On Feb 15, 4:51 pm, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > On 15 Feb 2011, at 16:23, 1Z wrote: > > > > > > > On Feb 15, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote: > > >>> On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >>>> On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote: > > >>>>> On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >>>>>> Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or > >>>>>> false? If > >>>>>> you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism, > >>>>>> which is > >>>>>> enough for the comp consequences., > > >>>>> Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore > >>>>> not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't. > > >>>> That's my point. > > >>> Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that > >>> I am an immaterial dreaming machine. > > >> It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you want, with the > >> philosophy you want. > > > I want to say "number aren't real, so I'm not really a number" > > All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me > nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and what is not real,
Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that? > which is a bit absurd at the start. > Could you define what you mean by "real"? i can point to my own reality. > >> Just be careful in case you do say "yes" to a > >> physically real doctor. > > >>>>>> Do you believe that Church thesis makes sense? That is enough to > >>>>>> say > >>>>>> that you believe in the 'arithmetical platonia' > > >>>>> Not at all. > > >>>> OK. This means that you are using "arithmetical platonia" in a > >>>> sense > >>>> which is not relevant for the reasoning. > >>>> If you accept CT, there should be no problem with the reasoning at > >>>> all. > > >>> I accept CT and reject Platonism, > >>> and thus the reasoning does not go > >>> through. > > >> To provide sense to CT, you need to be able to say that any program P > >> on any input x will stop or will not stop. So you have to accept the > >> use of classical logic on numbers definable properties. That is > >> what I > >> called Arithmetical realism. > > > That doesn't tell me anything about what I am. > > Right. But then Comp is CT + "yes doctor", where "yes doctor" is a > memo for "it exists a level of description of my generalized body such > that .... " (see the paper). I am not a description. I for descriptions. > >> I prefer to use Platonism for theology. Platonism is the theology in > >> which the physical reality is the shadow, or the border, or the > >> projection of something else. > > > In the context of phiosophy of mathematics, Platonism > > is the claim that numbers have immaterial, non spatio temporal > > existence > > I don't use that platonism, and given that I come up with a conclusion > related to the theological Platonism, I prefer to keep the > "arithmetical realism" vocabulary. It means that A v ~A for A > arithmetical. Sometimes I say that it means that (A v ~A) is true > independently of me, you, etc. You cannot come to conclusions about my existence with a merely formal statement of bivalence > > >> That use of Platonism come up in the > >> conclusion of the reasoning and is not assumed at the start. > > >>>>>> . People needs to be > >>>>>> ultrafinitist to reject the arithmetical platonia. > > >>>>> No, they just need to be anti realist. > > >>>> Same remark. > > >>> Nope. Finitists think 7 exists., anti realists think it doesn't. > > >> Use AR formally. The theological conclusion will be provided by the > >> fact that you might be able to imagine surviving a digital graft. > > > I might well imagine being reincarnated in some other physical > > medium. I won't imagine being reincarnated as a number > > It is not so difficult to imagine. If you can imagine being > reincarneted in a virtual reality, like in a dream, you can uderstand > that the feeling of "matter" is a construct of your mind. Then it is > just a matter of study to understand that arithmetical truth contains > all the emulation of all programs, As it is purely hypothetical it doesn't contain a ny actual running programmes. >and this in relative proportion. AT > contains a natural "matrix", and we can test it because it has a non > trivial precise mathematical structure, related to the self- > referential points of view available to the universal numbers. > > > > > > >>>>>> Personnaly I am a bit skeptical on set realism, because it is > >>>>>> hard to > >>>>>> define it, but for the numbers I have never met people who are > >>>>>> not > >>>>>> realist about them. > > >>>>> Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told > >>>>> you 7 doesn't exist. > > >>>> You contradict your self, > > >>> No I don't. How many times have I explained that > >>> mathematical existence claims are true in a fictive > >>> sense that doesn't imply real existence > > >> Then please use that fictive sense in the reasoning. Then yes > >> doctor + > >> occam gives the ontological conclusion. > > > No, if it has a fictive premise, it has a fictive conclusion. > > That is your idiosyncracy. You can add as many "fictive" terms as you > want, it will not change the validity of the reasoning, and the > testability of comp (+ the classical theory of knowledge). If it is testable, it is false. > > >>>> unless you mean that seven is not made of > >>>> matter. In which case comp nothing exists. > > >>> What does "comp nothing exists" mean? > > >> Sorry. I meant "In which case comp implies nothing exists." > > > Comp implies that the midn is a computer. All known > > computers are phsycial, so comp implies that the mind is physical. > > You will not find any book in physics, except by Zristotle which use > the notion of primary matter. They all do. Physicists think matter/energy exists. > You will not find any book on computers which mention the notion of > matter. They don't mention pixie dust either. One cannot conclude from that that anyone has a background assumption that computers are made of pixie dust. >Except quantum computers. > Computers have been discovered by mathematicians before there were > approximated by terrestrial constructions. > > >>>>>> Even to say "I am not arithmetical realist" is > >>>>>> enough to be an arithmetical realist > > >>>>> Nonsense. > > >>>> Probable, given your rather inappropriate sense of metaphysical > >>>> realism in mathematics. > > >>> I am not a realist about maths. You must be because you exist > >>> and you think you are a number > > >> I start from the assumption that I can survive through a digital > >> backup. So locally "I am a number", in that sense. > > > That's misleading. There is a difference between being tied > > to no particular physical instance and being tied to no instance at > > all. > > That is why I make those things precise through the MGA. But it helps > people to understand that we are immaterial before learning the MGA > stuff. I am immaterial with comp in the sense that I can in principle > chose a different body at all times, so I am not my body. That is misleading for the usual reasons. >At that > stage, matter might still seems necessary, and that is the case up to > the step seven of the reasoning, which nevertheless explain already > the reversal between physics and computer science, before the more > complex immateriality argument (MGA). Do you have a problem in UDA-1-7? > > > > > > >> But this concerns > >> only my third person I (body), and I show that the first person > >> naturally associated (by its memories, or by the classical theory of > >> knowledge) is not a number. > > >>>>>> . A real anti-ariothmetical > >>>>>> realist cannot even spaeak about arithmetical realism. You need > >>>>>> to be > >>>>>> an arithmetical realist to make sense of denying it. > > >>>>> Like the old canard that to deny God is to accept God? Naah. > >>>>> Meaning > >>>>> is not > >>>>> just reference. > > >>>> A reasoning is valid, or not valid. > > >>> A true conclusion requires soundness as well as validity > > >> In science we never know if our premisses and conclusions are true or > >> not. > > > I can still resist the conclusion by *believing* Platonism > > to be false, while believing comp to be true. > > "platonism" is ambiguous. I mean and have always meant mathematical Platonism > Any way, you can resist any conclusion in > science with some ad-hoc philosophy. There is nothing unscientific in the attitude the immaterial things don't exist. >So you are not saying something > informative here. > Ad without a minimal amount of arithmetical realism you cannot endorse > Church thesis, A formalist can endorses anything with no ontological realism whatsoever. All that is left without any ontological realism is a formal axiom of bivalence > which is a thesis at the cross of epistemology and > mathematics. CT says a priori nothing about physical things. The > consequences in physics come from CT + "yes doctor". > > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
