On 15 Feb 2011, at 16:23, 1Z wrote:



On Feb 15, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote:





On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:

On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or false? If you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism, which is
enough for the comp consequences.,

Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore
not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't.

That's my point.

Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
I am an immaterial dreaming machine.

It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you want, with the
philosophy you want.

I want to say "number aren't real, so I'm not really a number"

All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and what is not real, which is a bit absurd at the start.
Could you define what you mean by "real"?




Just be careful in case you do say "yes" to a
physically real doctor.





Do you believe that Church thesis makes sense? That is enough to
say
that you believe in the 'arithmetical platonia'

Not at all.

OK. This means that you are using "arithmetical platonia" in a sense
which is not relevant for the reasoning.
If you accept CT, there should be no problem with the reasoning at
all.

I accept CT and reject Platonism,
and thus the reasoning does not go
through.

To provide sense to CT, you need to be able to say that any program P
on any input x will stop or will not stop. So you have to accept the
use of classical logic on numbers definable properties. That is what I
called Arithmetical realism.

That doesn't tell me anything about what I am.

Right. But then Comp is CT + "yes doctor", where "yes doctor" is a memo for "it exists a level of description of my generalized body such that .... " (see the paper).




I prefer to use Platonism for theology. Platonism is the theology in
which the physical reality is the shadow, or the border, or the
projection of something else.

In the context of phiosophy of mathematics, Platonism
is the claim that numbers have immaterial, non spatio temporal
existence

I don't use that platonism, and given that I come up with a conclusion related to the theological Platonism, I prefer to keep the "arithmetical realism" vocabulary. It means that A v ~A for A arithmetical. Sometimes I say that it means that (A v ~A) is true independently of me, you, etc.





That use of Platonism come up in the
conclusion of the reasoning and is not assumed at the start.



. People needs to be
ultrafinitist to reject the arithmetical platonia.

No, they just need to be anti realist.

Same remark.

Nope. Finitists think 7 exists., anti realists think it doesn't.

Use AR formally. The theological conclusion will be provided by the
fact that you might be able to imagine surviving a digital graft.

I might well imagine being reincarnated in some other physical
medium. I won't imagine being reincarnated as a number

It is not so difficult to imagine. If you can imagine being reincarneted in a virtual reality, like in a dream, you can uderstand that the feeling of "matter" is a construct of your mind. Then it is just a matter of study to understand that arithmetical truth contains all the emulation of all programs, and this in relative proportion. AT contains a natural "matrix", and we can test it because it has a non trivial precise mathematical structure, related to the self- referential points of view available to the universal numbers.





Personnaly I am a bit skeptical on set realism, because it is
hard to
define it, but for the numbers I have never met people who are not
realist about them.

Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
you 7 doesn't exist.

You contradict your self,

No I don't. How many times have I explained that
mathematical existence claims are true in a fictive
sense that doesn't imply real existence

Then please use that fictive sense in the reasoning. Then yes doctor +
occam gives the ontological conclusion.

No, if it has a fictive premise, it has a fictive conclusion.

That is your idiosyncracy. You can add as many "fictive" terms as you want, it will not change the validity of the reasoning, and the testability of comp (+ the classical theory of knowledge).




unless you mean that seven is not made of
matter. In which case comp nothing exists.

What does "comp nothing exists" mean?

Sorry. I meant "In which case comp implies nothing exists."

Comp implies that the midn is a computer. All known
computers are phsycial, so comp implies that the mind is physical.

You will not find any book in physics, except by Zristotle which use the notion of primary matter. You will not find any book on computers which mention the notion of matter. Except quantum computers. Computers have been discovered by mathematicians before there were approximated by terrestrial constructions.




Even to say "I am not arithmetical realist" is
enough to be an arithmetical realist

Nonsense.

Probable, given your rather inappropriate sense of metaphysical
realism in mathematics.

I am  not a realist about maths. You must be because you exist
and you think you are a  number

I start from the assumption that I can survive through a digital
backup. So locally "I am a number", in that sense.

That's misleading. There is a difference between being tied
to no particular physical instance and being tied to no instance at
all.

That is why I make those things precise through the MGA. But it helps people to understand that we are immaterial before learning the MGA stuff. I am immaterial with comp in the sense that I can in principle chose a different body at all times, so I am not my body. At that stage, matter might still seems necessary, and that is the case up to the step seven of the reasoning, which nevertheless explain already the reversal between physics and computer science, before the more complex immateriality argument (MGA). Do you have a problem in UDA-1-7?




But this concerns
only my third person I (body), and I show that the first person
naturally associated (by its memories, or by the classical theory of
knowledge) is not a number.



. A real anti-ariothmetical
realist cannot even spaeak about arithmetical realism. You need
to be
an arithmetical realist to make sense of denying it.

Like the old canard that to deny God is to accept God? Naah. Meaning
is not
just reference.

A reasoning is valid, or not valid.

A true conclusion requires soundness as well as validity

In science we never know if our premisses and conclusions are true or
not.

I can still resist the conclusion by *believing* Platonism
to be false, while believing comp to be true.

"platonism" is ambiguous. Any way, you can resist any conclusion in science with some ad-hoc philosophy. So you are not saying something informative here. Ad without a minimal amount of arithmetical realism you cannot endorse Church thesis, which is a thesis at the cross of epistemology and mathematics. CT says a priori nothing about physical things. The consequences in physics come from CT + "yes doctor".

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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