On Feb 15, 1:54 pm, David Nyman <[email protected]> wrote: > On 15 February 2011 13:27, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > >> I am not a realist about maths. You must be because you exist > >> and you think you are a number > > > I start from the assumption that I can survive through a digital backup. So > > locally "I am a number", in that sense. But this concerns only my third > > person I (body), and I show that the first person naturally associated (by > > its memories, or by the classical theory of knowledge) is not a number. > > I hesitate (really!) to but into one of these delightful to-ings and > fro-ings, but it strikes me that a focus on Peter's claim, and Bruno's > rebuttal, above might be fruitful for the overall discussion. Peter's > objection seems to be summed up by "you think you are a number". But > Bruno's reply is that "the first person naturally associated (by its > memories, or by the classical theory of knowledge) is not a number."
He thinks he's an immaterial something or other. I am not particularly bothered about whether that is an immaterial number, immaterial machine, etc. > He has said elsewhere that comp can be considered a form of > (objective) idealism, and hence its ontological basis - i.e. what is > RITSIAR - is the "ideal", or equivalently, "consciousness" in some > primary or undifferentiated sense. From this perspective, the number > realm is conceived not as an independent ontology in itself, but > rather as the effective means of differentiating the epistemology of > persons and their "physical" environments, whose ontology is inherited > from the whole. > > Does this help? > > David No. I don't thinkBM is assuming the primacy of consciousness, and I can make no sense of it. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
