2011/2/15 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> > > > On Feb 15, 6:13 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 15 Feb 2011, at 18:16, 1Z wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Feb 15, 4:51 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > >> On 15 Feb 2011, at 16:23, 1Z wrote: > > > > >>> On Feb 15, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > >>>> On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote: > > > > >>>>> On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > >>>>>> On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote: > > > > >>>>>>> On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > >>>>>>>> Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or > > >>>>>>>> false? If > > >>>>>>>> you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism, > > >>>>>>>> which is > > >>>>>>>> enough for the comp consequences., > > > > >>>>>>> Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore > > >>>>>>> not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't. > > > > >>>>>> That's my point. > > > > >>>>> Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that > > >>>>> I am an immaterial dreaming machine. > > > > >>>> It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you want, with > > >>>> the > > >>>> philosophy you want. > > > > >>> I want to say "number aren't real, so I'm not really a number" > > > > >> All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me > > >> nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and what is not > > >> real, > > > > > Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that? > > > > I meant "in general". > > > I don't need anything more than > 1) I am real > 2) Unreal things don't generate real things > > I think both of those are hard to dispute. >
You arbitrarily choose the unreal things... without any argument that prove that they are unreal (or real or whatever). The principle is sound, the choice is not without arguments. You say numbers don't exist... but as I said before, I can think about them in my mind... I exist, hence they transitively exist through my mind at the least. I do not chose if a number is prime or not hence I'm not inventing them as I'm not inventing the world around me. > > > >> which is a bit absurd at the start. > > >> Could you define what you mean by "real"? > > > > > i can point to my own reality. > > > > To your own consciousness. I grant that. But nothing else. Wake up! > > > > > >>> That doesn't tell me anything about what I am. > > > > >> Right. But then Comp is CT + "yes doctor", where "yes doctor" is a > > >> memo for "it exists a level of description of my generalized body > > >> such > > >> that .... " (see the paper). > > > > > I am not a description. I for descriptions. > > > > I am not a description too. Neither from the first nor the third > > person view. > > The difficulty of logic consists in the understanding of the > > difference between a fact which might be true, like 1+1=2, and a > > description of that fact, like "1+1=2". Modern tools makes it possible > > to handle that difference in purely formal ways. > > The difficulty in MGA consists in understanding the difference between > > a computation (be it immaterial or material) and a description of a > > computation (be it immaterial or material). > existence > > > > >> I don't use that platonism, and given that I come up with a > > >> conclusion > > >> related to the theological Platonism, I prefer to keep the > > >> "arithmetical realism" vocabulary. It means that A v ~A for A > > >> arithmetical. Sometimes I say that it means that (A v ~A) is true > > >> independently of me, you, etc. > > > > > You cannot come to conclusions about my existence > > > with a merely formal statement of bivalence > > > > I use bivalence but also "yes doctor". > > But YD doesn't get anywhere if I am only agreeing > to a physical substitution > > > Then after concluding, we can > > take as theory of everything just elementary arithmetic, and it is > > explained in all detail how to recover formally physics (among other > > things) from that. > > > >>>> Use AR formally. The theological conclusion will be provided by the > > >>>> fact that you might be able to imagine surviving a digital graft. > > > > >>> I might well imagine being reincarnated in some other physical > > >>> medium. I won't imagine being reincarnated as a number > > > > >> It is not so difficult to imagine. If you can imagine being > > >> reincarneted in a virtual reality, like in a dream, you can uderstand > > >> that the feeling of "matter" is a construct of your mind. Then it is > > >> just a matter of study to understand that arithmetical truth contains > > >> all the emulation of all programs, > > > > > As it is purely hypothetical it doesn't contain a ny actual > > > running programmes. > > > > Actual is an indexical, and can be relative to numbers' configurations. > > > If a multiverse is not actual, no-one within it can make > and indexical judgement of actuality. > > > > >>>>>> You contradict your self, > > > > >>>>> No I don't. How many times have I explained that > > >>>>> mathematical existence claims are true in a fictive > > >>>>> sense that doesn't imply real existence > > > > >>>> Then please use that fictive sense in the reasoning. Then yes > > >>>> doctor + > > >>>> occam gives the ontological conclusion. > > > > >>> No, if it has a fictive premise, it has a fictive conclusion. > > > > >> That is your idiosyncracy. You can add as many "fictive" terms as you > > >> want, it will not change the validity of the reasoning, and the > > >> testability of comp (+ the classical theory of knowledge). > > > > > If it is testable, it is false. > > > > Why? > > Not enough WR's. > > > >>>>> What does "comp nothing exists" mean? > > > > >>>> Sorry. I meant "In which case comp implies nothing exists." > > > > >>> Comp implies that the midn is a computer. All known > > >>> computers are phsycial, so comp implies that the mind is physical. > > > > >> You will not find any book in physics, except by Zristotle which use > > >> the notion of primary matter. > > > > > They all do. Physicists think matter/energy exists. > > > > Some does not. John A. Wheeler is open to the idea that physics emerge > > from something non physical (cf It from Bit). > > And everyone else doesn't. > > > Anyway, to refer to a what people think is not an argument. > > Then why is it refer to books? > > > > >> You will not find any book on computers which mention the notion of > > >> matter. > > > > > They don't mention pixie dust either. One cannot > > > conclude from that that anyone has a background > > > assumption that computers are made of pixie dust. > > > > The point is that the notion of computer used in the proof is the > > traditional mathematical notion. > > There is no mathematical notion such that you can run a programme on > it. > > > > >> That is why I make those things precise through the MGA. But it helps > > >> people to understand that we are immaterial before learning the MGA > > >> stuff. I am immaterial with comp in the sense that I can in principle > > >> chose a different body at all times, so I am not my body. > > > > > That is misleading for the usual reasons. > > > > Klein on Maudlin? > > No: "not dependent on a particular body" does not mean "capable of > existing with no body" > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. 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