at the ASSC4.
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2) that any measure of uncertainty of the comp first person indeterminacy is independent of the reconstitution delays (step four).
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3) that comp entails first person non locality (step this has been more developed in my thesis, long and short version are in my web page). This has been retrieved from sane04 (for reason of place), but is developed in the original 1994 thesis (and in the 1998 short version, recently published).
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4) That first person experience does not distinguish real from virtual implementation (this is not original, it is in Galouye, and it is a comp version of the old dream argument in the greek chinese and indian antic literature). Step six. In particular indeterminacy and non locality does not depend on the real or virtual nature of the computation.
```All good so far.

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Step seven itself shows the reversal between physics and arithmetic (or any first order theory of any universal system in post Church Turing sense) in case the physical universe exists primitively and is sufficiently big.
```Because?

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So UDA1-7 is the one of the main result of the thesis. A theory which want to explain and unify quanta and qualia, and respect comp, has to derive quanta and qualia without postulating them.
```Yes
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You have also that comp + ~solipsisme entails first person plural MW. Normally comp should imply ~solipsisme, but as I explain this part is not yet solved in the concrete.
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Now most people (among interested) understand UDA1-7, that is, that comp + *very big* universe entails the reversal. If you have no problem with the first person indeterminacy, with the invariance for reconstitution delays, with the inability of first persons to distinguish (in short time) real and virtual, I don't see what you miss in the step seven. 7 is a direct consequence of 4,5,6.
```Because?

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These simply show that the structure of information / algorithm / computation defining the mind of the observer is simultaneously present in a very large number of different physical instantiations.
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I say that this means that the effective physical environment of this observer is the simultaneity of all of those physical environments. This is the concept I call 'universe superposition'.
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The result applies equally to a reality basically physical or arithmetic.

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The result is personal parallel physical realities for each and every observer, which I find very interesting and exciting.
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This is because, in each such reality, the effective physical environment (quantum mechanical, or arithmetically simulated quantum mechanical) is determinate only where observed. Thus each observer is in a very special position in their reality, in that all the other observers are effectively icons in this reality, of other parallel realities.
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So the difference between me and others in my reality suggests solipsism - only I am real and fully defined in my reality. At the same time, we are all in the same situation, which is why I call it multisolipsism. Naturally, all this applies irrespective of whether the basis of reality is physical or arithmetic.
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But I don't see why any of that implies 'the reversal between physics and arithmetic'. It does imply that the determinacy of the effective physical environment of the observer is defined by, and only by, the structure of information defining the observer, as held in many-minds theories. This is all part of the universe superposition concept. But we still require a physical reality for all this to be instantiated in.
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Now, you can postulate that this physical reality itself is simulated, or purely arithmetic. And I have no problem with that. But I do not see how this is shown to be the case.
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To do that, you would have to show that the appearance of all of this going on is the natural result of arithmetical processes in the absence of physical instantiation. This is what I am all agog to have explained to me!
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Andrew

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