On 15 February 2011 13:27, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>> I am  not a realist about maths. You must be because you exist
>> and you think you are a  number
>
> I start from the assumption that I can survive through a digital backup. So
> locally "I am a number", in that sense. But this concerns only my third
> person I (body), and I show that the first person naturally associated (by
> its memories, or by the classical theory of knowledge) is not a number.

I hesitate (really!) to but into one of these delightful to-ings and
fro-ings, but it strikes me that a focus on Peter's claim, and Bruno's
rebuttal, above might be fruitful for the overall discussion.  Peter's
objection seems to be summed up by "you think you are a number".  But
Bruno's reply is that "the first person naturally associated (by its
memories, or by the classical theory of knowledge) is not a number."
He has said elsewhere that comp can be considered a form of
(objective) idealism, and hence its ontological basis - i.e. what is
RITSIAR - is the "ideal", or equivalently, "consciousness" in some
primary or undifferentiated sense.  From this perspective, the number
realm is conceived not as an independent ontology in itself, but
rather as the effective means of differentiating the epistemology of
persons and their "physical" environments, whose ontology is inherited
from the whole.

Does this help?

David


>
> On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>>
>>> On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or false? If
>>>>> you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism, which is
>>>>> enough for the comp consequences.,
>>>
>>>> Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore
>>>> not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't.
>>>
>>> That's my point.
>>
>> Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
>> I am an immaterial dreaming machine.
>
> It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you want, with the
> philosophy you want. Just be careful in case you do say "yes" to a
> physically real doctor.
>
>
>
>>
>>>
>>>>> Do you believe that Church thesis makes sense? That is enough to say
>>>>> that you believe in the 'arithmetical platonia'
>>>
>>>> Not at all.
>>>
>>> OK. This means that you are using "arithmetical platonia" in a sense
>>> which is not relevant for the reasoning.
>>> If you accept CT, there should be no problem with the reasoning at all.
>>
>> I accept CT and reject Platonism,
>> and thus the reasoning does not go
>> through.
>
> To provide sense to CT, you need to be able to say that any program P on any
> input x will stop or will not stop. So you have to accept the use of
> classical logic on numbers definable properties. That is what I called
> Arithmetical realism.
> I prefer to use Platonism for theology. Platonism is the theology in which
> the physical reality is the shadow, or the border, or the projection of
> something else. That use of Platonism come up in the conclusion of the
> reasoning and is not assumed at the start.
>
>
>
>>
>>>>> . People needs to be
>>>>> ultrafinitist to reject the arithmetical platonia.
>>>
>>>> No, they just need to be anti realist.
>>>
>>> Same remark.
>>
>> Nope. Finitists think 7 exists., anti realists think it doesn't.
>
> Use AR formally. The theological conclusion will be provided by the fact
> that you might be able to imagine surviving a digital graft.
>
>
>
>
>>
>>>>> Personnaly I am a bit skeptical on set realism, because it is hard to
>>>>> define it, but for the numbers I have never met people who are not
>>>>> realist about them.
>>>
>>>> Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
>>>> you 7 doesn't exist.
>>>
>>> You contradict your self,
>>
>> No I don't. How many times have I explained that
>> mathematical existence claims are true in a fictive
>> sense that doesn't imply real existence
>
> Then please use that fictive sense in the reasoning. Then yes doctor + occam
> gives the ontological conclusion.
>
>
>
>>
>>> unless you mean that seven is not made of
>>> matter. In which case comp nothing exists.
>>
>> What does "comp nothing exists" mean?
>
> Sorry. I meant "In which case comp implies nothing exists."
>
>
>>
>>>>> Even to say "I am not arithmetical realist" is
>>>>> enough to be an arithmetical realist
>>>
>>>> Nonsense.
>>>
>>> Probable, given your rather inappropriate sense of metaphysical
>>> realism in mathematics.
>>
>> I am  not a realist about maths. You must be because you exist
>> and you think you are a  number
>
> I start from the assumption that I can survive through a digital backup. So
> locally "I am a number", in that sense. But this concerns only my third
> person I (body), and I show that the first person naturally associated (by
> its memories, or by the classical theory of knowledge) is not a number.
>
>
>
>
>>
>>>>> . A real anti-ariothmetical
>>>>> realist cannot even spaeak about arithmetical realism. You need to be
>>>>> an arithmetical realist to make sense of denying it.
>>>
>>>> Like the old canard that to deny God is to accept God? Naah. Meaning
>>>> is not
>>>> just reference.
>>>
>>> A reasoning is valid, or not valid.
>>
>> A true conclusion requires soundness as well as validity
>
> In science we never know if our premisses and conclusions are true or not.
> We judge validity only.
>
> Bruno
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
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