On Feb 15, 4:51 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 15 Feb 2011, at 16:23, 1Z wrote:
> > On Feb 15, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >> On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote:
> >>> On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >>>> On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:
> >>>>> On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >>>>>> Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or  
> >>>>>> false? If
> >>>>>> you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism,  
> >>>>>> which is
> >>>>>> enough for the comp consequences.,
> >>>>> Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore
> >>>>> not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't.
> >>>> That's my point.
> >>> Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
> >>> I am an immaterial dreaming machine.
> >> It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you want, with the
> >> philosophy you want.
> > I want to say "number aren't real, so I'm not really a number"
> All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me  
> nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and what is not real,  

Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?

> which is a bit absurd at the start.
> Could you define what you mean by "real"?

i can point to my own reality.

> >> Just be careful in case you do say "yes" to a
> >> physically real doctor.
> >>>>>> Do you believe that Church thesis makes sense? That is enough to
> >>>>>> say
> >>>>>> that you believe in the 'arithmetical platonia'
> >>>>> Not at all.
> >>>> OK. This means that you are using "arithmetical platonia" in a  
> >>>> sense
> >>>> which is not relevant for the reasoning.
> >>>> If you accept CT, there should be no problem with the reasoning at
> >>>> all.
> >>> I accept CT and reject Platonism,
> >>> and thus the reasoning does not go
> >>> through.
> >> To provide sense to CT, you need to be able to say that any program P
> >> on any input x will stop or will not stop. So you have to accept the
> >> use of classical logic on numbers definable properties. That is  
> >> what I
> >> called Arithmetical realism.
> > That doesn't tell me anything about what I am.
> Right. But then Comp is CT + "yes doctor", where "yes doctor" is a  
> memo for "it exists a level of description of my generalized body such  
> that .... " (see the paper).

I am not a description. I for descriptions.

> >> I prefer to use Platonism for theology. Platonism is the theology in
> >> which the physical reality is the shadow, or the border, or the
> >> projection of something else.
> > In the context of phiosophy of mathematics, Platonism
> > is the claim that numbers have immaterial, non spatio temporal
> > existence
> I don't use that platonism, and given that I come up with a conclusion  
> related to the theological Platonism, I prefer to keep the  
> "arithmetical realism" vocabulary. It means that A v ~A for A  
> arithmetical. Sometimes I say that it means that (A v ~A) is true  
> independently of me, you, etc.

You cannot come to conclusions about my existence
with a merely formal statement of bivalence

> >> That use of Platonism come up in the
> >> conclusion of the reasoning and is not assumed at the start.
> >>>>>> . People needs to be
> >>>>>> ultrafinitist to reject the arithmetical platonia.
> >>>>> No, they just need to be anti realist.
> >>>> Same remark.
> >>> Nope. Finitists think 7 exists., anti realists think it doesn't.
> >> Use AR formally. The theological conclusion will be provided by the
> >> fact that you might be able to imagine surviving a digital graft.
> > I might well imagine being reincarnated in some other physical
> > medium. I won't imagine being reincarnated as a number
> It is not so difficult to imagine. If you can imagine being  
> reincarneted in a virtual reality, like in a dream, you can uderstand  
> that the feeling of "matter" is a construct of your mind. Then it is  
> just a matter of study to understand that arithmetical truth contains  
> all the emulation of all programs,

As it is purely hypothetical it doesn't contain a ny actual
running programmes.

>and this in relative proportion. AT  
> contains a natural "matrix", and we can test it because it has a non  
> trivial precise mathematical structure, related to the self-
> referential points of view available to the universal numbers.
> >>>>>> Personnaly I am a bit skeptical on set realism, because it is
> >>>>>> hard to
> >>>>>> define it, but for the numbers I have never met people who are  
> >>>>>> not
> >>>>>> realist about them.
> >>>>> Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
> >>>>> you 7 doesn't exist.
> >>>> You contradict your self,
> >>> No I don't. How many times have I explained that
> >>> mathematical existence claims are true in a fictive
> >>> sense that doesn't imply real existence
> >> Then please use that fictive sense in the reasoning. Then yes  
> >> doctor +
> >> occam gives the ontological conclusion.
> > No, if it has a fictive premise, it has a fictive conclusion.
> That is your idiosyncracy. You can add as many "fictive" terms as you  
> want, it will not change the validity of the reasoning, and the  
> testability of comp (+ the classical theory of knowledge).

If it is testable, it is false.

> >>>> unless you mean that seven is not made of
> >>>> matter. In which case comp nothing exists.
> >>> What does "comp nothing exists" mean?
> >> Sorry. I meant "In which case comp implies nothing exists."
> > Comp implies that the midn is a computer. All known
> > computers are phsycial, so comp implies that the mind is physical.
> You will not find any book in physics, except by Zristotle which use  
> the notion of primary matter.

They all do. Physicists think matter/energy exists.

> You will not find any book on computers which mention the notion of  
> matter.

They don't mention pixie dust either. One cannot
conclude from that that anyone has a background
assumption that computers are made of pixie dust.

>Except quantum computers.
> Computers have been discovered by mathematicians before there were  
> approximated by terrestrial constructions.

> >>>>>> Even to say "I am not arithmetical realist" is
> >>>>>> enough to be an arithmetical realist
> >>>>> Nonsense.
> >>>> Probable, given your rather inappropriate sense of metaphysical
> >>>> realism in mathematics.
> >>> I am  not a realist about maths. You must be because you exist
> >>> and you think you are a  number
> >> I start from the assumption that I can survive through a digital
> >> backup. So locally "I am a number", in that sense.
> > That's misleading. There is a difference between being tied
> > to no particular physical instance and being tied to no instance at
> > all.
> That is why I make those things precise through the MGA. But it helps  
> people to understand that we are immaterial before learning the MGA  
> stuff. I am immaterial with comp in the sense that I can in principle  
> chose a different body at all times, so I am not my body.

That is misleading for the usual reasons.

>At that  
> stage, matter might still seems necessary, and that is the case up to  
> the step seven of the reasoning, which nevertheless explain already  
> the reversal between physics and computer science, before the more  
> complex immateriality argument (MGA). Do you have a problem in UDA-1-7?
> >> But this concerns
> >> only my third person I (body), and I show that the first person
> >> naturally associated (by its memories, or by the classical theory of
> >> knowledge) is not a number.
> >>>>>> . A real anti-ariothmetical
> >>>>>> realist cannot even spaeak about arithmetical realism. You need
> >>>>>> to be
> >>>>>> an arithmetical realist to make sense of denying it.
> >>>>> Like the old canard that to deny God is to accept God? Naah.  
> >>>>> Meaning
> >>>>> is not
> >>>>> just reference.
> >>>> A reasoning is valid, or not valid.
> >>> A true conclusion requires soundness as well as validity
> >> In science we never know if our premisses and conclusions are true or
> >> not.
> > I can still resist the conclusion by *believing* Platonism
> > to be false, while believing comp to be true.
> "platonism" is ambiguous.

I mean and have always meant mathematical Platonism

> Any way, you can resist any conclusion in  
> science with some ad-hoc philosophy.

There is nothing unscientific in the attitude
the immaterial things don't exist.

>So you are not saying something  
> informative here.
> Ad without a minimal amount of arithmetical realism you cannot endorse  
> Church thesis,

A formalist can endorses anything with no ontological
realism whatsoever. All that is left without any ontological
realism is a formal axiom of bivalence

> which is a thesis at the cross of epistemology and  
> mathematics. CT says a priori nothing about physical things. The  
> consequences in physics come from CT + "yes doctor".
> Bruno
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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