On Feb 15, 1:54 pm, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> wrote:
> On 15 February 2011 13:27, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
> >> I am  not a realist about maths. You must be because you exist
> >> and you think you are a  number
>
> > I start from the assumption that I can survive through a digital backup. So
> > locally "I am a number", in that sense. But this concerns only my third
> > person I (body), and I show that the first person naturally associated (by
> > its memories, or by the classical theory of knowledge) is not a number.
>
> I hesitate (really!) to but into one of these delightful to-ings and
> fro-ings, but it strikes me that a focus on Peter's claim, and Bruno's
> rebuttal, above might be fruitful for the overall discussion.  Peter's
> objection seems to be summed up by "you think you are a number".  But
> Bruno's reply is that "the first person naturally associated (by its
> memories, or by the classical theory of knowledge) is not a number."

He thinks he's an immaterial something or other. I am not particularly
bothered about whether that is an immaterial number, immaterial
machine,
etc.

> He has said elsewhere that comp can be considered a form of
> (objective) idealism, and hence its ontological basis - i.e. what is
> RITSIAR - is the "ideal", or equivalently, "consciousness" in some
> primary or undifferentiated sense.  From this perspective, the number
> realm is conceived not as an independent ontology in itself, but
> rather as the effective means of differentiating the epistemology of
> persons and their "physical" environments, whose ontology is inherited
> from the whole.
>
> Does this help?
>
> David

No. I don't thinkBM is assuming the primacy of consciousness, and I
can make  no sense of it.

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